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Communications With Experts: Moore v. Getahun and the Advocates’ Society Report

An expert does not draft his/her report in a vacuum. Communication with counsel is required. Ultimately, an expert must provide independent and objective evidence at a hearing. So the question arises as to what amount of communication is appropriate between counsel and the expert during the drafting stage. This was an issue considered by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in Moore v. Getahun (2014 ONSC 237).

In Moore, the plaintiff suffered a wrist injury in a motorcycle accident, and claimed medical negligence against the treating doctor. The defendants called an expert to testify on the medical treatment of the plaintiff following the accident. During the preparation of the expert’s report, the expert and defence counsel had a 90-minute conference call during which the draft report was discussed.

In 2010, sections 4.1 and 53.03 of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure were amended to (among other things) codify the expert’s duty to the court and to require the execution and filing of an expert’s certificate acknowledging this duty.

These amendments are similar to the recent amendments to the Tax Court of Canada Rules (General Procedure): Section 145 (“Expert Witnesses”), Form 145(2) (“Certificate Concerning Code of Conduct for Expert Witnesses”) and Schedule III (“Code of Conduct for Expert Witnesses”).

In Moore, the court considered the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure amendments and concluded:

Whether it is appropriate for counsel to review experts’ draft reports

[519]      Defence counsel reviewed Dr. Taylor’s draft report during a one-and-a-half-hour telephone conference call.

[520]      The purpose of Rule 53.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is to ensure the independence and integrity of the expert witness. The expert’s primary duty is to the court. In light of this change in the role of the expert witness under the new rule, I conclude that counsel’s practice of reviewing draft reports should stop. There should be full disclosure in writing of any changes to an expert’s final report as a result of counsel’s corrections, suggestions, or clarifications, to ensure transparency in the process and to ensure that the expert witness is neutral.

(See also the court’s discussion of this issue at paragraphs 47-52 of the Moore decision.)

Not surprisingly, the Ontario court’s narrow interpretation of Rule 53.03 attracted the attention of litigators across the country.

In response, the Advocates’ Society has drafted a position paper (and a set of nine principles) regarding communications with expert witnesses. The Advocates’ Society has taken the position that the view expressed by the court in Moore (i.e., that the amendments constitute a change in the role of expert witnesses) is mistaken. The case law prior to Moore on the subject of experts’ testimony had established that experts must testify independently and objectively. Further, the amendments were likely responding to the specific problem of “hired guns” or “opinions for sale”, and thus codified the expert’s duty and imposed the certificate requirement so that testifying experts clearly understand their duty to the court.

The report also notes the problems and unintended consequences of the court’s ruling in Moore – namely, that the ruling fails to recognize the “important and entirely appropriate role” of advocates in ensuring that expert evidence is presented in a cogent, succinct and well-organized fashion that will assist the trier of fact; further, a “one-size-fits-all” approach to communications with experts is discordant with the realities of modern litigation.

Given the similar language in the Tax Court’s rules regarding expert evidence, Moore could have an impact on the manner in which expert reports are to be prepared for a Tax Court proceeding.

Moore has been appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal.

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Communications With Experts: Moore v. Getahun and the Advocates’ Society Report

CRA: Tax treatment of Ponzi scheme investments

We have previously written about court decisions on the tax results arising from taxpayers’ (failed) investments in Ponzi schemes (see our posts on Roszko v. The Queen (2014 TCC 59), Johnson v. The Queen (2011 TCC 54) and (2012 FCA 253), Hammill v. The Queen (2005 FCA 252) and Orman v. Marnat (2012 ONSC 549)).

These decisions raise questions as to how the CRA may assess all aspects of the income earned and losses suffered by the duped investors. For example, while the cases focused on whether the taxpayer was required to report some of the returned funds as income, the tax treatment of losses after the collapse of the fraudulent scheme has not been considered.

The CRA has now provided some guidance on how it will administer the Income Tax Act (Canada) in respect of the income and losses arising from Ponzi schemes. In CRA Document No. 2014-0531171M6 “Fraudulent Investment Schemes” (July 3, 2014), the CRA stated:

  • Income inclusion – Amounts paid to a taxpayer that are returns on their investment should be included in the taxpayer’s income. The fact that the funds were not invested on behalf of the taxpayer does not change the nature of the transaction for the taxpayer.
  • Bad debt – If the investment was a fraudulent scheme, the taxpayer may be able to claim a bad debt under paragraph 20(1)(p) of the Act in respect of the lost investment funds. The amount of the bad debt claim will be subject to certain adjustments. The bad debt should be claimed in the year the fraud is discovered (i.e., the year in which fraud charges are laid by the Crown against the perpetrator, or at such earlier time as the debt is established to have become bad).
  • Losses – The taxpayer may be able to claim a capital loss or business investment loss:
    • Capital loss – The taxpayer may be able to claim a capital loss under paragraph 39(1)(b) of the Act, which may be carried back three years or forward indefinitely. A net capital loss may only be applied against a taxable capital gain.
    • Business investment loss – Under paragraph 39(1)(c), a business investment loss is a capital loss from a disposition of a share of a small business corporation or a debt owing to the taxpayer by a Canadian-controlled private corporation that was a small business corporation. Under paragraph 38(c) of the Act, one-half of a business investment loss is an allowable business investment loss, which may be deducted against all sources of income.
  • Other deductions – The taxpayer may be able to claim interest expenses or other carrying charges not previously claimed by filing a T1 Adjustment Request form.
  • Recovered amounts – Where the taxpayer recovers funds from a scheme (i.e., through a legal settlement or otherwise), these recovered amounts may be taxable as recovery of a previously deducted bad debt, recovery of a previously deducted business loss, or recovery of a previously deducted capital loss.
  • Taxpayer relief – The CRA will consider requests for taxpayer relief on a case-by-case basis.

This guidance is helpful, but there are many technical requirements for the operation of these provisions, and further it is not clear how the CRA’s administrative views accord with the case law. For example, at least three cases (Roszko, Orman and Hammill) have held that amounts paid out a fraudulent scheme are not income to the duped investor. In future cases, we expect the courts will continue to clarify the tax treatment of income and losses arising from failed Ponzi schemes.

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CRA: Tax treatment of Ponzi scheme investments

Health Quest: Appeal allowed where Crown failed to properly plead assumptions

What is the result of the Crown’s failure to properly plead its assumptions in the Reply? This issue was considered by the Tax Court in Health Quest Inc. v. The Queen (2014 TCC 211) in which the Crown’s Reply included “assumptions” that were statements of mixed fact and law rather than facts alone.

The taxpayer was a distributor of modified and “off-the-shelf” therapeutic footwear for relief of various disabling conditions of the feet. During the reporting periods at issue, section 24.1 in Part II of Schedule VI of the Excise Tax Act stated that zero-rated supplies included footwear designed for use by an individual who has a crippled or deformed foot or other similar disability when the footwear is supplied on the written order of a medical practitioner. (The provision was amended in 2012 to broaden the definition to include written orders by a “specified professional”.) The taxpayer considered that most or all of the footwear it sold was zero-rated under s. 24.1.

The CRA audited the taxpayer for the period of January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2009. Based on a sampling of the taxpayer’s sales (in the months of August and December 2009), the CRA assessed additional GST owing of $42,274.72 for the period.

In the Tax Court, the taxpayer argued that all of the shoes it sold were for a prescribed diagnosis and thus zero-rated. The Respondent argued that the “off-the-shelf” shoes sold by the taxpayer (i.e., sold “as-is” without modification) were not zero-rated and thus subject to GST.

Under section 6 of the Tax Court of Canada Rules of Procedure Respecting the Excise Tax Act (Informal Procedure), every Reply to a Notice of Appeal must contain (among other things) a statement of the findings or assumptions of fact made by the CRA when making the assessment and the reasons the Crown intends to rely on in support of the assessment. (The Tax Court’s other procedural rules contain substantially identical provisions – see, for example, section 49 of the Tax Court of Canada Rules (General Procedure)).

In Health Quest, the Crown’s Reply stated, “In so assessing the Appellant, the Minister relied on the following …

(a)        the facts stated and admitted above;

(b)        the Appellant was a GST/HST registrant;

(c)        the Appellant was required by the Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15, as amended (the “Act”) to file its GST/HST returns on a quarterly basis;

(d)       the Appellant was a corporation involved in the supply of footwear which were specially modified by the Appellant or were specially designed by the manufacturer for persons with physical disabilities;

(e)        the products described in subparagraph 7(d) above are zero-rated for HST pursuant to Schedule VI of the Act;

(f)        the Appellant also supplied other products which were not zero-rated pursuant to Schedule VI of the Act; and

(g)        during the periods under appeal, the Appellant failed to collect tax of not less than $42,274.72 on its supply of products which were not zero-rated pursuant to Schedule VI of the Act.”

The Tax Court noted that paragraphs (f) and (g) were problematic in that they both contained statements of mixed fact and law, which the Federal Court of Appeal has stated have no place in the Minister’s assumptions (see Anchor Pointe Energy Ltd. v. the Queen (2003 FCA 294) and Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. The Queen (2013 FCA 122)). In Anchor Pointe, the Court of Appeal stated,

[23] The pleading of assumptions gives the Crown the powerful tool of shifting the onus to the taxpayer to demolish the Minister’s assumptions. The facts pleaded as assumptions must be precise and accurate so that the taxpayer knows exactly the case it has to meet.

In Health Quest, the Tax Court determined the Crown’s key “assumptions” were merely the Respondent’s view on the application of the law to the facts of the appeal.

The Court noted that where the Crown has not set out any proper assumptions of fact in the pleadings, the evidentiary onus reverts to the Crown to establish the correctness of the assessment (see Pollock v. Minister of National Revenue (94 DTC 6050 (Fed. C.A.) and Brewster v. the Queen (2012 TCC 187)). In other words, the normal requirement that a taxpayer must adduce evidence to “demolish” the Crown’s assumptions is reversed and the Crown must prove its case.

In Health Quest, the Respondent’s only evidence was the testimony of the appeals officer. The Tax Court held the testimony did not establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the footwear in question was not zero-rated. The Court noted that it would have been beneficial to have product literature, scientific studies, or the testimony of medical professionals, and this type of evidence would have been essential to engage in a meaningful textual, contextual and purposive analysis of the applicable legislation (there are no previous cases that have considered the interpretation of section 24.1).

The Tax Court allowed the appeal.

The Court’s decision in Health Quest is a helpful reminder of the importance of including only facts and not legal arguments in the assumptions in a Reply. Taxpayers and their counsel should closely scrutinize the assumptions and reasons described in a Reply to ensure the pleading conforms with the Tax Court’s rules.

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Health Quest: Appeal allowed where Crown failed to properly plead assumptions

Van Helden: Private Piano Lessons Not Eligible for Tuition Tax Credit

Under subsection 118.5(1) of the Income Tax Act, an individual taxpayer may claim a tax credit in respect of certain qualifying tuition fees. Pursuant to paragraph 118.5(1)(a), the following requirements apply: (i) the student must be enrolled at an educational institution in Canada; (ii) that educational institution must be a university, college or “other educational institution”; and, (iii) the educational institution must provide courses at a post-secondary school level. Tuition credits may be transferred to a parent or grandparent under section 118.9 of the ITA. (See also Income Tax Folio S1-F2-C2 “Tuition Tax Credit” (March 2013)).

In Van Helden v. The Queen (2014 TCC 196), the taxpayer had claimed the tuition credit in respect of fees paid for weekly private piano lessons for his two daughters.

In an earlier case (Tarkowski v. The Queen (2007 TCC 632)), the Tax Court had determined that the Mississauga School of Music was an “educational institution” for the purposes of subsection 118.5(1), and the relevant music courses were “at a post-secondary school level” because a Grade 12 high school credit was a prerequisite to taking these courses.

In Van Helden, the taxpayer argued that, just as the Mississauga School of Music was found to be an “educational institution” in Tarkowski, the private instructors in this case should be found to be educational institutions.

However, the Tax Court disagreed and dismissed the taxpayer’s appeal (see also Kam v. The Queen (2013 TCC 266)). The Tax Court cited the Parliamentary debates (from 1961) regarding the intent and scope of the term “educational institution” and stated:

[20] In conclusion, the original intent of the tuition credit was to make post secondary education more accessible to students by lessening their financial burden. Although subsection 118.5(1) should be interpreted broadly, it is clear that Parliament did not intend that the provision should apply to fees which students paid for private piano lessons at an instructor’s home.

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Van Helden: Private Piano Lessons Not Eligible for Tuition Tax Credit

FCA Cautions Parties on Adjournment Requests

In recent years the Tax Court of Canada has strictly applied the requirements for adjournments and timetable amendments as described in the Court’s Practice Note No. 14. We understand this may have been prompted by a practice that had developed over time whereby the parties to an appeal would consent to extensions of time or adjournments and then informally seek the Court’s approval.

The Federal Court of Appeal appears to have been wrestling with similar scheduling and adjournment issues. In UHA Research Society v. Canada (2014 FCA 134), the Appellant sought an adjournment of a hearing date due to the unavailability of counsel.

In a lengthy discussion of the Court’s scheduling process, the Court’s expectations of counsel and the test for an adjournment request (i.e., there must be significant new developments, marked changes in circumstances, or compelling reasons of fairness), Justice Stratas provided a reminder about the Court’s procedure and practice regarding adjournments.

In UHA, Justice Stratas granted the adjournment request, but cautioned:

[18] Having written these reasons – reasons written in response to a spate of recent incidents of lack of regard for scheduling orders of this Court – I may well be less accommodating in a future case.

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FCA Cautions Parties on Adjournment Requests

Morris Meadows: Judge Declines Job Offer and Workers Were Employees

In Morris Meadows Country Holidays and Seminars Ltd. v. M.N.R. (2014 TCC 191), the Tax Court considered whether certain hospitality workers were employees or independent contractors for the purposes of the Employment Insurance Act and the Canada Pension Plan.

Morris Meadows offered meeting facilities, sleeping facilities and dining facilities. In doing so it hired workers, as required, to perform certain duties such as cleaning, gardening, maintenance, cooking and serving food.

The CRA classified the workers as employees, and assessed the taxpayer for additional CPP contributions and EI premiums. The taxpayer appealed on the basis that the workers were (i) independent contractors or (ii) casual employees not employed for the purposes of Morris Meadows’ business.

In respect of the evidence, the Tax Court made this comment on a witness’s testimony:

[3] Mr. Morris, the moving force behind Morris Meadows, was the only witness for the Appellant. He was refreshingly forthright in his testimony to the point of offering me work as a cook at Morris Meadows. I declined the offer.

On the issue of the classification of the workers, the Tax Court considered the applicable tests in 671122 Ontario Ltd. v Sagaz Industries Canada Inc. (2001 SCC 59) and 1392644 Ontario Inc. o/a Connor Homes v Minister of National Revenue (2013 FCA 85) (see our previous post on Connor Homes).

In the present case, the Court held there was no written agreement expressing intent and thus no mutual intent (as per the Connor Homes analysis). The Court then pursued the traditional Sagaz/Wiebe Door analysis to determine whether the workers performed their services in business on their own account. On this point, the Court concluded that all but one of the workers were employees.

On the issue of whether the workers were engaged in employment of a casual nature other than for the purpose of the employer’s trade or business (see subsection 5(2) of the Employment Insurance Act and subsection 6(2) of the Canada Pension Plan), the Tax Court cited the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in Roussy v Minister of National Revenue ([1992] F.C.J. No. 913), which stated:

[7] … the duration of the time a person works is not conclusive in categorizing employment as casual; the length of time may be a factor to be considered, but a more important aspect is whether the employment is “ephemeral” or “transitory” or, if you will, unpredictable and unreliable. It must be impossible to determine its regularity. In other words, if someone is spasmodically called upon once in a while to do a bit of work for an indeterminate time, that may be considered to be casual work. If, however, someone is hired to work specified hours for a definite period or on a particular project until it is completed, this is not casual, even if the period is a short one.

The Tax Court held that the workers were engaged in unpredictable “part-time” work rather than casual employment. Further, the Court noted that Morris Meadows advertised its dining facilities (available for business meetings or weddings), hired workers to serve the food, and profited from such commerce. In the Court’s view, Morris Meadows was in a business to which the employment related, and the casual employment was for the purpose of Morris Meadows’ business. The Court held the workers were not engaged in casual employment for the purposes of the EI Act and the CPP.

The Court allowed the appeals only in respect of the one worker who was an independent contractor.

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Morris Meadows: Judge Declines Job Offer and Workers Were Employees

Bitcoin Users Face Regulatory “Patchwork”

In the International Tax Review, Laura Gavioli (of Dentons’ Dallas office) and I discuss the Canada and U.S. approaches to the regulation and tax treatment of Bitcoin currency. We also discuss the approach taken in several other jurisdictions around the world.

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Bitcoin Users Face Regulatory “Patchwork”

Bakorp: Appeal Dismissed for Failure to Comply with Large Corporations Rules

In Bakorp Management Ltd. v. The Queen (2014 FCA 104), the Federal Court of Appeal upheld a decision of the Tax Court dismissing the taxpayer’s appeal for failure to comply with the rules relating to objections and appeals filed by large corporations.

The result in Bakorp is a reminder to large corporations and their advisors of the need for careful consideration of the issues and relief sought in objections and appeals. In this regard, it would be good practice to have a Notice of Objection of a large corporation reviewed by a tax litigation lawyer before the objection is filed with the Canada Revenue Agency.

Background

The taxpayer was a large corporation under subsection 225.1(8) of the Income Tax Act (ITA). In 1992, five Class A shares of a corporation not connected with the taxpayer were redeemed by that corporation for $338,213,849 resulting in a deemed dividend pursuant to subsection 84(3). A portion of the proceeds was not payable until 1995, and the taxpayer reported that portion ($52,912,264) as taxable income in 1995, resulting in $13,333,059 of Part IV tax.

The CRA reassessed the taxpayer’s 1993-1995 tax years (only the 1995 tax year was at issue in the appeal), and for the 1995 tax year the CRA reduced the amount of the deemed dividend included as taxable income by $25,332,237, and the Part IV tax was reduced accordingly.

The taxpayer filed a Notice of Objection and claimed that its original filing position should be restored (namely that the entire $52 million deemed dividend should be included in income in 1995). The CRA issued a Notice of Confirmation stating that $28 million of the deemed dividend should be included in income in 1995.

Tax Court

The taxpayer filed a Notice of Appeal to the Tax Court and argued that no amount of the deemed dividend should be included in its income in 1995. In response, the Crown brought a motion under section 53 of the Tax Court Rules (General Procedure) for an order dismissing the appeal on the basis the taxpayer had failed to comply with subsection 169(2.1) of the ITA (and thus the appeal was not validly constituted).

Under the ITA, large corporations are subject to specific rules regarding the content of their objections and appeals. Under subsection 165(1.11) of the ITA, a large corporation in its objection must reasonably describe each issue, specific the relief sought for each issue, and provide facts and reasons in support of the taxpayer’s position. Under subsection 169(2.1), a corporation may appeal to the Tax Court only with respect to the issues and relief sought in the objection.

In the Tax Court, the Appellant argued the objection was clear that the issue was the particular amount of the redemption proceeds that were to be included in income in 1995. However, the Tax Court disagreed and stated that the taxpayer was taking too general an approach in identifying the issue. Further, the Tax Court held the taxpayer was seeking entirely different relief in respect of the issue. The Tax Court allowed the Crown’s motion and dismissed the taxpayer’s appeal (2013 TCC 94).

Federal Court of Appeal

The taxpayer appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal. The taxpayer argued that the large corporations rules require the taxpayer to describe the “point in question”, and in this case the objection was clear the debate was about the share redemption proceeds added to income as a deemed dividend. Further, less specificity is required in respect of the relief sought, and in this case that was simply relief in respect of the taxpayer’s Part IV tax liability. The Crown argued that the determination of whether the issue and relief sought were the same in the objection and the appeal was a question of fact, and on these factual issues the Tax Court made no palpable and overriding error.

Of the question of what was meant by “issue”, the Court of Appeal noted the large corporation rules require the taxpayer to reasonably describe each issue, which will differ in each case and will depend on the degree of specificity required to allow the CRA to know each issue to be decided. In the present case, the Court stated that the issue must be described in a manner that would result in the quantification as a specified amount of the relief sought.

The Court of Appeal criticized the taxpayer’s characterization of the issue in its Notice of Objection, but concluded that the issue was whether the taxpayer was correct in concluding that it had received $52 million in dividends in 1995. Accordingly, the taxpayer’s appeal was limited only to this issue. However, the Court of Appeal noted that the issue raised in the Notice of Appeal was not the issue raised in the taxpayer’s objection.

Although it was not necessary to dispose of the appeal, the Court commented on the question of whether or not the relief sought was the same in the objection and appeal. The Court noted that the taxpayer had challenged the reduction of Part IV tax in the objection, but on appeal the taxpayer was asking the court to eliminate the Part IV tax entirely. In the Court’s view, this was not the same relief.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

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Bakorp: Appeal Dismissed for Failure to Comply with Large Corporations Rules

More Guidance from the CRA on Bitcoin Activities and Transactions

Following the recent IRS publication on the U.S. tax treatment of bitcoin activities and transactions, the CRA has issued further guidance on the Canadian tax issues arising in respect of the virtual currency.

In CRA Document No. 2014-052511E5 “Virtual Currencies (Bitcoins)” (March 28, 2014), the CRA was asked several questions about bitcoin activities and transactions (not all of the underlying facts are described in the technical interpretation, but we can infer what the taxpayer asked from the responses provided by the CRA).

Bitcoin Mining Business?

In respect of bitcoin “mining“, the CRA noted the difference between business and personal activities. In Stewart v. The Queen (2002 SCC 46) the Supreme Court of Canada stated that an activity may be commercial in nature if the taxpayer had a subjective intention to profit and there was evidence of business-like behaviour supporting such intention. Whether a particular activity is undertaken for profit is a question of fact that can only be determined on a case by case basis. The CRA stated that, in this case, the taxpayer appeared to be operating a bitcoin mining business.

If a taxpayer mines bitcoins in a commercial manner, the taxpayer’s income for the year will be determined with reference to the property in the taxpayer’s inventory at the end of the year. The rules for determining the value of inventory are described in section 10 of the Income Tax Act and Part XVIII of the Income Tax Regulations, and in most cases will be either (i) the value of the inventory at the end of the year at its cost or fair market value (whichever is lower) or (ii) the value of the inventory at the end of the year at its fair market value (this requires a determination of whether or not the business activity is an adventure or concern in the nature of trade). In certain cases, other methods of valuing inventory may be available (see Interpretation Bulletin IT-473R “Inventory Valuation” (December 21, 1998)).

Theft / Losses

The CRA also noted that a loss of trading assets (i.e., inventory or cash) through theft or embezzlement is normally deductible in computing income from a business if such losses are an inherent risk of the business and the loss is reasonably incidental to the business activities. The amount of the loss would be the cost of the property less any insurance proceeds. Stolen capital property may result in a capital loss (see Interpretation Bulletin IT-185R “Losses from Theft, Defalcation or Embezzlement” (March 9, 2001)). This is interesting, given the recent difficulties encountered by the Mt. Gox bitcoin exchange, which in February 2014 discovered a theft of more than 700,000 of its bitcoins.

Gifts / Other Income

The CRA added that a gift of a virtual currency would not be subject to income tax in the hands of the recipient (see Interpretation Bulletin IT-334R2 “Miscellaneous Receipts” (February 21, 1992)). However, where a taxpayer receives a voluntary payment from an employer or another person in connection with employment, the payment may be taxable as employment income under section 5 or as a taxable benefit under paragraph 6(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act. Further, voluntary payments received in connection with a business must be included in the taxpayer’s income from that business.

Barter Transactions

Finally, the CRA stated that, where one type of virtual currency is exchanged for another type of virtual currency, the value of the goods or services received by the taxpayer must be brought into the taxpayer’s income if they are business-related (see Interpretation Bulletin IT-490 “Barter Transactions” (July 5, 1982)).

The CRA suggested that Canadian taxpayers should review the CRA’s fact sheet, “What you should know about digital currency” (November 2013).

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More Guidance from the CRA on Bitcoin Activities and Transactions

There’s A Litigation App For That?

We were intrigued to learn that KosInteractive LLC has created the U.S. “Fed Courts” app for Android and Apple devices which contains helpful information about U.S. federal courts rules of procedure and court information. The app provides access to the PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records) database, and the procedural rules for appellate, bankruptcy, civil, and criminal proceedings. The federal rules of evidence and the U.S. Supreme Court procedural rules are also available. One drawback – the information isn’t searchable or indexed with hyperlinks.

In any event, there seems to be no Canadian equivalent for litigation or procedural apps.

A quick search in the Apple iTunes stores for “Canada tax” returns 54 results, including an array of federal and provincial tax calculators. ”Canada courts” returns five items, including apps related to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, mortgage foreclosures, U.S. Miranda warnings, and a car dealership. A search for “Ontario civil procedure” returns one item, and “Canada tax court” returns zero items.

We are reminded of the very helpful event app developed by the Canadian Tax Foundation that has become a regular feature of the Foundation’s national and regional conferences.

We are confident that Canadian tax professionals would welcome a broader array of court and litigation procedure apps that would provide mobile access to most or all of the court and procedural information we’re stuffing into our oversized litigation bags.

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There’s A Litigation App For That?