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Gariepy: When is a director’s resignation effective?

In Gariepy v. the Queen (2014 TCC 254), the Tax Court considered (i) whether two directors had effectively resigned from their positions, and (ii) if not, whether the directors were duly diligent in seeking to prevent the failure of the company to remit source deductions.

In Gariepy, the two directors argued that they were not liable under subsection 227.1(1) of the Income Tax Act (Canada) (the “Act”) for $500,000 in unremitted source deductions of 1056922 Ontario Limited (the “Corporation”) on the basis that they had resigned as directors more than two years prior to the assessment. In the alternative, the two directors put forth a due diligence defence.

The two appellants were the only directors of the Corporation, but it was in fact managed and operated by their husbands. After approximately two years, the husbands decided it was time for their wives to cease to be directors and have themselves appointed. One of the husbands – Mr. Chriss – contacted the Corporation’s law firm to advise of the change of directors.

There was conflicting or confused testimony presented in the 10-day hearing of the appeals, but the Tax Court held that there was sufficient evidence that the two directors had resigned in 2001 and the limitation period in subsection 227.1(4) of the Act had passed – even though written resignations prepared by a corporate law firm had not been signed by either of the directors.

The Tax Court examined e-mails between the parties and their lawyers, corporate records, and minute books and determined that there was sufficient documentary and oral evidence to demonstrate the resignations were “meaningfully communicated” to the Corporation in 2001. The resignations were valid and effective as of the date the resignations were prepared by the corporate law firm. Although the Court noted serious credibility issues by both directors with respect to the resignations, it was held that these credibility issues were not relevant to decide the merits of the case but would be relevant to determining any cost awards.

The Tax Court noted that this conclusion was consistent with the Court’s earlier decisions in Perricelli v. The Queen (2002 GSTC 71)Walsh v. The Queen (2009 TCC 557)Corkum v. The Queen (2005 TCC 755)Irvine v. M.N.R. (91 DTC 91), and Cybulski v. M.N.R. (88 DTC 1531).

Although the above finding was sufficient to dispose of the appeals, the Court went on to discuss the directors’ alternative argument – whether it was nonetheless reasonable for the directors to think they had resigned and, if so, whether their complete failure to act or concern themselves with the company’s affairs during the non-remittance periods could support a due diligence defence.

On this alternative argument, the Tax Court came to different results for the directors. The Tax Court held that one of the directors – Mrs. Chriss – reasonably relied on her husband and the corporate law firm that her resignation was valid. Conversely, the Tax Court held that for the other director – Mrs. Gariepy – it was not reasonable for her to think that she had ceased to be a director. For Mrs. Gariepy, the evidence did not support a finding that she asked for, was advised of, or was otherwise aware that Mr. Chriss had been asked to or did contact a law firm to advise of the resignations.

Gariepy provides a reminder of the importance of meticulous record-keeping for directors when they resign from their positions. A signed resignation letter would have obviated the need for a lengthy proceeding, and would have clarified at the outset the potential liability of the directors for the company’s unremitted source deductions.

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Gariepy: When is a director’s resignation effective?

McKesson: Trial Judge Recuses Self From Two Remaining Issues in Transfer Pricing Case

In McKesson v. The Queen (2014 TCC 266), Justice Patrick Boyle recused himself from the two remaining issues with which he was seized in the transfer pricing case – costs and the content of the court’s public file (i.e., the determination of whether certain information may be confidential).

This unusual decision arises as a result of the content of the Appellant’s factum filed in the Federal Court of Appeal in the appeal of Justice Boyle’s trial decision in McKesson (see our posts on the Tax Court case here and the Federal Court of Appeal proceeding here and here).

In his recusal reasons, Justice Boyle wrote:

[4]        As detailed below, I have, of my own motion, decided that I am compelled to consider whether I need to recuse myself from the two remaining issues before this Court. A consideration of this issue is required because I became aware that the Appellant and Appellant’s counsel, together with its co-counsel in the Federal Court of Appeal in respect of the appeal of the trial decision, had made certain public written statements about me in its factum in the Federal Court of Appeal (the “Factum”) which, upon reflection, appear to me to clearly include:

(i)         allegations that I was untruthful and deceitful in my Reasons;

(ii)         clear untruths about me, what I said and heard in the course of the trial, as well as the existence of evidentiary foundations supporting what I wrote in my Reasons; and

(iii)        allegations of impartiality on my part.

[5]        This requires me to consider whether:

(i)         I believe that a reasonable person reading the Factum, my Reasons, and the relevant portions of the transcript would believe that the trial judge so strongly complained of by McKesson Canada might not be able to remain impartial in his consideration of costs and confidential information;

(ii)         I believe I can impartially consider, weigh and decide the costs and confidential information issues before me; and

(iii)        whether the public challenge of my impartiality expressed by McKesson Canada and its co-counsel in the Factum is itself sufficient to warrant recusing myself at this stage.

 …

[133]     I view these as public allegations by a party to the costs and confidential information matters remaining before this Court that, regardless of the merits of their reasoning or their thoughts, I am unable to decide the remaining matters impartially. I believe that a reasonable person reading only these phrases from the Factum, without reviewing my Reasons or the trial Transcript, would believe that such strong complaints by McKesson Canada and its counsel may give rise to a serious doubt that I will be seen to be able to dispose of the two remaining issues and discharge my duties on an impartial basis.

[136]     For the Reasons identified above, I have decided I have to recuse myself from the remaining costs and confidential information issues in McKesson Canada’s proceeding in this Court.

[137]     It may be that some of the perceived untruths about the trial judge described above under heading II might individually not warrant recusal, and may be within an appellate advocate’s licence to overstate through the use of absolutes like ‘never’, ‘only’ and ‘any’.

[138]     However, I am satisfied that a reasonable fair-minded Canadian, informed and aware of all the issues addressed above, would entertain doubt that I could remain able to reach impartial decisions. I believe that such a reasonable fair-minded and informed person, viewing this realistically and practically would, after appropriate reflection, be left with a reasoned suspicion or apprehension of bias, actual or perceived. Canadians should rightly expect their trial judges to have broad shoulders and thick skins when a losing party appeals their decision, but I do not believe Canadians think that should extend to accusations of dishonesty by the judge, nor to untruths about the judge. Trial judges should not have to defend their honour and integrity from such inappropriate attacks. English is a very rich language; the Appellant and its counsel could have forcefully advanced their chosen grounds for appeal without the use of unqualified extreme statements which attack the personal or professional integrity of the trial judge.

[139]     For these reasons, I will be advising my Chief Justice that I am recusing myself from completing the McKesson Canada proceeding in the Tax Court. This extends to the consideration and disposition of the costs submissions of the parties in this case, as well as to the 2010 confidential information order of Justice Hogan in this case and its proper final implementation by the Tax Court and its Registry.

No date has been set for the hearing of the main matter by the Federal Court of Appeal.

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McKesson: Trial Judge Recuses Self From Two Remaining Issues in Transfer Pricing Case

Tax Reminders? Now There’s an App For That

We have previously blogged about litigation apps and the absence of Canadian litigation and tax litigation apps.

Yesterday, the Canada Revenue Agency introduced a new tool for tax compliance with the release of the first CRA app for businesses.

From the CRA’s mobile apps webpage:

The Business Tax Reminders mobile app is recommended for small and medium-sized businesses with annual revenue of $20 million or less and fewer than 500 employees. The app was created based on consultations with small and medium-sized businesses, and allows business users to:

  • create custom reminders for key CRA due dates related to instalment payments, returns, and remittances.
  • customize and tailor the reminder system for their personal business deadlines with either calendar or pop-up messages.

The Canada Revenue Agency is committed to improving services for small and medium-sized businesses by reducing red tape. We have listened to these businesses across the country and created our Business Tax Reminders mobile app to ensure the CRA’s online services meet the needs of businesses by helping them fulfil their tax obligations.

We applaud the CRA for its commitment to helping Canadian taxpayers comply with their tax obligations, and we look forward to seeing how this new app is used by Canadian businesses. For tax advisors, we expect that apps, downloads, and mobile reminders will likely become a new aspect of our tax dispute discussions with the CRA.

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Tax Reminders? Now There’s an App For That

Communications With Experts: Moore v. Getahun and the Advocates’ Society Report

An expert does not draft his/her report in a vacuum. Communication with counsel is required. Ultimately, an expert must provide independent and objective evidence at a hearing. So the question arises as to what amount of communication is appropriate between counsel and the expert during the drafting stage. This was an issue considered by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in Moore v. Getahun (2014 ONSC 237).

In Moore, the plaintiff suffered a wrist injury in a motorcycle accident, and claimed medical negligence against the treating doctor. The defendants called an expert to testify on the medical treatment of the plaintiff following the accident. During the preparation of the expert’s report, the expert and defence counsel had a 90-minute conference call during which the draft report was discussed.

In 2010, sections 4.1 and 53.03 of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure were amended to (among other things) codify the expert’s duty to the court and to require the execution and filing of an expert’s certificate acknowledging this duty.

These amendments are similar to the recent amendments to the Tax Court of Canada Rules (General Procedure): Section 145 (“Expert Witnesses”), Form 145(2) (“Certificate Concerning Code of Conduct for Expert Witnesses”) and Schedule III (“Code of Conduct for Expert Witnesses”).

In Moore, the court considered the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure amendments and concluded:

Whether it is appropriate for counsel to review experts’ draft reports

[519]      Defence counsel reviewed Dr. Taylor’s draft report during a one-and-a-half-hour telephone conference call.

[520]      The purpose of Rule 53.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is to ensure the independence and integrity of the expert witness. The expert’s primary duty is to the court. In light of this change in the role of the expert witness under the new rule, I conclude that counsel’s practice of reviewing draft reports should stop. There should be full disclosure in writing of any changes to an expert’s final report as a result of counsel’s corrections, suggestions, or clarifications, to ensure transparency in the process and to ensure that the expert witness is neutral.

(See also the court’s discussion of this issue at paragraphs 47-52 of the Moore decision.)

Not surprisingly, the Ontario court’s narrow interpretation of Rule 53.03 attracted the attention of litigators across the country.

In response, the Advocates’ Society has drafted a position paper (and a set of nine principles) regarding communications with expert witnesses. The Advocates’ Society has taken the position that the view expressed by the court in Moore (i.e., that the amendments constitute a change in the role of expert witnesses) is mistaken. The case law prior to Moore on the subject of experts’ testimony had established that experts must testify independently and objectively. Further, the amendments were likely responding to the specific problem of “hired guns” or “opinions for sale”, and thus codified the expert’s duty and imposed the certificate requirement so that testifying experts clearly understand their duty to the court.

The report also notes the problems and unintended consequences of the court’s ruling in Moore – namely, that the ruling fails to recognize the “important and entirely appropriate role” of advocates in ensuring that expert evidence is presented in a cogent, succinct and well-organized fashion that will assist the trier of fact; further, a “one-size-fits-all” approach to communications with experts is discordant with the realities of modern litigation.

Given the similar language in the Tax Court’s rules regarding expert evidence, Moore could have an impact on the manner in which expert reports are to be prepared for a Tax Court proceeding.

Moore has been appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal.

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Communications With Experts: Moore v. Getahun and the Advocates’ Society Report

Prince v ACE: Extra-territorial effect of U.S. tax laws?

Should a Canadian court exercise its jurisdiction to hear a class action lawsuit against Air Canada for improperly collecting U.S. travel taxes on ticket purchases in Canada and on air travel in Canada?

That was the question in Prince v. ACE Aviation Holdings Inc. (2014 ONCA 285), in which the Ontario Court of Appeal declined to exercise its jurisdiction and stayed the class action on the basis that the U.S. was clearly a more appropriate forum until the plaintiffs exhaust their rights in the U.S. by first applying to the IRS for a refund and, if refused, appealing to the U.S. courts.

In Prince, a class action was commenced in Ontario against Air Canada for improperly collecting U.S. travel taxes on ticket purchases in Canada and on air travel in Canada. Effectively, the plaintiffs alleged that Air Canada was giving extra-territorial effect to U.S. tax laws. The plaintiffs claim raised issues about the taxes imposed by the U.S. government, the methods used to collect those taxes, the immunity conferred on intermediaries who collect the taxes, the procedures established for the recovery of those taxes and the interpretation of the taxing statute.

Analysis

Before a Canadian Court will engage in the interpretation of a foreign revenue law, the party alleging the infringement must raise the issue in the appropriate forum in the foreign jurisdiction.  Doing so achieves the goals of order, fairness, efficiency and comity, all of which underlie the forum non conveniens analysis.

Jurisdiction

Ontario had presence-based jurisdiction over Air Canada.  However, Air Canada argued that the “revenue rule”, which provides that a Canadian court will not entertain a suit by a foreign state to recover a tax, bars the Ontario court from having subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ action.  The Court of Appeal reasoned that an Ontario court has jurisdiction to determine whether a foreign law is being enforced extra-territorially and to grant appropriate relief.  Such an approach is consistent with the “revenue rule” as the court would only determine those rights and obligations of the plaintiffs and Air Canada which are not derivative of the sovereign authority of the U.S.

Forum Non Conveniens

The forum non conveniens analysis engaged in by the Court of Appeal included a consideration of juridical advantages and disadvantages.

In the U.S., Air Canada, as an intermediary tax collector for the U.S. government, is entitled to statutory immunity (comparable immunity provisions exist in Canadian tax law).  Air Canada would not have the benefit of that immunity in Canada.

The administrative procedure to recover an overpayment of tax from the IRS is a complete system for the effective administration of taxes in the U.S and was not considered to be a procedural disadvantage to the plaintiffs.  Comity requires respect for the right of a foreign state to make and apply laws within its territorial limits.

Conclusion

As a matter of comity, the interpretation of the U.S. statute, including its scope, should be undertaken by agencies and courts in the U.S.  This would require the IRS to determine whether Air Canada acted beyond the scope of the taxation statute. If the plaintiffs are unsuccessful, the IRS decision can be challenged in the U.S. courts.   If the U.S. court affirms the decision of the IRS, then the Ontario Court will have the benefit of those reasons if the Court is called upon to decide whether the collection of taxes by Air Canada is a violation of the principles governing the conduct of sovereign states and an extraterritorial application of U.S. law in Canada.

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Prince v ACE: Extra-territorial effect of U.S. tax laws?

Emerging Markets: Non-EU Investment Funds Eligible for Withholding Tax Refund

In Emerging Markets Series of DFA Investment Trust Company (C -190/12), the European Court of Justice (ECJ) confirmed that investment funds based outside the European Union (EU) should benefit from the EU free movement of capital rule regarding investments in Europe. Thus, if an EU domestic investment fund can benefit from local income tax exemptions, then non-EU investment funds (e.g., U.S. or Canadian) investing in the EU should also be entitled to apply for such exemptions.

In Emerging Markets, a U.S. investment fund applied for a refund of withholding tax paid on dividends derived from Polish companies. The ECJ stated that U.S. investment funds are entitled to put themselves in a position similar to that of local funds. This means that under certain conditions non-EU investors may benefit from local tax preferences/exemptions.

In light of the relevant Polish regulations (which provide for income tax exemptions for domestic investment funds and funds based in the EU/EEA) and the tax information exchange agreement between Poland and U.S., the dividends paid to a U.S. investment fund should also be exempt from withholding tax in Poland.

The ECJ’s judgment in Emerging Markets provides a basis for non-EU investors to benefit from certain EU rules and to rely on tax preferences granted to EU/EEA entities. Therefore, if these investors have paid withholding tax on dividends derived from EU/EEA companies, they should consider whether certain tax preferences are available for investment funds in the country of residence of the companies paying the dividends (subject to any applicable time limits).

Canadian companies should also consider whether a refund of withholding tax would impact the foreign tax credit available in respect of any withholding tax previously paid and not refunded.

Additional information is available here.

Cezary Przygodzki and Rafal Mikulski practice in Dentons’ Warsaw office. 

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Emerging Markets: Non-EU Investment Funds Eligible for Withholding Tax Refund

There’s A Litigation App For That?

We were intrigued to learn that KosInteractive LLC has created the U.S. “Fed Courts” app for Android and Apple devices which contains helpful information about U.S. federal courts rules of procedure and court information. The app provides access to the PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records) database, and the procedural rules for appellate, bankruptcy, civil, and criminal proceedings. The federal rules of evidence and the U.S. Supreme Court procedural rules are also available. One drawback – the information isn’t searchable or indexed with hyperlinks.

In any event, there seems to be no Canadian equivalent for litigation or procedural apps.

A quick search in the Apple iTunes stores for “Canada tax” returns 54 results, including an array of federal and provincial tax calculators. ”Canada courts” returns five items, including apps related to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, mortgage foreclosures, U.S. Miranda warnings, and a car dealership. A search for “Ontario civil procedure” returns one item, and “Canada tax court” returns zero items.

We are reminded of the very helpful event app developed by the Canadian Tax Foundation that has become a regular feature of the Foundation’s national and regional conferences.

We are confident that Canadian tax professionals would welcome a broader array of court and litigation procedure apps that would provide mobile access to most or all of the court and procedural information we’re stuffing into our oversized litigation bags.

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There’s A Litigation App For That?

Supreme Court of Canada to Release Two Decisions on Tax and Rectification

On Thursday November 28, the Supreme Court of Canada will release its decisions in the companion cases of Agence du Revenu du Québec v. Services Environnementaux AES Inc., et al. (Docket #34235) and Agence du Revenu du Québec v. Jean Riopel, et al. (Docket #34393).

The narrow question on appeal is under what circumstances the Superior Court of Quebec may correct a written instrument that does not reflect the parties’ intentions. More broadly, the issue is how and to what extent the equitable principles of rectification operate in the context of the Quebec Civil Code. These will be the first substantive decisions of the Supreme Court on tax and the doctrine of rectification.

See our previous posts on the cases here and here.

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Supreme Court of Canada to Release Two Decisions on Tax and Rectification

Mark Your Calendars: Tax Litigation Forum – December 11, 2013

As the Canada Revenue Agency becomes increasingly aggressive in pursuit of perceived domestic and offshore tax avoidance, it is more important than ever to be familiar with recent developments in legislation, policy and procedure. David W. Chodikoff (Miller Thompson LLP) and David E. Spiro (Dentons Canada LLP) are, therefore, delighted to chair this tax litigation conference – the first organized by Insight Information.

Leading litigators and clients have been gathered to participate in lively panel discussions covering a wide range of challenging issues – from how to deal with CRA requirements and misconduct to making successful voluntary disclosure applications and fairness requests. You’ll learn about the latest developments in transfer pricing and the GAAR and will find out how project management can help you win your case. Finally, for those cases that can be resolved before trial, his conference will explore when and how to take advantage of the opportunities for settlement. In short, you will leave with the tools to resolve tax controversies more confidently than ever!

Event Details
December 11, 2013
07:45 AM – 05:00 PM EDT
St. Andrew’s Club and Conference Centre
150 King Street West
Toronto, Ontario M5H 4B6

For more information, including a list of Distinguished Faculty members and Event Schedule, click here.

To register, click here.

Mark Your Calendars: Tax Litigation Forum – December 11, 2013

Take a Chance: Judicial Review of the CRA’s Discretionary Power under s. 152(4.2) of the Income Tax Act

In Radonjic v. The Queen (2013 FC 916), the taxpayer brought an application for judicial review of the CRA’s refusal to make certain adjustments to the taxpayer’s tax returns after the normal reassessment period had expired.

In 2003, the taxpayer start playing online poker. After consulting with his accountant, the taxpayer treated his gambling winnings as income in 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007. Later, he concluded that his gambling winnings were likely not taxable. Accordingly, the taxpayer filed a request for an adjustment under subsection 152(4.2) of the Income Tax Act asking that the income tax he had paid be returned to him.

The CRA denied the taxpayer’s adjustment request. The taxpayer then brought an application for judicial review of the decision to deny the adjustment request.

The Federal Court noted that the standard of review for the CRA’s exercise of discretion under subsection 152(4.2) is reasonableness (see Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick (2008 SCC 9), Caine v. C.R.A. (2011 FC 11), and Hoffman v. Canada (2010 FCA 310)). In other words, the court should intervene only if the decision was unreasonable in the sense that it falls outside the “range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law”.

The Federal Court considered the parties’ positions on the issue and the various court decisions that have addressed the taxation of gambling gains and losses (see, for example, Cohen v. The Queen (2011 TCC 262), and Leblanc v. The Queen (2006 TCC 680)).

The court concluded that the CRA had fully considered all of the taxpayer’s submissions, and that there was no evidence of procedural unfairness or bad faith by the CRA.

However, the court concluded that the CRA had misinterpreted or misunderstood the taxpayer’s activities, and had drawn unreasonable and unsupportable conclusions about the tax treatment of the taxpayer’s gambling winnings:

[51] … The Minister’s exercise of her discretion under subsection 152(4.2) of the Act in this case lacks intelligibility and justification and, in my view, falls outside the range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.

Overall, the court found that the taxpayer was simply an enthusiastic and ever-hopeful poker player engaged in a personal endeavour.

The court quashed the CRA’s decision and returned the matter to the CRA for reconsideration in accordance with the court’s reasons.

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Take a Chance: Judicial Review of the CRA’s Discretionary Power under s. 152(4.2) of the Income Tax Act