Further thoughts on the Fundy Settlement decision: Supreme Court offers a nuanced view of trust residence
In Garron Family Trust v. The Queen (2009 TCC 450), Justice Judith Woods of the Tax Court of Canada came down with a very broad new rule for determining the residence of trusts.
 I conclude, then, that the judge-made test of residence that has been established for corporations should also apply to trusts, with such modifications as are appropriate. That test is “where the central management and control actually abides.”
This was viewed widely as a repudiation of the historic test based on the residence of the trustee. Many tax professionals thought that the test for residence of a trust required a determination of the residence of the majority of the trustees and where their functions were performed, and that it was not necessary to go beyond this test.
The Federal Court of Appeal in St. Michael Trust Corp. v. Canada (2010 FCA 309) appeared to endorse Justice Woods’ new legal test but in a somewhat guarded fashion:
 St. Michael Trust Corp. argues that a test of central management and control cannot be applied to a trust because a trust is a “legal relationship” without a separate legal personality. I do not accept this argument. It is true that as a matter of law a trust is not a person, but it is also true that for income tax purposes, a trust is treated as though it were a person. In my view, it is consistent with that implicit statutory fiction to recognize that the residence of a trust may not always be determined by the residence of its trustee.
 St. Michael Trust Corp. also argues that the residence of the trust must be determined as the residence of the trustee because section 104 of the Income Tax Act embodies the trust, as taxpayer, in the person of the trustee. In my view, that gives section 104 a meaning beyond its words and purpose. Section 104 was enacted to solve the practical problems of tax administration that would necessarily arise when it was determined that trusts were to be taxed despite the absence of legal personality. I do not read section 104 as a signal that Parliament intended that in all cases, the residence of the trust must be the residence of the trustee.
When the Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal, some tax professionals were puzzled. These tax professionals believed that it was unlikely the decision would be reversed since the Crown had a very strong factual case that the trusts in question were managed in Canada by the trust beneficiaries. The decision released on April 12 by the Supreme Court (Fundy Settlement v. Canada, 2012 SCC 14) in fact dismissed the appeal in somewhat cursory fashion.
 As with corporations, residence of a trust should be determined by the principle that a trust resides for the purposes of the Act where “its real business is carried on” (De Beers, at p. 458), which is where the central management and control of the trust actually takes place. As indicated, the Tax Court judge found as a fact that the main beneficiaries exercised the central management and control of the trusts in Canada. She found that St. Michael had only a limited role ― to provide administrative services ― and little or no responsibility beyond that (paras. 189-90). Therefore, on this test, the trusts must be found to be resident in Canada. This is not to say that the residence of a trust can never be the residence of the trustee. The residence of the trustee will also be the residence of the trust where the trustee carries out the central management and control of the trust, and these duties are performed where the trustee is resident. These, however, were not the facts in this case.
 We agree with Woods J. that adopting a similar test for trusts and corporations promotes “the important principles of consistency, predictability and fairness in the application of tax law” (para. 160). As she noted, if there were to be a totally different test for trusts than for corporations, there should be good reasons for it. No such reasons were offered here. [Emphasis added]
On a close reading it is arguable that the Supreme Court has gently tempered the new rule set out by Justice Woods and, to some extent, by the Federal Court of Appeal. Where the trustee does what it is supposed to do, including managing the trust and its properties, the operative test remains the residence of the trustee. It would seem that only where the trustee carries on those “management and control” activities in a place other than where the trustee is resident, or where the trustee abdicates many of its powers to a third party, that Justice Woods’ new test becomes relevant.