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McKesson: Additional Submissions on Motion

“The Order and Reasons for Recusal do not and should not form part of the record before this Court. Their existence in the public domain does not compromise the ability of this Court to adjudicate the appeal or the appearance and reality of a fair process.”
-Crown’s Written Representations

In the most recent developments in the McKesson transfer pricing case, the Respondent has filed its Written Representations in response to the Appellant’s motion to raise new issues on appeal, and the Appellant has filed a Reply submission.

In the Written Representations, the Respondent has argued that the trial judge’s Order and Reasons for Recusal are irrelevant to the issues to be decided on appeal and do not properly form part of the record before the Federal Court of Appeal. The Respondent has also argued that the Order and Reasons for Recusal do not compromise the appearance and reality of a fair process in the appeal.

In its Reply, the Appellant has argued that the Respondent’s “remarkable position” that the Reasons for Recusal are not part of the record on appeal cannot be right. Rather, the Appellant argues, the Court of Appeal should perform a “meaningful review” of the Reasons for Recusal, as such reasons should not be “immune from review” or “shielded from appellate scrutiny”. The Appellant states, “The panel of this Court hearing the Appellant’s appeal must be given the opportunity to adjudicate [the Recusal Reasons'] legal effect.”

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McKesson: Additional Submissions on Motion

Brogan Family Trust: CRA Not Entitled to Notice of Rectification Application

Is the CRA entitled to notice of a rectification application?

In Brogan Family Trust (2014 ONSC 6354), the Ontario Superior Court of Justice said “no”, and dismissed the Crown’s motion to set aside an earlier rectification order on the basis that the CRA had not been notified of the proceeding.

In Brogan, the taxpayer had restructured his business and settled a trust for family tax planning purposes in 2004. Subsequently, in 2010, the trustees became aware of an error in the trust agreement that prevented the distribution of trust property to intended minor beneficiaries. The trust made an application for rectification of the trust agreement so that the trust property could be distributed as intended. The trust’s tax litigation counsel advised that no notice to the CRA was required.

The rectification application proceeded in November 2010. Shortly before the rectification order was granted, the trust sold a business. In its 2010 tax return, the trust allocated the proceeds to the beneficiaries, who in turn reported the income in their returns.

The CRA commenced an audit of the sale of the business and the trust in June 2012, at which time it became aware of the 2010 rectification order that had corrected the trust agreement. In August 2012, the CRA was provided a copy of the rectification order. And then in May 2013, the CRA brought its motion for an order setting aside the 2010 rectification order.

The Court considered three issues:

  1. Did the CRA bring the motion “forthwith” after learning of the rectification order?
  2. Did the CRA have standing to bring the motion?
  3. Should the CRA have been notified of the rectification application?

The Crown argued that (i) the delay was not inordinate because there had been internal confusion at the CRA in respect of the rectification order, (ii) the CRA was a creditor and thus was affected by the rectification order, and (iii) the CRA’s own view and the custom among tax litigators is that the CRA should be given notice (see, for example, Income Tax Technical News No. 22, at pg. 6).

The taxpayer argued that (i) the CRA’s 10-month delay was unreasonable and not “forthwith”, (ii) the CRA was not affected by the rectification application, and (iii) in any event, there was no requirement the CRA be notified of the rectification application.

The Court agreed with the taxpayer and dismissed the Crown’s motion.

The Court stated that the CRA was not a creditor and thus was not affected by the rectification order. The Court contrasted the current case with Snow White Productions Inc. v. PMP Entertainment Inc. (2004 BCSC 604), in which the rectification proceeding had been launched in response to an adverse ruling by the CRA and it was thus appropriate for the CRA to receive notice and participate (see also Aim Funds Management Inc. v. Aim Trimark Corporate Class Inc. (2009 CanLII 29491 (ON SC)).

On the issue of delay, the Court stated that the CRA had not brought the motion forthwith. The 10-month delay was the fault of the CRA, and even after the rectification order was referred to counsel, it still took two months for the motion to be launched.

And finally, on the issue of whether notice should be provided to the CRA, the Court stated that it had been directed to no authority on the point that the CRA should be given notice, nor on the point that notice is required if the CRA is not a creditor. The Court was not persuaded that providing notice to the CRA was the practice of tax litigators, and nor was it the law.

Rather, in the Court’s view, the delivery of a Notice of Assessment creates rights for the CRA to participate in a rectification proceeding as a creditor (see, for example, Canada (A.G.) v. Juliar ((2000) 50 O.R. (3d) 728 (C.A.) (a case on which Dentons was counsel for the successful taxpayer)).

The Court concluded as follows:

[22] … the CCRA is only required to be given notice of a proposed rectification proceeding when the CCRA’s legal interests might be directly affected by the outcome of the rectification proceeding, such as where the CCRA is a creditor and the rectification would affect its rights. Otherwise, the CCRA might be made a party when so advised by counsel that notice should be given to the CCRA.

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Brogan Family Trust: CRA Not Entitled to Notice of Rectification Application

Highlights from the Toronto Centre CRA & Tax Professionals Groups Breakfast Seminar (November 6, 2014)

On November 6, 2014 at the Toronto Centre Canada Revenue Agency & Tax Professionals Breakfast Seminar, representatives from the CRA provided an update on the Income Tax Rulings Directorate (“Rulings”) and discussed current topics of interest.

Income Tax Rulings Directorate Update

Mickey Sarazin, Director General of the CRA’s Income Tax Rulings Directorate in Ottawa, presented on recent developments at Rulings.

Mr. Sarazin noted that 10 years ago Rulings received approximately 500 ruling requests whereas today Rulings receives approximately 120 requests each year. As a result, there is an increased effort to engage with not only taxpayers but also the Department of Finance, Department of Justice, internal CRA employees, various accounting and legal professional organizations.

The slides from Mr. Sarazin’s presentation are available here.

Folios - In March 2013, 11 folios were published, which took approximately two years to draft and finalize. Ruling has partnered with the Canadian Tax Foundation and CPA Canada to increase the number and timeliness of Folios. Currently, there are 38 additional folios at the draft stage.

National Capacity Building Forums – Rulings is providing taped video sessions or webinars for all CRA employees in order to educate and raise awareness of certain tax issues and subjects. Attendees also include individuals from the Department of Justice and Revenue Quebec.

Pre-Rulings Consultations – This initiative was announced on November 26, 2013 at the Roundtable session at the 65th Annual Tax Conference of the Canadian Tax Foundation held in Toronto, Ontario. The initiative allows taxpayers to meet with Rulings to discuss potential transactions before a formal ruling application is filed. Although only 6-7 requests were received in the first nine months of the program, in the past three months 21 requests were received. Of these 21 requests, 17 have been concluded. In nine of the 17 requests, the CRA responded that a favourable ruling would not be issued.

Technical Capacity/Satellite Offices – Rulings is continuing efforts to hire new staff and reallocate existing staff. Rulings is also establishing satellite offices to attract new employees. For example, Rulings has recently established a presence in the Toronto Centre TSO and the North York TSO. In future years, Rulings expects that it will grow its presence in Toronto, Montreal, Calgary and Vancouver.

Stakeholder Engagement -In conjunction with CPA Canada, Rulings has established a framework for consideration of current issues. Seven committees have been struck under the framework:

  • Service Committee (i.e., how to improve services provided to taxpayers);
  • Compliance Committee (i.e., how to address early conflicts between auditors and taxpayers before the appeals stage);
  • Tax Administration Committee (i.e., dealing with flaws in the legislation);
  • SR&ED Committee (i.e., all issues relating to the scientific research and experimental development tax incentives);
  • HST/GST/Excise Committee (i.e., all issues relating to these areas of the law)
  • Training Committee (i.e., hiring new talent and training auditors)
  • Red Tape Committee (i.e., focusing on increasing efficiencies at a national level)

Current Topics of Interest

Vitaliy Anissimov, Industry Sector Specialist, Income Tax Rulings Directorate, discussed several topics that had been addressed in the CRA Roundtable at the recent APFF conference in Montreal (we expect that the full questions/answers will be published by the CRA in the future).

The slides from Mr. Anissimov’s presentation are available here. A general summary of some of the issues discussed is as follows:

  • In response to the interest deductibility discussion in Swirsky v. The Queen (2013 TCC 73), the CRA noted that as long as there is a reasonable expectation that a corporation will pay dividends then interest can be deducted on loans to acquire common shares of that same corporation (see paragraph 31, of IT-533). Each case will, however, be decided on its own facts.
  • The CRA’s position on the use of average exchange rates has not changed for the purposes of gains or losses on account of income (see CRA Document No. 2014-0529961M4 ” Capital gains on property in foreign currency” (June 10, 2014)).
  • The CRA noted that interest paid by a trust on a note issued by it to a beneficiary in settlement of a capital interest of the beneficiary in the trust is not deductible by the trust for the purposes of calculating its income under 20(1)(c)(ii) of the Act because there is no income-earning purpose;
  • In response to D&D Livestock v. The Queen (2013 TCC 318), which allowed a taxpayer to take into account twice the amount of safe income in the context of subsection 55(2) of the Act, the CRA noted that it would consider using GAAR in this type of case where there is a duplication of tax attributes by the taxpayer.
  • Subsection 98(3) would not apply where a partnership ceases to exist as a result of an acquisition by a single partner of all partnership interest. The requirements of subsection 98(3) would not be met in this type of case.
  • The CRA will consider the reasonableness of maintaining surplus accounts in a particular currency on a case by case basis (see also Regulation 5907(6) and section 261 of the Income Tax Act).

 

Highlights from the Toronto Centre CRA & Tax Professionals Groups Breakfast Seminar (November 6, 2014)

McKesson: Taxpayer Seeks to Raise Additional Issue on Appeal

“Judges are expected to decide cases as framed by the parties, then step back and allow the appellate process to unfold. In this case, the trial judge did neither.”
- Taxpayer’s Supplemental Memorandum of Fact and Law

The transfer pricing case of McKesson v. The Queen has raised procedural issues that are without precedent in Canadian tax cases. This week, those procedural issues became a central part of the matters that will be considered by the Federal Court of Appeal.

In a Notice of Motion (and other materials) filed this week, the taxpayer has asked for a new trial before the Tax Court.

Background

McKesson is a case involving transfer pricing adjustments under section 247 of the Income Tax Act (Canada) in respect of the factoring of accounts receivable as well as the limitation period in Article 9(3) of the Canada-Luxembourg Tax Convention. The Tax Court dismissed the taxpayer’s appeal.

After the taxpayer had commenced an appeal in the Federal Court of Appeal, Tax Court Justice Patrick Boyle recused himself (2014 TCC 266) from the two remaining issues before the lower court (i.e., costs and the content of the Tax Court’s public file) on the basis that the taxpayer had, in its materials filed in the Court of Appeal, accused of him of bias (see our previous post here).

Notice of Motion

On November 3, the taxpayer filed a Notice of Motion in the Federal Court of Appeal for leave to file (i) an Amended Notice of Appeal, and (ii) a Supplementary Memorandum of Fact and Law. In its Motion, the taxpayer states that Justice Boyle’s reasons for recusal raise a further ground of appeal in addition to those already set out in the original Notice of Appeal. The proposed Amended Notice of Appeal and Supplementary Memorandum of Fact and Law address the following additional ground of appeal:

Do the trial judge’s Recusal Reasons compromise the appearance and reality of a fair process in this case such that a new trial is necessary?

Specifically, the proposed Amended Notice of Appeal states,

8. The Trial Judge’s Reasons for Recusal dated September 4, 2014 interfere with the fairness of the appellate process and compromise the appearance and reality fairness of both the trial and appeal.

The taxpayer has also hired additional counsel in respect of the motion, namely Henein Hutchison LLP, a Toronto-based litigation law firm.

Taxpayer’s Arguments

The taxpayer’s Written Representations in support of its Motion argue that the recusal reasons were directed at the Court of Appeal and have compromised the fairness of the case. The taxpayer argues that this “improper intervention” has compromised the integrity of the appeal process.

The taxpayer’s Supplementary Memorandum of Fact and Law states that the trial judge’s “intervention in this appeal was ill-advised and improper”. The taxpayer argues that the trial judge should have remained “above the fray” and should not have “put himself into the appellate arena”.

The taxpayer characterizes the recusal reasons as a “post-hoc attempt to justify to an appellate court a decision given many months earlier” [emphasis in original]. The taxpayer states that the “Recusal Reasons are nothing less than an explicit attempt by the trial judge to insert himself into the appellate process as an advocate against the Appellant and its lawyers.”

The taxpayer argues that the recusal reasons must be considered part of the record in the case before the Federal Court of Appeal. A new trial would, in the taxpayer’s view, give it “an opportunity to make its case at trial, free of the unfairness that has now tainted this proceeding.”

The taxpayer also argued that the recusal reasons have undermined the solicitor-client relationship, and retrospectively reveal the trial judge’s disposition against the taxpayer.

The taxpayer has requested that the appeal be allowed and the matter remitted to the Tax Court for a new trial before a different judge.

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The Crown has not yet filed its response to the taxpayer’s Notice of Motion.

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McKesson: Taxpayer Seeks to Raise Additional Issue on Appeal

Tax Court: Mini Storage Not a “Small Business”

The small business deduction (“SBD”) is a tax-preference provided to certain privately-held Canadian corporations, and only in respect of certain types of income. More specifically, the SBD provides for a reduction of the rate of federal income tax on the first $500,000 of active business income earned in Canada by a “Canadian-controlled private corporation”, in accordance with the rules established in the Income Tax Act (Canada) (the “Act”). The provinces generally offer a similar rate reduction, although the threshold below which the rate applies may vary.

The definition of “active business carried on by a corporation” in subsection 125(7) of the Act excludes a business that is a “specified investment business” (“SIB”). In general, this prevents a corporation from accessing the SBD where the principal purpose of the corporation’s business is to derive income from property, subject to limited exceptions.

In 0742443 B.C. Ltd. v. The Queen (2014 TCC 301), the Tax Court considered whether the taxpayer’s business of providing mini-storage and associated services was a SIB.

The Crown’s position was that the taxpayer clearly earned income from property – the storage units were rented out for a fee based on an established schedule, and the presence of some ancillary services did not change this principal purpose. The taxpayer disagreed, arguing that it was providing numerous services akin to those provided by a hotel, which is generally understood to be a services business and not a SIB.

The taxpayer’s counsel argued that the Crown’s assumptions were fundamentally misguided. Further, the rules in the Act permitting (and denying) the SBD were ambiguous, and such ambiguity should be given a liberal interpretation in favour of the taxpayer (i.e., the legislation should be read with the assumption that the intention of Parliament was to enable taxpayers to access the deduction wherever possible).

In a thorough analysis, the Tax Court disagreed with the arguments put forth by the taxpayer. The Court held that the income was clearly rent. The entire pricing structure of the taxpayer’s business was from monthly rental income based on the size of a storage unit rented. While the taxpayer was commendable in his efforts to give clients a positive experience, this did not change the nature of the business. In the words of the Court: “a few services to a few customers does not change the inherent nature of income from property”. The Court also concluded that there is no ambiguity in the relevant legislation.

In addition, the Court rejected the taxpayer’s assertion that it should succeed in the appeal because it had been treated unfairly by the Crown, specifically in respect of the Respondent’s “bad and misleading pleadings”. The Court noted that pleadings are often imperfect but that does not necessarily prejudice the other side or impede that side’s ability to understand the case that needs to be met. There were some concerns regarding the pleading of the assumptions in the Crown’s Reply, but the issue was clear, the parties knew what the case was about, evidence was properly led, and the Court was able to determine the correctness of the assessment.

The Tax Court dismissed the taxpayer’s appeal.

Tax Court: Mini Storage Not a “Small Business”

Devon: TCC considers large corporation rules

In Devon Canada Corporation v. The Queen the issue is whether the taxpayer (“Devon”) may deduct $20,884,041 paid to cancel issued stock options. After the close of pleadings, the Crown brought a procedural motion relating to the large corporations rules. The Tax Court allowed the motion in part, and struck certain portions of Devon’s Notices of Appeal (2014 TCC 255) (the main tax issue has not yet been heard by the Tax Court).

The content of objections and appeals for large corporations is subject to specific rules in the Income Tax Act (Canada). Under subsection 165(1.11), a large corporation’s Notice of Objection must describe each issue, the specific the relief sought for each issue, and facts and reasons in support of its position. Further, under subsection 169(2.1), the large corporation may appeal to the Tax Court only with respect to the issues and relief sought in the Notice of Objection. The Federal Court of Appeal recently considered these rules in Bakorp Management Ltd. v. The Queen (2014 FCA 104) (see our post on Bakorp here).

In the present case, the Tax Court highlighted some of the themes that have emerged from the case law on this issue:

  1. a taxpayer is not required to describe each issue exactly but is required to describe it reasonably (Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan Inc. v. The Queen, 2003 FCA 471);
  2. the determination of what degree of specificity is required for an issue to have been described reasonably is to be made on a case by case basis (Potash);
  3. a taxpayer may add new facts or reasons on appeal but not new issues (British Columbia Transit v. The Queen, 2006 TCC 437);
  4. if the proposed additional argument would result in the large corporation seeking greater relief than was previously sought, the courts are more likely to consider the argument to be a new issue rather than a reason (Potash; Telus Communications (Edmonton) Inc. v. The Queen, 2005 FCA 159);
  5. if the proposed additional argument would result in the large corporation seeking the same relief that was previously sought, the courts are more likely to consider the argument to be the same issue (British Columbia Transit; Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. The Queen, 2013 TCC 170); and
  6. if the proposed additional argument would result in the large corporation seeking completely different relief than was previously sought, the courts are more likely to consider the argument to be a new issue rather than a reason (Bakorp Management Ltd. v. The Queen, 2014 FCA 104).

Devon raised three arguments in its Notices of Appeal for the deductibility of the payments to cancel stock options. These were summarized by the Tax Court as follows:

(a) Devon’s primary argument is that the payments are deductible as current expenses under subsection 9(1);

(b) In the alternative, Devon argues that the payments are eligible capital expenditures that, once added to cumulative eligible capital, would result in deductions pursuant to paragraph 20(1)(b). It further argues that, due to the fact that there were acquisitions of control of both of the predecessor companies during the taxation periods in which the payments were made, subsection 111(5.2) applies to cause significant additional deductions of cumulative eligible capital; and

(c) In the further alternative, Devon claims that the payments are financing expenses deductible under paragraph 20(1)(e).

The Crown argued that Devon, a large corporation in the years at issue, only referred to section 9 in its Notice of Objection. The other provisions – namely paragraph 20(1)(b) and subsection 111(5.2) and paragraph 20(1)(e) – were mentioned in a supplementary memorandum filed by Devon during the objection process. As such, references to provisions other than section 9 should be struck from Devon’s Notice of Appeal.

The Tax Court held that no mechanism in the Act would permit the supplemental memorandum filed by Devon to amend the original Notice of Objection. However, the Tax Court struck out references to paragraph 20(1)(b) and subsection 111(5.2) but not paragraph 20(1)(e).

The Tax Court held that paragraph 20(1)(e) did not raise a new issue and was merely an alternative reason argued by the taxpayer in favor of deducting the payments to cancel the issued stock options. However, paragraph 20(1)(b) and subsection 111(5.2) raised new issues that were not otherwise raised in the Notice of Objection and would have entitled Devon to a deduction for amounts in its cumulative eligible capital that were unrelated to the payments to cancel the stock options.

Although the taxpayer did not describe the relief sought with respect to paragraph 20(1)(e) in the Notice of Objection and only specified allowing the deduction in full, the Tax Court agreed that if a full deduction is pleaded under subsection 169(2.1) then a partial deduction of the same nature should not necessarily have to be separately pleaded under the large corporation rules.

Both the taxpayer and the Crown have appealed this procedural decision to the Federal Court of Appeal (Court File No. A-389-14).

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Devon: TCC considers large corporation rules

McKesson: Trial Judge Recuses Self From Two Remaining Issues in Transfer Pricing Case

In McKesson v. The Queen (2014 TCC 266), Justice Patrick Boyle recused himself from the two remaining issues with which he was seized in the transfer pricing case – costs and the content of the court’s public file (i.e., the determination of whether certain information may be confidential).

This unusual decision arises as a result of the content of the Appellant’s factum filed in the Federal Court of Appeal in the appeal of Justice Boyle’s trial decision in McKesson (see our posts on the Tax Court case here and the Federal Court of Appeal proceeding here and here).

In his recusal reasons, Justice Boyle wrote:

[4]        As detailed below, I have, of my own motion, decided that I am compelled to consider whether I need to recuse myself from the two remaining issues before this Court. A consideration of this issue is required because I became aware that the Appellant and Appellant’s counsel, together with its co-counsel in the Federal Court of Appeal in respect of the appeal of the trial decision, had made certain public written statements about me in its factum in the Federal Court of Appeal (the “Factum”) which, upon reflection, appear to me to clearly include:

(i)         allegations that I was untruthful and deceitful in my Reasons;

(ii)         clear untruths about me, what I said and heard in the course of the trial, as well as the existence of evidentiary foundations supporting what I wrote in my Reasons; and

(iii)        allegations of impartiality on my part.

[5]        This requires me to consider whether:

(i)         I believe that a reasonable person reading the Factum, my Reasons, and the relevant portions of the transcript would believe that the trial judge so strongly complained of by McKesson Canada might not be able to remain impartial in his consideration of costs and confidential information;

(ii)         I believe I can impartially consider, weigh and decide the costs and confidential information issues before me; and

(iii)        whether the public challenge of my impartiality expressed by McKesson Canada and its co-counsel in the Factum is itself sufficient to warrant recusing myself at this stage.

 …

[133]     I view these as public allegations by a party to the costs and confidential information matters remaining before this Court that, regardless of the merits of their reasoning or their thoughts, I am unable to decide the remaining matters impartially. I believe that a reasonable person reading only these phrases from the Factum, without reviewing my Reasons or the trial Transcript, would believe that such strong complaints by McKesson Canada and its counsel may give rise to a serious doubt that I will be seen to be able to dispose of the two remaining issues and discharge my duties on an impartial basis.

[136]     For the Reasons identified above, I have decided I have to recuse myself from the remaining costs and confidential information issues in McKesson Canada’s proceeding in this Court.

[137]     It may be that some of the perceived untruths about the trial judge described above under heading II might individually not warrant recusal, and may be within an appellate advocate’s licence to overstate through the use of absolutes like ‘never’, ‘only’ and ‘any’.

[138]     However, I am satisfied that a reasonable fair-minded Canadian, informed and aware of all the issues addressed above, would entertain doubt that I could remain able to reach impartial decisions. I believe that such a reasonable fair-minded and informed person, viewing this realistically and practically would, after appropriate reflection, be left with a reasoned suspicion or apprehension of bias, actual or perceived. Canadians should rightly expect their trial judges to have broad shoulders and thick skins when a losing party appeals their decision, but I do not believe Canadians think that should extend to accusations of dishonesty by the judge, nor to untruths about the judge. Trial judges should not have to defend their honour and integrity from such inappropriate attacks. English is a very rich language; the Appellant and its counsel could have forcefully advanced their chosen grounds for appeal without the use of unqualified extreme statements which attack the personal or professional integrity of the trial judge.

[139]     For these reasons, I will be advising my Chief Justice that I am recusing myself from completing the McKesson Canada proceeding in the Tax Court. This extends to the consideration and disposition of the costs submissions of the parties in this case, as well as to the 2010 confidential information order of Justice Hogan in this case and its proper final implementation by the Tax Court and its Registry.

No date has been set for the hearing of the main matter by the Federal Court of Appeal.

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McKesson: Trial Judge Recuses Self From Two Remaining Issues in Transfer Pricing Case

McKesson: Respondent’s Factum Filed

Earlier this year, McKesson Canada Corporation appealed the decision of the Tax Court of Canada in McKesson Canada Corporation v. The Queen (2013 TCC 404) (see Federal Court of Appeal File Nos. A-48-14 and A-49-14).

At issue was the appropriate discount rate paid under a receivables sales agreement between McKesson Canada and its parent company, MIH, under section 247 of the Income Tax Act (Canada). A secondary issue was the assessment of withholding tax on a deemed dividend that arose as a result of the lower discount rate. For our earlier blog post on the Tax Court decision see here.

In the Federal Court of Appeal, the Appellant’s Memorandum of Fact and Law was filed on June 11, 2014. For our earlier post summarizing the appellant’s memorandum see here.

The Respondent’s Memorandum of Fact and Law was recently filed on August 11, 2014.

In its Memorandum, the Respondent states that the trial judge’s “carefully reasoned decision” and findings were “amply supported” by the evidence at trial and no palpable and overriding error can be found in the trial judge’s conclusions.

The Respondent summarizes its points at issue at paragraph 56 of its Memorandum:

  • The trial judge applied the correct test. His decision was based on what arm’s-length persons would agree to pay for the rights and benefits obtained and not on findings of tax avoidance, lack of need for funds, or group control.
  • Ample evidence supports the trial judge’s determination of the arm’s-length discount rate. Since no palpable and overriding error was committed, his decision should not be disturbed.
  • The trial judge did not commit an error of law in concluding that the five-year limitation period in Article 9(3) of the Canada-Luxembourg Tax Treaty does not apply to the Part XIII tax reassessment at issue.

No hearing date has yet been set for the hearing in the Federal Court of Appeal.

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McKesson: Respondent’s Factum Filed

Communications With Experts: Moore v. Getahun and the Advocates’ Society Report

An expert does not draft his/her report in a vacuum. Communication with counsel is required. Ultimately, an expert must provide independent and objective evidence at a hearing. So the question arises as to what amount of communication is appropriate between counsel and the expert during the drafting stage. This was an issue considered by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in Moore v. Getahun (2014 ONSC 237).

In Moore, the plaintiff suffered a wrist injury in a motorcycle accident, and claimed medical negligence against the treating doctor. The defendants called an expert to testify on the medical treatment of the plaintiff following the accident. During the preparation of the expert’s report, the expert and defence counsel had a 90-minute conference call during which the draft report was discussed.

In 2010, sections 4.1 and 53.03 of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure were amended to (among other things) codify the expert’s duty to the court and to require the execution and filing of an expert’s certificate acknowledging this duty.

These amendments are similar to the recent amendments to the Tax Court of Canada Rules (General Procedure): Section 145 (“Expert Witnesses”), Form 145(2) (“Certificate Concerning Code of Conduct for Expert Witnesses”) and Schedule III (“Code of Conduct for Expert Witnesses”).

In Moore, the court considered the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure amendments and concluded:

Whether it is appropriate for counsel to review experts’ draft reports

[519]      Defence counsel reviewed Dr. Taylor’s draft report during a one-and-a-half-hour telephone conference call.

[520]      The purpose of Rule 53.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is to ensure the independence and integrity of the expert witness. The expert’s primary duty is to the court. In light of this change in the role of the expert witness under the new rule, I conclude that counsel’s practice of reviewing draft reports should stop. There should be full disclosure in writing of any changes to an expert’s final report as a result of counsel’s corrections, suggestions, or clarifications, to ensure transparency in the process and to ensure that the expert witness is neutral.

(See also the court’s discussion of this issue at paragraphs 47-52 of the Moore decision.)

Not surprisingly, the Ontario court’s narrow interpretation of Rule 53.03 attracted the attention of litigators across the country.

In response, the Advocates’ Society has drafted a position paper (and a set of nine principles) regarding communications with expert witnesses. The Advocates’ Society has taken the position that the view expressed by the court in Moore (i.e., that the amendments constitute a change in the role of expert witnesses) is mistaken. The case law prior to Moore on the subject of experts’ testimony had established that experts must testify independently and objectively. Further, the amendments were likely responding to the specific problem of “hired guns” or “opinions for sale”, and thus codified the expert’s duty and imposed the certificate requirement so that testifying experts clearly understand their duty to the court.

The report also notes the problems and unintended consequences of the court’s ruling in Moore – namely, that the ruling fails to recognize the “important and entirely appropriate role” of advocates in ensuring that expert evidence is presented in a cogent, succinct and well-organized fashion that will assist the trier of fact; further, a “one-size-fits-all” approach to communications with experts is discordant with the realities of modern litigation.

Given the similar language in the Tax Court’s rules regarding expert evidence, Moore could have an impact on the manner in which expert reports are to be prepared for a Tax Court proceeding.

Moore has been appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal.

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Communications With Experts: Moore v. Getahun and the Advocates’ Society Report

McKesson: Appellant’s Factum Filed‏

On January 10, 2014, McKesson Canada Corporation appealed the decision of the Tax Court of Canada in McKesson Canada Corporation v. The Queen (2013 TCC 404) (see Federal Court of Appeal File Nos. A-48-14 and A-49-14).

In McKesson, the Tax Court upheld the CRA’s transfer price adjustments (made pursuant to section 247 of the Income Tax Act (Canada)) that had reduced the discount rate paid under a receivables sales agreement between McKesson Canada and its parent company, MIH, from 2.206% to 1.013%. The Tax Court also upheld the assessment of withholding tax on a deemed dividend that arose in a secondary adjustment resulting from the lower discount rate.

The Appellant’s Memorandum of fact and law was filed on June 11, 2014.

In its Memorandum, the Appellant states that the Trial Judge made a “fundamental error of law” and requests that the appeal be allowed with costs and the matter be remitted to the Tax Court for a new trial before a different judge. The Appellant describes the issues on the appeal as follows:

Did the Trial Judge err in law by stepping outside the pleadings and the case put forward and as developed by the parties over the course of the trial to find against McKesson Canada, thereby depriving McKesson Canada of its right to know the case it had to meet and its right to a fair opportunity to meet that case?

Did the Trial Judge err in law when he misconstrued the arm’s-length principle by holding that, in determining what terms and conditions arm’s length parties would have made or imposed, he was to assume that one party (purchaser) controls the other (seller)?

As a result of stepping outside of the pleadings and the case put forward and as developed by the parties over the course of the trial and committing an error of law, did the Trial Judge calculate the discount rate in a manner that ignored the assumption of risk by MIH, contrary to the terms of the Agreement and resulted in a discount rate that is commercially absurd?

Did the Trial Judge err in permitting the Minister to assess non-resident withholding tax after the expiry of the applicable limitation period and in contravention of Canada’s obligations under a bilateral tax treaty?

See our previous commentary on the Tax Court’s McKesson decision here.

 

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McKesson: Appellant’s Factum Filed‏