In a ruling handed down May 6, 2013, the Federal Court of Appeal ordered that portions of a Crown pleading be struck out for suggesting that a deduction may be disallowed on the basis that the conduct of the taxpayer in incurring the expense was “egregious or repulsive”.  Sharlow J. A. wrote the reasons in Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. The Queen, 2013 FCA 122 in which Evans J.A. and Stratas J.A. concurred.

By way of background, the Canada Revenue Agency reassessed CIBC to disallow the deduction of some $3 billion of expenses incurred between 2002 and 2006.  The expenses at issue were incurred to settle litigation in the United States arising from losses suffered due to the collapse of Enron Corporation.  In the U.S. litigation, it was alleged that CIBC participated in the financing of Enron in a manner that made it liable to the complainants.

The Income Tax Act provides the formula for determining a taxpayer’s income for the year for income tax purposes.  Under paragraph 3(a), one component of a taxpayer’s income is income from a business of the taxpayer.  Under subsection 9(1), a taxpayer’s income for a year from a business is the taxpayer’s profit for the year from that business. 

The most important limitation on the scope of subsection 9(1) is paragraph 18(1)(a) which provides:

18. (1) In computing the income of a taxpayer from a business […] no deduction shall be made in respect of

(a) an outlay or expense except to the extent that it was made or incurred by the taxpayer for the purpose of gaining or producing income from the business […];

In 65302 British Columbia Limited v. The Queen, a 1999 decision in which the deduction of a fine was allowed (later to be specifically disallowed by Parliament), Iacobucci J. of the Supreme Court of Canada made the following observation:

It is conceivable that a breach [of the law] could be so egregious or repulsive that the fine subsequently imposed could not be justified as being incurred for the purpose of producing income.

In the contentious part of its pleading, the Crown relied on that obiter statement and offered the following theory of non-deductibility of expenses:

134. The misconduct of [CIBC and its affiliates] was so egregious and repulsive that any consequential settlement payments […] cannot be justified as being incurred for the purpose of gaining or producing income from a business or property within the meaning of paragraph 18(1)(a) of the [Income Tax] Act. The [CIBC affiliates] knowingly aided and abetted Enron to violate the United States’ federal securities laws and falsify its financial statements. The misconduct of [the CIBC affiliates] in enabling Enron to perpetrate its frauds, known to [CIBC], or the misconduct of [CIBC] itself, was so extreme, and the consequences so dire, that it could not be part of the business of a bank.

The Crown’s contention, in a nutshell, was that an expense incurred due to conduct of the taxpayer that was “egregious or repulsive”, is precluded from deduction by paragraph 18(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act.

The CIBC asked the Tax Court of Canada to strike out that paragraph along with the other portions of the pleading reflecting the same theory.  The Tax Court chose not to do so.  The Federal Court of Appeal disagreed and struck out the contentious paragraph along with the related parts.

In dismissing the Crown’s argument, the Federal Court of Appeal emphasized that “the only question to be asked in determining whether paragraph 18(1)(a) prohibits a particular deduction is this: Did the taxpayer incur the expense for the purpose of earning income?”  The Court concluded by stating that the characterization of the morality of a taxpayer’s conduct is not legally relevant to the application of paragraph 18(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act.

Parties are generally given the opportunity to make whatever arguments they consider necessary to their case with the ultimate determination being made by the trial judge who is in the best position to decide questions of relevance and weight in light of all the evidence.  It is rather unusual for a legal theory, novel though it is, to be taken off the table at such an early stage.  At the same time, courts are increasingly concerned about “proportionality” and are reluctant to allow scarce judicial resources to be spent on matters that are unlikely to have any effect on the outcome of the hearing.  Whatever one’s view of the matter the Crown rarely seeks leave to appeal on procedural points, making it unlikely that this decision will be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Canada.

Notwithstanding the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal, the Crown will still be able to argue that the deductions taken by CIBC ought to be disallowed on a variety of other grounds including:

• the deduction of the settlement payments does not accord with well accepted business principles;
• the settlement payments were not made for the purpose of earning income from a business;
• the settlement payments were outlays on account of capital;
• the settlement payments were contingent liabilities when made; and
• the amount of the settlement payments were not reasonable in the circumstances. 

Although the taxpayer has prevailed in this battle, the war has just begun.

 *  *  *

This article was first published in the International Tax Review.

A Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”) audit initiative is targeting taxpayers who have recently sold condominium units they did not occupy or occupied for only a short period of time (the “CRA Condo Project”).

The CRA is reassessing some of these dispositions on the basis that the condo was sold in the course of business, treating the profit as income (instead of capital gains) and, in some cases, assessing gross negligence penalties under subsection 163(2) of the Income Tax Act. In doing so, the CRA may be incorrectly reassessing some taxpayers whose gains are legitimate capital gains and that may be subject to the principal residence exemption (click here for a discussion of the principal residence exemption).

Consider this example. A taxpayer signs a pre-construction purchase agreement for a condo in 2007.  In 2009, the unit was completed and occupied by the taxpayer, before the entire development was finished and registered in land titles.  Land titles registration occurs in 2010, but shortly thereafter the taxpayer sells the condo for a profit.  Ordinarily, one would conclude the condo was held on account of capital and the gain would be at least partially exempt from tax on the basis that condo was the taxpayer’s principal residence.  The CRA may be inclined to reassess on the basis that land title records show the taxpayer on title for only a short time, as though the taxpayer had intended to merely “flip” the condo rather than reside in it.

This assessing position may be incorrect because the buyer of a condo does not appear on title until the entire condominium development is registered.  In fact, several years can pass from the date of signing the purchase agreement to occupancy to land titles registration – and, accordingly, the taxpayer’s actual length of ownership will not be apparent from the land title records.

This type of situation could cause serious problems for some taxpayers. If a taxpayer is audited and subject to reassessment on the basis that their entire gain should be taxed as income, the taxpayer will need to gather evidence and formulate arguments in time to respond to an audit proposal letter within 30 days, or file a Notice of Objection within 90 days of the date of a reassessment.

Taxpayers could respond to such a reassessment by providing evidence that they acquired the condo with the intent that it would be their residence, and that the subsequent sale was due to a change in life circumstances.  Taxpayers may wish to gather the following evidence to support such claims:

• Purchase and sales agreements;
• Letter or certificates granting permission to occupy the condo;
• Proof of occupancy, such as utility bills, bank statements, CRA notices, identification (such as a driver’s license) showing the condo as a residence; or
• Evidence of a change in life circumstances which caused the condo to no longer be a suitable residence, including:
  • Marriage or birth certificates;
  • A change of employer or enrollment in education that required relocation; or
  • Evidence showing the taxpayer cared for a sick or infirm relative, or had a disability that precluded using a condo as a residence.

Taxpayers should be prepared to provide reasonable explanations for any gaps in the evidence.  If a taxpayer wishes to explore how best to respond in the circumstances, they should consult with an experienced tax practitioner.

The June 6th breakfast meeting of the Toronto Centre CRA & Professionals Group promises to be particularly informative. It features presentations from senior Ottawa CRA officials on the work of the Rulings Directorate and the CRA’s administration of the General Anti-Avoidance Rule. This is in addition to the case comments provided by Cliff Rand of Deloitte Tax Law LLP and Arnold Bornstein of the Department of Justice.

Please click here to register for the June 6th breakfast meeting.

We are often asked to provide a “likelihood of success” opinion (frequently with percentage thresholds) with respect to a proposed transaction. As anyone whose been asked for such an opinion knows, it is far from an exact science.

This document has been around for a while, but recently arrived on our desks again. It is a helpful (and humourous) listing of each percentage along with its corresponding ”plain english” explanation.

Enjoy!

In the Provincial Income Allocation Newsletter No. 4 (March 2013), the Canada Revenue Agency notes that the Allocation Review Committee (“ARC”) has changed its position on amounts previously excluded in calculating “salary and wages paid in the year” for provincial income allocation purposes:

Effective for the 2013 tax year, the amount of salaries and wages paid in the year for the purpose of provincial income allocation calculations will include all taxable benefits that are to be included in the employees’ income in the year. This includes deemed amounts such as stock option benefits under section 7 of the Income Tax Act (Canada), regardless of whether these benefits are deductible in calculating the employer’s income.

Corporations having a permanent establishment in more than one province will need to consider the ARC’s change in position when preparing their next income tax return.  Applying the previous year’s method of calculation salaries and wages may fail to include all of the amounts now required to be included in the calculation.

In Sifto Canada Corp. v. Minister of National Revenue, 2013 FC 214, Prothonotary Aalto of the Federal Court rejected the Crown’s motion to strike out judicial review applications filed by Sifto Canada Corp. challenging decisions made by the Minister of National Revenue to:

(a) assess penalties contrary to the terms of the Voluntary Disclosure Program; and

(b) assess transfer pricing adjustments contrary to an agreement between the Competent Authorities of Canada and the United States on the appropriate transfer price under Article XXVI of the Canada-U.S. Tax Treaty (known as the “Mutual Agreement Procedure” or “MAP”).

The Crown made the usual argument that section 18.5 of the Federal Courts Act precludes such judicial review applications (for background, see our earlier post on the JP Morgan decision mentioned below).  Prothonotary Aalto had this to say about the Crown’s argument:

[8]    One of the mantras of the Minister of National Revenue is that the judicial review process should not be used to circumvent the comprehensive code for the assessment and collection of taxes set out in the Income Tax Act (ITA) and for which the Tax Court of Canada (TCC) is given exclusive jurisdiction.  As a general proposition, this is a correct approach to the taxation regime in Canada.  However, cases such as Chrysler Canada [2008 FC 727, aff’d 2008 FC 1049], JP Morgan Asset Management [2012 FC 651, aff’d 2012 FC 1366] and Canadian Pacific Railway [2012 FC 1030; aff’d 2013 FC 161] come to this Court and fall within this Court’s jurisdiction because of their unique factual circumstances.  This case, like those, revolves around a factual scenario which takes it out the pure assessment or appeal regime of the ITA and the jurisprudence recognizes that such matters can come within the jurisdiction of this Court.

Prothonotary Aalto explained his reasoning for allowing the applications to proceed:

[22]    In this case there are agreements which are alleged to have been entered into between Sifto and the Respondent which are alleged to have been breached.  These facts on their face do not engage issues of the correctness of assessments or appeals under the ITA.  They are therefore not bereft of any chance of success.  To the extent the breach of agreements and other allegations made in these applications engage matters beyond the scope of the correctness of an assessment or re-assessment they are not within the jurisdiction of the TCC.

[23]    The conduct of officials in CRA cannot be considered in determining the correctness of assessments [footnote omitted].  Such matters must be asserted in another Court.  Thus, the conduct of CRA officials as asserted by Sifto in this case relating to understandings and agreements cannot be considered by the TCC.

[24]    These applications engage more than a review of assessments to determine their correctness.  Therefore, it cannot be said that these applications are bereft of any chance of success.

In addition to arguing that the applications should be struck out in their entirety, the Crown argued in the alternative that certain allegations should be struck out or that the applications be stayed (by way of ”extension of time”) until the final determination of appeals against the assessments issued as a result of the impugned decisions.  Prothonotary Aalto had little difficulty dismissing each of the Crown’s alternative arguments.

The Crown has already made a motion asking a Federal Court judge to set aside the Prothonotary’s decision.  In light of the decisions of the Federal Court in Chrysler Canada, JP Morgan and Canadian Pacific, the Crown may very well be facing an uphill battle.

Since 1995, the Large Corporation Rules found in subsections 165(1.11), 169(2.1) and 152(4.4) of the Income Tax Act (Canada) have applied to discourage large corporations from objecting to tax assessments as a means of keeping tax years “open”. In Bakorp Management Ltd. v. The Queen, 2013 TCC 29, the Minister brought a motion to dismiss the corporation’s tax appeal on the basis that it failed to comply with the Large Corporation Rules. Basically, these rules require that an objection fled by a large corporation must reasonably describe each issue to be decided and, for each issue, must specify the relief sought as the amount of change in a balance. The rules also limit the issues and relief sought in a subsequent appeal to those set out in the objection. The locus classicus on the interpretation of these provisions is the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in The Queen v. Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan Inc., 2003 FCA 471.

In Bakorp, the corporation owned shares of another corporation that were redeemed in 1992 for $338M. As the proceeds from the redemption were received over a number of years, Bakorp reported in 1995 the portion of the deemed dividend related to proceeds received in 1995. The Minister reassessed Bakorp’s 1995 tax year to reduce the deemed dividend from $53M to $25M, a reduction of $28M. The corporation objected to the Minister’s reassessment and the Minister confirmed the reassessment. The corporation then filed a Notice of Appeal taking the position that the $28M deemed dividend remaining in its 1995 income was actually received in 1993 and should be included in the corporation’s 1993 tax year, not the 1995 year.

The Minister was, no doubt, surprised by Bakorp’s position to reduce the 1995 deemed dividend to zero. In response, the Minister brought a motion to dismiss the corporation’s appeal, arguing that the issue and relief set out in the Notice of Appeal were not those set out in the Notice of Objection.

Bakorp argued that it had complied with the Large Corporation Rules because the issue in both its objection and appeal was, fundamentally, the amount of deemed dividend to be included in its 1995 income. The Court disagreed noting that it could not “imagine a fuller reconstruction than making a 180 degree turn in what is to be included in income.” In the Court’s view, applying such a general approach to identifying the issue would render the Large Corporation Rules meaningless. In respect of specifying the relief sought, the Court was not prepared to accept that a complete reversal from wanting $53M included in income to wanting nothing included in income could be seen as complying with the Large Corporation Rules.

As a notice of appeal has been filed with the Federal Court of Appeal, the Tax Court’s reasoning will not be the last word in this particular matter. However, it is safe to say that the Bakorp decision is a timely reminder that large corporations must take particular care in preparing a Notice of Objection. Failure to do so may seriously impact a later appeal to the Tax Court of Canada.

The role of intent in the determination of whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor has taken on greater significance in the last decade or so. However, despite a series of decisions on the issue from the Tax Court and the Federal Court of Appeal, there appeared to be some inconsistency in respect of how and when intent was to be considered when applying the “four-in-one” test from Wiebe Door Services Ltd. v. The Queen ([1986] 3 F.C. 553) and 1671122 Ontario Ltd. v. Sagaz Industries Canada Inc. (2001 SCC 59).

In 1392644 Ontario Inc. (o/a Connor Homes) et al. v. The Queen (unreported; see court files 2010-948(CPP)I, 2010-949(CPP)I, 2010-950(EI)I, 2010-951(EI)I, 2011-237(EI)I, 2011-239(CPP)I, 2011-241(EI)I, 2011-242(CPP)I), the Tax Court held that several workers were employees of the appellant companies.

In the Federal Court of Appeal (2013 FCA 85), the taxpayers argued that the Tax Court judge had erred by (i) placing weight on the findings of fact made in other judgments involving the same appellants before the Tax Court, and (ii) not considering and misapplying the test for determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor, particularly by not giving proper weight to the intention of the parties as expressed in their contracts.

On the first issue, the Federal Court of Appeal held that the lower court had noted that the facts in the present appeal were essentially the same as those considered previously in three separate appeals before three other judges of the Tax Court. However, in this case, the lower court judge had reviewed the parties’ evidence, weighed it, and reached his own conclusions based on it. Thus, there was no error committed by the lower court judge.

On the second issue – the role of intent – the Federal Court of Appeal noted the jurisprudential trend towards affording substantial weight to the stated intention of the parties (see, for example, Wolf v. The Queen (2002 FCA 96), Royal Winnipeg Ballet v. The Queen (2006 FCA 87)). However, the Court of Appeal noted, there was some difficulty in the application of the approach described in Wolf and Royal Winnipeg Ballet. The Court of Appeal emphasized that the parties’ may describe their relationship as they see fit, but the legal effect that results from the relationship is not to be determined at the sole subjective discretion of the parties. The Federal Court of Appeal stated:

[38] Consequently, Wolf and Royal Winnipeg Ballet set out a two-step process of inquiry that is used to assist in addressing the central question, as established in Sagaz and Wiebe Door, which is to determine whether the individual is performing or not the services as his own business on his own account.

[39] Under the first step, the subjective intent of each party to the relationship must be ascertained. This can be determined either by the written contractual relationship the parties have entered into or by the actual behavior of each party, such as invoices for services rendered, registration for GST purposes and income tax filings as an independent contractor.

[40] The second step is to ascertain whether an objective reality sustains the subjective intent of the parties. … the subjective intent of the parties cannot trump the reality of the relationship as ascertained through objective facts. In this second step, the parties’ intent as well as the terms of the contract may also be taken into account since they color the relationship. … the relevant factors must be considered “in the light of” the parties’ intent. However, that being stated, the second step is an analysis of the pertinent facts for the purposes of determining whether the test set out in Wiebe Door and Sagaz has been in fact met, i.e., whether the legal effect of the relationship the parties have established is one of independent contractor or of employer-employee.

The Court of Appeal noted that, in the present case, the lower court judge had proceeded in an inverse order (i.e., dealing with the parties’ intent at the end of his analysis). The Court of Appeal stated that the first step of the analysis should always be to determine the intent of the parties. However, despite the lower court’s inverse analysis, the judge had reached the correct conclusion regarding the status of the workers.

The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the taxpayers’ appeals.

This is helpful guidance from the Federal Court of Appeal on the manner and stage at which intent should be considered when determining whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor.

We’ve gone global . . . just like our clients. Today was our first day online at dentons.com giving you a “first look” at the impressive combination of SNR Denton, Salans and FMC to form Dentons. We now have more than 2,500 lawyers and professionals in 79 locations in 52 countries. What does this mean for our tax clients? We can help you access the right value-added tax expertise around the world, particularly when tax authorities in more than one jurisdiction are reviewing your affairs (e.g. simultaneous cross-border audits), when contentious issues arise with the Canada Revenue Agency or when you need to appeal to the Tax Court of Canada.

Questions? Just let us know.

On March 21, 2013, the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed (with costs) the application for leave to appeal in the case of Donna M. Johnson v. Her Majesty The Queen.

The issue in Johnson was the tax treatment of receipts from a Ponzi scheme. The Tax Court (2011 TCC 540) allowed the taxpayer’s appeal and held that the receipts were not income from a source for the purpose of paragraph 3(a) of the Income Tax Act. The Federal Court of Appeal (2012 FCA 253) reversed the lower court’s decision, allowing the Crown’s appeal.

I commented on the decisions of the Tax Court and the Federal Court of Appeal in the March 2013 Ontario Bar Association Tax Section newsletter.

The Canada Revenue Agency had an important win this week in its efforts to access information outside of Canada.  On March 20, 2013, the Federal Court issued its decision in Soft-Moc Inc. v. M.N.R.  2013 FC 291, dismissing Soft-Moc’s judicial review application to have the CRA’s decision to issue a Foreign-Based Information Requirement set aside or varied.

The CRA has broad powers to access information related to the determination of a taxpayer’s tax obligations.  Under subsection 231.6 of the Income Tax Act, these powers include the issuance of a Foreign-Based Information Requirement to obtain information or documents located outside of Canada.

In Soft-Moc, the CRA was conducting a transfer pricing audit and sought information from corporations in the Bahamas who provided services to Soft-Moc.  These corporations and their individual Bahamian resident shareholder owned 90% of the common shares of Soft-Moc.  The CRA issued a Foreign-Based Information Requirement to Soft-Moc under subsection 231.6(2) of the Income Tax Act. 

The Requirement requested substantial amounts of information related to the Bahamas Corporations including extensive details of the services provided, customers, financial statements, costs and profits and employee data.  Soft-Moc applied for judicial review of the decision to issue the requirement. 

Primarily, Soft-Moc argued that the information requested went well beyond that necessary to enable the CRA to complete the transfer pricing audit and that the decision to issue the requirement was, therefore, unreasonable.  Soft-Moc argued that a portion of the information requested was irrelevant and that some portions were confidential or proprietary. 

The Court was not sympathetic to Soft-Moc’s arguments, noting the wide-ranging statutory powers of the CRA to collect information and the low threshold to be met in determining whether the requested information is relevant and reasonable. 

This win, which was not surprising in light of the Federal Court of Appeal’s earlier decision in Saipem Luxembourg S.A. v. The Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, 2005 FCA 218, will encourage the CRA to continue to use foreign-based requirements more frequently and earlier in the audit process.

A tax dispute with the Canada Revenue Agency may be an unwelcome and unpleasant experience for a taxpayer. In addition to the potentially complex tax issues, the dispute resolution process itself can be a nuanced and challenging process. However, an appeal to the Tax Court of Canada offers taxpayers a chance to have their disputes considered by “fresh eyes,” which could result in a victory, settlement or other efficient resolution.

In the March 15, 2013 issue of The Lawyers Weekly, I discuss some of the ways a tax appeal differs from a typical civil trial.

The taxpayer in this case, NRT Technology Corp, successfully applied before the Federal Court for judicial review in respect of a decision of an Assistant Director of the Toronto Tax Services Office of the Canada Revenue Agency denying NRT’s request for the cancellation of a penalty under the Taxpayer Relief Provisions pursuant to subsection 220(3.1) of the Income Tax Act (Canada). The style of cause is NRT Technology Corp v. Attorney General of Canada, 2013 FC 200.

Background

On February 26, 2006, NRT paid a bonus to its President in the amount of $7,093,000 (the “Bonus”). On March 14, 2006, NRT remitted corresponding withholding payroll taxes in the amount of $2,848,548.80. On March 23, 2006, CRA assessed NRT for a 10% late remitting penalty in the amount of $284,805 as NRT had accelerated remitter status which it was notified of by the CRA in November 2005. CRA determined that NRT ought to have remitted the $2,848,548.80 on March 3, 2006 and its failure to do so warranted the assessment of a penalty.

Upon payment of the Bonus, NRT was advised by its tax advisor to hold off on the payroll remittances to the CRA until further instruction was received by her. On March 13, 2006, NRT’s tax advisor indicated that she had been advised by the CRA that NRT was obliged to withhold and remit the full amount of tax due on the payment of the Bonus by March 15, 2006. On March 14, 2006, NRT remitted the payroll taxes on account of the payment of the Bonus.

The First Taxpayer Relief Request

On November 9, 2006, in response of a relief request dated September 13, 2006 by NRT, the CRA denied the request stating that a “review of the account history and the circumstances outlined in [NRT’s] letter [had] failed to substantiate that [NRT was] prevented from complying with the [CRA’s] requirements.” The CRA further indicated that NRT failed to demonstrate that the lateness was the result of extenuating circumstances or the result of CRA departmental error and that as a result, the directors of NRT did not exercise reasonable care with respect to the remittance.

The Second Taxpayer Relief Request

On July 18, 2007, NRT filed for a second administrative review in relation to the taxpayer relief request. In a letter dated December 14, 2007, the Director denied the requested relief.

Under the second level review process, an officer reviews the applicant’s second level review submissions and prepares a recommendation report for the review of the Director. The Director then decides whether to grant the relief sought. In this case, the officer’s report and ultimate decision made by the Director and communicated to NRT by letter dated December 14, 2007 were at issue (the “Decision Letter”).

The officer’s report recommended that relief should not be granted on the basis that NRT exhibited a degree of carelessness in its handling of the Bonus and failed to act quickly to remedy the error. In accepting the recommendation in the officer’s report, the Decision Letter indicated that there was no evidence that NRT was misdirected by the CRA or that the CRA failed to provide information to NRT in a timely manner. It was further stated that NRT was careless in its handling of the bonus and was not quick to remedy the error.

The focus of the Federal Court’s analysis was on the reasonableness of the impugned second level decision.

The Applicant’s Argument

It was NRT’s contention that given the broad authority available to the Minister to grant relief under s. 220(3.1) and the extraordinary circumstances, the Minister’s decision to deny relief was unreasonable. Further, no reasons were given as to how NRT failed to quickly act to remedy the error that had been committed. NRT noted that once its tax advisor had advised it to remit, it did so without delay.

The Respondent’s Argument

In noting that deference was owed to the CRA under the reasonableness standard of review, the Crown reiterated its reasons as outlined in the Decision Letter in support of its position.

The Decision of the Federal Court

The Federal Court noted that it was not clear what exactly the “error” was which was not acted upon quickly enough. If the “error” was failing to remit on or before March 3, 2006, this error was rectified with NRT’s remittance on March 14, 2006, a day after it was advised by its tax advisor that such remittance was required immediately, contrary to NRT’s belief that the remittance was required by March 15, 2006.

If the “error” was not paying the penalty in a timely manner, the Federal Court noted that the offsetting amount pursuant to the flow-through shares acquired by NRT was not accounted for until August 2006. As such, there was no way for NRT to know how much was owed until that time. Moreover, the reduced amount owing was offset against GST refunds in November 2006. If this was in fact the “error” referenced in the Decision Letter, NRT had taken steps to reduce the amount and ultimately settle the balance in a timely manner.

As there was no indication in the Decision letter as to what the “error” was, why NRT’s rectification was not sufficiently prompt, or how NRT could have rectified the situation more quickly, the Federal Court concluded that the reasoning in the Decision Letter was equivocal. The steps taken by NRT were supportive of its claim that it quickly remedied its failure to remit the amount due and that it took steps to address the penalty owed. The Court therefore found in favor of NRT, concluding that the “…Director’s decision that NRT failed to quickly remedy the error to be unreasonable as it fails the requirements of being justified, transparent and intelligible as required under Dunsmuir.”

Reflections

The impact of this decision goes beyond merely chastising the CRA for a poorly written letter. There appears to be a “cut and paste” approach applied by the CRA from time to time which may cause a reasonable observer to believe that the taxpayer’s circumstances were not fully considered, particularly where the taxpayer’s conduct reflects a considerable degree of due diligence.  It is hoped that this decision will cause those at the CRA who are responsible for reviewing taxpayer relief requests to thoroughly consider the circumstances of each case, particularly where quick action was taken in the direction of compliance - taxpayers deserve no less.

On February 21, 2013, the Federal Court of Appeal released two decisions related to the obligations of the Minister of National Revenue when making ex parte applications under subsection 231.2(3) of the Income Tax Act (the “Act”) for judicial authorization requiring taxpayers to produce certain information and documents relating to customers.  In Minister of National Revenue v. RBC Life Insurance Company et al., 2013 FCA 50, the FCA affirmed the decision of the Federal Court (reported at 2011 FC 1249) cancelling four authorizations issued by the Federal Court in relation to customers of the Respondent companies who had purchased a particular insurance product that has been described as “10-8 insurance plans”.  In Minister of National Revenue v. Lordco Parts Ltd., the FCA adopted its reasoning in RBC and again affirmed a judgment of the Federal Court cancelling an authorization that had required information in respect of certain employees of the Respondent.

In both cases, the FCA reaffirmed the Minister’s “high standard of good faith” and the powers of the Federal Court to curtail abuses of process by the Crown.

In RBC, the Minister argued that the facts that it failed to disclose on its ex parte application before the Federal Court were not relevant to the applications. Reviewing the judgment of the Federal Court, the FCA concluded that the Minister failed to disclose the following facts:

• The Department of Finance’s refusal to amend the Act;
• Information in an advance income tax ruling;
• CRA’s decision to “send a message to the industry” to chill the 10-8 plans; and
• The GAAR committee had determined the plans complied with letter of Act.

The FCA held that the Federal Court’s finding that these facts were relevant was a question of mixed fact and law and the Minister had not demonstrated palpable and overriding error by the Federal Court judge. At a minimum, this suggests the Crown may have to disclose information of the sort included in the enumerated list.  Examining that list is interesting and suggests a requirement to include in the disclosure to the Federal Court judge hearing an ex parte application facts related to legislative history and intent including discussions about potential problems and possible legislative “fixes”, internal analysis of issues within the CRA including other advance income tax rulings, motivations on the part of the CRA and its officers and agents that may extend beyond auditing the particular facts, and previous analysis of the facts known  to the CRA and indications that those facts might support compliance with the Act and inapplicability of the GAAR.  That is a very extensive list, and it is encouraging to know that Crown obligations extend into each of these areas.

Further, the FCA held that even if the Federal Court on review of an ex parte order determined that the Minister had a valid audit purpose, it was open to the Federal Court to cancel the authorization based on the Minister’s lack of disclosure.  Somewhat surprisingly, the Minister argued that section 231.2(6), unlike section 231.2(3), did not allow for judicial discretion. Once the statutory conditions are established, the Minister argued, the Federal Court judge MUST NOT cancel the authorizations, no matter how egregiously the Crown acted.  The FCA rejected this argument, reaffirming the importance of judicial discretion and the duty of the Minister to act in good faith:

[26] In seeking an authorization under subsection 231.2(3), the Minister cannot leave “a judge…in the dark” on facts relevant to the exercise of discretion, even if those facts are harmful to the Minister’s case: Derakhshani, supra at paragraph 29; M.N.R. v. Weldon Parent Inc., 2006 FC 67 at paragraphs 153-155 and 172. The Minister has a “high standard of good faith” to make “full disclosure” so as to “fully justify” an ex parte order under subsection 231.1(3): M.N.R. v. National Foundation for Christian Leadership, 2004 FC 1753, aff’d 2005 FCA 246 at paragraphs 15-16. See also Canada Revenue Agency, Acquiring Information from Taxpayers, Registrants and Third Parties (issued June 2010).

The Minister’s argument, the FCA held, also runs contrary to the inherent power of the Federal Court to “redress abuses of process, such as the failure to make full and frank disclosure of relevant information on an ex parte application” (para 33):

The Federal Courts’ power to control the integrity of its own processes is part of its core function, essential for the due administration of justice, the preservation of the rule of law and the maintenance of a proper balance of power among the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government. Without that power, any court – even a court under section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 – is emasculated, and is not really a court at all. (para 36)

Overall, the RBC decision strongly reaffirms the role of the Federal Court in ensuring the Minister acts in good faith when making ex parte applications.  Given the broad powers granted in subsection 231.2(3) and elsewhere in the Act, it is reassuring to know that the Courts can, and will, protect taxpayers and citizens generally by ensuring that the CRA puts all relevant information before the Court when it seeks to exercise those powers.

On February 6, 2013, at the Toronto-Centre Tax Professionals Breakfast Seminar, the Canada Revenue Agency discussed its current strategic activities and priorities and changes to the Scientific Research & Experimental Development (SR&ED) program.

Strategic Direction

Derrick Smith, Director of Policy Integration and Coordination Division of the Strategic Policy Directorate, Strategy and Integration Branch, presented on the CRA’s current strategic activities and priorities. A brief overview of the issues he discussed are as follows:

• Intelligent compliance management: The CRA is increasing its use of business intelligence and advanced analytics to ensure more efficient and effective compliance intervention. This is inspired in part by Australia’s “industry campaign” approach and may include informing taxpayers of errors or other methods of encouraging compliance before a formal audit.
• Integration of taxpayer experience: The CRA intends to create more online tools for taxpayers to minimize interaction with the CRA and simplify access to information and services. This is similar to the U.S. digital government strategy and the Australian Centrelink initiative.
• Early certainty about tax issues: The CRA intends to facilitate advance decisions, update technical bulletins by soliciting the assistance of private practitioners with the oversight of the CRA, and develop the online Quick View interface for taxpayers to learn about the status of charities.
• Influence compliance attitudes: The CRA will use advertising campaigns and social media to attempt to change moral attitudes towards tax compliance. The CRA cited the recent announcement by Starbucks that it will voluntarily pay tax in the United Kingdom after a public outcry over the corporation’s tax planning.
• Increased reliance on third parties: The CRA will reach out to third parties to help achieve policy goals. This may take a variety of forms including engaging academics for discourse on policy, partnering with provinces and territories to address the underground economy, engaging in social media, and inviting tax practitioners to be involved in the production of CRA commentary.
• Continued transition to electronic communications: The CRA continues its efforts to encourage Canadians to file electronically and engage the online tools available to them.
• Improved use of collected data: The CRA has amassed substantial financial and tax data, but this data is not being efficiently stored or accessed in the CRA’s computer systems. The CRA intends to enhance the use and usability of the data available to it.
• Optimized organization and workforce: The CRA intends to modernize its workforce and working environment.

SR&ED Formal Pre-Approval Process

Nancy Karigiannis, Research & Technology Policy Coordinator for the Technical Guidance Division of the Scientific Research & Experimental Development Directorate, Compliance Program Branch, discussed the CRA’s initiative to streamline the SR&ED program. In particular, Ms. Karigiannis discussed recent initiatives to enhance the online accessibility and self-assessment tools available to taxpayers and the newly developed Formal Pre-Approval Process (“FPAP”).

The FPAP is a response to the report submitted by the expert federal panel on R&D to the federal government in October 2011, called Innovation Canada: A Call to Action, which called for the simplification of the SR&ED program (among other initiatives). After conducting a feasibility study and consulting internal and external industry experts, the CRA is now ready to initiate an FPAP pilot program and is looking for a diverse selection of claimants who are willing to participate.

The CRA intends to provide enhanced predictability to SR&ED applicants by allowing the CRA to conduct eligibility determinations in “real time” (i.e., during the development process) instead of after the application has been filed. The CRA will provide feedback to participants on agency expectations, the type of supporting evidence necessary for compliance, and other advice regarding filing requirements. By the end of the service, the necessary materials should be complete and ready for filing minimizing year-end work for the taxpayer.

Taxpayers interested in taking part in the FPAP pilot program should consult the requirements for eligibility and be certain to contact the CRA before February 14, 2013.

The recent Federal Court of Appeal decision of Edwards v. The Queen (2012 FCA 330) includes an interesting observation dealing with the Canada Revenue Agency’s policy with respect to proposed legislation.

In Edwards, the taxpayer was involved in a charitable donation scheme. Essentially, the taxpayer was able to obtain a charitable donation tax credit in an amount greater than his outlay or gift. The taxpayer was one of approximately 8,000 taxpayers that had been reassessed, and Edwards was the lead case for eight other appeals.

In the Tax Court, the taxpayer brought a motion for an adjournment of the hearing pending the enactment of proposed amendments to the Income Tax Act. The proposed amendments would be retroactive to when they were first announced. They may have allowed the taxpayer to claim all or a portion of the denied credit.

The CRA had been applying the proposed amendments as if they were law. However, the CRA refused to apply the amendments in the taxpayer’s case. The CRA took the view that the rules did not apply in his situation. As this was an administrative position on proposed amendments rather than law, the taxpayer could not challenge this decision.

The Tax Court denied the taxpayer’s adjournment request (2012 TCC 264).

The Federal Court of Appeal held that the motions judge made no error in denying the application for adjournment. At the time of the hearing of the motion it was not clear if the amendments would be enacted. However, the amendments were subsequently included in a bill to amend the Income Tax Act that received first reading on November 26, 2012. The Federal Court of Appeal found that this new information was a sufficient basis for reversing the motions judgment and granting the adjournment.

In obiter, Justice Evans noted that “there seems something fundamentally unfair in the CRA’s administration of proposed amendments to the Income Tax Act for the past ten years as if they were already law.”

Another example is proposed section 56.4. It has been in draft form since 2005. The proposed rule governs the tax treatment of restrictive covenants. As a matter of existing statute and case law, until proposed section 56.4 is enacted, it is arguable that restrictive covenants should receive the tax treatment described in case law such as the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Manrell v. the Queen (2003 FCA 128).

However, advisors and clients – mindful that the proposals will likely become law with retroactive effect – instead find themselves complying with legislative proposals that change over time and impose compliance burdens that are not clear. Proposed section 56.4 includes election provisions referencing prescribed forms that have not actually been prescribed. Taxpayers must satisfy themselves that they have provided sufficient supporting information, a matter over which the CRA retains discretion.

Sometimes the administration of proposed law for long periods of time becomes itself the subject of legislative proposals. For example, for close to a decade there were proposed changes to section 94.1, which deals with certain offshore investments. Ultimately, the proposed changes were withdrawn. Ironically, this has caused the need for new proposed legislation to provide a mechanism for relief for taxpayers who had complied with the unenacted original proposals.

Worse still, taxpayers and advisors must sometime rely only on press releases describing proposed legislation in arranging their tax affairs. For example, recent changes to rules respecting “stapled securities” were announced on July 20, 2011, with intended effect for some taxpayers one year from that date. The proposed legislation itself was released mere days after the intended effective date on July 25, 2012. To echo Justice Evan’s comments there seems to be something “fundamentally unfair” about the proposed laws a taxpayer must comply with being released days after compliance must begin.

It is hoped that the rather pointed remarks by Justice Evans lead to a review by the Department of Finance and the Canada Revenue Agency of this unsatisfactory state of affairs.

In Stanley J. Tessmer Law Corporation v The Queen, 2013 TCC 27, Justice Paris of the Tax Court of Canada confirmed that the general GST charging provision in section 165 of the Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15 (the “ETA”) does not infringe section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”).  Section 10(b) of the Charter provides:

Everyone has the right on arrest or detention

…

to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right;

The Appellant (“Tessmer”) provides criminal defence legal services.  During the period July 1, 1999 to December 31, 2006, Tessmer did not collect GST (totaling $228,440.97) in respect of legal services for criminal defence work charged to clients who had been arrested or detained and who were either charged with a criminal offence or who had been arrested with criminal charges pending.

Tessmer did not conduct an independent review of the financial circumstances of its clients to determine the ability of its individual clients to afford its fees and any GST exigible on those fees.  In addition, no financial records of any of Tessmer’s individual clients were produced at the hearing.

The Minister of National Revenue (the “Minister”) assessed Tessmer for such GST plus interest and penalty, and Tessmer appealed those assessments to the Tax Court.  In the context of those appeals, the parties decided to bring a reference to the Tax Court, pursuant to section 310 of the ETA, to determine the following question raised by Tessmer in its appeals:

Whether, based on the facts set out in the Agreed Statement of Facts filed herewith, the goods and services tax (GST) imposed by s. 165 of the Excise Tax Act infringes or is inconsistent with the rights of the Appellant’s clients guaranteed by ss. 7 and ss. 10(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms such that s. 165 of the Excise Tax Act is, to the extent of any such inconsistency and, subject to s.1 of the Charter, of no force and effect by reason of s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act.

Although the question put to the Tax Court referred to both sections 7 and 10(b) of the Charter, Tessmer’s counsel advised the Tax Court at the hearing that he was only relying on section 10(b) of the Charter, and the above question was amended accordingly.

Subsection 165(1) of the ETA, the general GST charging provision, read as follows during the periods at issue:

Subject to this Part, every recipient of a taxable supply made in Canada shall pay to Her Majesty in right of Canada tax in respect of the supply calculated at the rate of 7% [note: 6% for the period between July 1, 2006 through December 31, 2006 – Ed.] on the value of the consideration for the supply.

Tessmer argued that a tax on criminal defence legal services provided to a person who has been arrested or detained is inconsistent with that person’s right under section 10(b) of the Charter to retain or instruct counsel of choice, on the basis that the tax is an impediment to the exercise of that right and is therefore unconstitutional with respect to both purpose and effect.  Relying on a U.S. case (United States v. Stein, SI 05 Crim. 0888 LAK United States District Court, Southern District of New York June 26, 2006), Tessmer argued that a tax on criminal defence legal fees will interfere with the right to counsel since the additional cost of the tax to an accused will interfere with the financial resources available to mount a defence to the charges brought against him or her.

Tessmer also argued that it was not required to provide evidence that any of its clients were denied counsel of their choice as a result of the tax imposed on the services of counsel.  Instead, and relying on a series of past Charter cases, Tessmer argued that it only needed to show that the general effect of the tax is unconstitutional under reasonably hypothetical circumstances.

The Tax Court, therefore, was required to determine whether either of the purpose or the effect of subsection 165(1) of the ETA was contrary to section 10(b) of the Charter.

With respect to the purpose of subsection 165(1) of the ETA, the Tax Court readily found that the purpose of that provision was not unconstitutional:

[31]        The appellant contends that the general purpose of the GST legislation imposing the tax is to raise revenue but that it also has a specific purpose to tax an accused with respect to the provision of legal services in defence of a State-sponsored prosecution. Its only submission regarding the unconstitutionality of the purpose of the tax was that it is patently inconsistent to prosecute a person and at the same time tax the legal services that the person requires in order to defend against the prosecution.

[32]        I am unable to ascribe the specific purpose suggested by the appellant to subsection 165(1) of the ETA, ….

[33]        Subsection 165(1) is a provision of general application and covers an infinite variety of transactions. I do not believe that it can be said that a specific purpose of subsection 165(1) is to tax legal services in defence of a State-sponsored prosecution since Parliament has not singled out those particular services for different treatment under that provision. Therefore I find that the appellant has not shown that subsection 165(1) of the ETA has an invalid purpose.

With respect to the effect of subsection 165(1) of the ETA, the Tax Court rejected Tessmer’s arguments that no evidence of an impediment to section 10(b) Charter rights was required.  The Tax Court stated, in relevant part, as follows:

[54]        From my review of the Supreme Court decisions on point, it appears that a party may only rely on hypotheticals to establish a factual foundation for a Charter challenge where actual facts are not available to that party. In such cases, the Court has been willing to consider imaginable circumstances which could easily arise in day-to-day life. ….

[55]        A party will also be relieved from presenting any factual foundation at all in cases where the unconstitutionality of the impugned legislation is apparent on the face of the legislation.

[56]        Apart from these limited exceptions, a party challenging legislation will be required to bring evidence of the effects of the legislation. Therefore, I reject the appellant’s contention that in any Charter challenge the Court may rely on imaginable circumstances to establish the effects of impugned legislation.

[57]        Furthermore, since the appellant does not take the position that evidence of the effect of the GST on the ability of its clients who were detained or arrested to afford its services is unavailable, I find that this case does not fall within the exception set out in Mills and implicitly recognized in Seaboyer/Gayme.

[58]        It is also obvious that the section 12 Charter standard of review which was applied in Goltz and Ferguson is not relevant to this case.

…

[64]        In response to the appellant’s submission that prejudice to a person’s section 10(b) rights must be presumed in this case, I can only say that I am unable to easily imagine that a person who has been arrested or detained would be prevented or even deterred from retaining and instructing counsel in that situation by the additional GST payable on counsel fees.

[65]        Finally, I do not accept the appellant’s contention that the constitutionality of the GST on criminal legal defence services is a question of law alone and therefore that it is not required to produce any evidence because it is apparent on its face that the tax will impede access to counsel.

Therefore, in the absence of evidence that any of Tessmer’s clients were unable to retain counsel as a result of the GST payable on legal services, the Tax Court found that the GST imposed under section 165 of the ETA does not infringe section 10(b) of the Charter.

Interestingly, the Tax Court hearing took place on December 15, 2011, and the decision was released on January 28, 2013.  Tessmer is still within the time limit to file an appeal with the Federal Court of Appeal, so it remains to be determined whether the Tax Court’s judgment remains the final word on this issue.

The Canada Revenue Agency has now published a set of answers to questions and concerns about the audit process presented to it by the Tax Executives Institute late last year (see our earlier blog post).

One of the highlights is the set of answers by the CRA to a series of questions about its new risk-based audit process.  The questions and answers on that subject are as follows:

Question 12 – Risk-based Audit Process

In 2011 CRA announced it was instituting a risk-based approach to audits whereby CRA would meet with senior representatives of the taxpayer to:

• Explain the redefined risk-based approach to large business compliance and how the approach affects taxpayers;

• Share CRA’s findings and observations noted during the taxpayer’s risk assessment; and

• Understand how the taxpayer manages tax risk at its highest governance levels.

With the first round of meetings with taxpayers complete, TEI has the following questions in respect of the approach:

a) Would CRA share its general observations, findings, trends, or conclusions with respect to the state of tax-risk governance?

Response by CRA:

The Approach to Large Business Compliance is being phased in over a five-year period commencing in 2010-11. During this period, CRA officials conduct meetings with Large Business enterprises’ senior executives to discuss tax compliance and risk of non-compliance associated with their business activities, governance regime, internal controls, and inherent and behavioral risk factors affecting their risk segmentation. At this point in time, it is still premature to draw general conclusions on the state of tax-risk governance. We have noted that there are taxpayers with no formal method of identifying and responding to corporate tax risk. These taxpayers are informed that this lack of tax risk governance, in the absence of other mitigating controls, will weigh negatively on their overall risk rating with the CRA.

b) In the interests of transparency, will CRA consider publishing a document outlining and discussing its review and risk-assessment process?

Response by CRA:

The CRA is of the view that the success of the Approach to Large Business Compliance is based on a well-informed, transparent tri-partite relationship. Providing further information on the risk assessment process in a published document would be in the best interests of all parties. As this initiative unfolds, the CRA will be in a better position to further communicate the risk-assessment process.

c) Has the first round of meetings with taxpayers led CRA to consider changes to its risk-assessment process and will it publicly announce the changes? Will affected taxpayers be apprised of changes to the scope of the risk-management approach that apply to their cases?

Response by CRA:

There have been no major changes in the risk assessment process. As expected, we are fine-tuning our risk assessment process and exploring ways to leverage technology in our drive to a more automated state and enhanced accuracy and efficiency.

d) Will CRA review the risk assessment with the affected taxpayer, including discussing the criteria and factors used to determine a taxpayer’s risk rating? If a taxpayer disagrees with its risk-assessment rating, what steps can it take to address its concerns?

Response by CRA:

During the face-to-face meetings, the taxpayer is informed of their risk rating. At that time, they will be informed of why they have attained this rating and what can be done to reduce the rating in the future. It is, however, not a debating forum where taxpayers can “negotiate” a better rating.

e) Assuming a taxpayer’s risk profile can change over time, will CRA revisit its risk-assessment ratings on a regular basis? If so, how often will the assessment be revised? Will CRA meet again with the taxpayer’s senior executives to review the revised rating?

Response by CRA:

Each taxpayer is risk assessed on a yearly basis based on the latest available information. Currently, as for the meetings, CRA officials are meeting with each Large Business taxpayer and discussing their individual risk rating over the 5-year phase-in period. Once this round of meetings is completed, CRA will consider revisiting taxpayers to review their rating.

f) Can CRA provide any details about the factors affecting a taxpayer’s risk rating?

Response by CRA:

The CRA’s Approach to Large Business Compliance (ALBC) discloses the criteria used in risk evaluating all taxpayers. The large business population is being risk assessed using several techniques, such as:

• Undertaking a historical analysis of audit results and a corresponding analysis of behavioural patterns;

• Examining every large business taxpayer in their TSOs and assessing their risk based on analysis and local knowledge;

• Conducting issue-based risk assessment to determine whether taxpayers are participating in tax planning schemes;

Additionally, consideration is being given to a number of risk factors, such as:

• Audit history;

• Industry sector issues;

• Unusual and/or complex transactions;

• Corporate structure;

• Major acquisitions and disposals;

• International transactions;

• Corporate governance;

• Participation in aggressive tax planning; and

• Openness and transparency.

These factors will vary by taxpayer and the taxpayers will be advised as to the factors considered in their risk assessment when the ALBC approach is discussed, in the face to face meeting that the CRA will hold with them. All factors are considered collectively in arriving a global risk rating for the entity.

g) Will CRA inform other tax jurisdictions (provincial or foreign) of its findings in respect of a taxpayer’s risk rating?

Response by CRA:

CRA has not shared any information related to any taxpayer’s risk rating with any other tax jurisdiction. In the future, any request made by another tax jurisdiction will be reviewed by the CRA on a case by case basis, while respecting the Provision of Information laws outlined in section 241 of the Income Tax Act and the relevant international exchange of information protocols.

h) What guidance has been provided to the TSOs to ensure that the objectives of the new audit approach are applied consistently by all the TSOs?

Response by CRA:

Given the prominence of risk assessment and the impact of risk rating on the design and implementation of the Approach to Large Business Compliance, a national risk assessment calibration committee has been formed to supplement the regional calibration committees thus ensuring national and regional consistency.

In certain other responses, the CRA refers to its strategic plan entitled “Vision 2020″ (question 2) and issues around Scientific Research & Experimental Development (question 3).  Both subjects will be discussed in detail at a breakfast seminar of the Toronto Centre CRA & Professionals Group at the Toronto Board of Trade to be held on Wednesday, February 6, 2013.

On December 20, 2012, the Tax Court ruled on a motion under Rule 52 of the Tax Court of Canada Rules (General Procedure) (the “Rules”) to require the Minister to comply with a demand for particulars specifying how the Income Tax Act (the “Act”) was abused in a General Anti-Avoidance rule (“GAAR”) case.

In Birchcliff Energy Ltd. v The Queen (2012-10887(IT)G), the Minister alleged that the GAAR should apply because the series of transactions (the “Transactions”) undertaken by the taxpayer resulted in a misuse of 10 sections of the Act and an abuse of the Act as a whole. In response, the taxpayer sought an order requiring the Minister to disclose the policy behind each section of the Act that was allegedly abused and how the Transactions abused that policy.

The Tax Court held that the Minister must disclose the object, spirit, and purpose of the provisions of the Act (the “Policy”) that the assessor relied upon in making the assessment. The Minister does not need to disclose the actual Policy that will be argued at trial, or the way that the Policy was abused.

Arguments

The taxpayer argued that in making a GAAR assessment, the Minister must assume as a fact the Policy and an abuse of that Policy. Relying on Johnston v M.N.R. (1948 S.C.R. 486), the taxpayer argued that the Crown had a duty to disclose “precise findings of fact and rulings of law which have given rise to the controversy”. The taxpayer also argued that there was a heightened obligation on the Minister to be specific in cases of misconduct, negligence, or misrepresentation, relying on Chief Justice Bowman’s decision in Ver v Canada ([1995] T.C.J. No. 593). Misuse or abuse, it was argued, belonged in the category of offenses requiring more precise disclosure.

The Minister, on the other hand, argued that the Policy was a conclusion of law, not fact and that only allegations of fact must be disclosed in particulars. The Minister raised a “slippery slope” argument, suggesting that this ruling could require the Crown to explain its legal interpretation of all provisions of the Act in the future. Although the Minister acknowledged that Trustco v Canada (2005 SCC 54) placed the burden of identifying the Policy on the Crown, that burden did not apply to pleadings. The Minister also argued that disclosing the Policy would not help the Appellant because the Minister could still argue a different policy at trial.

Decision

The Tax Court highlighted the unique nature of GAAR, and stated that any disclosure requirements from this case would only apply to GAAR assessments. Justice Campbell Miller specifically pointed to the Crown’s burden to prove the Policy in GAAR cases as evidence of its unique requirements.

Justice Miller separated the elements of the Policy into two distinct categories:

1)      The actual Policy that would be argued and decided at trial (the “True Policy”), and

2)      The fact that the Crown relied on a particular Policy when determining that GAAR should be applied (the “Historical Policy”).

The Court held that the True Policy was a question of law that should ultimately be decided by the court. This policy was open to change throughout the course of litigation and did not need to be disclosed to the Appellant at this stage.

The Historical Policy, however, was held to be “a material fact, not an assumption, but the fact the Minister relied upon x or y policy underlying the legislative provisions at play in the case.” Taxpayers are entitled in pleadings to know the basis of the assessment. Disclosing the Historical Policy would be similar to disclosing the legislation upon which non-GAAR assessments are made. The Court distinguished the Historical Policy from the type of materials to which the taxpayer was denied access in Mastronardi v The Queen (2010 TCC 57), a recent Tax Court decision holding that the Minister did not need to disclose the extrinsic materials on which the Minister relied in determining the Policy. In Mastronardi, the materials sought to be disclosed were evidence that could be used to prove the policy, rather than the material fact of which policy was relied on (evidence itself is not a material fact).

The Historical Policy that must be disclosed is not the Policy of each identified section in isolation. The Minister must identify the collective policy of all of the identified provisions together that the Crown relied on in making the assessment. The Historical Policy should be disclosed under paragraph 49(1)(e) of the Rules as “any other material fact”.

With regards to the Appellant’s request for information on how the Policy was abused, the Court held that it was not required to be disclosed. Abuse is a conclusion of law to be determined by the court based on the Policy and the facts of the case. The Minister did not assume how the Policy was abused as a fact. The Minister concluded, based on the Policy and the facts assumed, that there was an abuse.

*  *  *

The Tax Court has reiterated that the taxpayer is entitled to know the basis of the assessment made against him.  Such an approach is consistent with principles of fundamental fairness and is entirely in keeping with the letter and spirit of the Rules.

On January 10, 2013, the Canada Revenue Agency released its 2011-2012 Advance Pricing Arrangement Program Report (previous reports are available here).

This is the eleventh year in which the CRA has issued such a report, which is generally intended to enhance taxpayer awareness of the APA program and to describe (i) current operational status, (ii) relevant changes, and (iii) issues that may affect the program in future years.

The general purpose of an APA is to create certainty between the taxing authorities of Canada and a foreign country concerning the transfer pricing of cross-border intercompany transactions.  In the absence of an APA governing such transactions, taxpayers may be exposed to higher audit risk relating to their intercompany transfer pricing methodologies, which may ultimately result in costly and time-consuming negotiations with the multiple tax authorities as well as potential litigation. Accordingly, the CRA encourages taxpayers to avail themselves of the APA program to mitigate the transfer pricing risk in the appropriate circumstances, particularly where the taxpayer engages in intercompany transactions of a recurring nature (i.e., frequent sale of goods between affiliates or the ongoing provision of intercompany services).

The APA program has proven popular with taxpayers over the years and the number of applicants continues to grow – the 2011-2012 fiscal year had the highest number of applicants to the program (34) since the 2007-2008 fiscal year.  The inventory of unresolved cases also continues to grow (the inventory increased from 96 at the end of the 2010-2011 fiscal year to 102 at the end of the 2011-2012 fiscal year).  In the 2011-2012 fiscal year, 17 new cases were admitted to the APA program whereas only 10 cases were completed (and one was withdrawn).  The large discrepancy between the number of applicants and the number of cases formally admitted to the program in the year is partially a reflection of the changes introduced by the CRA beginning in the 2010-2011 fiscal year requiring that taxpayers invest significantly more time and resources during the initial application/due diligence phase of the APA process and to provide a greater amount of financial and business information prior to acceptance into the program.  This results in a longer and more extensive “screening” process but is intended to eliminate inappropriate cases before they are accepted into the program inventory.

Other highlights of the Report include:

• The average amount of time required to conclude a bilateral APA from acceptance into the program until completion was 44 months, which appears generally consistent with prior years;
• The majority of APA’s relate to the cross-border transfer of tangible property.  Approximately 47% of APA cases in process relate to tangible personal property whereas cases involving tangible personal property and intra-group services represent approximately 31% and 22% of cases in process;
• The transactional net margin method (“TNMM”) continues to be the most frequently used transfer pricing methodology in APA cases; and
• APAs involving the United States represent approximately 71% of all APA cases that are in process (which is slightly lower than the percentage of completed APA cases that involve the United States).

Earlier this month, the Tax Executives Institute, Inc. (TEI) raised a number of important income tax administration issues in its annual meeting with the Canada Revenue Agency. Concerns were expressed about how the CRA conducts and manages large file audits (including the role of the Large File Case Manager or LFCM) as well as the design and development of the CRA’s new risk-based audit process for large businesses.

The agenda for those meetings (which also included the Department of Finance) is here.  TEI plans to publish CRA’s responses as soon as they are released.  The questions and concerns dealing with the audit process in particular are set out below.

7. CRA Audit Practices — Taxpayer Field Experience

CRA and large taxpayers share a common interest and goals in promoting a smooth and efficient audit. The goals include:

• Ensuring that audits are current;

• Avoiding the use of waivers to extend the audit period unnecessarily or habitually;

• Focusing audit queries on high-risk compliance issues;

• Using accepted audit sampling procedures to expand stretched resources;

• Maintaining transparency in decision-making and the determination of tax positions;

• Promoting timely, consistent, and effective issue resolution;

• Deploying human resources as effectively as possible; and

• Maximizing cost controls.

Over the course of the last several years, CRA has developed new audit approaches based upon an enhanced relationship with large taxpayers and a risk-based audit approach. TEI supports CRA’s new audit approach not only because of the common interest and shared goal of promoting efficiency, but because it promotes certainty of tax treatment sooner. That said, many large taxpayers have experienced behaviours seemingly at odds with the shared interests and goals. Examples include:

a) LFCMs are declining to discuss issues (or assert control over certain issues), saying they lack authority to make a decision in respect of subject matter. This suggests that issue resolution may be increasingly managed by CRA Headquarters in Ottawa as opposed to the TSOs. TEI believes that the objectives identified above can be advanced only if the LFCM is empowered to make decisions on issues and taxpayers are able to communicate directly with the decision-makers.

b) Auditors are asking for information on behalf of an undisclosed CRA source or seeking opinions or advice from CRA Headquarters without communicating the issue to the taxpayer or informing the taxpayer of the request. Where an opinion or advice is solicited, the TSO is generally bound by the Headquarters decision even though the taxpayer had little or no input into the development of the facts upon which the opinion is based.

c) Many auditors and LFCMs assert that they have no jurisdiction over specialty areas (e.g., SR&ED, International or Tax Avoidance matters). Thus, there seems to be no overriding coordinator or decision-maker.

d) The scope and nature of the tax treatment of items seem to change dramatically from previous years (i.e., fewer adjustments are proposed, but high-level conceptual challenges to a taxpayer’s filing position are asserted with minimal or no apparent technical analysis). Examples include challenges to reclassify amounts long treated (and frequently reviewed) as current expenses into capital items or challenges to the longstanding (and frequently reviewed) classification of capital items into longer-lived capital asset pools.

e) Adjustments are proposed without discussion or explanation of the technical position despite requests for the rationale, which leaves taxpayers questioning the quality of the audit or propriety of the asserted position. Without discussion, the position can seem arbitrary, and may be a consequence of the Tax Earned by Auditor (TEBA) metric.

f) Information requests or proposals for adjustments are submitted shortly before a taxation year becomes statute barred.

g) Certain audit queries seem intended to audit the taxpayer’s financial statements rather than the tax returns (e.g., there are instances where an auditor is verifying account balances in audited financial statements rather than trying to understand the adjustments on the tax returns to the financial accounts and the rationale for the adjustments).

h) Requests are made for significant amounts of data as opposed to relying on sampling where practical (e.g., requests for all professional fee invoices). In addition, information requests require taxpayers to produce enormous amounts of data within an abbreviated time frame. Response times should be reasonable and proportional to the volume of information requested.

i) Some auditors have refused to make taxpayer-favourable consequential changes and adjustments in subsequent years, even where the changes flow directly from an accepted audit adjustment to an earlier period. Instead, taxpayers are compelled to file amended returns to claim the consequential adjustments.

In addition to a general discussion of the member perceptions of audit behaviours and whether those behaviours are counterproductive to the shared goals of expeditious audits, transparency, and an enhanced relationship, TEI invites a discussion of the following:

a) In connection with the new risk-based audit approach, have quality control reviews been performed on the audit files since the approach was adopted? If not, will the quality control review be conducted on all files or all files above a certain size? Will new roles be created within CRA to conduct the quality control reviews independently of the field auditors?

b) Can CRA confirm whether the TEBA metric has been eliminated, as announced at the May 2012 TEI Annual Conference? If so, what measures will the Agency employ internally and for reporting its activities to other parts of the Government (e.g., Finance, Parliament, and the Auditor General)?

c) What other changes are being implemented at Headquarters and the TSOs to support the risk-based audit initiative?

*  *  *

12. Risk-based Audit Process

In 2011 CRA announced it was instituting a risk-based approach to audits whereby CRA would meet with senior representatives of the taxpayer to:

• Explain the redefined risk-based approach to large business compliance and how the approach affects taxpayers;

• Share CRA’s findings and observations noted during the taxpayer’s risk assessment; and

• Understand how the taxpayer manages tax risk at its highest governance levels.

With the first round of meetings with taxpayers complete, TEI has the following questions in respect of the approach:

a) Would CRA share its general observations, findings, trends, or conclusions with respect to the state of tax-risk governance?

b) In the interests of transparency, will CRA consider publishing a document outlining and discussing its review and risk-assessment process?

c) Has the first round of meetings with taxpayers led CRA to consider changes to its risk-assessment process and will it publicly announce the changes? Will affected taxpayers be apprised of changes to the scope of the risk-management approach that apply to their cases?

d) Will CRA review the risk assessment with the affected taxpayer, including discussing the criteria and factors used to determine a taxpayer’s risk rating? If a taxpayer disagrees with its risk-assessment rating, what steps can it take to address its concerns?

e) Assuming a taxpayer’s risk profile can change over time, will CRA revisit its risk-assessment ratings on a regular basis? If so, how often will the assessment be revised? Will CRA meet again with the taxpayer’s senior executives to review the revised rating?

f) Can CRA provide any details about the factors affecting a taxpayer’s risk rating?

g) Will CRA inform other tax jurisdictions (provincial or foreign) of its findings in respect of a taxpayer’s risk rating?

h) What guidance has been provided to the TSOs to ensure that the objectives of the new audit approach are applied consistently by all the TSOs?

In Noran West Developments Ltd. v. The Queen, the Tax Court of Canada (Justice Brent Paris) upheld the validity of a taxpayer’s waiver of its right to appeal executed following the conclusion of a settlement with the Appeals Division of the Canada Revenue Agency (the “CRA”).  This conclusion was reached, and the Crown’s motion to quash granted, notwithstanding the taxpayer’s valiant attempts to set aside the agreement.

The relevant statutory provision in subsection 169(2.2) of the Income Tax Act:

Waived issues

(2.2) Notwithstanding subsections 169(1) and 169(2), for greater certainty a taxpayer may not appeal to the Tax Court of Canada to have an assessment under this Part vacated or varied in respect of an issue for which the right of objection or appeal has been waived in writing by the taxpayer.

By way of background, the CRA audited a corporate taxpayer (the Appellant) in respect of unreported income from a condominium joint venture which engaged in certain non-arm’s length dispositions.  The auditor reassessed to (a) include $640,000 in the taxpayer’s income for its 2005 taxation year (on the basis of a valuation of the relevant condominium units), (b) recognize a shareholder benefit to the taxpayer’s sole shareholder and (c) apply gross negligence penalties under subsection 163(2) of the Income Tax Act in respect of both reassessments.

The taxpayer filed a notice of objection objecting to the inclusion of the $640,000 in its income (on the basis that the CRA’s valuation was wrong) and the assessment of a subsection 163(2) penalty.  The taxpayer’s sole shareholder filed no objection against his own reassessment.

Following discussions with the taxpayer’s representative, the Appeals Officer offered to settle the matter by (a) reducing the income inclusion by $50,000 (on the basis of a reduced valuation of the relevant condominium units) and (b) reducing the amount of the subsection 163(2) penalty accordingly.  The Appeals Officer sent a standard waiver letter which was signed by the taxpayer’s sole shareholder on behalf of the taxpayer.  It included the usual language in which the signatory attests that he or she is ”familiar with subsection 165(1.2) and 169(2.2) of the Income Tax Act and understand that I will be precluded from filing an objection or an appeal with respect to those issues.”

The CRA reassessed to implement the settlement, but the taxpayer filed an appeal in Tax Court in response.  The Crown moved to quash the appeal on the basis that the taxpayer had waived its right to appeal under subsection 169(2.2) of the Income Tax Act.  In answer to the motion counsel for the taxpayer advanced six arguments, none of which were successful:

1. The waiver agreement was not “in writing” as required by subsection 169(2.2) as the Appeals Officer omitted the taxpayer’s name.

The Tax Court judge concluded that “waived in writing” simply “requires that a waiver be reduced to writing as opposed to one given orally” and proceeded to find that the waiver agreement could not reasonably be read as applying to anyone other than the taxpayer.

2. The waiver agreement is unenforceable as the reassessment contemplated by that agreement would not have been consistent with the facts and the law.

The Tax Court judge found that there were errors in the first reassessment (the one that was settled).  However, the reassessment before the Court was the second reassessment (the one issued as a result of the waiver agreement).  As the second reassessment simply reduced the taxpayer’s income by $50,000 and reduced the subsection 163(2) penalty accordingly, there was no question that such a reassessment is within the CRA’s power.

3. The waiver agreement is invalid because the parties were not ad idem as to the terms of the agreement.  

First, it was said that the taxpayer’s sole shareholder believed that the waiver agreement applied to three taxpayers, not just one.  Therefore, there was no “meeting of the minds”.  Unfortunately for the taxpayer, the judge found that that belief, on the evidence, was “highly unlikely”.  In addition, an adverse inference was drawn from the failure of the taxpayer’s representative to give any evidence at all about what happened at the appeals stage.  The judge also rejected the contention that the sole shareholder believed that issue of beneficial ownership of the condominium units wasn’t covered by the waiver agreement and, therefore, there was no consensus ad idem.  There was no ”beneficial ownership” issue raised in the Notice of Objection, so there could be no reasonable expectation that it would have been reflected in the agreement.  The taxpayer’s final contention was that the sole shareholder did not believe that the waiver agreement dealt with the subsection 163(2) penalty.  As the text of the agreement dealt with the penalty, Justice Paris concluded that:

[61] . . . [i]f a party chooses not to read an agreement with care before signing it, or chooses to skip reading parts of it, I fail to see how he can turn around and allege that his intention did not accord with the written agreement. It must be presumed that, in those circumstances, the party intended to accept the agreement as written.

4. The agreement was vitiated by the CRA as it did not satisfy the terms of the waiver agreement because the subsection 163(2) penalty was incorrectly calculated on the second reassessment. 

Here is the error:

[24]  The respondent’s counsel concedes that an error was made in calculating the amount of the gross negligence penalty in the [second] reassessment and that the penalty was based on unreported income in the amount of $599,760 rather than on $589,760, as agreed. The respondent concedes that the penalty was too high by as much as $1,106. Because this error was only raised by Noran’s counsel shortly before the hearing of the motion, counsel for the respondent advised the Court that she was unable to obtain the exact amount of the error.

The Tax Court judge found himself unable to agree with the proposition that:

[65] . . . any inconsistency between the reassessment and the waiver agreement allows a taxpayer to appeal any aspect of the reassessment as if no waiver had been given.  It does not make sense that any error in reassessing, however minor, could permit a taxpayer to repudiate the waiver entirely.

5. The Tax Court should decline to enforce the waiver agreement on the basis that it is unconscionable. 

This argument was not pressed strongly.  In any event, the judge could find no evidence to support it.

6. The taxpayer is appealing issues other than those dealt with in the waiver agreement. 

This argument was based on the sole shareholder’s belief about what was covered by the agreement (which was rather narrow) rather than the text of the agreement itself.  Justice Paris rejected reliance on subjective belief and concluded that a “reasonable person” standard must be applied:

[74]  When searching for the intentions of the parties, I believe that the search for intention in the case of a waiver is to be conducted in the same manner as for any contract on the basis of the parties’ manifested intention. That intention is determined from the perspective of the objective reasonable bystander. Fridman in the Law of Contract in Canada, refers to the classical formulation of this notion in Smith v. Hughes:

If whatever a man’s real intention may be, he so conducts himself that a reasonable man would believe that he was assenting to the terms proposed by the other party and that other party upon that belief enters into a contract with him, the man thus conducting himself would be equally bound as if he had intended to agree to the other party’s terms.

*  *  *

Underlying this decision is a clear public policy that negotiated settlements, as a general matter, ought to be upheld:

[45] . . . The desirability of upholding negotiated settlements was discussed by Bowie J. in 1390758 Ontario Corp v. The Queen: 

[35] I agree with Bowman C.J. and the authors Hogg, Magee and Li that there are sound policy reasons to uphold negotiated settlements of tax disputes freely arrived at between taxpayers and the Minister’s representatives. The addition of subsection 169(3) to the Act in 1994 is recognition by Parliament of that. It is not for the Courts to purport to review the propriety of such settlements. That task properly belongs to the Auditor General.

[36] The reality is that tax disputes are settled every day in this country. If they were not, and every difference had to be litigated to judgment, unmanageable backlogs would quickly accumulate and the system would break down.

[37] The Crown settles tort and contract claims brought by and against it on a regular basis. There is no reason why it should not settle tax disputes as well. Both sides of a dispute are entitled to know that if they invest the time and effort required to negotiate a settlement, then their agreement will bind both parties.

Although the taxpayer was unsuccessful, this decision is ultimately reassuring as the same principle applies to the government - if the CRA attempts to resile from a settlement agreement it too will be confronted by the same underlying public policy, namely, that negotiated settlements of tax disputes should be respected.

General Objectives of the Proposed Amendments

The general objectives of the proposed amendments are:

(1) to streamline the process of hearings and to codify the practice relating to litigation process conferences;

(2) to implement new rules and amend existing rules governing expert witnesses and the admissibility of their evidence in the Tax Court of Canada;

(3) to allow the Court to proceed with a hearing of one or more appeals, while other related appeals are stayed pending a decision on the lead cases heard by the Court;

(4) to encourage parties to settle their dispute early in the litigation process; and

(5) to make technical amendments.

Detailed Description of Proposed Amendments

(1) Streamlining the process of hearings and codifying the practice relating to litigation process conferences

A proposed definition of “litigation process conference” is added to section 2. That definition lists the hearings referred to in section 125 and the conferences referred to in subsection 126(2) and sections 126.1 and 126.2.

Amendments are proposed to subsection 123(4) to indicate that the Registrar or a designated person may fix the time and place for the hearing subject to any direction by the Court.

Proposed subsection 123(4.1) indicates that the Court may, on its own initiative, fix the time and place for the hearing.

Proposed subsection 123(6) indicates that, if the time and place for a hearing have been fixed after a joint application of the parties, the hearing should not be adjourned unless special circumstances justify the adjournment and it is in the interest of justice to adjourn it.

Amendments are required to be made to section 125 (Status Hearing) to provide that initial status hearings are ordered to take place approximately two months after the filing of the reply, and further status hearings can take place later in the appeal to ensure the appeal is ready for trial and to fix a trial date. Finally, proposed subsection 125(8) provides that where a party fails to comply with an order or direction made at a status hearing, or if a party fails to appear at a status hearing, the Court may allow or dismiss the appeal or make any other order that is appropriate.

Existing section 126 is replaced by proposed section 126, which is designed to allow the Chief Justice to assign a judge to manage an appeal that is complex, or slow moving, or for some other reason requires ongoing management by a judge. The judge takes responsibility for the progress of the appeal to ensure that the appeal proceeds to trial in a timely way while conserving judicial resources.

Proposed section 126.1 provides that a trial management conference can be held after the appeal hearing date has been set and is presided over by the judge assigned to preside at the hearing. The conference is to ensure that the hearing proceeds in an orderly and organized fashion.

Proposed section 126.2 permits the Court to direct that a conference be held for the purpose of exploring the possibility of settlement of any or all of the issues.

Amendments are required to section 127 to add references to sections 125 and 126, and to proposed section 126.1.

Amendments are required to section 128 to add references to matters related to a settlement or settlement discussions during a litigation process conference.

(2) Implementing new rules and amending existing rules governing expert witnesses and the admissibility of their evidence in the Tax Court of Canada

Subsection 145(1) is amended to replace the reference to “affidavit” by “expert report.”

Proposed subsection 145(2) provides that the expert’s report must set out the proposed evidence of the expert, the expert’s qualifications and be accompanied by a certificate signed by the expert acknowledging that the expert agrees to be bound by the Code of Conduct for Expert Witnesses that is added as a schedule to the Rules to ensure that expert witnesses understand their independent advisory role to the Court. Proposed subsection 145(3) indicates that if an expert fails to comply with the Code of Conduct, the Court may exclude some or all of the expert’s report.

Proposed subsection 145(4) requires a party to seek leave to the Court if they intend to call more than five expert witnesses at a hearing and proposed subsection 145(5) indicates what the Court has to consider in deciding to grant leave.

Proposed subsection 145(6) allows parties to name a joint expert witness.

Existing subsection 145(2) is renumbered subsection 145(7) and specifies the conditions that need to be met in order for evidence of an expert witness to be received at the hearing.

Existing subsection 145(4) is renumbered subsection 145(8) and indicates how evidence in chief of an expert witness is to be given at a hearing.

Proposed subsection 145(9) indicates what may be addressed during a litigation process conference, other than a settlement conference, in respect of expert witnesses.

Proposed subsections 145(10), (11), (12), (13) and (14) introduce new rules that deal with expert conferences.

Existing subsection 145(3) is renumbered subsection 145(15) and is amended to change the number of days, from 15 to 60, for a copy of rebuttal evidence to be served on all parties.

Proposed subsection 145(16) indicates when evidence of an expert witness can be led in surrebuttal of any evidence tendered under subsection (15).

Proposed subsections 145(17), (18), (19) and (20) allow the Court to require that some or all of the experts testify as a panel. Experts are only allowed to pose questions to each other with leave of the Court to ensure the orderly presentation of evidence. The rules governing cross-examination and re-examination will continue to apply to experts testifying concurrently.

(3) Allowing the Court to proceed with a hearing of one or more appeals, while other related appeals are stayed pending a decision on the lead cases heard by the Court

Proposed section 146.1 is intended to apply where there is more than one appeal which has common or related issues of fact or law. It allows the Court to proceed with the hearing of one of the appeals, the lead case, while other related appeals are stayed pending a decision on the lead case. The parties in a related appeal have to agree to be bound, in whole or in part, by the final decision on the lead case.

(4) Encouraging parties to settle their dispute early in the litigation process

The provisions of the Rules addressing offers to settle are designed to encourage parties to settle their dispute early in the litigation process. An early settlement has the added advantage of reducing the costs borne by the parties and conserving judicial resources.

Parties are entitled to make and accept offers of settlement at any time before there is a judgment and any written offer to settle will be considered by the Court in assessing costs under section 147. In addition to this general rule, there is a need to encourage parties to reach an early settlement, ideally before the beginning of the trial or hearing. This is the specific objective of adding subsections 147(3.1) to (3.8).

(5) Making technical amendments

To amend section 6 to provide that the Court may direct that any step in a proceeding may be conducted by teleconference, by videoconference or by a combination of teleconference and videoconference.

To amend section 52 by adding a new subsection to provide that a demand for particulars shall be in Form 52 and shall be filed and served in accordance with the Rules, and to add Form 52 to Schedule I.

To amend sections 53 and 58 to regroup all matters where the Court may strike out or expunge all or part of a pleading or other document under section 53, and all matters relating to the determination of questions of law, fact or mixed law and fact under section 58. As a consequence of these changes, sections 59, 60, 61 and 62 are repealed.

To add subsection 67(7) to provide for when proof of service of a motion must be filed.

To repeal subsection 95(3) as a result of the changes made to the expert witness rules.

To amend subsection 119(3) as a result of the changes made to the expert witness rules.

To amend paragraph 146(1)(d) to change the number of days for service from 10 to 5.

To add subsection 153(3) to provide that the taxing officer may direct that the taxation of a bill of costs be conducted by teleconference, videoconference or by combination of both.

To amend the reference to “issuing a judgment” by “rendering a judgment” in subsection 167(1).

To remove the reference to “and it shall be entered and filed there whereupon section 17.4 of the Act shall be complied with” in subsection 167(3).

*  *  *

The full text of the proposed amendments is here. Interested persons may make representations concerning the proposed Rules within 60 days after December 8, 2012. All such representations must cite the Canada Gazette, Part Ⅰ, and the December 8th date of publication of the notice, and be addressed to the Rules Committee, Tax Court of Canada, 200 Kent Street, Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0M1.

On November 19, 2012, the Tax Court released its decision in Berg v. The Queen (2012 TCC 406), which dealt with donative intent in the context of a donation scheme involving inflated charitable donation receipts. The Tax Court held that, although the taxpayer received documentation reflecting a valuation about nine times greater than the fair market value of the donations, the cash contributed by the taxpayer could effectively be segregated from the rest of the scheme and, thereby, constitute a “gift” for purposes of subparagraph 118.1 of the Income Tax Act.

Facts

In 2002 and 2003, Mr. Berg purchased 68 timeshare units, for which he paid $375,950 in cash and the remainder via low-interest financing. The taxpayer subsequently donated the units, and the recipient charity issued donation receipts for amounts approximately nine times higher than the fair market value of the units. The taxpayer claimed the inflated charitable donation tax credits. The CRA reassessed and disallowed the claimed charitable gifts of $2,420,000 for 2002, $1,786,000 for 2003 and $718,380 for 2004, including the portions paid by the taxpayer in cash for the units. 

The only issue before the Tax Court was whether the cash paid was a “gift” and therefore eligible for the charitable donation tax credit.

Analysis

The taxpayer argued that since he provided value for the units, and received no benefit from the charity (other than the credits themselves), the cash payments had to constitute a gift. The Crown argued that the inflated receipts conferred an additional benefit to the donor, thereby negating the donative intent of the taxpayer entirely. The Tax Court distinguished Marechaux v. The Queen in the Tax Court and Federal Court of Appeal on the basis that the Crown had conceded in this case:

[35] . . . that the Transaction Documents were pretenses and thereby not legally effective documents. Legally, no tangible or potential benefit to the Appellant, beyond the camouflage afforded by the Inflated Gift Receipts which were needed to enhance the purported gift value beyond the Cash Donation Amounts, can be ascribed to the Transaction Documents which, on admission by the Respondent, gave rise to no legal rights, obligations or benefits.

The Tax Court concluded as follows:

[48] . . . to the extent the Cash Donation Amount related to the Transferred Units, the Appellant was impoverished by, paid valuable consideration for, intended to give, and conveyed the Transferred Units which were, in turn, received by the Charity. Whatever opprobrium may be ascribed to the Donation Program, legally the Cash Donation Amount has met the legal test of a charitable gift. In the absence of some other benefit received beyond the Inflated Tax Receipts, no legal authority suggests donative intent as defined by the case law relevant to section 118.1 of the Act has been vitiated or nullified to the extent of the value of the Cash Donation Amount.

Conclusion

The Tax Court concluded that the taxpayer intended to donate to the charity, even if he was motivated by the possiblility of receiving an inflated tax receipt. This decision takes seriously the words of the Federal Court of Appeal in The Queen v. Friedberg in which it was held that a “gift is a voluntary transfer of property owned by the donor to a donee, in return for which no benefit or consideration flows to the donor.” In certain circumstances, including those found in this case, one may be able to effectively segregate the “gift” amount from the “non-gift” amount provided that the requisite degree of intent is found in connection with the former.  

It is not known whether the Crown will appeal the Tax Court’s decision to the Federal Court of Appeal.

In a decision released on November 26, 2012 in JP Morgan Asset Management (Canada) Inc. v. Minister of National Revenue and Canada Revenue Agency (Docket T-1278-11), Justice Leonard Mandamin of the Federal Court dismissed the Crown’s appeal of an order by Prothonotary Aalto in JP Morgan Asset Management (Canada) Inc. v. Minister of National Revenue and Canada Revenue Agency in which the Crown moved unsuccessfully to strike out a judicial review application on the basis that the taxpayer had no possibility of success in seeking to set aside the decision of the Minister of National Revenue (the “Minister”) to assess Part XIII tax in a manner contrary to the Minister’s own policy.

This decision is the latest in a series of defeats for the Crown on this issue.  Since the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada v. Addison & Leyen Ltd., [2007] 2 S.C.R. 793, there has been a vigorous debate around the limits of judicial review of Ministerial action involving the decision to issue an assessment and the scope of section 18.5 of the Federal Courts Act which reads as follows:

Despite sections 18 and 18.1, if an Act of Parliament expressly provides for an appeal to the Federal Court, the Federal Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court Martial Appeal Court, the Tax Court of Canada, the Governor in Council or the Treasury Board from a decision or an order of a federal board, commission or other tribunal made by or in the course of proceedings before that board, commission or tribunal, that decision or order is not, to the extent that it may be so appealed, subject to review or to be restrained, prohibited, removed, set aside or otherwise dealt with, except in accordance with that Act.

The Minister has consistently intepreted the decision of the Supreme Court in Addison & Leyen and section 18.5 of the Federal Courts Act as precluding judicial review of the Minister’s decision to issue an assessment.  Thus far, however, the Crown has been largely unsuccessful in striking out such judicial review applications in Federal Court.  See, for example, the decision of Prothonotary Aalto in Chrysler Canada Inc. v. Canada and the decision of Justice Hughes on appeal in Chrysler Canada Inc. v. Canada.

By way of background, the Minister assessed Part XIII tax against JP Morgan in respect of fees it had paid to non-resident affiliates between 2002 and 2008.  JP Morgan applied for judicial review of the Minister’s decision to assess it for amounts payable under Part XIII of the Income Tax Act.  In particular, JP Morgan alleged that in exercising discretion to assess for years other than the current year and the two immediately preceding years

. . . CRA did not consider, or sufficiently consider, CRA’s own policies, guidelines, bulletins, internal communiqués and practices which would otherwise have limited assessments to the current tax year and the two (2) immediately preceding years.  CRA thus acted arbitrarily, unfairly, contrary to the rules of natural justice and in a manner inconsistent with CRA’s treatment of other tax payers.

The Crown moved to strike the application for judicial review, relying on section 18.5 of the Federal Courts Act.  Citing his earlier decision in Chrysler Canada, the Prothonotary dismissed the Crown’s motion.  He held that JP Morgan’s judicial review application dealt with:

. . . the discretion to assess as described in various policies of CRA.  That decision to apparently depart from policies and assess is subject to judicial review and is the type of situation that is contemplated by Addison & Leyen.  The ITA provides that the Minister “may” assess not “shall” assess which connotes a discretionary decision.  The decision of the Minister to apparently depart from policies is not otherwise reviewable [by the Tax Court of Canada] and therefore is subject to judicial review.

Consistent with his earlier decision in Chrysler Canada, the Prothonotary held that “JP Morgan only seeks judicial review of the decision to reassess which is alleged to be contrary to policies of CRA which were in place.  No attack on the reassessments is in play.” In his view, the case was about the Minister’s discretion to assess, not the assessments themselves.

It is not yet known whether the Crown will appeal the decision of Justice Mandamin in JP Morgan, but it would not be surprising in light of the fact that several Crown motions to strike such judicial review applications are currently before the Federal Court.

Under proposed 237.3 of the Income Tax Act, a “reportable transaction” is an avoidance transaction that has two of three “hallmarks” (fee hallmark, confidential protection hallmark, or contractual protection hallmark). For a brief summary of proposed s. 237.3, see “Tax Avoidance Transaction Reporting” by Brian Carr and Zahra Nurmohamed in Resource Sector Taxation (vol. VIII, no. 1).

Following release of the draft legislation, many tax advisors were concerned that the definition of “confidential protection” was too broad. In response, the recent Technical Notes on proposed s. 237.3 released by the Department of Finance offer the following interpretation:

Based on the definition “confidential protection”, the circumstances described in paragraph (b) of the definition “reportable transaction” would exist in respect of an avoidance transaction or series of transactions that includes the avoidance transaction if an advisor or promoter in respect of the transaction or series obtains or obtained anything that would prohibit the disclosure to any person or to the Minister of details or the structure of the avoidance transaction or series that includes the avoidance transaction under which a tax benefit could result. This is in contrast to a situation in which a client of an advisor benefits from the existence of solicitor-client privilege in respect of information regarding the avoidance transaction or series of transactions, and which would not give rise to a “hallmark” in respect of the avoidance transaction or series. See the explanatory notes accompanying new subsection 237.3(11) for further details about solicitor-client privilege in the context of new section 237.3.

It appears that the Department of Finance believes that the existence of solicitor-client privilege is not “confidential protection” for the purposes of s. 237.3, though a literal reading of the definition of “confidential protection” does not appear to draw this distinction.

Are the Technical Notes on this issue sufficient comfort for tax advisors? Is this the last statement from the Department of Finance on the subject? Stay tuned for further developments.

The Federal Court of Appeal has dismissed the taxpayer’s appeal in Morguard Corporation v The Queen.

(See our previous posts on the case here, here and here.)

Justice Sharlow wrote for the panel which also included Justice Evans and Justice Stratas.  She agreed with the reasoning of the trial judge that Ikea Ltd. v. Canada is indeed the leading case on the characterization of extraordinary or unusual receipts in the business context, and found that his application of the principles stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ikea was correct. The court noted that Ikea was not based on a particular factual finding, but “involved consideration of a number of factors, including the commercial purpose of the payment and its relationship to the business operations of the recipient.”

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made no error in concluding, on the facts of the case, that the break fee received by Morguard as the result of a failed takeover bid was income and not capital. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Is a “break fee” received in return for withdrawing from a takeover bid a capital receipt or an income receipt?

That was the issue before a panel of the Federal Court of Appeal (“FCA”) on November 20, 2012 in Morguard Corporation v. The Queen on appeal from a decision of the Tax Court of Canada. The panel consisted of Justice Evans, Justice Sharlow and Justice Stratas. At the conclusion of the hearing, judgment was reserved.

For the facts of the case and our analysis of the trial decision, see here. For a brief review of the issues raised in the factum filed by each party in the FCA, see here.

Arguments of the Taxpayer

Counsel for the appellant argued the trial judge had made an “error of law” in determining that Acktion Corporation (“Acktion”) was “essentially in the business of doing acquisitions and takeovers” (Acktion was the name under which Morguard Corporation (“Morguard”) operated during the period at issue). Counsel argued that Acktion was a holding company and that it had sought the takeover to increase its capital holdings. The standard of review for an error of law is “correctness”.

The panel asked counsel whether there was any error of law. Justice Stratas asked whether the issue was really a factual one, for which the standard of review is much higher, namely, “palpable and overriding error”.

Counsel argued that it is settled law that a corporation cannot conduct a “business” of acquiring capital assets. Accordingly, counsel argued that the trial judge erred in concluding that Acktion had done so. In support of this proposition, counsel cited the 1978 FCA decision in Neonex International Ltd. v The Queen (78 DTC 6339). 

It was not clear whether the panel agreed with counsel on this point, as their other questions focused on whether the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) decision in Ikea Ltd. v. Canada ([1998] 1 SCR 196) had displaced Neonex by instituting a “modern approach” that supports an organic assessment of the circumstances around the receipt.

Counsel argued the break fee was received in the pursuit of a capital acquisition and that, according to the modern approach, it should be characterised as a capital receipt. Counsel stressed that the expert evidence adduced at trial by both parties was that break fees are intended to support the acquisition of capital by deterring other bidders or to compensate for the various costs incurred in a failed takeover bid.

The panel sought clarification of the appellant’s position that there should be no tax liability arising from the receipt of the break fee. In its written submissions, the appellant argued that the break fee should not be taxed as a capital gain because there were no proceeds of disposition. Justice Sharlow noted that, according to this theory, the break fee could only be characterized either as income or a non-taxable capital gain.

Arguments of the Crown

Counsel for the Crown had to answer fewer questions from the panel. Counsel argued that the characterization of an “unusual receipt” such as a break fee requires a factual determination (relying on the SCC’s decision in Ikea on this point), which the Tax Court had made in this case.

Justice Evans asked about the distinction between conducting a real estate business that acquires companies as capital and being a real estate company in the business of acquisitions and takeovers. Counsel argued that, instead of acquiring real estate directly, Acktion’s business strategy was to acquire businesses that already owned real estate. Counsel further submitted that the corporate information distributed to its shareholders described the corporation as a real estate company and not as a holding company.

Justice Sharlow questioned the Crown’s reliance on the commercial description of Acktion’s business, noting that the technical distinction between income and capital is a legal distinction that would not generally be expected to appear in a commercial context. In response, counsel argued that Acktion treated the takeover bid as part of its regular business. After losing its takeover bid, Acktion negotiated a higher price for its remaining “toehold” in the company, then took the break fee and the proceeds of disposition of its shares and immediately sought to purchase another business. Counsel argued this course of conduct shows that Acktion considered the negotiation of break fees to be part of its real estate business.

In response to the appellant’s position that the break fee was a non-taxable capital gain, counsel submitted that the trial judge was correct in applying the factors set out by the FCA in Canada v. Cranswick ([1982] CTC 69) to determine whether a payment was a windfall. In this respect, the break fee was the product of an enforceable claim negotiated by the Appellant according to common practices in takeover bids and, thus, could not be characterised as a windfall.

*  *  *

The panel reserved judgment. We will report on the judgment when it is released.

Tomorrow morning (November 20, 2012), the Federal Court of Appeal is scheduled to hear an appeal by Morguard Corporation (“Morguard”, formerly operating as Acktion Corporation), regarding the taxation of a “break fee” received as a result of a failed takeover bid.

Break fees are an agreed-upon fee to be paid by or on behalf of a target corporation to a prospective purchaser on the rejection of that prospective purchaser’s bid and the acceptance of another offer. Break fees are intended to reflect, more or less, the monetary and non-monetary costs incurred by the prospective purchaser in making a bid, and are common in sophisticated takeover transactions.

The Morguard case concerns a $7.7 million break fee received by Morguard on withdrawal from a bidding war. In its return, Morguard treated the payment as a capital gain but was reassessed by the Minister of National Revenue on the basis that the amount was an income receipt. On appeal to the Tax Court of Canada, the trial judge agreed with the Minister’s position that, on the facts of the case, the break fee represented income and should be taxed accordingly. For our analysis of the Tax Court decision, see our earlier blog post.

The taxpayer has appealed the trial judge’s decision to the Federal Court of Appeal on the basis that the lower court erred in law and in fact. The Appellant has described the issues raised in the appeal as follows:

(a) Whether the trial judge erred in law by concluding that the taxpayer received the break fee on income account rather than capital account.

(b) If received on capital account, whether the break fee was received in circumstances that gave rise to a capital gain.

(c) Whether the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors in finding that the taxpayer was in the business of doing acquisitions and takeovers, and received the break fee in the ordinary course of its business similar to the receipt of dividends, rents, or management fees.

(d) Whether the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error in finding that the break fee was not linked to a capital purpose of the taxpayer.

(e) Whether the trial judge erred in law in his interpretation and application of the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Ikea Ltd. v. Canada [1998] 1 S.C.R. 196.

(f) Whether the trial judge erred in law by applying the legal test developed by the Federal Court of Appeal in The Queen v. Cranswick (82 DTC 6073) to break fees.

The Crown, on the other hand, has framed the issues as follows:

(a) Whether the trial judge committed a palpable and overriding error in finding that the negotiation and receipt of the break fee by the appellant was part of the ordinary course of its regular real estate business.

(b) Whether the trial judge was correct in concluding that the break fee should be included in the computation of the appellant’s income because it was received in the ordinary course of its business.

(c) Whether the trial judge correctly applied the jurisprudence to conclude that the break fee was not a windfall.

The Appellant’s factum is here. The Crown’s factum is here.

We intend to report again after the hearing in the Federal Court of Appeal.

At today’s Canada Revenue Agency Toronto Centre Tax Professionals Group Breakfast Seminar (November 14, 2012), the CRA provided an update on a number of current audit issues.

The CRA was represented by Sal Tringali, Regional Technical Advisor of Aggressive Tax Planning, and James McNamara, Manager of International Taxation and Aggressive Tax Planning Audit Division from the Toronto Centre Tax Services Office. The discussion was moderated by Jacques Bernier (Baker McKenzie LLP) and Rachel Gervais (BDO Canada LLP).

The audit issues highlighted by the panel included the following:

GST/HST

1. Recapture input tax credit
2. ITC allocation % – mixed supplies
3. Financial services
4. Imported supplies
5. Reinsurance/loading
6. Loyalty reward points
7. VDP – Related parties

Income Tax

Additionally, the CRA made the following comments:

• The CRA’s access to/requests for accountants’ working papers remains a “hot topic”. Generally speaking, the CRA will first ask the taxpayer for information/documents, after which the CRA may request information/documents from the taxpayer’s accountants. The CRA’s objective is to perform high-quality audits, and access to complete information is required to do so.

• The CRA reminded taxpayers of its recent announcement that the CRA will not assess a taxpayer’s return where the taxpayer has claimed a charitable donation and the alleged gift is made as part of a donation arrangement. The delay in assessing the return could be two years or more (see Jamie Golombek’s recent article on the subject).

• The CRA is considering a variety of provisions that may be applied where the taxpayer has used a structure to divert business income to RRSPs through trusts and partnership interests held by shareholders or key employees. (See also the CRA’s announcement at the Canadian Tax Foundation’s 2012 Ontario Tax Conference, at which the CRA stated that it may apply s. 56(2) to the actions of a trustee.)

• The CRA has appealed the Tax Court’s decision in Guindon v. The Queen to the Federal Court of Appeal. In light of the Tax Court’s decision, the CRA is currently considering its options in respect of the assessment of third party penalties.

• The CRA has considered the application of third party penalties in 185 cases. In 71 of those cases the penalty was applied, resulting in the imposition of $79 million of penalties. In 50 cases the penalty was not applied, and 64 cases are ongoing.

• The CRA will continue to revoke e-file privileges where a tax preparer is subject to a penalty, even where a penalty against a single tax preparer may result in the revocation for his or her entire firm.

• The CRA referred to the recent Supreme Court decision in GlaxoSmithKline v. The Queen and stated that it intends to follow the new OECD guidelines on transfer pricing and the hierarchy of pricing methods. The CRA said that it did not expect to release any formal communication to the public on this issue, but Information Circular IC 87-2R “International Transfer Pricing” may be updated to reflect this position.

UPDATE: After the seminar, the CRA informed us that it intends to follow the guidance in the recently updated OECD Guidelines and will be issuing a Transfer Pricing Memoranda (TPM) on the matter to the public. This TPM will reflect a recently released internal Communique on the same subject and will be made available in the near future.

• The CRA clarified that Tax Earned By Audit (“TEBA”) remains a metric for measuring ”tax at risk”, but it is not used to measure the performance of an auditor. Rather, the CRA measures the performance of auditors based on six major elements: (i) planning the audit, (ii) conducting the audit, (iii) applying the appropriate legislation/policy, (iv) the end product of the audit, (v) professionalism in the audit, and (vi) timeliness of completion of the audit.

• The CRA plans to convene face-to-face meetings with approximately 160 large businesses (i.e., annual sales over $250 million) as part of the CRA’s large business audit project. The CRA will continue to risk-assess all large businesses/entities annually.

• The CRA intends to clear a backlog of approximately 1,300 audit files so that it may assess the most recent taxation year and the immediately preceding taxation year for most businesses by 2015-16.

• The CRA reiterated that issues that arise during the audit process should be raised with the auditor, after which it may be appropriate to involve the auditor’s team leader. If the issue cannot be resolved at that level, it would be appropriate to raise the issue with the auditor’s manager or the assistant director of audit at the particular TSO.

In what circumstances may the Superior Court of Quebec correct a written instrument that does not reflect the parties’ intent?  That is the question that was considered by the Supreme Court of Canada on November 8, 2012 on appeals from decisions of the Quebec Court of Appeal in Agence du Revenu du Québec (formerly the Deputy Minister of Revenue of Quebec) v. Services Environnementaux AES Inc., et al. and Agence du Revenu du Québec v. Jean Riopel, et al.

The panel consisted of McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Fish, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ. The Court reserved judgment in both cases.

Services environnementaux AES Inc.

Centre technologique AES Inc. (“Centre”) was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Services environnementaux AES Inc. (“AES”). In the context of a corporate reorganization, AES decided to sell 25% of its shares in Centre to a new investor. AES and Centre instructed their advisors that there was to be an exchange of shares under section 86 of the Income Tax Act (“ITA”) and the corresponding provisions of the provincial legislation.

AES believed – mistakenly – that the adjusted cost base of its shares in Centre was $1,217,029. Based on that error, a promissory note of $ 1,217,028 was received by AES as part of the consideration for its shares.

Subsequently, AES received a Notice of Reassessment that added a taxable capital gain of $840,770 to its taxable income. The parties discovered that the adjusted cost base of the shares had been miscalculated and that it was, in fact, only $96,001.

AES filed an application in the Superior Court of Quebec for an order rectifying the written instruments for the transactions. The Superior Court granted the application, noting that its judgment was effective as of the date of the transactions and that it was enforceable against third parties (including tax authorities). The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal of the Quebec Revenue Agency (QRA).

Riopel

The Riopel case is another case about a corporate reorganization gone wrong.

Mr. Riopel was the sole shareholder of a corporation and held a 60% stake in a second corporation. Ms. Archambeault, Mr. Riopel’s wife, held the remaining 40% of the shares in the second corporation. The parties intended to amalgamate the corporations, with Mr. Riopel as the sole remaining shareholder of the amalgamated corporation. Both shareholders met with a tax advisor and agreed on plan for the reorganization. The parties were clear that the reorganization was to be completed with no immediate tax impact.

However, the Articles of Amalgamation included an error (i.e., the Articles did not reflect the correct share ownership). The shareholders’ professional advisors realized the error, and they tried to correct the situation without notifying the taxpayers.

Subsequently, Ms. Archambeault received a Notice of Reassessment adding a deemed dividend of $335,000 to her taxable income. The shareholders and the corporation brought an application in the Superior Court of Quebec to rectify the written instruments to accord with their true intention (i.e., implementing a reorganization without immediate tax effect).

The Superior Court denied the rectification on the basis that the agreement between the parties was distinct from the mandate given to their advisors. The Court suggested that the error could have vitiated the agreement, but it was not the remedy sought by the parties. The Court added that the error affected both the form and substance of the transactions. Accordingly, rectification was not an appropriate remedy.

That decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal of Quebec. The Court of Appeal applied the reasoning in AES and ordered the rectification so as to give effect to the parties’ common intention.

Position of the Tax Authorities in the Supreme Court of Canada (Oral Argument)

In the Supreme Court, counsel for QRA argued that the rectifications obtained by the taxpayers were not an exercise of interpretation of contracts as permitted by the Civil Code of Quebec (“CCQ”). The contracts in question were clear and should not have been modified, even though the transactions had unintended tax consequences for the parties.

Indeed, tax considerations may be the motivation behind a transaction, but they do not reflect the intent of the parties and are therefore not part of the “scope of the contract”. Thus, according to counsel for QRA, the Court of Appeal erred in rectifying the written instruments in order to make them consistent with the parties’ tax motivations. The parties could have sought cancellation of the contracts, but they failed to do so.

Justice LeBel asked if there was a legal principle that would operate to prevent parties from varying or rescinding a contract. Counsel for QRA responded that there was none, but that such a variation or rescission cannot have retroactive effect with respect to third parties. The situation would be different if the contract was cancelled by the Court since the contract is then deemed to never have existed. In such a case, the QRA would respect the decision of the Court and would assess the taxpayer accordingly.

Justice LeBel also asked if the tax authorities are third parties for the purposes of civil law. QRA’s position is that they are third parties and they have an obligation to apply the law based on the contracts concluded by the taxpayers.

Justice Fish noted that there was no dispute that the parties intended to comply with the provisions of the ITA and that, in this case, they had failed to do so because of human error. Counsel for QRA replied that the only relevant intent was in respect of the actual terms of the contract and not the tax motivation. The CCQ does not operate to vary clear contractual provisions so as to conform to the parties’ tax motivation. A possible remedy would have been the cancellation of the contracts, but that was not what the parties sought.

Counsel for the Attorney General of Canada essentially took the same position. Counsel explained that a party (or parties) cannot rewrite the history of a transaction because of unexpected tax consequences. Counsel emphasized that a distinction must be drawn between the motivation of the parties and the object of the contract. He added that the courts have long recognized that a “mistake in assumption” does not warrant the rectification of a contract. This applies in both common law and civil law.

Position of AES in the Supreme Court of Canada (Oral Argument)

Counsel argued that AES did not ask the Superior Court to modify a contract, but rather to rectify a written instrument to accord with the parties’ common intention in order to reflect the true legal relationship. In this case, the parties intended to complete the transaction in accordance with section 86 of the ITA but the written instrument did not reflect this intention. Accordingly, it was legitimate and necessary for the Superior Court to order rectification.

Justice LeBel asked about the impact of the law of evidence in the context of an application for rectification (i.e., the parol evidence rule). Counsel responded that the restrictions on presenting evidence of a party’s intent did not apply in this case since it has been admitted that the parties’ intention was not correctly reflected in the written document.

Justice LeBel also asked if it was AES’s position that a tax authority is a third party to a contract. Counsel stated that a government has an obligation to enforce tax law based on bona fide legal relationships between the parties. A tax authority would not be a third party because it would have no rights to claim with respect to the rectification of a written instrument. However, on a practical level, it may be appropriate to give the tax authorities an opportunity to be heard.

In closing, counsel stated that an application for rectification in Quebec is based solely on the principles of civil law and that it is not an attempt to “import” a common law concept.

Position of Riopel in the Supreme Court of Canada (Oral Argument)

Counsel stated that this was not a tax case but rather a civil law case. The question that must be asked was the following: Where can the contract be found? It is a mistake to confuse the contract with the written document evidencing it.

The Court of Appeal relied on Article 1425 of the CCQ to grant the application for rectification. Indeed, the application met the three criteria developed by the Court of Appeal in AES (i.e., necessity, legitimacy and no harm to third parties). Moreover, even if the tax authorities should be regarded as third parties, they would not be prejudiced because the rectification had no impact on the tax base.

Justice LeBel noted that numerous errors had been committed. Counsel responded that the errors all had a common origin, namely the Articles of Amalgamation. The number of written instruments to be rectified was not relevant, as long as the purpose was to give effect to the parties’ true intention.

Justice LeBel also wondered if this was an exercise of contractual interpretation. Counsel responded that granting rectification is an operation of correction following the interpretation of the parties’ true intention. Just because the provisions of a contract are clear does not mean that they reflect the parties’ intentions.

*  *  *

As noted above, judgment was reserved in both appeals. We will report on the decisions as soon as they are released.

Two appeals will be heard tomorrow morning by the Supreme Court of Canada in rectification decisions from the Quebec courts. The first appeal is Agence du Revenu du Québec (formerly the Deputy Minister of Revenue of Quebec) v. Services Environnementaux AES Inc., et al. while the second appeal is Agence du Revenu du Québec v. Jean Riopel, et al.  In each case, the Quebec Court of Appeal agreed with the taxpayers that rectification was in order.

The Supreme Court’s summary of the first appeal may be found here.  Each factum in the first appeal may be read here.

The Supreme Court’s summary of the second appeal may be found here.  Each factum in the second appeal may be read here.

The decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal in the first appeal is here.  The decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal in the second appeal is here.

At 9:30 a.m. tomorrow, the live webcast of the hearings may be viewed here or here.  The archived webcast will be available for viewing a day or two later.

The newest member of the Supreme Court of Canada, Justice Richard Wagner, was a member of the panel of the Quebec Court of Appeal that decided the second appeal.  He will, therefore, not hear tomorrow’s appeals.  Accordingly, a maximum of seven judges will be on the panel tomorrow morning.

Postscript: At the conclusion of the hearing, the panel reserved judgment.  During the course of the hearing, highlights of argument were tweeted live @CanTaxLit

On October 31, 2012, the Crown filed a Notice of Appeal with the Federal Court of Appeal against the judgment of the Tax Court of Canada in Julie Guindon v. The Queen (2012 TCC 287). In that decision, the Tax Court held that the advisor penalties imposed under section 163.2 of the Income Tax Act were criminal in nature, and therefore attract constitutional protection under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Court also held that the standard of “culpable conduct” in section 163.2 was a higher standard than “gross negligence” as the latter has been interpreted in the context of subsection 163(2) penalties. For a more detailed review of the Tax Court decision, see our previous post here.

In particular, the Crown has appealed the Tax Court’s finding that the Charter applies to section 163.2 penalties, and the determination of the Court that “culpable conduct” is a different standard than “gross negligence”.

The advisor, who was found to have engaged in culpable conduct (and therefore would have been subject to the assessed penalty had the court not found the penalty to be criminal in nature) has yet to file a cross-appeal on that point.

Stay tuned to www.canadiantaxlitigation.com for further updates on this important appeal.

At the Canadian Tax Foundation’s recent Ontario Tax Conference (October 29-30), the Canada Revenue Agency provided an update on its current audit priorities and activities as part of the conference’s “Tax Administration Panel“.

The CRA was represented by Fiona Harrison, Manager of the Resources Section at the CRA’s Income Tax Rulings Directorate, and Jeff Sadrian, National Director of the CRA’s Large Business Audit Programs.

In the course of the presentation, the CRA discussed a variety of issues (see the “Tax Administration Panel” conference slides), including “red tape” reduction, the CRA’s trust audit project, Regulation 105 waivers, ABIL claims, and omission penalties under s. 163(1). The CRA confirmed that it determines audit priorities based on the “highest risk”, and that it is continuing its “intelligence-based risk assessment” of taxpayers to determine which files will be selected for audit.

Other highlights included:

• Folios – The CRA considers many existing Interpretation Bulletins to be out of date. The CRA intends to reorganize the information in the existing publications in new Folio chapters (i.e., all information relating to specific subjects will be “grouped” together). The CRA plans to update the Folios on an on-going basis, and the first 10-12 Folio chapters are likely to be published before the end of 2012.
• Entity Classification - In a reversal of an earlier position (see, for example, CRA Document No. 2011-0415141E5 “Tax status of a German Family Trust” (August 4, 2011)), the CRA will once again accept requests for rulings on the classification of foreign entities.
• Inter-Provincial Trusts – Where a trust claims to be resident, and pays tax, in one province, and the trust is later reassessed as resident in another province, the CRA will reassess the trust only for the difference between the tax paid in the first province and the tax owing in the second province.
• U.S. LLCs – The CRA continues to disagree with the Tax Court’s decision in TD Securities (USA) LLC. v. The Queen (2010 TCC 186). The CRA’s view is that a fiscally-transparent U.S. LLC does not qualify as a resident of the U.S. for the purposes of the Canada-U.S. Tax Treaty, and is not a “qualifying person” under Article XXIX-A of the Treaty.
• Section 56(2) – The CRA stated that it is aware of “elaborate arrangements” utilized to divert business income to family members. The CRA stated that, where such arrangements include the use of a trust, section 56(2) may be applied in respect of distributions from the trust provided the requirements of the provision are otherwise met (see Neuman v. The Queen (98 D.T.C. 6297 (S.C.C.)). In other words, the CRA may apply s. 56(2) to the actions of a trustee.

(The Tax Administration Panel conference slides are republished with permission of the Canadian Tax Foundation.)

The Tax Court of Canada recently released its decision in Guindon, a case concerning the application of third-party penalties under section 163.2 of the Income Tax Act (the
“Act”). The Court found that the penalty imposed under section 163.2 of the Act is a
criminal penalty, not a civil one, and therefore subject to the same constitutional protections as other penal statutes enacted by the federal government.

Click here to read more.

Taxpayers and their advisors should be aware of a significant new development concerning the appropriate withholding tax rate on the payment of cross-border interest, royalties and dividends.

On October 19, 2012, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (the “OECD”) released a revised discussion draft concerning the meaning of “beneficial owner” for the purposes of Articles 10, 11 and 12 of the OECD’s model tax convention (the “OECD Model”). The discussion draft builds on the OECD’s prior discussion draft (released on April 29, 2011), which received widespread international criticism for its ambiguity and lack of meaningful guidance on this fundamental issue of international taxation.

Background

Canada’s Income Tax Act (the “Act”) requires that a Canadian company withhold 25 percent of dividends, interest and royalties paid to non-residents and remit this amount to the Canada Revenue Agency (the “CRA”) on behalf of the non-resident. However, Canada has entered into numerous bilateral tax treaties with various countries that reduce or eliminate the withholding tax. To benefit from these reductions or eliminations of Canadian withholding tax, the treaties generally require (among other things) that the recipient qualify as the “beneficial owner” of the amount paid.

Canada’s tax treaties are generally based on the OECD Model, which, together with its commentaries, generally provide that a resident of a contracting state will be the beneficial owner of an amount received from a resident of the other contracting state so long as the recipient was not acting in its capacity as an agent, nominee, fiduciary or administrator on behalf of a person not resident in that state.

However, there is surprisingly little additional insight into the intended meaning or possible interpretations of this term. There is a growing body of Canadian and international jurisprudence on the issue, with the Canadian case of Prevost Car, Inc. v. The Queen (2009 D.T.C. 5053 (F.C.A.), aff’g 2008 D.T.C. 3080 (T.C.C.)) currently serving as the high-water mark.  Nevertheless, inconsistencies remain in the manner in which different states interpret and apply “beneficial owner” (see also the earlier article by FMC’s Matt Peters on Velcro v. The Queen (2012 TCC 57)) .

OECD Guidance

Instead of clarifying the issue, the OECD’s prior discussion draft was roundly criticised for adding further uncertainty to the meaning of “beneficial owner”. In the prior draft, the OECD emphasized the desire to introduce a meaning that could be universally accepted and applied by all countries.  In this respect, the prior draft focused on assessing the recipient’s ability to have the “full right to use and enjoy” dividend, interest or royalty income and stated that a recipient will not be the beneficial owner if its powers are constrained by a contractual or legal obligation to pass the payment received to another person.  Many commentators suggested that this approach was too broad and ambiguous and left taxpayers with little certainty when structuring their affairs.  Moreover, the exact role of a country’s domestic law meaning of “beneficial owner” was left somewhat open.

The new draft attempts to clarify the issue by (i) more strongly abandoning the relevancy of any particular state’s domestic law meaning of “beneficial owner”; and (ii) providing further guidance as to what is meant by the right to use and enjoy an amount unconstrained by contractual or legal obligations.  The revised draft reviews in some detail the comments received by the OECD on it’s prior draft and explains in more detail (and through examples) the rationale behind its approach.

Next Steps

This is a controversial issue and the approach adopted by the OECD in its revised discussion draft will undoubtedly stir debate in the international tax arena.  The OECD has indicated that it will be accepting comments on the revised draft before 15 December, 2012, suggesting that another revised draft will likely be released in 2013.  Tax practitioners and their clients will need to carefully consider the approach that contained in the OECD’s revised draft and assess whether it presents any risks in their particular circumstances.

* Special thanks to Christian Orton, Articling Student, for his valuable contributions to this article. 

This morning, the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown’s appeal in The Queen v. GlaxoSmithKline Inc., the first transfer pricing case to be heard by the Supreme Court of Canada under subsection 69(2) of the Income Tax Act (Canada) (the “Act”) and ordered the parties to return to the Tax Court of Canada for the determination of the appropriate transfer price.  The Supreme Court of Canada remitted the matter to the Tax Court of Canada:

[76]   . . . to be redetermined, having regard to the effect of the Licence Agreement on the prices paid by Glaxo Canada for the supply of ranitidine from Adechsa.  The Tax Court judge should consider any new evidence the parties seek to adduce and that he may choose to allow.

The Supreme Court endorsed and elaborated on the legal test set out by the Federal Court of Appeal and rejected the test applied by the Tax Court.  However, it is important to note that subsection 69(2) has been replaced by subection 247(2) of the Act which applies in respect of taxation years and fiscal periods beginning after 1997.  The taxation years at issue in this litigation were 1990-1993.

The reasons for judgment were delivered by Justice Rothstein for a panel of seven (the other members of the panel were the Chief Justice, Justice Deschamps, Justice Abella, Justice Cromwell, Justice Moldaver and Justice Karakatsanis).

By way of background, GlaxoSmithKline Inc. (“Glaxo Canada”) purchased ranitidine, the active ingredient in the anti-ulcer medication called Zantac, from a Swiss non-arm’s length source approved by Glaxo UK (“Adechsa S.A.”) which was part of the Glaxo Group in the U.K.  It did so at a price approximately five times higher than the price at which the same ranitidine was sold in the market to Canadian generic drug manufacturers who did not have the right to manufacture or sell Zantac.

Glaxo Canada could not have gone into the market to purchase ranitidine at the price paid by the generic drug manufacturers and use that ranitidine to manufacture and sell Zantac in Canada.  It had the right to manufacture and sell Zantac in Canada under an agreement with Glaxo Group pursuant to which it was required to purchase all of its ranitidine from Adechsa S.A. at a price determined by Glaxo Group.  Glaxo Canada entered into a Licence Agreement with Glaxo Group which allowed it to manufacture and sell Zantac in Canada in consideration of a royalty payment to Glaxo Group.  Glaxo Canada was also required to purchase the raw ingredient, ranitidine, from a source approved by Glaxo Group (i.e., Adechsa S.A.) under a Supply Agreement between it and Adechsa S.A.  During the years at issue, the price of ranitidine purchased by Glaxo Canada was $1500 per kilogram while identical ranitidine was available and was purchased by generic drug manufacturers at $300 per kilogram.

The 1985 version of subsection 69(2) applicable to the years 1990-1993 reads:

(2) Where a taxpayer has paid or agreed to pay to a non-resident person with whom the taxpayer was not dealing at arm’s length as price, rental, royalty or other payment for or for the use or reproduction of any property, or as consideration for the carriage of goods or passengers or for other services, an amount greater than the amount (in this subsection referred to as “the reasonable amount”) that would have been reasonable in the circumstances if the non-resident person and the taxpayer had been dealing at arm’s length, the reasonable amount shall, for the purpose of computing the taxpayer’s income under this Part, be deemed to have been the amount that was paid or is payable therefor.

The Decision of the Tax Court of Canada

The issue before the Tax Court was whether the amount paid by the taxpayer to the non-arm’s-length party was “reasonable in the circumstances.”  The Tax Court held that (a) the “comparable uncontrolled price” (or CUP) method was the most accurate way to determine the arm’s-length price for ranitidine and (b) the appropriate comparable transactions were the purchases of ranitidine by the generic manufacturers. Subject to a relatively minor adjustment, the Tax Court dismissed the taxpayer’s appeal.

The Decision of the Federal Court of Appeal

The Federal Court of Appeal allowed the taxpayer’s appeal. The Court of Appeal held that the Tax Court had erred in its application of the “reasonable in the circumstances” test, and that it should have inquired into the circumstances that an arm’s-length purchaser in the taxpayer’s position would have considered relevant in deciding what reasonable price to pay for ranitidine. The Court of Appeal set aside the Tax Court judgment and sent the matter back to the Tax Court to be reconsidered.

The Hearing Before the Supreme Court of Canada

At the hearing, Crown counsel emphasized the fact that the only transaction under review was the purchase of ranitidine.  As counsel put it at the hearing, you don’t throw into the analysis “the whole deal.”  She argued that the only question is “what is an arm’s length price to pay for ranitidine?”  Counsel contended that one must strip away the non-arm’s length circumstance (i.e., the requirement to buy ranitidine at a price set by Glaxo Group).

(a) Questions for the Crown at the Supreme Court Hearing

Justice Abella was concerned about whether it was fair for the Crown to compare (under the CUP method) on the one hand the price paid by Glaxo Canada for ranitidine that was destined to become Zantac and, on the other hand, the price paid by generic drug manufacturers for ranitidine that was not destined to become Zantac.  Justice Abella asked counsel whether “in the circumstances” in subsection 69(2) meant that you look at the whole deal.  Counsel argued that you can’t look at the whole deal.

The Chief Justice focused on the words of 69(2) “that would have been reasonable in the circumstances” and asked Crown counsel what is to be included in “the circumstances”.  Crown counsel contended that the only relevant circumstance is the price of ranitidine paid by the generic drug manufacturers in Canada.  The Crown maintained that one cannot take into account any “non-arm’s length” circumstance (e.g., that Glaxo Canada must pay the price set by Glaxo Group) and that all non-arm’s length circumstances must be stripped out of the analysis under subsection 69(2).

During the Crown’s reply argument, Justice Cromwell described the Crown’s position as: ”Whatever the deal is, we ignore it.”  Crown counsel agreed with that characterization.

Justice Moldaver asked counsel, in light of the decision of Parliament not to use the phrase “reasonable in the circumstances” in the successor provision to subsection 69(2) (subsection 247(2) of the Act), why would the Crown ignore that language and call the whole structure of the deal “background music” and not part of the “circumstances”.

Justice Rothstein remarked that Glaxo Canada was not simply purchasing ranitidine but was purchasing ranitidine for the purpose of resale as Zantac.  If Glaxo Canada went into the market like the generics and purchased ranitidine, they would not have been able to resell it as Zantac and Zantac is their business.  He asked Crown counsel why the words “reasonable in the circumstances” exclude the way that a business plans to use the product it is purchasing.  He noted that there is a “generic market” and a “brand product” market for most drugs.  He asked why those circumstances are not relevant in determining the price someone would pay for ranitidine to be used for “brand product” sales as opposed to ranitidine for ”generic product” sale.

In answer to some of these concerns, counsel referred to paragraph 89 of the reasons for judgment of the Tax Court:

[89]     If the legislature intended that the phrase “reasonable in the circumstances” in subsection 69(2) should include all contractual terms there would be no purpose to subsection 69(2); any MNE would be able to claim that its parent company would not allow it to purchase from another supplier. No MNE would ever have its transfer prices measured against arm’s length prices, because all MNEs would allege that they could purchase only from sources approved by the parent company. The controlling corporation in a MNE would structure its relationships with its related companies, and as between its related companies, in this manner or in some similar manner. There is no question that the appellant was required to purchase Glaxo approved ranitidine. The issue is whether a person in Canada dealing at arm’s length with its supplier would have accepted the conditions and paid the price the appellant did.

Justice Deschamps observed that if the Crown is looking at a transaction with a generic company, it is not looking at the same transaction.  Crown counsel responsed by saying that the transaction at issue is a simple purchase of ranitidine and the Minister is only trying to value that one transaction.

Justice Abella asked counsel whether it is relevant to the pricing analysis that this was not just a purchase of ranitidine but a purchase of ranitidine for the purpose of being sold as Zantac.  Crown counsel maintained that this was just a purchase of ranitidine as subsection 69(2) strips out the non-arm’s length element.

Justice Rothstein asked counsel what there would be to argue if the matter were remitted back to the Tax Court.  Counsel responded that the Minister’s position would be exactly the same (the price paid by Glaxo Canada was not “the reasonable amount”) based on the evidence of what the generic drug manufacturers paid.  The Crown concluded by arguing that you simply cannot find a comparator selling Zantac without the concomitant non-arm’s length circumstances.

(b) Questions for Glaxo Canada at the Supreme Court Hearing

Justice Abella asked counsel whether there was any way of determining whether $1,500 per kilogram was the “fair market value” of the ranitidine to someone in Glaxo Canada’s position.  How do you test the “reasonableness” of the $1,500 per kilo price?  Counsel responded by saying that that wasn’t the Minister’s case.  The Minister simply assessed on the basis that Glaxo Canada paid more than the generics did and that was the only relevant comparator.  Once that theory was set aside by Federal Court of Appeal, that was the end of it.

The Chief Justice asked counsel whether it would be possible for taxpayers to avoid Part XIII tax on royalties for the use of intellectual property if no actual royalty was paid but was, instead, effectively embedded in the cost of the goods.  Counsel replied that such “unbundling” is unnecessary as other provisions deal with abusive tax avoidance such as that.  In any event, there are no such allegations in this case by the Minister (i.e., that “unbundling” is required or that inappropriate tax avoidance has taken place).

The Chief Justice wondered whether the Minister’s allegation that Glaxo Canada paid too much shifted the onus to Glaxo Canada to fully engage in the “unbundling” debate.  Counsel responded that Glaxo Canada paid $1,500 per kilogram to Adechsa S.A. for the ranitidine and paid a separate royalty to Glaxo Group for the use of intellectual property.  The Minister never argued that Glaxo Canada was obliged to do any sort of unbundling in this case.

Justice Rothstein asked counsel whether once the Federal Court of Appeal determined that the wrong test had been applied, it should have remitted the matter back to the Tax Court to determine the non-arm’s length price based on the proper legal test (i.e. taking into account the particular business circumstances around the transaction).  Counsel argued that sending the matter back to the Tax Court would turn the rules of civil litigation in general, and tax litigation in particular, on their heads.  He contended that the Tax Court cannot try a case that was never pleaded by the Crown.  The Chief Justice wondered whether the taxpayer had not discharged its burden of showing that $1,500 per kilogram was “the reasonable amount”.  Counsel responded by observing that Glaxo Canada, at trial, had demolished the basis for the Minister’s assessment and, in light of the judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal, the burden shifts to the Minister – the burden does not remain on the taxpayer to demonstrate why the price charged for the ranitidine was “the reasonable amount”.  Glaxo Canada met the case pleaded against it and the Minister has no right to start all over again in respect of the taxation years at issue.  On the pleadings as they currently stand, there is no case to go back to the Tax Court.

The Decision of the Supreme Court of Canada

In a nutshell, the Court held that the legal test applied by the Tax Court was incorrect as it ignored the Licence Agreement and the Supply Agreement which formed part of the relevant circumstances surrounding the transaction at issue.  As there had been no factual determination of the appropriate transfer price in light of the correct legal test, the Court referred the matter back to the Tax Court to determine the appropriate transfer price.

More detailed commentary will follow in the days to come but, in the meantime, here are some of the more important passages in the decision:

The role of OECD Guidelines

[20]   In the courts below and in this Court, there has been reference to the1979 Guidelines and the 1995 Guidelines (“the Guidelines”).  The Guidelines contain commentary and methodology pertaining to the issue of transfer pricing.  However, the Guidelines are not controlling as if they were a Canadian statute and the test of any set of transactions or prices ultimately must be determined according to s. 69(2) rather than any particular methodology or commentary set out in the Guidelines.

The relevant circumstances

[38]   . . . The requirement of s. 69(2) is that the price established in a non-arm’s length transfer pricing transaction is to be redetermined as if it were between parties dealing at arm’s length.  If the circumstances require, transactions other than the purchasing transactions must be taken into account to determine whether the actual price was or was not greater than the amount that would have been reasonable had the parties been dealing at arm’s length.

                                                                        *  *  *

[42]   Thus, according to the 1995 Guidelines, a proper application of the arm’s length principle requires that regard be had for the “economically relevant characteristics” of the arm’s length and non-arm’s length circumstances to ensure they are “sufficiently comparable”.  Where there are no related transactions or where related transactions are not relevant to the determination of the reasonableness of the price in issue, a transaction-by-transaction approach may be appropriate.  However, “economically relevant characteristics of the situations being compared” may make it necessary to consider other transactions that impact the transfer price under consideration.  In each case it is necessary to address this question by considering the relevant circumstances.

                                                                       *  *  *

[44]   Because s. 69(2) requires an inquiry into the price that would be reasonable in the circumstances had the non-resident supplier and the Canadian taxpayer been dealing at arm’s length, it necessarily involves consideration of all circumstances of the Canadian taxpayer relevant to the price paid to the non-resident supplier.  Such circumstances will include agreements that may confer rights and benefits in addition to the purchase of property where those agreements are linked to the purchasing agreement. The objective is to determine what an arm’s length purchaser would pay for the property and the rights and benefits together where the rights and benefits are linked to the price paid for the property.

Stripping out non-arm’s length elements

[47]   There were only two approved sources, one of which was Adechsa.  Thus, in order to avail itself of the benefits of the Licence Agreement, Glaxo Canada was required to purchase the active ingredient from one of these sources.  This requirement was not the product of the non-arm’s length relationship between Glaxo Canada and Glaxo Group or Adechsa.  Rather, it arose because Glaxo Group controlled the trademark and patent of the brand-name pharmaceutical product Glaxo Canada wished to market. An arm’s length distributor wishing to market Zantac might well be faced with the same requirement.

[48]   The effect of the link between the Licence and Supply agreements was that an entity that wished to market Zantac was subject to contractual terms affecting the price of ranitidine that generic marketers of ranitidine products were not.

[49]   As such, the rights and benefits of the Licence Agreement were contingent on Glaxo Canada entering into a Supply Agreement with suppliers to be designated by Glaxo Group.  The result of the price paid was to allocate to Glaxo Canada what Glaxo Group considered to be appropriate compensation for its secondary manufacturing and marketing function in respect of ranitidine and Zantac.

The use of generic comparators

[53]   . . . the generic comparators do not reflect the economic and business reality of Glaxo Canada and, at least without adjustment, do not indicate the price that would be reasonable in the circumstances, had Glaxo Canada and Adechsa been dealing at arm’s length.

Glaxo Canada was paying for more than just ranitidine

[51]   Thus, it appears that Glaxo Canada was paying for at least some of the rights and benefits under the Licence Agreement as part of the purchase prices for ranitidine from Adechsa.  Because the prices paid to Adechsa were set, in part, as compensation to Glaxo Group for the rights and benefits conferred on Glaxo Canada under the Licence Agreement, the Licence Agreement could not be ignored in determining the reasonable amount paid to Adechsa under s. 69(2), which applies not only to payment for goods but also to payment for services.

[52]   Considering the Licence and Supply agreements together offers a realistic picture of the profits of Glaxo Canada.  It cannot be irrelevant that Glaxo Canada’s function was primarily as a secondary manufacturer and marketer.  It did not originate new products and the intellectual property rights associated with them.  Nor did it undertake the investment and risk involved with originating new products.  Nor did it have the other risks and investment costs which Glaxo Group undertook under the Licence Agreement.  The prices paid by Glaxo Canada to Adechsa were a payment for a bundle of at least some rights and benefits under the Licence Agreement and product under the Supply Agreement.

                                                                    *  *  *

[59]   In addition, while, as Rip A.C.J. found, Glaxo Canada’s ranitidine and generic ranitidine are chemically equivalent and bio-equivalent, he also found that there was value in the fact that Adechsa’s ranitidine manufactured under Glaxo Group’s “good manufacturing practices” “may confer a certain degree of comfort that the good has minimal impurities and is manufactured in a responsible manner” (para. 118).  Zantac is priced higher than the generic products, presumably, at least in part, because of that “degree of comfort” that Rip A.C.J. acknowledged.

[60]   These are all features of the Licence Agreement and the requirement to purchase from a Glaxo-approved source that add value to the ranitidine that Glaxo Canada purchased from Adechsa over and above the value of generic ranitidine without these rights and benefits.  They should justify some recognition in determining what an arm’s length purchaser would be prepared to pay for the same rights and benefits conveyed with ranitidine purchased from a Glaxo Group source.  It is only after identifying the circumstances arising from the Licence Agreement that are linked to the Supply Agreement that arm’s length comparisons under any of the OECD methods or other methods may be determined.

Part XIII (withholding) tax

[57]   Although I said above that the purchase price appeared to be linked to some of the rights and benefits conferred under the Licence Agreement, I make no determination in these reasons as to whether the rights under the ranitidine patent granted to Glaxo Canada to manufacture and sell Zantac and the exclusive right to use the Zantac trademark are linked to the purchase price paid by Glaxo Canada to Adechsa.  However, arguably, if the purchase price includes compensation for intellectual property rights granted to Glaxo Canada, there would have to be consistency between that and Glaxo Canada’s position with respect to Part XIII withholding tax.  This issue was not specifically argued in this Court and may be addressed by the parties in the Tax Court and considered by the Tax Court judge when considering whether any specific rights and benefits conferred on Glaxo Canada under the Licence Agreement are linked to the price for ranitidine paid to Adechsa.

Guidelines for the Tax Court of Canada in making its redetermination

[54]   I agree with Justice Nadon that “the amount that would have been reasonable in the circumstances” if Glaxo Canada and Adechsa had been dealing at arm’s length has yet to be determined.  This will require a close examination of the terms of the Licence Agreement and the rights and benefits granted to Glaxo Canada under that Agreement.

                                                                  *  *  *

[61]   I would offer the following additional guidance with respect to the redetermination.  First, s. 69(2) uses the term “reasonable amount”.  This reflects the fact that, to use the words of the 1995 Guidelines, “transfer pricing is not an exact science” (para. 1.45).  It is doubtful that comparators will be identical in all material respects in almost any case.  Therefore, some leeway must be allowed in the determination of the reasonable amount.  As long as a transfer price is within what the court determines is a reasonable range, the requirements of the section should be satisfied.  If it is not, the court might select a point within a range it considers reasonable in the circumstances based on an average, median, mode, or other appropriate statistical measure, having regard to the evidence that the court found to be relevant.  I repeat for emphasis that it is highly unlikely that any comparisons will yield identical circumstances and the Tax Court judge will be required to exercise his best informed judgment in establishing a satisfactory arm’s length price.

[62]   Second, while assessment of the evidence is a matter for the trial judge, I would observe that the respective roles and functions of Glaxo Canada and the Glaxo Group should be kept in mind.  Glaxo Canada engaged in the secondary manufacturing and marketing of Zantac.  Glaxo Group is the owner of the intellectual property and provided other rights and benefits to Glaxo Canada.  Transfer pricing should not result in a misallocation of earnings that fails to take account of these different functions and the resources and risks inherent in each.  As discussed above, whether or not compensation for intellectual property rights is justified in this particular case, is a matter for determination by the Tax Court judge.

[63]   Third, prices between parties dealing at arm’s length will be established having regard to the independent interests of each party to the transaction.  That means that the interests of Glaxo Group and Glaxo Canada must both be considered.  An appropriate determination under the arm’s length test of s. 69(2) should reflect these realities.

[64]   Fourth, in this case there is some evidence that indicates that arm’s length distributors have found it in their interest to acquire ranitidine from a Glaxo Group supplier, rather than from generic sources.  This suggests that higher-than-generic transfer prices are justified and are not necessarily greater than a reasonable amount under s. 69(2).

The Supreme Court of Canada will release its decision in The Queen v. GlaxoSmithKline Inc. (F.C.) (33874) on Thursday, October 18, at 9:45 a.m.

In earlier proceedings, the Tax Court dismissed the taxpayer’s appeal, and the Federal Court of Appeal allowed the taxpayer’s appeal (see our posts on those decisions here and here).

The Crown’s factum may be found here, and GSK Canada’s factum here. Oral arguments were heard by the Supreme Court of Canada in January 2012 (see our post on the arguments here). The decision will be the first for the Supreme Court on the issue of transfer pricing.

The two main questions placed before the Supreme Court were:

1. Did the Federal Court of Appeal err by applying the reasonable business person test to the interpretation of s. 69(2) of the Act?
2. Did the Federal Court of Appeal err in interpreting s. 69(2) by failing to apply the arm’s-length principle on a transaction-by-transaction basis and on the basis that members of the multinational group are operating as separate entities?

In a cross-appeal by GSK Canada, the Supreme Court was asked to consider whether the Federal Court of Appeal erred in ordering that the matter be returned to the trial judge for further determination.

We will blog the decision shortly after its release tomorrow.

In what is certain to be the first step in a very important precedent, the Tax Court of Canada held on October 2, 2012 that the advisor penalties created under section 163.2 of the Income Tax Act constitute criminal offences and entitle the taxpayer to all of the constitutional protections that entails, including a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt: Guindon v. The Queen, 2012 TCC 287.

The case involved a tax avoidance scheme that was deeply flawed from a technical perspective:

[1] The participants in a donation program (the “Program”) were to acquire timeshare units as beneficiaries of a trust for a fraction of their value and donate them to a charity in exchange for tax receipts for the actual value of the units. No donation ever took place as the timeshare units never existed and no trust was settled. The Minister of National Revenue (the “Minister”), on the basis that the Appellant made, participated in, assented to or acquiesced in the making of 135 tax receipts that she knew, or would reasonably be expected to have known, constituted false statements that could be used by the participants to claim an unwarranted tax credit under the Income Tax Act (the “Act”), assessed against the Appellant on August 1, 2008 penalties under section 163.2 of the Act in the amount of $546,747 in respect of false statements made in the context of that donation program. The Appellant appealed the assessment.

The appellant was a lawyer with no experience or expertise in tax law. Nevertheless she prepared an opinion that was used by the Program promoters to attract potential donors. The opinion was found to be badly flawed and purported to rely upon documentation which the appellant had never examined (and which, in fact, did not exist):

[105] The Appellant wrote and endorsed a legal opinion regarding the Program, an opinion which she knew would be part of a promotional package intended for potential participants in the Program. Her legal opinion clearly states that she reviewed the principal documents relating to the Program when these documents had in fact never been provided to her. She knew, therefore, that her legal opinion was flawed and misleading.

[106] The Appellant chose to rely on the Program’s Principals. They pressured her into providing them with an executed version of the legal opinion without providing her with the supporting documents on which to found her opinion. Yet her legal opinion does not reflect this reality. Rather, it indicates that the documents were reviewed.

[107] When the Appellant chose to involve the Charity in the Program and, later, to sign the tax receipts, she knew she could not rely on her legal opinion. She again decided to rely on the Principals. However, the Principals had relied on the Appellant to attest the legality of the Program. The Appellant knew her legal opinion could not be relied on and, for that reason, she could not be entitled to blindly rely on the Principals. In other words, the Appellant would have been entitled to rely on the Principals if a different professional had signed the legal opinion. She could not, however, rely on her own legal opinion which she knew to be incomplete.

[108] Her conduct is indicative either of complete disregard of the law and whether it was complied with or not or of wilful blindness. The Appellant should have refrained from involving the Charity and signing the tax receipts until she had either reviewed the documents herself or had another professional approve the Program’s activities. When the Appellant issued the tax receipts, she could have reasonably been expected to know that those receipts were tainted by an omission, namely, that no professional had ever verified the legal basis of the Program.

[109] The Appellant cannot agree to endorse a legal opinion and then justify her wrongful conduct by saying she did not have the necessary knowledge — either of tax law or of foreign law — to write that opinion.

[110] Moreover, the Appellant’s conduct after the tax receipts were signed negatively affects her credibility and reflects badly on her character. When the Appellant was informed, after the tax receipts had been issued, that the legal titles were not in order, she co-signed a letter informing the participants of the situation. At that point, the Appellant knew she could not rely on the Principals — the same individuals who had never provided her with the documents she was supposed to review and the same individuals she had trusted in signing the tax receipts. Yet when Ploughman sent out a letter, days before the end of the fiscal year, stating that all was in order and that the participants could submit their receipts, the Appellant blindly relied on him again, without asking any further questions.

Thus, it is reasonably clear that if the test under section 163.2 were a normal burden of “balance of probabilities” the advisor penalties against the appellant would have been sustained.

Justice Bédard, however, performed a very thorough and detailed analysis of section 163.2 to determine whether the penalties imposed amounted to criminal sanctions. At the end of that careful analysis he concluded that they did create criminal offences and allowed the appeal:

[69] The Respondent submits that it is not the penalty that would stigmatize the Appellant but rather her unlawful conduct and the professional sanctions that could result from it. What the Respondent fails to recognize is that this judgment, when rendered, will be public. That professional sanctions may be imposed subsequently does not alter the fact that there will be a public document setting out all the details of the Appellant’s conduct, whether that conduct was found to qualify as culpable conduct or not, and indicating the amount of the penalty that she is being assessed. This constitutes a form of stigma which one should not fail to consider.

[70] In conclusion, applying the rationale enunciated in Wigglesworth, section 163.2 of the Act should be considered as creating a criminal offence because it is so far-reaching and broad in scope that its intent is to promote public order and protect the public at large rather than to deter specific behaviour and ensure compliance with the regulatory scheme of the Act. Furthermore, the substantial penalty imposed on the third party — a penalty which can potentially be even greater than the fine imposed under the criminal provisions of section 239 of the Act, without the third party even benefiting from the protection of the Charter — qualifies as a true penal consequence.

This case will almost undoubtedly be appealed, quite possibly to the Supreme Court of Canada. Nevertheless, the rationale of the decision seems balanced and well-reasoned. If it is sustained on appeal it may very well sound the death knell for advisor penalties under section 163.2 since the burden of proof on the Crown, i.e., proof beyond a reasonable doubt, will normally be far too onerous to justify prosecuting such penalties.

Traditionally in a Tax Court appeal the costs awarded to a successful taxpayer have been no more than a small fraction of the out-of-pocket costs actually incurred in pursuing the appeal. The Court made very rare exceptions in the case of improper or vexatious conduct on the part of CRA. In recent years, however, the Tax Court has shown an increasing willingness to award substantial costs in cases where the taxpayer has been successful on important and novel issues. The recent decision of the Tax Court in Dickie v. The Queen (September 19, 2012) is an important example of how the law is evolving in this area.

In order to understand the implications of the cost award one must briefly examine the background of the underlying tax issue which was reported as Dickie v The Queen (July 10, 2012). The taxpayer was an aboriginal person living on a Reserve. He carried on a substantial business of cutting and slashing timber and brush to permit oil and gas exploration companies to carry out seismic testing. The administrative functions of the business were carried on within the Reserve but the physical activity of the business was carried on almost exclusively outside of the Reserve, generally within an 80 kilometre radius of the Reserve:

[8] While the Appellant clearly negotiated and received accepted contracts for work from the Reserve location, it is clear that 99% of the work was conducted off Reserve, within an 80-kilometre radius of the Reserve. In 2003, the Appellant had over 140 workers engaged for his Business and had revenue of approximately $3.4 million. The Appellant testified he hired mainly aboriginal workers, 16 in all from the Reserve, and others from Reserves in other parts of British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan and even as far away as Newfoundland and Labrador. In all, the evidence is that approximately 105 of the 140 workers were aboriginal workers.

[9] The Appellant testified that the Business would bid on between 20 to 25 tenders a year and was usually successful 20% of the time, hence was awarded four to five contract bids a year. He also testified a small portion of the work of the Business was from small job requests but that the great majority of the Appellant’s Business revenue was from the larger bid contracts. The evidence is clear that all of the clients of the Business, generally oil and gas exploration or distribution companies, were not located or based on the Reserve and in fact most were based in Calgary, Alberta, the place of their office. The Appellant also testified that in 2003 the Business was a competitive one, evidenced also by the fact he was only successful on 20% of his bids.

The taxpayer claimed that his income was exempt for taxation by virtue of paragraph 81(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act:

81(1) There shall not be included in computing the income of a taxpayer for a taxation year,

(a) statutory exemptions [including Indians] – an amount that is declared to be exempt from income tax by any other enactment of Parliament, other than an amount received or receivable by an individual that is exempt by virtue of a provision contained in a tax convention or agreement with another country that has the force of law in Canada; . . .

Traditionally the courts construed this exemption somewhat narrowly placing significant emphasis on physical connection to the reserve and displaying a certain reluctance to apply the exemption to activities in the commercial mainstream.

Two recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, Bastien Estate v. Canada, 2011 SCC 38, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 710 and Dubé v. Canada, 2011 SCC 39, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 764, substantially changed the law in this area. In a nutshell they held that the commercial mainstream test should no longer carry the degree of weight it had historically:

[21] Cromwell J. made it clear that the expression “Indian qua Indian” referred to by La Forest J. and Gonthier J. in Williams does not mean one can import into the purpose of the legislation “an effort to preserve the traditional way of life in Indian communities” or consider as a relevant factor “whether the investment income benefits the traditional Native way of life”. While Cromwell J. found that he did not read the judgments in Mitchell or Williams “as departing from a focus on the location of the property in question when applying the tax exemption”, he also found that neither decision mandated an approach that assessed what is in fact, to use the parlance of the Appellant here, the “Indianness” of the activity. In paragraph 27 of Bastien Estate, Cromwell J. stated:

[27] . . . A purposive interpretation goes too far if it substitutes for the inquiry into the location of the property mandated by the statute an assessment of what does or does not constitute an “Indian” way of life on a reserve. . . .

[22] And in paragraph 28 stated:

[28] . . ., a purposive interpretation of the exemption does not require that the evolution of that way of life should be impeded. Rather, the comments in both Mitchell and Williams in relation to the protection of property which Indians hold qua Indians should be read in relation to the need to establish a connection between the property and the reserve such that it may be said that the property is situated there for the purposes of the Indian Act. While the relationship between property and life on the reserve may in some cases be a factor tending to strengthen or weaken the connection between the property and the reserve, the availability of the exemption does not depend on whether the property is integral to the life of the reserve or to the preservation of the traditional Indian way of life. . .

[23] Likewise Cromwell J. cautioned against elevating considerations of whether the economic activity was in the “commercial mainstream” as a factor of determinative weight in determining the situs of investment income, which he felt was done in Recalma v. Canada, 98 DTC 6238 (F.C.A.) and other decisions of the lower courts, as “problematic” as he stated in paragraph 56 :

[56] . . . because it might be taken as setting up a false opposition between “commercial mainstream” activities and activities on a reserve. Linden J.A. in Folster was alive to this danger when he observed that the use of the term “commercial mainstream” might “… imply, incorrectly, that trade and commerce is somehow foreign to First Nations” (para. 14, note 27). He was also careful to observe in Recalma that the “commercial mainstream” consideration was not a separate test for the determination of the situs of investment property, but an “aid” to be taken into consideration in the analysis of the question (para. 9). Notwithstanding this wise counsel, the “commercial mainstream” consideration has sometimes become a determinative test. . . .

Justice Pizzitelli applied the new test enunciated by the Supreme Court and came to the conclusion that the taxpayer had demonstrated an entitlement to the exemption claimed and made the following direction as to costs:

[74] The appeal is allowed with costs to the Appellant; however, the parties are invited to file written submissions within 30 days as to costs if any of them feel a standard cost award should not stand.

In making his cost award roughly two months later Justice Pizzitelli was critical of CRA’s reliance upon the “commercial mainstream” argument in light of the Bastien and Dubé decisions:

[20] I do however also agree with the Appellant that having regard to the clear wording and intention of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions effectively reducing the importance of the commercial mainstream factor, if not obliterating it, that the Respondent could have shortened the proceeding by conceding this fact before trial. While the Respondent’s counsel acknowledged the reduction in weight to be given to the issue in argument at trial, she nonetheless maintained its assumptions in its pleadings regarding the commercial mainstream and argued forcefully that such factor would grant an advantage to aboriginal businesses over non-aboriginal businesses, an argument in my opinion clearly not consistent with the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions on the issue. As I referred to in my decision, if the other factors are sufficient to establish the income was situate on a Reserve, then any such resulting advantage was acceptable. In my view, the Respondent could have significantly reduced the length of the hearing by conceding the argument before trial on receiving the Appellant’s counsel’s letter. In my view, this matter falls under the heading of Rule 147(h) the denial or the neglect or refusal of any party to admit anything that should have been admitted. In my opinion, the Respondent paid lip service to the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions on the importance of the commercial mainstream argument yet proceeded to trial on the basis it was one of its strongest arguments.

In the result he awarded the taxpayer 60% of his out-of-pocket costs and 100% of his disbursements claimed:

[26] In my view, having regard to the clear victory of the Appellant in this matter, the sizeable amount of taxes in dispute including for other years for which this case served as a test case, the importance of the commercial mainstream issue in particular and the complexity of the issue in light of the Respondent’s position notwithstanding the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in Bastien Estate and Dubé and the amount of work generated for the Appellant as a result of the Respondent’s position on that issue and the importance it continued to give to the commercial mainstream factor as above discussed, which in my view should have been conceded before trial to shorten the trial and narrow the issues, there clearly exist special circumstances justified by the application of factors listed in Rule 147(3) to merit awarding the Appellant costs in excess of the Tariff.

[27] The Appellant asked for between 50 and 75% of solicitor and client costs plus disbursements, consistent with the range of traditional awards cited by author Mark Orkin in the Law of Costs, 2nd ed., Vol. 1 (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 2008) at 2-3 as quoted by Campbell J. in Re Zeller Estate above at paragraph 9. The Appellant’s costs on a solicitor and client basis claimed are $133,000 plus $10,000 in disbursements. In my opinion, the Appellant is deserving of 60% of such claim, amounting to $80,000 plus $10,000 in disbursements, for a total award of $90,000.

While the background of this case is somewhat uncommon, the issues it presents occur frequently in serious commercial tax litigation: important, novel issues involving a great deal of tax. When this is combined with a stubborn refusal on the part of CRA to acknowledge the obvious weaknesses of some of its arguments, we may begin to see more significant costs awards in the mold of the Dickie decision.

In my recent blog post on the Newmont Canada Corporation decision I examined the importance that the Federal Court of Appeal attached to credible evidence put forward by taxpayers in tax appeals. The recent decision of Justice Woods in the Tax Court in Bruno v. The Queen is a good illustration of a fair and balanced approach to weighing that evidence.

The taxpayer, Mrs. Bruno, had a business that specialized in supplying custom window coverings. During the 2007 and 2008 taxation years she employed two of her children in the business on a part-time basis and paid them (in the aggregate) $18,000 and $7,000, in each respective year, for their services.

Justice Woods summarized the evidence as follows:

[6] In the 2007 taxation year, Ms. Bruno reported income from the business in the amount of $11,944. In the 2008 taxation year, she reported a loss from the business in the amount of $16,963.

[7] Ms. Bruno’s two children were 15-16 and 13-14 in the years at issue and helped out in the business on weekends and holidays.

[8] According to Ms. Bruno’s evidence, the younger child did less skilled tasks such as cleaning and answering phones, and the older child did mainly clerical work. Both children also spent time learning sales.

[9] Ms. Bruno entered into evidence a summary of the hours worked and wages earned by the children. Wages were payable at the rate of between $10 and $12 per hour. The summary showed that the children generally worked store hours on both weekend days during 2007 and on one weekend day during 2008, as well as on holidays in both years. The reduction in the hours worked in 2008 was explained by Ms. Bruno on the basis that the business was not doing as well in that year.

[10] The wages were not paid by cheque. Instead, Ms. Bruno paid for some of the children’s personal expenditures which in aggregate are approximately equal to the wages shown on the summary. According to Ms. Bruno’s testimony, the expenditures were luxury items that the children chose to purchase out of the money that they had earned. A list of the expenditures with a brief description was kept by Ms. Bruno.

[11] Ms. Bruno stated that her accountant advised her that she could not take a deduction for expenditures on the children’s basic needs, but that she could take a deduction for luxury items. She said that she followed this advice and kept track of the expenses that would qualify.

[12] Ms. Bruno testified that she could veto any of the children’s purchases that were inappropriate but that she usually approved them.

The Crown’s position was short and to the point:

[15] At the outset, I would comment that the Crown did not argue that the wages were unreasonable based on the services performed and there was virtually no cross-examination of Ms. Bruno on this point. I will therefore accept that the amounts are reasonable.

[16] The Crown argued that the expenditures are not deductible because they are personal or living expenditures of Ms. Bruno and the children did not have sufficient discretion over the funds.

Justice Woods dismissed the Crown’s arguments that the children did not have sufficient discretion over the application of the funds:

[22] As for the Crown’s argument that the children did not have sufficient discretion over the funds, this argument is based on the decision of Beaubier J. in Bradley v The Queen, 2006 TCC 500, 2006 DTC 3535. Paragraph 9 of that decision reads:

[9] But in a related family, parent-child situation, payment must be made and deposited as it would be to a stranger. The payee must receive and control the alleged payment in his or her name and be able to use it for his or her benefit without any further control by the payer. That did not happen in this case.

[23] This comment suggests that the children must have complete discretion over the expenditures made. I would respectfully disagree with this and note that Bradley is not a binding precedent since it was an informal procedure case. I see nothing wrong with parents having a veto over expenditures made by their children.

Her conclusion on this point seems unimpeachable. There is little merit in the suggestion that a minor child must have entirely unfettered discretion as to what to do with his or her earnings in order for those amounts to constitute the child’s income. Would it be any less the child’s income if the parents could veto a decision by the minor to purchase a pit bull or pay for hang-glider lessons?

On the broader issue whether wages paid to children were deductible, Justice Woods relied upon the Symes decision of the Supreme Court of Canada:

[19] In considering the interplay between s. 18(1)(a) and (h), the majority decision in Symes concluded that the prohibition for personal expenditures in s. 18(1)(h) does not apply to an expenditure that was laid out for the purpose of earning income. Justice Iacobucci stated, at page 6014:

Upon reflection, therefore, no test has been proposed which improves upon or which substantially modifies a test derived directly from the language of s. 18(1)(a). The analytical trail leads back to its source, and I simply ask the following: did the appellant incur child care expenses for the purpose of gaining or producing income from a business?

[20] Accordingly, if a taxpayer incurs an expense for the purpose of gaining or producing income from a business, the deduction will not be prohibited pursuant to s. 18(1)(h) on the basis that it also has a personal benefit to the taxpayer.

[21] Applying this principle to the facts in this case, if the children are owed wages in reasonable amount, a deduction may be claimed if the wages are paid in the form of purchasing luxury personal items chosen by the children.

Justice Woods then turned to what was undoubtedly the most difficult aspect of this case: weighing and assessing the taxpayer’s evidence.

[24] Turning to the facts of this case, the difficulty that I have with Ms. Bruno’s argument is that the evidence about the expenditures was not sufficiently detailed for me to be satisfied, even on a prima facie basis, that all the expenditures were made for the children’s benefit, let alone that they were for luxury items.

[25] The evidence concerning the nature of the expenditures consisted mainly of Ms. Bruno’s oral testimony and the list that she prepared. As for the oral testimony, it is self‑serving and not sufficiently detailed for me to be satisfied on most of the expenditures. As for the accounting records, a great many of the descriptions of the expenditures were simply too general to be of great assistance.

[26] Based on the evidence as a whole, I am satisfied that some of the expenditures are luxury items for the children’s benefit. However, the evidence is not detailed enough for me to determine which items qualify. It is appropriate in these circumstances, where the appeal is governed by the informal procedure, for the Court to make a rough estimate. On that basis, I propose to allow a deduction for 50 percent of the amounts claimed.

On the one hand she accepted that the services were provided; that the children’s labour actually constituted a tangible benefit to the business. On the other hand the taxpayer had not put forward a sufficiently strong case to persuade Justice Woods that there was not an element of personal benefit to the parents. As a result she split the difference and allowed 50% of the salary expenses claimed.

While the Bruno decision is an informal procedure case and involved relatively small amounts, in my view it clearly illustrates the difficulty a trial judge has in assessing the evidence of a credible witness dealing with difficult or imprecise facts. It further demonstrates the importance of careful preparation of witnesses and the documentary evidence that must be introduced. Finally, it shows once more that counsel must have a finely-tuned ear to anticipate and deal with the types of issues that will likely concern the trial judge.

The decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Newmont Canada Corporation v. Canada delivered July 27, 2012 was primarily concerned with an unsuccessful attempt by the taxpayer to write off the principal amount of a large loan.  What makes the case quite interesting, however, is a side issue concerning the taxpayer’s claim to write off accrued interest on the loan.  That is where the Federal Court of Appeal parted company with the Tax Court of Canada and provided a useful reminder about the importance of evidence in tax appeals.

The interest in question arose in the 1988, 1989 and 1990 taxation years.  The CRA auditor allowed a portion of the interest expense:

[173]  During the course of the CRA audit, [the taxpayer] provided the CRA auditor, Mr. MacGibbon, with the details of the entries recorded in its general ledger account 2101 between August 1, 1989 and the end of May 1990. [The taxpayer] used this general ledger account to record amounts due from Windarra, including accrued interest on the Windarra Loan.

[174]  Mr. MacGibbon testified that [the taxpayer] did not provide him with any books or records for periods prior to August 1, 1989.

[175]  Based upon his review of the general ledger for account 2101, Mr. MacGibbon was able to identify entries totalling $183,336 that recorded interest income in respect of the interest accrued on the Windarra Loan. As a result, he allowed a deduction under subparagraph 20(1)(p)(i) in respect of the accrued interest.

While it is not clear why the earlier records were not produced, it is a reasonable inference that they were simply misplaced; they related to periods 20 or more years prior to the trial, which was held in 2009.

The taxpayer’s evidence was simple and direct:

[176]  The Appellant argued that the Minister understated the subparagraph 20(1)(p)(i) deduction by $156,888. It arrived at this number by performing the following calculation:

First, it determined the amount of accrued interest as at December 31, 1989 as follows:

a. The amount shown on the balance sheet at December 31, 1989 in respect of the Windarra Loan: $8.513 million

b. Less: the principal amount of the loan at December 31, 1989: $8.25 million

c. Equals the amount of accrued interest as at December 31, 1989: $263,000.

The Appellant then compared the $263,000 with the amount of interest income Mr. MacGibbon had calculated for the periods prior to 1989, namely $106,112.

[177]  It is the Appellant’s position that the difference between $263,000 and $106,112, which is $156,888, represents additional accrued interest income that was included in the income reported in [the taxpayer’s] 1988 and 1989 income tax returns.

[178]  During his testimony, Mr. Proctor summarized the Appellant’s argument as follows: “Because we have it on the balance sheet and, since debits must equal credits, it must have been on the Income Statement and we did not adjust it in arriving at net income for income tax purposes. For financial statement purposes it must be in the net income for income tax purposes.”

The Tax Court Judge rejected the taxpayer’s evidence:

[181]  I cannot accept the Appellant’s argument. [The taxpayer] could have recorded the offsetting amount as interest income. Alternatively, it could have recorded the offsetting amount on a balance sheet account such as a deferred revenue account or a reserve account. The only way to determine how the offsetting amounts were recorded in 1988 and the first half of 1989 would be to review the relevant books and records. Unfortunately, the relevant books were not provided to either the Minister or the Court.

[182]  The only evidence before the Court of accrued interest being included in [the taxpayer’s] income was in the working papers of Mr. MacGibbon. I agree with counsel for the Respondent that in order for the Appellant to obtain a deduction in excess of the amount allowed by the Minister “the Court should be presented with something more reliable than a conclusion based on unsubstantiated assumptions.”

Fortunately for the taxpayer, the Federal Court of Appeal held that there was no basis for the Tax Court Judge to reject the taxpayer’s evidence on the point:

[65]  Notwithstanding the auditor’s admission that it was likely that interest accrued in 1988 and the first part of 1989 in the Windarra Loan, the Judge rejected Mr. Proctor’s evidence that additional interest was included in [the taxpayer’s] income on the basis that [the taxpayer] “could have recorded the offsetting amount on a balance sheet account such as a deferred revenue account or a reserve account.” However, for the reasons that follow, there was, in my view, no evidence before the Court to support such a conclusion.

[66]  The Judge found Mr. Proctor to be a credible witness. Mr. Proctor testified that [the taxpayer] would have included the sum of $263,000 in its retained earnings. He reviewed the Reconciliation of Net Income for Tax Purposes form (i.e. the T2S(1) form) provided by [the taxpayer] for each of the 1988 and 1989 taxation years as part of its income tax returns (Appeal Book volume 2, pages 81 and 109) and identified no adjustments “in moving from financial statement income to net income for tax purposes relating to Windarra” (Appeal Book volume 7, page 1699).

[67]  With respect to the Judge’s reference to deferred revenue and reserve accounts, while [the taxpayer’s] 1988 and 1989 balance sheets did show a deferred revenue liability (Appeal Book volume 5, pages 1176 and 1181), the notes to its financial statements specified that the deferred revenue liability related solely to [the taxpayer’s] gold loan owed to a consortium of Canadian banks (Appeal Book volume 5, pages 1178 and 1188). The 1988 and 1989 balance sheets did not record any reserve accounts.

[68]  In this circumstance there was, in my respectful view, no evidence on which to impugn Mr. Proctor’s evidence, so that the Judge committed a reviewable error in rejecting the evidence for the reasons that he gave. Mr. Proctor’s evidence, together with the auditor’s concession established that [the taxpayer] had included the additional sum of $156,888 in interest income in its income tax returns.

[69]  It remained for [the taxpayer] to establish that the interest income was or became a bad debt. This required consideration of whether any monies paid to it pursuant to the Settlement Agreement were allocated to monies owing on account of interest. If so, that portion of the interest income would not be a bad debt.

[70]  Article 1(3) of the Settlement Agreement evidenced the parties’ agreement that the settlement proceeds were to be “applied on account of the principal amount of the [Windarra] Loan.” This established on a prima facie basis that all of the interest owing to [the taxpayer] pursuant to the Windarra Loans was a bad debt.

[71]  To conclude on this point, in my view, this Settlement Agreement combined with the evidence of Mr. Proctor and the auditor’s concession was sufficient to demolish the Minister’s assumption. Further, counsel for the Minister did not point to any evidence which rebutted [the taxpayer’s] prima facie case.

[72]  It follows that [the taxpayer] established its entitlement to deduct $156,888 under subparagraph 20(1)(p)(i) of the Act in 1992.

The case serves as a useful reminder about two important points.  First, the rules of onus are alive and well (as also discussed in my recent blog post on McMillan v. Canada).  Once a taxpayer has raised a prima facie case rebutting the Minister’s assumptions, the Minister cannot succeed unless Crown counsel can adduce additional evidence or otherwise undermine that prima facie case.

Second, and perhaps more important, the case demonstrates that solid evidentiary preparation and strong witnesses are critical if a taxpayer hopes succeed in the courts.  As it is exceedingly rare for the Federal Court of Appeal to overturn findings of fact made by a Tax Court Judge, every effort must be made to adduce evidence, both documentary and viva voce, in the Tax Court of Canada in order to maximize the likelihood of success both at trial and on appeal.

In Hine v. The Queen (2012 TCC 295), a decision released last week, the Tax Court of Canada considered whether a taxpayer was “grossly negligent” in relying on his accountant (who happened to be his wife) to prepare his tax return, and whether the taxpayer’s written offer to settle (asking the Crown to concede entirely) should be considered when making a cost award.

The decision in Hine is helpful in determining (a) whether the taxpayer was grossly negligent in relying entirely on his tax preparer, and (b) whether a settlement offer may be ignored by the Tax Court in awarding costs.

Gross Negligence – 163(2)

The taxpayer was a general contractor who was in the business of “flipping” homes. In 2006, he sold a renovated house for $319,000. The taxpayer reported a loss of $131,653 for the year. In the course of an audit that commenced in 2008, the CRA discovered that the taxpayer had failed to report $157,965 of business income on the sale of the house. The CRA reassessed to include the additional income and imposed a gross negligence penalty under subsection 163(2) of the Income Tax Act. Only the gross negligence penalty was at issue in the appeal.

Generally, under subsection 163(2), the CRA may impose a penalty equal to the greater of $100 and 50% of the avoided tax where the taxpayer knowingly, or under circumstances amounting to gross negligence, made a false statement or omission in a return.

The courts have been consistent in holding that a high degree of negligence or intentional acting is required in order for the gross negligence penalty to apply (see, for example, Udell v. M.N.R., 70 DTC 6019 (Ex. Ct.)). However, there has been less consistency in the application of the penalty where the taxpayer relied on the work of his/her tax preparer. Generally, in such cases, there must be gross negligence on the part of the tax preparer, and there must be some element of privity or wilful blindness on the part of the taxpayer such that he/she acquiesced in the making of the false statement or should have taken further steps to confirm the accuracy of the return.

In Hine, the taxpayer handed over responsibility for the bookkeeping and tax returns to his wife, who had a background in financial accounting but was not a professional accountant. The taxpayer relied entirely on his wife to keep proper records and prepare his returns. The wife’s error resulted in the underreported income, and neither the taxpayer nor his wife detected the error before filing the return.

In argument, the taxpayer relied on a line of cases establishing that reliance on professional advisors does not necessarily lead to a finding of gross negligence (see, for example, Findlay v. The Queen (2000 DTC 6345 (Fed. C.A.)), Gallery v. The Queen (2008 TCC 583) and Down v. M.N.R. (93 DTC 591) (T.C.C.)). The Crown relied on a line of cases that states that a taxpayer cannnot escape his or her own liability under subsection 163(2) by simply handing over all tax affairs to a professional advisor (see, for example, Panini v. The Queen (2006 FCA 224), Hougassian v. The Queen (2007 TCC 293) and Brygman v. M.N.R. (79 DTC 858) (Tax R.B.)).

The Tax Court found that the taxpayer and his wife intended to be diligent and accurate in reporting the taxpayer’s income, and an honest confusion led to the error.

Finally, the Tax Court held that the determination of the issue of whether the taxpayer and his advisor were grossly negligent was unaffected by the their spousal relationship. On the facts of the case, the taxpayer’s “blind faith in his wife” was not unreasonable. The Tax Court allowed the taxpayer’s appeal.

Costs

After the court’s decision, the taxpayer sought costs above the usual tariff amounts on the basis that a settlement offer had been made before the hearing. The taxpayer argued that the offer should be considered under paragraph 147(3)(d) of the Tax Court of Canada Rules (General Procedure) and enhanced costs awarded.

In his written offer, the taxpayer had set out certain submissions he intended to make at the hearing and argued that the gross negligence penalty was unsupportable. The taxpayer offered to settle the matter, without costs, if the Crown reassessed accordingly (i.e., conceding the penalty in its entirety). The taxpayer stated that if the Crown did not accept the settlement offer the taxpayer would seek solicitor and client costs if successful at trial. The Crown rejected the offer.

The Tax Court dismissed the taxpayer’s request for enhanced costs and stated that “… An ‘offer’ that the other party to the litigation withdraw in order to avoid a threat of enhanced costs cannot, in this circumstances, be considered to be an ‘offer of settlement’.” Further, the court stated that, “To have ‘settled’ the case as offered by the Appellant would have been to abdicate the responsibilities imposed on the Department of Justice.” (See also CIBC World Markets Inc. v. The Queen (2012 FCA 3) on the difficulties of making a settlement offer where there is a “yes-no” question at issue in the appeal.)

Accordingly, parties to a tax dispute should ensure that their offers are “settlement” offers and not “withdrawal” offers and that the offer is the type of offer that can indeed be accepted by the other party. Otherwise a court may decline to consider the offer when assessing costs.

In Worsfold v. The Queen (2012 FC 644), the Federal Court held that a taxpayer’s disclosure under the Voluntary Disclosures Program (the “VDP”) was “voluntary”, even though the Canada Revenue Agency (the “CRA”) had commenced enforcement action against a related party. Worsfold confirms that a link between the enforcement action and the disclosed information is what is important — not a link between the parties — when considering whether a disclosure made alongside an existing enforcement action is voluntary. Also, given that the sequence of events was integral to the findings in this case, this decision underscores the importance of keeping detailed records at every stage of a voluntary disclosure.

To read the full article, please click here.

A recent decision of Canada’s Federal Court of Appeal provides insight on the application of the country’s tax treaties to income that is attributed to a Canadian resident taxpayer under the Income Tax Act (Canada). Also, the court made useful comments on the classification of an Austrian private foundation (privatstiftung) for domestic Canadian tax purposes.

In Peter Sommerer v. The Queen, 2012 FCA 207, the court affirmed the decision of the Tax Court of Canada (2011 TCC 212) finding that gains realized on dispositions of shares by an Austrian private foundation were not taxable in the hands of an individual beneficiary of the foundation on the basis that either (a) the gains could not be attributed to the Canadian individual under the ITA’s attribution rules or (b) the capital gains article of the Austria-Canada Income Tax Convention of 1976, as amended, prohibited Canada from taxing the gains.

To read the full article by Jesse Brodlieb, Matthew Peters, and Tony Schweitzer, as published in Tax Notes International, Vol. 67, Number 6, August 6, 2012, please click here. For our earlier blog post on the decision, please click here.

On August 13 I came across this article in the Globe and Mail outlining how CRA treated prizes received by Canadian Olympic Medalists.

Gold medalists receive a $20,000 prize from the Canadian Olympic Committee, Silver medalists $15,000 and Bronze medalists $10,000. The CRA asserts that those amounts are taxable. The CRA’s position is based on what can only be described as a questionable interpretation of Income Tax Regulation 7700:

7700. For the purposes of subparagraph 56(1)(n)(i) of the Act, a prescribed prize is any prize that is recognized by the general public and that is awarded for meritorious achievement in the arts, the sciences or service to the public but does not include any amount that can reasonably be regarded as having been received as compensation for services rendered or to be rendered.

This regulation is directly related to the Nobel Prize in Chemistry awarded in 1986 to Dr. John C. Polanyi of the University of Toronto. There was considerable public sentiment that Dr. Polanyi not be subject to income tax on this prize. As a result the Income Tax Act was amended to introduce the concept of a tax exempt “prescribed” prize. It is one of the most straightforward provisions in Canadian tax law. All that is required is:

1. recognition of the prize by the general public; and
2. that the prize is awarded for meritorious achievement in the arts, the sciences or service to the public (I am intentionally omitting the irrelevant language about compensation for services).

Surprisingly, the CRA has concluded that Canada’s Olympic medalists were not being awarded for “service to the public”:

I must clarify that the media reports you refer to dealt not with the value of the medals themselves but with the prize money the Canadian athletes who won medals at the Games. Paragraph 56(1)(n) of the Income Tax Act states that the total of all amounts received in the year as, or on account of a prize for achievement in a field of endeavour that the taxpayer ordinarily carries on should be included in the taxpayer’s income. This provision of the Act would not normally apply to your example of a lottery winner; however, paragraph 56(1)(n) is sufficiently broad as to apply to a prize awarded to an athlete for winning an Olympic medal.

I note that the Act provides an exception to this rule for a prescribed prize. For purposes of this exception, section 7700 of the Income Tax Regulations defines a “prescribed prize” as any prize that is recognized by the general public and that is awarded for meritorious achievement in the arts, the sciences, or in service to the public. Although winning an Olympic medal may be an internationally recognized achievement and could indirectly promote a sense of nationalism, such a prize is not awarded in recognition of service to the public and therefore would not be a prescribed prize and would not fall within the exception.

CRA Document 2008-0300071M4 “Olympic medals” (26 June 2009)

Since it first participated in the games of 1900, Canada has won 278 medals in the Summer Games (an average of 11 per Games) and 145 in the Winter Games (an average of 7 per Games). It is astonishing that the CRA and the Department of Finance would regard the taxation of these awards as material. To suggest that these young men and women who spend years of their lives training for the chance once every four years to put the Canadian flag and anthem on display for the entire world to see and hear are not engaged in service to the Canadian public is not only unsupportable in light of the text, context and purpose of the provision, but serves to undermine the federal government’s own financial support of amateur athletics and best and brightest of Canada’s Olympic athletes. It is hoped that the CRA sees the light sooner rather than later and changes its position accordingly.

In order to administer and enforce the self-reporting system of tax assessment in Canada, the Income Tax Act (ITA) and Excise Tax Act (ETA) provide the CRA with the power to demand certain information from taxpayers. Generally, this information is collected for the purposes of auditing a taxpayer, but may also be obtained where no audit is conducted. For example, the CRA may access such information for the purpose of evaluating whether record-keeping requirements have been complied with. Higher statutory thresholds are imposed on the CRA – such as requiring a search warrant issued by a judge – where the information sought would not normally be required for an audit.

Despite the broad statutory powers conferred on the CRA to ensure compliance, the courts are wary of the potential for abuse and have been careful to circumscribe their application. In James Richardson & Sons v. M.N.R., the Supreme Court of Canada clarified that when requiring the production of documentation there must be a “genuine and serious inquiry” into the tax liability of a specific taxpayer (or taxpayers). Richardson was decided in the context of what is now section 231.2 of the ITA, which requires taxpayers to provide documents or information to the CRA for the enforcement or administration of the Act. In its recent decision in R. v. He, the British Columbia Court of Appeal confirmed that the same principle should be applied to section 231.1 of the ITA (and the corresponding section 288 of the ETA) when inspecting records at the taxpayer’s place of business.

R. v. He concerned a CRA program called the Electronic Records Evaluation Pilot Project (“ERE”) that targeted specific businesses for research purposes – including restaurants, convenience stores and small supermarkets – to evaluate their record-keeping compliance. One business chosen for the program was the restaurant, Sushi Man, run by the He family in Vancouver. Although the initial contact by the CRA indicated that its review would not be an audit, certain inconsistencies were found that led to an audit, investigation and, ultimately, criminal charges. Apparently, CRA thought that Sushi Man had been using some form of sales suppression software (known as a “zapper”) to erase the record of certain transactions and thereby evade taxes. The taxpayer alleged that the CRA’s real purpose was to conduct a criminal investigation into establishments using the zapper software and, therefore, it had strayed outside the scope of section 231 of the ITA (and 288 of the ETA) thereby violating his right against unreasonable search and seizure under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The issue before the courts was whether, under the circumstances, the CRA was entitled to seize information from Sushi Man under section 231.1 of the ITA and 288 of the ETA. The Provincial Court Judge found that there had been no “genuine and serious” inquiry into that taxpayer’s tax liability and concluded that the seizure of information by the CRA was unlawful, implying that the ERE program had been used improperly for an undercover investigation into restaurants using zappers. On appeal, both the Supreme Court of British Columbia and the British Columbia Court of Appeal agreed with the Provincial Court that the rule established in Richardson should be applied to section 231.1 of the ITA (and by extension to section 288 of the ETA).

Writing for the Court of Appeal, Justice Hinkson remarked as follows:

[54] In my opinion, s. 231.1 of the ITA, if interpreted too broadly, is open to that same possibility of abuse. It and its parallel section in the ETA permit the same broad authority to the CRA as does  s. 231.2 and its parallel section in the ETA. Further, as discussed by the appeal judge, s. 231.1 allows for a more intrusive power than that permitted under s. 231.2. It is my opinion that the correct interpretation of s. 231.1 requires that the reasoning in Richardson must therefore be applied to that section.

With respect to the conduct of the CRA investigation, Justice Hinkson deferred to the Provincial Court Judge’s conclusion that the ERE’s true purpose was not to review books and records nor to audit the individual businesses selected. Therefore, the seizure of information was not permissible under section 231.1 of the ITA (or section 288 of the ETA).

While it is not yet certain whether the Crown will seek leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada (no leave application has been filed at the time of this post), it seems clear that unless it has secured prior judicial authorization, the CRA cannot obtain information from a taxpayer in the absence of a “genuine and serious” inquiry into the taxpayer’s tax liability.

In what circumstances can a party obtain a large lump-sum cost award after a favourable Tax Court decision?

That was the question considered by the Tax Court in Velcro Canada Inc. v. The Queen (2012 TCC 273), in which the Tax Court awarded the successful taxpayer a lump sum cost award of $60,000 plus disbursements. The Court’s reasoning has provided some helpful clarification on the manner in which the Court will determine the nature and amount of a cost award.

In the main appeal (Velcro Canada Inc. v. The Queen, 2012 TCC 57), the Appellant taxpayer was successful in establishing that a Dutch holding company was the “beneficial owner” of royalties paid by a related Canadian company. (See our previous commentary on the decision by FMC’s Matt Peters here.)

At the costs hearing, the Appellant argued that the Tax Court should award enhanced costs because the Appellant had been entirely successful in the appeal, the amount in issue was in excess of $9 million, the issues raised were of national and international importance, and the novelty of the issues required additional time and resources in preparing for and conducting the appeal.

The Respondent’s view was that costs should be assessed in accordance with Tariff B of Schedule II of the Tax Court of Canada Rules (General Procedure). The Respondent argued that the main issue had previously been considered in the ground-breaking case of Prévost Car Inc. v. The Queen (2008 TCC 231; aff’d 2009 FCA 57), and that the Appellant had not adduced evidence of the work and effort put into the appeal. Further, no exceptional circumstances existed that would justify the Court exercising its discretion to award costs beyond the Tariff.

The Tax Court considered the factors discussed in section 147 of the General Procedure Rules and Tariff B of Schedule II thereto, and concluded that no exceptional circumstances were required to justify a deviation from the Tariff. In fact, the discretion of the Tax Court is quite wide – the Tariff may be relied on, but only if the Court chooses to do so. The Court stated:

[16] Under the Rules, the Tax Court of Canada does not even have to make any reference to Schedule II, Tariff B in awarding costs. The Court may fix all or part of the costs, with or without reference to Schedule II of Tariff B and it can award a lump sum in lieu of or in addition to taxed costs. The Rules do not state or even suggest that the Court follow or make reference to the Tariff. …

[17] It is my view that in every case the Judge should consider costs in light of the factors in Rule 147(3) and only after he or she considers those factors on a principled basis should the Court look to Tariff B of Schedule II if the Court chooses to do so. … [emphasis in original]

The Court went on to consider the result in the proceeding (taxpayer was entirely successful), the amount in issue (more than $9 million), the importance of the issues (very important domestically and internationally), any settlement offer in writing (there wasn’t one), the volume of work (considerable effort required), the complexity of the issues (relatively straight-forward but in a complex factual matrix), and the conduct of the parties (very well pleaded and impressive presentations at the hearing). The Court awarded $60,000 plus disbursements to the Appellant.

The Court’s decision is significant because it signals an evolution in the approach to cost awards from the currently accepted practice.

As most tax litigators know, a general practice developed whereby large lump-sum cost awards were sought only in exceptional circumstances (i.e., where one party had engaged in misconduct or unnecessary procedural wrangling). The decision of Associate Chief Justice Rossiter appears to open the door to the possibility of seeking large lump-sum cost awards in any proceeding because, according to the Court, the Judge should look first to section 147 of the Rules and may, but not necessarily, look to the Tariff.

It seems that this approach accords with the Tax Court’s recent focus, and emphasis, on the importance of settlements. The parties to a tax appeal should not lightly dismiss the Court’s reasoning in Velcro Canada when considering whether to settle a matter before going to trial.

It’s been just over four months since the Supreme Court of Canada (the “SCC”) heard oral argument in The Queen v. John H. Craig (see our prior blog post for coverage of the hearing and background on section 31), the only section 31 restricted farm loss case to reach the SCC since the oft-criticized Moldowan v. R., 1977 DTC 5213.

Result: Moldowan has been overruled. It took an uncharacteristically short period of time for the SCC to render its judgment – the unanimous decision emphatically stated that “Moldowan cannot stand.”

Justice Rothstein delivered the reasons, which prescribe a new analysis to be undertaken when a taxpayer needs to determine if his or her income from farming activities (such as a horse racing or breeding business), when combined with some other source of income (such as employment or business income) constitutes a “chief source of income.” If this test is satisfied, then the taxpayer may deduct the full amount of any losses from the farming operation against the other source of income, without restriction. If the test is not satisfied, then section 31 restricts the amount of the deductible loss in any given taxation year to $8,750.

The New Test: The new test outlined by the SCC is still a fact-based analysis to be applied to the particular circumstances of the taxpayer, and has two steps:

Step 1: At the outset, a determination needs to be made that the farming business is in fact a business (a source of income from which losses may be deducted), as opposed to a personal endeavour. This test is enunciated in Stewart v. Canada (2002 SCC 46) as the “commercial manner” test, stating that the farming operation is a business if there is no personal or hobby element; or if there is a personal or hobby element, then the venture must be undertaken in a sufficiently commercial manner “in accordance with objective standards of businesslike behaviour” in order to be considered a business.

Step 2: Once it is determined that the farming operation is a business, the taxpayer is entitled to full deduction of farming losses against another source of income if it is determined that farming and the other source of income is his or her chief source of income, based on the following factors, taken together: the amount of capital invested in farming and the other source of income; the income from each of the two sources of income; the time spent on the two sources of income; and the taxpayer’s ordinary mode of living, farming history and future intentions and expectations. To be successful, it must be shown that the taxpayer has invested significant funds and has spent considerable time attending to the farming business and that the taxpayer places significant emphasis on both the farming and non-farming sources of income. Further, it is not necessary that income from the farming business exceed income from the other source of income – this fact is irrelevant to the analysis.

The new test could be described as the “significant endeavors” test – which is much more palatable than the defunct ‘reasonable expectation of profit’ test or ‘three classes of farmer’ test that has now been buried along with Moldowan. RIP.

Rectification continues to be a topic of heated debate in Quebec. After a series of decisions by the Court of Appeal last year on the subject, the Quebec Superior Court rendered an important judgment on June 19, 2012 (Mac’s Convenience Stores Inc. v. Couche-Tard Inc., 2012 QCCS 2745) on a motion for declaratory judgment involving a well-known Canadian business.

This case is a reminder that rectification is not always available to correct errors made in the planning of a transaction, even if the unintended tax consequences result in a loss of several million dollars for a taxpayer.

The Facts

On April 14, 2005, Mac’s Convenience Store Inc. (“Mac’s”) borrowed $185 million from a U.S. corporation, Sildel Corporation (“Sildel”), which was a “specified non-resident” for purposes of the thin capitalization rules in subsection 18(4) of the Income Tax Act (the “Act”). Under this loan, Mac’s paid interest to Sildel ($911,854 in 2006, $11,069,590 in 2007, and $10,674,247 in 2008). These interest payments were deducted in computing the income of Mac’s for income tax purposes in the relevant years. This loan was fully repaid by Mac’s in 2008.

On April 25, 2006, Mac’s declared and paid a dividend of $136 million to Couche-Tard Inc. (“CTI”) out of its retained earnings. The decision to declare this dividend was taken after consultation with professional advisers.

More than 18 months later, it was discovered that the dividend of $136 million paid to CTI had the effect of raising the “debt” portion of Mac’s debt-to-equity ratio vis-a-vis Sildel for thin capitalization purposes beyond the then statutory limit of 2:1 under subsection 18(4) of the Act. In early 2008, Mac’s notified the CRA of the situation. After conducting an audit, the CRA issued notices of reassessment to Mac’s denying the deduction of all the interest it paid to Sildel during taxation years 2006, 2007, and 2008.

Mac’s filed a motion for declaratory judgment with the Quebec Superior Court requesting that the dividend of $136 million declared on April 25, 2006 and paid to the respondent CTI be cancelled retroactively and replaced by a reduction of Mac’s paid-up capital in the same amount. This rectification would have required no transfer of funds between the parties, but it would have allowed Mac’s to deduct the interest paid to Sildel in computing Mac’s income under the thin capitalization rules.

To read the full article, click here.

It is trite law that one of the main purposes of tax treaties is to prevent double taxation of the same income. In Canada this principle has often been treated with a grain of salt since Canadian domestic rules do not bar double taxation and, in fact, the Canada Revenue Agency often resorts to double taxation where, for example, a shareholder appropriation is disallowed as a corporate expense while fully taxed in the shareholder’s hands.

The recent decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in The Queen v. Sommerer illustrates a refreshing approach to the concept of double taxation, at least in the context of Canada’s network of bilateral tax treaties based on the OECD Model Convention (and, to a lesser extent, the UN Model Convention).

Mr. Sommerer was at all material times a resident of Canada. He was a contingent beneficiary of an Austrian Privatstiftung (the “Sommerer Private Foundation”) created by his father in 1996. The Sommerer Private Foundation was at all material times a resident of Austria for the purposes of the Canada-Austria Tax Treaty. The facts that gave rise to the assessments under appeal are summarized by Sharlow JA as follows:

[30] On October 4, 1996, Peter Sommerer sold to the Sommerer Private Foundation 1,770,000 shares of Vienna Systems Corporation (the “Vienna shares”) for their fair market value of $1,177,050 (66.5¢ per share). The Sommerer Private Foundation paid $117,705 of the purchase price on the date of the agreement and was legally obliged to pay the remainder at a later date, with interest. The sale was unconditional. The cash portion of the purchase price was paid using part of the initial endowment from Herbert Sommerer (paragraphs 67 and 88 of Justice Miller’s reasons).

[31] In December of 1997, the Sommerer Private Foundation sold 216,666 of the Vienna shares for $4.50 per share to three individuals unrelated to the Sommerer family, realizing a capital gain. In December of 1998, the Sommerer Private Foundation sold the remaining Vienna shares to Nokia Corporation for $9.00 per share, realizing a further capital gain.

[32] In April of 1998, Peter Sommerer sold to the Sommerer Private Foundation, unconditionally, 57,143 shares of Cambrian Systems Corporation (the “Cambrian shares”) for $100,000 (approximately $1.75 per share). In December of 1998, the Sommerer Private Foundation sold the Cambrian shares to Northern Telecom Limited for $14.97 (US) per share, plus a further $4.12 (US) per share conditional on certain milestones being met in 1999. That sale resulted in another capital gain for the Sommerer Private Foundation.

CRA assessed Mr. Sommerer on the basis of subsection 75(2) of the Income Tax Act alleging that the proceeds from the sale of the shares by the Foundation could possibly revert to Mr. Sommerer. Both Justice Campbell Miller in the Tax Court of Canada and Justice Sharlow in the Court of Appeal rejected that interpretation holding that subsection 75(2) could not apply on a sale of property at fair market value.

Justice Sharlow did not stop there however. She went on to agree with Miller J. that the position advocated by CRA violated the Treaty’s fundamental principle of avoiding double taxation:

[66] The OECD model conventions, including the Canada-Austria Income Tax Convention, generally have two purposes – the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion. Article XIII (5) of the Canada-Austria Income Tax Convention speaks only to the avoidance of double taxation. “Double taxation” may mean either juridical double taxation (for example, imposing on a person Canadian and foreign tax on the same income) or economic double taxation (for example, imposing Canadian tax on a Canadian taxpayer for the attributed income of a foreign taxpayer, where the economic burden of foreign tax on that income is also borne indirectly by the Canadian taxpayer). By definition, an attribution rule may be expected to result only in economic double taxation.

[67] The Crown’s argument requires the interpretation of a specific income tax convention to be approached on the basis of a premise that excludes, from the outset, the notion that the convention is not intended to avoid economic double taxation. That approach was rejected by Justice Miller, correctly in my view. There is considerable merit in the opinion of Klaus Vogel, who says that the meaning of “double taxation” in a particular income tax convention is a matter that must be determined on the basis of an interpretation of that convention (Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions: A Commentary to the OECD –, UN –, and US Model Conventions for the Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income and Capital, 3rd ed. (The Hague: Kluweer Law International, 1997)).

[68] I see no error of law or principle in the conclusion of Justice Miller that Article XIII (5) applies to preclude Canada from taxing Peter Sommerer on the capital gains realized by the Sommerer Private Foundation.

Unless this case is reversed by the Supreme Court of Canada (at the date of this comment, no leave application has been filed), it is likely to be a very important precedent for tax practitioners plying their craft in the highly complex area of international tax treaties.

In the recent case of McMillan v. Canada, the Federal Court of Appeal has reaffirmed the onus of proof rules in tax appeals. While the rules were never particularly unsettled at the federal level, the somewhat anomalous decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Northland Properties v. The Queen in Right of the Province of British Columbia, appeared to cast doubt on prior Federal Court of Appeal pronouncements as well as the decision of Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in Hickman Motors Ltd. v. Canada. In Northland, the B.C. Court of Appeal took issue with the concept, articulated by Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in Hickman, that the onus was on the taxpayer to “demolish” the assumptions pleaded by the Minister by means of raising a prima facie case at which point the burden shifts to the Minister to prove the assumptions on the balance of probabilities:

[29] Before us, counsel for the Crown made persuasive submissions on the issue of the so-called “prima facie” standard: L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s use of “prima facie” was made in the context of a case in which the Crown had not called any evidence whatsoever; it was relying solely on its assumptions. It is certainly possible in such circumstances that a prima facie case, or even one with “gaps”, would be sufficient to displace the Crown’s assumptions, but the prima facie standard described by Justice L’Heureux-Dubé should not be interpreted as having altered the usual standard of proof in tax cases: see the comments in Sekhon v. Canada, [1997] T.C.J. No. 1145 at para. 37; and Hallat v. The Queen (2000), [2001] 1 C.T.C. 2626 (F.C.A.).

The facts in McMillan are uncomplicated and not particularly interesting. The taxpayer had a business in the Dominican Republic and claimed a number of expenses in connection with that business. The Tax Court denied most of the expenses claimed on the basis that they were not proven by the taxpayer. The taxpayer appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal and her appeal was dismissed on the basis that she did not demonstrate any material error on the part of the Tax Court judge.

The interesting part of the decision is the Federal Court of Appeal’s articulation of the rules relating to onus of proof in tax appeals:

[7] Before concluding these reasons, we note that the appellant did not raise in her memorandum of fact and law any issue with respect to the Judge’s statement at paragraph 19 of the reasons, and repeated at paragraph 21, that the appellant “has the initial onus of proving on a balance of probabilities (i.e. that it is more likely than not), that any of the assumptions that were made by the Minister in assessing (or reassessing) the Appellant with which the Appellant does not agree, are not correct.” In our respectful view, it is settled law that the initial onus on an appellant taxpayer is to “demolish” the Minister’s assumptions in the assessment. This initial onus of “demolishing” the Minister’s assumptions is met where the taxpayer makes out at least a prima facie case. Once the taxpayer shows a prima facie case, the burden is on the Minister to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the assumptions were correct (Hickman Motors Ltd. v. Canada, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 336 at paragraphs 92 to 94; House v. Canada, 2011 FCA 234, 422 N.R. 144 at paragraph 30).

Thus, the Federal Court of Appeal has once again embraced the prima facie standard as the test that must be met by a taxpayer to displace or demolish assumptions pleaded by the Minister. While there may be a different standard applicable in provincial tax appeals in British Columbia, the reaffirmation of the prima facie standard by the Federal Court of Appeal is welcome news in federal tax appeals.

On April 26, 2012, Justice J.E. Hershfield of the Tax Court of Canada heard arguments in Nuclear Waste Management Organization v. The Queen in respect of a reassessment under the Canada Pension Plan (the “Plan”).  In written reasons released on June 18, 2012, Justice Hershfield found in favour of the Crown and upheld the assessment under the Plan. 

The facts of the matter were not in dispute.  The issue was entirely a matter of statutory interpretation, that being whether individuals appointed to the Advisory Board of the taxpayer were appointed to an “office” within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of the Plan.  If so, the members of the Advisory Council were engaged in pensionable employment as per section 6 of the Plan.  The Advisory Council was appointed in accordance with the Nuclear Fuel Waste Act and was composed of representatives of various interested parties.  The Advisory Council had no decision-making power over the taxpayer and could only make non-binding recommendations. 

The taxpayer took the position that because the Advisory Board’s remuneration was paid in part on a per diem basis, and because the number of meetings was not fixed from year to year, the remuneration was neither fixed nor ascertainable, such that it was not contemplated in the definition of “office” contained in the Plan.  Unfortunately for the taxpayer, two recent decisions (M.N.R. v. The Queen in Right of Ontario and M.N.R. v. Real Estate Council of Alberta) unequivocally confirm that compensation that is paid on a per diem basis is “ascertainable”.

The taxpayer’s second ground for appeal was that the definition of “office” should not be read to include volunteers, because it is not contained in the enumerated positions listed.  The definition contained in the Plan reads as follows:

“office” means the position of an individual entitling him to a fixed or ascertainable stipend or remuneration and includes a judicial office, the office of a minister of the Crown, the office of a lieutenant governor, the office of a member of the Senate or House of Commons, a member of a legislative assembly or a member of a legislative or executive council and any other office the incumbent of which is elected by popular vote or is elected or appointed in a representative capacity, and also includes the position of a corporation director, and “officer” means a person holding such an office;

Justice Hershfield noted that the definition contains an exhaustive definition (“means”) and a non-exhaustive definition (“includes”).  After observing that the exhaustive definition clearly captured the members of the Advisory Board, he turned his attention to the effect of the second half of the definition.  Presuming that the definition is not redundant, it could be interpreted to carve out certain members of the public service, who are then brought back into the definition (or not) by specific enumeration.  As the volunteers of the Advisory Board are not enumerated, the taxpayer argued that they were not included in the definition.

This reasoning was not persuasive to Justice Hershfield, who preferred to interpret the enumerated examples as being added for greater certainty to include those individuals who attain their position of office in a unique or unusual fashion.  The additional fact that all of the enumerated offices are examples of positions with real authority (and not merely advisory) was not sufficient to convince Justice Hershfield that an advisory role would be excluded. 

It is too early to tell whether this decision will be appealed.  It should be noted that the definition of “office” contained in section 248 of the Income Tax Act is identical to the definition contained in the Plan.  The same definition is also incorporated in paragraph 5(4)(g) of the Employment Insurance Act and its regulations.  It seems safe to assume that Justice Hershfield’s analysis would be equally applicable to a question under either of those statutes.

In his recent decision in Aecon Construction Group Inc. v. The Queen, Justice Angers of the Tax Court of Canada adopted a practical and sensible approach to the problem of an expert witness potentially being conflicted out of a tax appeal because of having been approached by one of the parties which then decides not to commission a report from that expert.

In Aecon, the disputed turned on the fair market value of mining properties in 1993.  The taxpayer contended that the value was $32 million while the Crown contended that the value was $3 million.  The taxpayer relied on two expert reports.  The Crown originally relied upon one expert report.  Prior to trial Crown counsel approached two other experts, Mr. F and Mr. R, both of whom had already been approached by the taxpayer.  The Crown wrote counsel for the taxpayer taking the position that the taxpayer’s limited contact with Mr. F should not disqualify him from acting for the Crown in the tax appeal.  The taxpayer’s counsel took the position that both Mr. F and Mr. R were disqualified and the Crown took this motion in the Tax Court to have the status of Mr. F determined in advance of trial.

Justice Angers quoted the famous statement of Lord Denning in Harmony Shipping Co SA v. Davis et al. as reproduced by Justice O’Keefe of the Federal Court in Abbott Laboratories v. Canada (Minister of Health), 2006 F.C. 340.

[20] Accordingly, the principles require that the Court balance the interests of the party seeking to retain an expert witness and the party seeking to protect its confidential information. In that regard, counsel for Pharmascience raises the danger of expert witnesses being contacted simply to deprive an opposing party of their expertise. This danger was eloquently described by Lord Denning in Harmony Shipping Co SA v. Davis et al, [1979] 3 All ER 177 (C.A.):

If an expert could have his hands tied by being instructed by one side, it would be very easy for a rich client to consult each of the acknowledged experts in the field. Each expert might give an opinion adverse to the rich man, yet the rich man could say to each, “Your mouth is closed and you cannot give evidence in court against me” ….. Does that mean that the other side is debarred from getting the help of any expert evidence because all the experts have been taken up by the other side? The answer is clearly No …. There is no property in an expert witness as to the fact he has observed and his own independent opinion of them. There being no such property in a witness, it is the duty of a witness to come to court and give his evidence in so far as he is directed by the judge to do so.

Justice Angers concluded that the limited contact between the taxpayer and Mr. F was not sufficient to support a disqualification:

[23] Neither party in this motion, has been able to clarify the nature of the confidential information that may or may not have been communicated. Mr. F’s affidavit does not disclose if he has, in fact, received any and the appellant did not cross-examine Mr. F on his affidavit. It is therefore unclear as to the risk associated with disclosing said information or if, it will cause a prejudice to the appellant. No evidence was put forward that allowing the respondent to retain Mr. F. would prejudice the appellant.

[24] In the light of the evidence presented, one cannot conclude that Mr. F and the appellant shared sufficient information for either one to expect that whatever that information may be would be kept in confidence or is privileged. Mr. F was never retained, no retainer agreement or confidentiality agreement was signed and there is no evidence that the appellant would have requested Mr. F not to discuss the matter with others. Mr. F did not open a file, did not invoice the appellant nor received any payment, nor was he asked to perform any services. It appears to me that the discussions Mr F had with the appellant in 2001 were of an informal nature and nothing more than an attempt to see if Mr. F shared their point of view. In his affidavit, Mr. F did not recall discussing specific legal strategy other than the fact that he refused to be “creative” in responding to CRA’s position. He cannot recall the documents he reviewed nor did he retain any documents. He also said that early on, he communicated to the appellant that, on the basis of previous experience with Watts, it was unlikely that the appellant would agree with his firm’s method of valuation. That is hardly the foundation necessary for the appellant to shield Mr. F from being retained by the opposing party and provide his opinion.  [Emphasis added]

What is clear from this decision is that a limited contact with a potential expert witness will not normally be sufficient to disqualify that witness.  There must be real concerns about confidential information shared with that potential expert and the taxpayer must be able to prove those concerns to the satisfaction of a judge if the potential disqualification is raised before the court.

Earlier today, the Supreme Court of Canada (The Chief Justice, Justice Rothstein and Justice Moldaver) dismissed an application for leave to appeal by Imperial Tobacco dealing with the classic distinction between deductible corporate expenditures on income account and non-deductible corporate expenditures on capital account. 

In brief, the taxpayer made a payment to extinguish an employee stock option plan (suggesting that the payment was made on income account) but made the payment during the course of a corporate reorganization (suggesting that the payment was made on capital account). 

The taxpayer’s argument for deductibility was supported by the Tax Court decision in Shoppers Drug Mart Limited v. The Queen (dealing with the very same transaction) while the Crown’s argument for non-deductibility was supported by the earlier Federal Court of Appeal decision in Kaiser Petroleum Ltd. v. The Queen.  

Both the Tax Court of Canada and Federal Court of Appeal followed the reasoning of the Federal Court of Appeal in Kaiser and sided with the Crown, holding that the payment was on capital account.  The decision of the Federal Court of Appeal is now final and binding.

For a brief description of the reasoning of the Federal Court of Appeal, see our earlier blog post.

A recent decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa considered the application of the capital gains article in a double tax convention based on the OECD model to a deemed disposition of property occurring as a result of an “exit tax” imposed on an emigrating corporation. As the Court’s decision concerns capital gains exemption language that is similar to that used in most double tax treaties based on the OECD Model, it provides a helpful glimpse into how such provisions may be interpreted in other jurisdictions, including Canada.

In Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v. Tradehold Ltd [2012] ZASCA 61, the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa (the “Court”) considered whether Article 13(4) of the Luxembourg-South Africa Tax Convention (the “Convention”) applied to exempt a deemed disposition arising under South Africa’s domestic “exit tax” from being subject to tax in South Africa.

The taxpayer, Tradehold Ltd. (“Tradehold”), was a publicly-listed holding corporation incorporated in South Africa. Under the domestic legislation, Tradehold was deemed to be a resident of South Africa by virtue of having been incorporated there. On July 2, 2002, the board of directors of Tradehold, at a meeting in Luxembourg, resolved that all further board meetings of the corporation would be held in Luxembourg. As a result, Tradehold became resident in Luxembourg under common law principles. Nonetheless, under South African legislation at the time, the corporation remained resident in South Africa.

As a dual resident corporation, the Convention’s “tie breaker” rule provided that Tradehold was deemed to be resident solely in Luxembourg for Convention purposes. A change to the definition of ‘resident’ under the South African domestic law to exclude a corporation that is “deemed to be exclusively a resident of another country for purposes of the application” of one of South Africa’s tax conventions, including the Convention, subsequently took effect on February 26, 2003.

The Commissioner assessed Tradehold on the basis that when Tradehold’s seat of effective management was relocated to Luxembourg, or when the domestic legislative change resulted in the corporation ceasing to be a deemed resident of South Africa, Tradehold was deemed to have disposed of its only relevant asset, namely, 100% of the shares of a subsidiary corporation, under South Africa’s departure tax. The result was a deemed capital gain in excess of R400,000,000.

At the Tax Court, the taxpayer argued that the deemed disposition was exempt from South African tax pursuant to Article 13(4) of the Convention, which designated the right to tax capital gains on most non-immovable property to the state of residence and not the source state. It was argued by Tradehold that the exemption was available because at the time of the deemed disposition the Convention tie breaker rule applied to deem Tradehold to be resident in Luxembourg only. The Tax Court rejected the Commissioner’s argument that the exemption in the Convention, which excluded “gains from the alienation of property” did not apply to a deemed disposition, as a deemed disposition was not an “alienation” for these purposes.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal, which is the highest court in South Africa for non-constitutional matters, the Commissioner again argued that the Convention did not provide an exemption for deemed dispositions, on the basis that a deemed disposition is not an “alienation”. The Commissioner argued that if Article 13(4) of the Convention applied, South Africa’s exit tax would be ineffective for corporations that migrate to a country with which South Africa has entered into a double tax treaty; it was argued that this could not have been the intention of the legislature. In addition, the Court considered the Commissioner’s argument that since the deeming provision in the domestic legislation provided that it applied “for purposes of this Schedule”, it could not apply to the Convention.

The Court held that the Convention modified South Africa’s domestic law and, as a result, it was necessary to determine whether the exit tax could be imposed consistently with the obligations entered into by South Africa when it signed the Convention. The Court noted that the Convention did not draw a distinction between capital gains arising from actual or deemed dispositions, despite the drafters of the Convention having been aware that the provisions of South Africa’s domestic taxing statute could result in deemed dispositions. The Court also found that there was no reason in principle why the parties to the Convention would have intended that Article 13(4) would apply only to taxes arising on actual capital gains arising from actual alienations of property. Accordingly, the Court found that the language of the Convention covered deemed dispositions and, therefore, the exit tax did not apply to Tradehold upon its ceasing to be resident in South Africa.

This decision has prompted the South African Minister of Finance, Pravin Gordhan, to state that he will consider whether legislative changes are necessary “to further clarify that a DTA does not apply to deemed or actual disposals while a taxpayer is resident in South Africa. Measures such as the immediate termination of a taxpayer’s year of assessment on the day before becoming non-resident, as is the practice in Canada, are being explored.” It is by no means clear however that the Canadian model would survive the analysis in Tradehold.

Reuters recently reported a study showing that corporations face very long odds in tax appeals heard by the United States Supreme Court. There were 919 income tax cases in the Supreme Court of the United States from 1909 to 2011. 364 of those cases involved corporations. In “abuse” cases, the government won 61% of the time. In other cases, the government won 68% of the time. The real story is likely much grimmer since the statistics show that the US Supreme Court only grants review in about 2% of leave applications.

The Canadian Supreme Court heard 356 income tax cases between 1920 and 2003. Of these, the statistics show that the government won 223, or roughly 2/3. The record of Supreme Court tax cases between 2004 and 2012 is essentially similar. While an exact breakdown of corporate cases is not available, anecdotal evidence suggests that the success rate of corporations is roughly 1/3 (a more detailed analysis will be available in the future).

While the Canadian experience appears superficially to mirror the American statistics, a very different story is disclosed by Canadian leave to appeal statistics.

As the chart demonstrates, roughly 12% of leave applications are granted in Canada. Thus, corporations and other taxpayers may have as high as 6 times more likelihood of success in a tax appeal before the Supreme Court of Canada than in cases before the Supreme Court of the United States.

The Federal Court of Appeal has once again affirmed the importance of Generally Accepted Account Principles (GAAP) in computing liability for the large corporation tax (LCT) applicable prior to 2006 while rejecting the Crown’s economic substance argument: The Queen v. Bombardier Inc.

The case turned on how Bombardier accounted for advances received in connection with long-term construction contracts:

[9] It can be seen from this agreement that the respondent has two divisions: the Aerospace Division (aircraft sale contracts) and the Transportation Division (public transportation equipment) and aircraft parts and components. It can also be seen that, in the Aerospace Division, as shown at paragraph 6 of the agreement, “[t]he income from contracts for aircraft sales is recognized as work progresses, on the basis of the delivery date, whereas in the Transportation Division, as shown in paragraph 10, “[i]ncome from long‑term contracts is recognized as work progresses, on the basis of costs incurred”.

[10] In summary, in the Aerospace Division, financing for long‑term work is obtained through advances of funds paid on dates predetermined in the contract of sale. The amounts of these advances do not depend on the work in progress or the work completed. They correspond to a portion of the selling price.

[11] Conversely, in the Transport Division, financing for work of the same nature is acquired through payments in amounts determined by progressive billing proportionate to the work completed.

In the case of aircraft sale contracts Bombardier used the “percentage-of-completion” method. The Crown did not dispute that this method was authorized by GAAP:

[27] The fact that the respondent’s balance sheet was GAAP‑compliant in all respects is recognized and acknowledged by the appellant and its expert. Indeed, the appellant’s expert, Mr. Thornton, confirmed this on cross‑examination. He also admitted that the respondent had correctly exercised its judgment regarding the advances, seemed to have applied standard SOP 81‑1 and had used paragraph 6.19 as a basis for its judgment; and that standard SOP 81‑1 was an acceptable source: see Mr. Thornton’s cross‑examination, Appeal Book, Vol. 10, at pages 109 to 114. He also acknowledged that the advances had been allocated to the project for which they had been paid, not used to finance other projects: ibidem, at page 117.

The Crown’s position was that in this case GAAP did not reflect economic reality:

[32] The appellant’s position, with which the Court of Québec agreed [a decision which is currently being appealed to the Québec Court of Appeal], gives precedence to the legal reality over the commercial and accounting reality by not allowing the amount of the advances to be reduced by the cost of the work for the purposes of calculating the taxable capital under paragraph 181(3)(b). According to the respondent’s expert, by designating the full amount of the advances as liabilities, the appellant is refusing to recognize that, on a commercial and economic level, the respondent used its inventory to perform the contract and sold that inventory, although from a legal standpoint ownership had not yet been transferred: see Mr. Chlala’s cross‑examination, Appeal Book, Vol. 9, at pages 40 to 43. In other words, the appellant’s position does not reflect the [translation] “economics of the situation” prevailing between the parties, which [translation] “suggest that a continuous sale occurs as the work progresses, and revenue should be recognized accordingly”: see the excerpt from the work by Messrs. Chlala, Ménard et al., quoted above in connection with the percentage‑of‑completion method.

The Court of Appeal rejected the Crown’s argument citing its earlier decision in Attorney General of Canada v. Ford Credit Canada Ltd.

In that decision Ryer JA wrote:

[27] In my view, this decision is far from helpful to the Minister in this appeal. In essence, Rothstein J.A. determined that the balance sheet of the taxpayer must be accepted for LCT purposes if it was accepted by the Superintendent of Financial Institutions. In my view, the same logic should apply where the corporation in question is subject to subparagraph 181(3)(b)(i) rather than subparagraph 181(3)(b)(ii). On that basis, provided that the balance sheet in question has been prepared in accordance with GAAP and otherwise complies with the specific provisions of Part I.3, that balance sheet must be accepted for the purposes of the determination of the LCT liability of the corporation.

While LCT decisions are of limited application to most taxpayers, this decision and the Ford Credit Canada Ltd. decision (where David Spiro was the successful lead counsel) form a useful bulwark against attacks mounted by the CRA based on “economic substance”.

In Garron Family Trust v. The Queen (2009 TCC 450), Justice Judith Woods of the Tax Court of Canada came down with a very broad new rule for determining the residence of trusts.

[162]  I conclude, then, that the judge-made test of residence that has been established for corporations should also apply to trusts, with such modifications as are appropriate. That test is “where the central management and control actually abides.”

This was viewed widely as a repudiation of the historic test based on the residence of the trustee. Many tax professionals thought that the test for residence of a trust required a determination of the residence of the majority of the trustees and where their functions were performed, and that it was not necessary to go beyond this test.

The Federal Court of Appeal in St. Michael Trust Corp. v. Canada (2010 FCA 309) appeared to endorse Justice Woods’ new legal test but in a somewhat guarded fashion:

[63]    St. Michael Trust Corp. argues that a test of central management and control cannot be applied to a trust because a trust is a “legal relationship” without a separate legal personality. I do not accept this argument. It is true that as a matter of law a trust is not a person, but it is also true that for income tax purposes, a trust is treated as though it were a person. In my view, it is consistent with that implicit statutory fiction to recognize that the residence of a trust may not always be determined by the residence of its trustee.

[64]    St. Michael Trust Corp. also argues that the residence of the trust must be determined as the residence of the trustee because section 104 of the Income Tax Act embodies the trust, as taxpayer, in the person of the trustee. In my view, that gives section 104 a meaning beyond its words and purpose. Section 104 was enacted to solve the practical problems of tax administration that would necessarily arise when it was determined that trusts were to be taxed despite the absence of legal personality. I do not read section 104 as a signal that Parliament intended that in all cases, the residence of the trust must be the residence of the trustee.

When the Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal, some tax professionals were puzzled.  These tax professionals believed that it was unlikely the decision would be reversed since the Crown had a very strong factual case that the trusts in question were managed in Canada by the trust beneficiaries.  The decision released on April 12 by the Supreme Court (Fundy Settlement v. Canada, 2012 SCC 14) in fact dismissed the appeal in somewhat cursory fashion.

[15]    As with corporations, residence of a trust should be determined by the principle that a trust resides for the purposes of the Act where “its real business is carried on” (De Beers, at p. 458), which is where the central management and control of the trust actually takes place.  As indicated, the Tax Court judge found as a fact that the main beneficiaries exercised the central management and control of the trusts in Canada.  She found that St. Michael had only a limited role ― to provide administrative services ― and little or no responsibility beyond that (paras. 189-90).  Therefore, on this test, the trusts must be found to be resident in Canada.  This is not to say that the residence of a trust can never be the residence of the trustee.  The residence of the trustee will also be the residence of the trust where the trustee carries out the central management and control of the trust, and these duties are performed where the trustee is resident.  These, however, were not the facts in this case.

[16]    We agree with Woods J. that adopting a similar test for trusts and corporations promotes “the important principles of consistency, predictability and fairness in the application of tax law” (para. 160).  As she noted, if there were to be a totally different test for trusts than for corporations, there should be good reasons for it.  No such reasons were offered here.  [Emphasis added]

On a close reading it is arguable that the Supreme Court has gently tempered the new rule set out by Justice Woods and, to some extent, by the Federal Court of Appeal.  Where the trustee does what it is supposed to do, including managing the trust and its properties, the operative test remains the residence of the trustee.  It would seem that only where the trustee carries on those “management and control” activities in a place other than where the trustee is resident, or where the trustee abdicates many of its powers to a third party, that Justice Woods’ new test becomes relevant.

Less than a month after hearing oral argument on March 13, 2012, the Supreme Court of Canada today released judgment and reasons for judgment in the Fundy Settlement v. Canada also known as the Garron Family Trust appeals (St. Michael Trust Corp., as Trustee of the Fundy Settlement v. The Queen and St. Michael Trust Corp., as Trustee of the Summersby Settlement v. The Queen).  The Court’s alacrity is remarkable, particularly in light of the fact that it had taken nearly eleven months to release its last tax decision (Copthorne Holdings Ltd. v. The Queen).

See here for a summary of the oral argument before the Supreme Court of Canada and here for the facts, the reasons for judgment of the Tax Court and Federal Court of Appeal and the factum filed by each party in the Supreme Court of Canada.

In Fundy Settlement, a unanimous panel of seven (Justices LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Rothstein, Moldaver and Karakatsanis) dismissed the Trustee’s appeals and held that the test for the determination of the residence of a trust is the same test as the corporate test, namely, the place where “central management and control” is exercised.  The reasons were written by the “Court” which further serves to highlight the unanimity of opinion among the judges who heard the appeals.

In a ringing endorsement of the reasoning of Justice Judith Woods of the Tax Court of Canada and Justice Karen Sharlow of the Federal Court of Appeal (both of whom had used a “functional analysis” to decide the issue) the Court explained, in a relatively brief 19 paragraph decision, why it agreed with the lower courts on this issue:

[14]  . . . there are many similarities between a trust and corporation that would, in our view, justify application of the central management and control test in determining the residence of a trust, just as it is used in determining the residence of a corporation.  Some of these similarities include:

1)   Both hold assets that are required to be managed;

2)   Both involve the acquisition and disposition of assets;

3)   Both may require the management of a business;

4)   Both require banking and financial arrangements;

5)   Both may require the instruction or advice of lawyers, accountants and other advisors; and

6)   Both may distribute income, corporations by way of dividends and trusts by distributions.

As Woods J. noted:  “The function of each is, at a basic level, the management of property” (para. 159).

[15]  As with corporations, residence of a trust should be determined by the principle that a trust resides for the purposes of the Act where “its real business is carried on” (De Beers, at p. 458), which is where the central management and control of the trust actually takes place.  As indicated, the Tax Court judge found as a fact that the main beneficiaries exercised the central management and control of the trusts in Canada.  She found that St. Michael had only a limited role ― to provide administrative services ― and little or no responsibility beyond that (paras. 189-90).  Therefore, on this test, the trusts must be found to be resident in Canada.  This is not to say that the residence of a trust can never be the residence of the trustee.  The residence of the trustee will also be the residence of the trust where the trustee carries out the central management and control of the trust, and these duties are performed where the trustee is resident.  These, however, were not the facts in this case.

[16]  We agree with Woods J. that adopting a similar test for trusts and corporations promotes “the important principles of consistency, predictability and fairness in the application of tax law” (para. 160).  As she noted, if there were to be a totally different test for trusts than for corporations, there should be good reasons for it.  No such reasons were offered here.

[17]  For these reasons, we would dismiss the appeals with costs.

In light of its conclusion on the main issue, the Court did not find it necessary to deal with the Crown’s alternative arguments, namely the application of section 94 of the Income Tax Act or the General Anti-Avoidance Rule.

By FMC’s Tax team in cooperation with CCH

On March 29, Canada’s Finance Minister Jim Flaherty tabled the 2012 federal budget, which was met with, as expected, detractors and supporters of the announced spending and tax measures. The Department of Finance’s focus was, obviously, on reducing spending for the foreseeable future, and the only surprise was that the spending reductions were not as extensive as many had anticipated.

Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP (FMC) worked in collaboration with CCH to produce editorial commentary on the content and potential effects of the 2012 federal budget for clients and those in the business and legal community. Some of the significant topics relating to corporate and business tax changes include:

• Expanding eligibility of clean energy equipment for capital cost allowance
• Reducing or eliminating some existing tax credits (such as the tax credit for mineral exploration and overseas employment)
• Changing the rates and qualifying expenditures for the SR&ED program
• Denying paragraph 88(1)(d) “bumps” for partnership interests
• Amending thin capitalization, transfer pricing and foreign affiliate rules
• Allowing split- and late-designations for eligible dividends
• Enhancing transparency and accountability for charities, and including gifts to foreign charitable organizations
• Changing the provisions regarding group sickness/accident insurance plans, retirement compensation arrangements and employee profit sharing plans

For further information or to read FMC and CCH’s commentary, download the complete analysis from FMC’s website.

On March 21, 2012 the Tax Court of Canada issued judgment in the decision of McClarty Family Trust et al v. The Queen. The Minister of National Revenue (the “Minister”) had applied the general anti-avoidance rule (the “GAAR”) in section 245 of the Income Tax Act (the “Act”) to re-characterize capital gains reported by the McClarty Family Trust (“MFT”) as taxable dividends. However, the Court agreed with the appellants’ submissions that the transactions in issue were undertaken primarily for the purpose of placing Darrell McClarty, the father of the minor beneficiaries of the MFT, beyond the reach of creditors and allowed the appeal.

The Minster’s argument was that pursuant to a series of transactions, Darrell McClarty was able to split business income with his minor children in a manner that avoided the tax on split income in section 120.4 of the Act (as it existed in 2003 and 2004).

Darrell McClarty was the owner of all of the issued and outstanding Class A voting shares of McClarty Professional Services Inc. (MPSI). The MFT owned all of the issued and outstanding Class B, non-voting common shares. MPSI, in turn, owned 31% of Projectline Solutions Inc., which earned business income from the provisions of geotechnical engineering services.

In 2003 and 2004, the MFT received stock dividends consisting of Class E common shares of MPSI. The Class E shares had low paid-up capital and a high redemption value. After the Class E shares were received by the MFT, the MFT sold them to Darrell McClarty for fair market value, realizing capital gains. The capital gains were then distributed to the minor beneficiaries of the MFT, and thereby not subject to tax under section 120.4 of the Act.

Through a series of loans between Darrell McClarty, MPSI and the MFT, Mr. McClarty ended up owing $104,400.37 in outstanding promissory notes to the MFT and the MFT had outstanding promissory notes in the amount of $96,000 owned to its minor beneficiaries. The Minister argued that the creditor protection objectives were essentially ineffective and that the circular flow of loans disguised the true intention of the plan, which was to distribute funds to minor beneficiaries in a manner that would not subject them to the tax on split income in section 120.4.

However, the Court accepted Mr. McClarty’s evidence that he was motivated to protect assets from his former employer, who was a potential judgment creditor in relation to allegations of improper use of software belonging to the former employer. The Court also agreed that because of the liabilities of Mr. McClarty and the MFT noted above, the creditor protection objectives were achieved.

It was also argued that the protection from creditors would have been achieved simply by paying dividends to the beneficiaries of the MFT and therefore the declarations of stock dividends amounted to avoidance transactions. However, the Court accepted the Appellants’ argument that the transfer of wealth from MPSI was undertaken to provide protection from creditors without attracting significant tax costs. The transactions were not avoidance transactions because it was acceptable to undertake creditor proofing transactions in a manner that attracted the least possible tax. Furthermore, the transaction would never have occurred in the absence of the need to protect MPSI’s assets.

The Court therefore concluded that because there were no avoidance transactions under subsection 245(3) of the Act, there was no need to continue the analysis to determine if there was abusive tax avoidance. However it did note that to the extent that there was a gap in the legislation, which allowed for the distribution of capital gains to minor beneficiaries of a trust in a manner that was not taxable under section 120.4 of the Act, it was inappropriate for the Minister to use the GAAR to fill in the gaps.

Typically, a simple informal request by a taxpayer to the CRA for copies of the T20 Audit Report, T401 Appeals Report or other documents will result in disclosure of those documents. However, sometimes these informal requests are met with resistance.

Assuming that there is no issue regarding the disclosure of taxpayer information under section 241 of the Income Tax Act, there are few reasons, if any, for the CRA not to provide these documents to a taxpayer upon an informal request.

In fact, the CRA has published CRA Document P148 “Resolving Your Dispute: Objection and Appeal Rights under the Income Tax Act” (2009), which lists the records available to taxpayers, including audit reports and working papers; scientific, appraisal and valuation reports; records of discussions between auditors and appeals officers; and others.

Additionally, the CRA recently published the answer it provided at the 2011 STEP Conference in response to a question about obtaining information and documents in the possession of the CRA (see CRA Document 2011-0403751C6 “2011 STEP Conference – Q8 – Access to Information” (June 2-3, 2011)).

In short, the CRA stated that its Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) Directorate promotes and encourages informal disclosure of documents by the CRA. The formal request procedures under the Access to Information Act (ATIA) and the Privacy Act (PA) are intended to complement and not replace existing procedures for access to government and personal information. The CRA stated that documents or reports created by an auditor or appeals officer should be given to the taxpayer without requiring the taxpayer to make a formal request under the ATIA and PA.

This is a helpful published position that should be referred to by the taxpayer if he/she is encounters resistance on an informal request for information/documents in the CRA’s possession.

Were your ears ringing this morning? They might have been if you are a racehorse owner or breeder in Canada, or if you are any other type of farmer who earns income from farming and some other source of income and are thus subject to section 31 of the Income Tax Act (the “Act”).

Section 31 of the Act is the restricted farm loss rule that operates to restrict the deductibility of your full farming losses against other sources of income if farming or a combination of farming and some other source of income is not your “chief source of income.”

For the past 35 years, section 31 has been applied to taxpayers on the basis of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Moldowan v. R., 1977 DTC 5213 (S.C.C.), which has resulted in section 31 being one of the most litigated provisions of the Act and replete with confusion, ambiguity and inconsistent results. Finally, the Supreme Court of Canada granted leave in The Queen v. John R. Craig, which was heard this morning by a seven judge panel (Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Fish were absent). For our earlier blog post on the case (including the factum filed by each party), click here.

The argument took two hours to complete. In the first hour the Court heard argument from counsel representing the Canada Revenue Agency (“Crown Counsel”), which was divided equally into two distinct sets of submissions organized by issue, and argued in succession by two Department of Justice lawyers.

The first issue addressed by Crown Counsel was its assertion that the legal doctrine of stare decisis was misapplied by the Federal Court of Appeal when it decided Craig, which, in the Crown’s submission, suggested that if Moldowan was applied in the manner desired by the Crown, then the case should have ended there with a Crown victory. Madam Justice Abella and Mr. Justice Rothstein took charge of this issue and put Crown Counsel to task with several related questions.

Justice Abella was very active in her questioning and emphasized that the evolution of the principles of statutory interpretation over the course of time makes it appropriate for outdated concepts to be reviewed. Further, the Supreme Court of Canada is THE venue for addressing any inconsistencies and is charged with the task of adjusting the principles for future application if the updated approach yields a different outcome.

It was also emphasized by both Justice Abella and Justice Rothstein that it is appropriate for lower courts to indicate that there is a problem with a prior precedent or an approach to interpretation, since that is the only way the record can be built and the matter brought before the Supreme Court of Canada for final resolution. That’s why they are there.

It was also noteworthy that Crown Counsel stated that the main issue to be decided was stare decisis, whereas Justice Rothstein was clear in his comments that the Supreme Court of Canada is free to overrule itself, and emphasized to Crown Counsel that the real question is whether Moldowan is right or wrong in the face of so much judicial and academic criticism. Those are the submissions he wanted to hear.

The second half of Crown Counsel’s submissions focused on the assertion that the Moldowan analysis of section 31 is correct and should not be disturbed.

Other tidbits from the panel during Crown Counsel’s submissions was Mr. Justice Moldaver’s comment that the ‘government is quite happy with Moldowan’ and Justice Abella’s comment that ‘farming is inherently unreliable as a source of income’ emphasizing the complexity of dealing with farming in the context of tax law. Justices LeBel, Karakatsanis and Cromwell also engaged Crown Counsel with questions during argument.

Mr. Craig’s counsel (“Taxpayer Counsel”) spent his hour focusing on Moldowan and why it needs to be overruled, given current principles of statutory interpretation, its unfairness to taxpayers and emphasizing the better approach taken by the Federal Court of Appeal in Gunn v. R., 2006 DTC 6544 (F.C.A.), which was followed by the Federal Court of Appeal in Craig. Further, it was submitted by Taxpayer Counsel that Mr. Craig would be successful with respect to the section 31 issue even upon strict application of the Moldowan principles.

The Justices were quite engaged in this discussion, which elicited questions or comments from Justices Abella, Moldaver, Cromwell, Karakatsanis, Deschamps and LeBel, all primarily directed at the wording of section 31 and how sense can be made of its wording to create fairness and certainty.

Taxpayer Counsel spent very little time on the stare decisis issue on the basis that, in its submission, the real issue is the correct interpretation of section 31.

After exactly two hours of argument, the far reaching financial implications on racehorse owners, breeders and other part-time farmers is now in the hands of the highest Court in the land to determine the future application of section 31, once and for all. The judgment is expected to be rendered within the next six to twelve months. Stay tuned.

For further background on this issue and a more comprehensive analysis of the history of section 31 prior to the appeal of Craig to the Supreme Court of Canada, click here.

Tax law geeks call it “form over substance” – how Canadians are taxed on their actual relationships and transactions rather than what they intended those to be.

However, mistakes can be made – and sometimes the tax assessed is not reflective of the true nature of the situation at hand.

In the March 16, 2012 issue of The Lawyers Weekly, I discuss the ways in which mistakes may be fixed so as to avoid unintended and adverse tax consequences.

Earlier today, the Supreme Court of Canada heard arguments in the Garron appeal.  The reasons for judgment of the Tax Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal, as well as the factum of each party, may be found at our earlier post.

Appellants’ Oral Argument

Counsel for the Appellants argued that the Income Tax Act contemplates that the residence of a trust is to be determined by the residence of the trustee.  It does so through a combination of subsections 104(1) and 104(2).  As a trust itself has no legal personality, Parliament has created a ”deemed individual” character for trusts in the form of the trustee under subsection 104(2).  In the Appellants’ view, subsection 104(1) is critical as it provides the “linkage” between the trust and the trustee.

Justice Abella wondered whether the phrase “ownership or control” in subsection 104(1) suggests that Parliament intended that the “control” test apply in the context of determining the residence of a trust, as the Crown contends.

Justices LeBel and Karakatsanis wondered why one would look to the residence of the trustee when, under subsection 104(2), the trust is considered a separate person.

Justice Rothstein wondered why a trust should be treated differently than a corporation in the sense that both are created in similar ways and both have similar “locational attributes”.  In other words, why can’t we locate the trust outside the place the trustee resides?

Justice Moldaver wondered whether the phrase “unless the context otherwise requires” in subsection 104(1) suggests that Parliament did not want trustees to be set up as straw men outside Canada simply to avoid tax.  Counsel for the Appellants responded that the phrase “unless the context otherwise requires” means that in a provision where it makes no sense for “trust” to mean “trustee” it does not mean “trustee” (e.g. subsection 108(6)).  He also responded that Parliament addresses avoidance concerns elsewhere in the Income Tax Act, including section 94.  He submitted that the rule for the determination of residence of a trust is not the answer to tax avoidance.

Counsel for the Appellants drew to the Court’s attention the (a) affiliated persons rule and (b) qualified environmental trusts rule as both deal with the residence of trustees (as opposed to the residence of trusts).  This makes it clear that the residence of the trustees is what really matters and confirms the “linkage” between trust and trustee.

Counsel for the Appellants also noted that the plan undertaken in this case would not work today in light of the amendments to section 94 of the Income Tax Act and the provisions of the Income Tax Conventions Interpretation Act.

Justice Abella asked whether, in light of the fact that both corporations and trusts manage property, the test ought to be the same for each (i.e. the central management and control test) and where they manage the property should be determined in the same way for both.  Counsel for the Appellants characterized such an approach as “superficial”.

Finally, counsel for the Appellants argued that adoption of the “formalistic” central management and control test will not eliminate the possibility of manipulation.  One could arrange that all meetings at which substantive decisions are made occur outside Canada.  Accordingly, there is no reason to prefer that test over the traditional residence of the trustee test.

Crown’s Oral Argument

Counsel for the Crown argued that the central management and control test is the proper test for determining the residence of a trust for income tax purposes.  She argued that such a test is consistent with the legislative scheme.  She also argued that the rationale for the application of the test in the trust context is the same as the rationale for the application of the test in the corporate context.

Justice Moldaver asked, if Parliament intended the same rule to apply to trusts as to corporations, why the Income Tax Act did not provide that a trust is deemed to be a  corporation rather than an individual.  Crown counsel responded that someone has to be assigned responsibility for administrative functions, as noted by the Federal Court of Appeal, and that is the trustee under subsection 104(1).  Such administrative functions include filing returns, receiving assessments, filing objections and appeals and paying tax debts of the trust.

Citing De Beers Consolidated Mines, Justice Rothstein asked what the result would be if those who actually controlled the trusts met in Barbados and that is where they made all the substantive decisions (i.e. the key decisions affecting the trust property).  After noting that you can’t just leave Canada in order to “paper” such decisions if they were actually made in Canada, Crown counsel admitted that such a trust would be resident in the Barbados if indeed all substantive decisions were made in Barbados.

Justice LeBel asked whether one would have to perform a complete factual enquiry in order to make such a determination.  Crown counsel said yes, just as one would do in the case of a corporation in order to determine the place of central management and control.

Crown counsel listed a number of similarities between corporations and trusts particularly with respect to the managment of property as a function of each.  The question then becomes: where is that management exercised?

Justice Deschamps asked Crown counsel about the two statutory examples cited by counsel for the Appellants, namely, the affiliated persons rule and the qualified environmental trust rule.  She argued that those rules simply dictate where the trustees must reside and nothing else.

Counsel concluded by noting that the central management and control test has been applied for one hundred years and that test should now be adopted to determine where a trust is resident.

The Crown’s Alternative Arguments: Section 94 and GAAR

Junior counsel for the Appellants and the Crown spent approximately ten minutes each arguing the section 94 and GAAR points.  There were no questions directed to the Appellants on these points, but several questions were directed to the Crown.

The Crown contends that even if the trusts were resident in Canada (under either test), the trusts should be deemed not to have been resident in Canada under paragraph 94(1)(b) (the “contribution test”), as the Federal Court of Appeal concluded, on the basis that the trusts “acquired” property without actually “owning” it.  Junior counsel for the Crown was challenged on this point by Justice Rothstein.  He was also challenged when he argued that the GAAR applied.  Justice LeBel admitted that he had “some problems at this stage” with the application of the GAAR under the circumstances.  In addition, Justice Rothstein questioned whether there could be a GAAR case if all substantive decisions had actually made in the Barbados and, therefore, the trusts had satisfied the Crown’s central management and control test.  Junior counsel for the Crown responded by contending that there would be a GAAR case as such trusts, in light of the fact that they have no function to serve, would be artificial entities and devoid of economic substance.

After a very brief reply by counsel for the Appellants, judgment was reserved.

In Morguard Corporation v. The Queen, 2012 TCC 55, Justice Boyle of the Tax Court of Canada considered whether a “break fee” received by a predecessor of the Appellant (for the purposes of this discussion, the “Appellant”) in respect of its unsuccessful attempted acquisition of a public corporation, was received on account of income or capital (there was also a procedural issue that will not be discussed in this post).  Based on the approach set out in Ikea Ltd. v. Canada, [1988] 1 SCR 196, 98 DTC 6092, affirming 96 DTC 6526 (FCA) and 94 DTC 1112 (TCC), Justice Boyle concluded that, on the facts, a break fee such as the one received by the Appellant was taxable on account of income because the negotiation and inclusion of break fees in the Appellant’s acquisition agreements was an integral part of its commercial business operations and activities. 

The relevant facts in this case are quite simple. In early 1997, the Appellant commenced implementation of its business strategy of assembling direct or indirect ownership of, or controlling positions in, real estate companies.  As a result of this business strategy, the Appellant acquired large/controlling interests in a number of real estate companies. 

In 1998, the Appellant acquired 19.2% of Acanthus Real Estate Corporation (“Acanthus”).  In June 2000, the Appellant made a hostile take-over bid for all of the remaining shares in Acanthus at a purchase price of $8.00, thereby increasing its position to 19.9%.  Following negotiations between Acanthus and the Appellant, the parties entered into a pre-acquisition agreement in order to give support and deal protection to the Appellant and the bid.  Pursuant to this pre-acquisition agreement, it was agreed that the Appellant would acquire all the outstanding shares of Acanthus at a purchase price of $8.25 per share and that Acanthus would, inter alia, pay a break fee of $4.7 million to the Appellant if a better bid was received and accepted by Acanthus.

On June 29, 2000, Acanthus received an unsolicited bid from a third-party (the “Third-Party”) for all of the outstanding shares of Acanthus at a purchase price of $8.75.  Attempting to thwart the Third-Party bid, the Appellant increased its bid to $9.00 per share on July 2, 2000.  At that time, the Appellant and Acanthus entered into an amending agreement (the “Amending Agreement”) to the original pre-acquisition agreement, pursuant to which a superior offer from a third-party would need to be for at least $9.30 per share and the break fee was increased to $7.7 million. 

Ultimately, Acanthus accepted an offer from the Third-Party for $9.40 and the Appellant chose not to match the offer.  Consequently, the Amending Agreement was terminated and Acanthus paid the Appellant the $7.7 million break fee.  In addition to the $7.7 million break fee (the “Break Fee”), the Appellant realised a gain of $4.8 million on the sale of its shares of Acanthus.

The Appellant argued that the Break Fee was a capital receipt and therefore should not be taxable because it was not received in respect of a disposition of property (i.e. no property was actually disposed of).  Critical to the Appellant’s argument was, the fact that (a) the Break Fee was received in relation to the acquisition of shares of Acanthus, which was a capital investment, and (b) the receipt of the Break Fee was the only time the Appellant had ever received a break fee in attempting to implement its real estate company acquisition strategy. 

After dismissing the Appellant’s “windfall” argument, Justice Boyle noted that Ikea is the leading modern case on the characterization of extraordinary or unusual receipts in the business context.  In that case, the taxpayer sought to assemble long-term leaseholds from which to operate its business.  In doing so, the taxpayer received a “tenant inducement payment” which it treated on capital account because the payment was received in respect of a long-term lease, which is capital in nature.  All levels of court found that the receipt was on income account because the leaseholds were necessary to the business of the taxpayer and they were a necessary incident to the conduct of the taxpayer’s business.  Consequently, the capital purpose (assembling long-term leaseholds) was not the relevant link to be considered. 

Citing the reasons for Judgment in the Tax Court of Canada in Ikea, Justice Boyle noted, at paragraph 43, that Justice Bowman was correct in finding “that the payment was clearly received and inextricably linked to [the taxpayer’s] ordinary business operations, and further that no question of linkage to a capital purpose could even be seriously entertained.”  In this case, Justice Boyle found that break fees were expected incidents of the Appellant’s business strategy of entering into acquisition agreements with real estate corporations, regardless of how unusual the receipt of such a payment may be and, therefore, the Break Fee was an amount received in the course of the Appellant’s business and commercial activities.  Consequently, the receipt of the Break Fee by the Appellant was on account of income.

On February 29, 2012, the Federal Court of Appeal (“FCA”) heard oral argument in The Sheldon Inwentash and Lynn Factor Charitable Foundation v. Her Majesty the Queen (FCA Court File No. A-235-11). Pursuant to subsection 172(3) of Income Tax Act (Canada) (the “Act”), an appeal of the Minister of National Revenue’s decision to refuse charitable registration is made directly to the FCA.

The Appellant trust appealed the Canada Revenue Agency’s (the “CRA”) decision to refuse to register the Appellant as a “public foundation” within the meaning of subsection 149.1(1) of the Act. The Appellant was instead registered as a “private foundation” (For an excellent, if slightly out-of-date, discussion on the difference between private and public foundations, see Cindy Radu, “Public/Private Foundations – Issues and Planning Opportunities” in “Personal Tax Planning,” (2009), vol. 57, no. 1 Canadian Tax Journal, 119-142).

The definition of “public foundation”, as currently enacted, reads in part (underline added):

public foundation” means a charitable foundation of which,

(a) where the foundation has been registered after February 15, 1984 or designated as a charitable organization or private foundation pursuant to subsection (6.3) or to subsection 110(8.1) or (8.2) of the Income Tax Act, chapter 148 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1952,

(i) more than 50% of the directors, trustees, officers or like officials deal with each other and with each of the other directors, trustees, officers or officials at arm’s length, and

(ii) not more than 50% of the capital contributed or otherwise paid in to the foundation has been so contributed or otherwise paid in by one person or members of a group of such persons who do not deal with each other at arm’s length

[…]

Main Issue

The main issue on appeal is whether a trust with a single trustee can meet the “more the 50%” test in paragraph (a)(i). The basis for the CRA rejecting the Appellant’s application to register as a private foundation was that as there is only one trustee (being a registered trust company), which does not satisfy the requirement in subsection 149.1(1) of the Act that more than 50% of the directors, trustees officers or officials deal at arm’s length with each other.

The Appellant takes the position that the CRA has incorrectly interpreted the definition of public foundation. In short, the Appellant contends that the CRA is in error with respect to its position that a trust with a single trustee can never meet test in subparagraph (a)(i) of the definition.

The Appellant notes that the Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c I-21, as amended, provides that words in the plural include the singular (and words in the singular include the plural) and that Parliament could have easily drafted the legislation governing public foundations to provide for a minimum number of trustees, not dissimilar to the specified investment business and personal service business definitions which require a corporation to employ “more than five full time employees”. In the Appellant’s view, where a single, professional and arm’s length trust company is the sole trustee of a trust, the trust can still be public foundation pursuant to the definition in subsection 149.1(1), especially in light of the policy behind subparagraph (a)(ii), which the Appellant submits is to prevent the use of tax-exempt charitable donations for private gain.

The Appellant also contends that the CRA has not taken a consistent position on the application of this provision. Published CRA statements indicate that a trust requires at least three trustees in order to meet the test in subparagraph (a)(i). However, the Appellant points out that the CRA has approved as public foundations trusts with only two trustees. This position, according to the Appellant, cannot be reconciled with the CRA’s position on the “more than 50%” threshold, as two trustees by definition cannot satisfy such a requirement any more than can a trust with a single trustee.

The Crown’s position is that the definition of public foundation is clear and unequivocal, and should therefore be interpreted strictly in accordance with the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Placer Dome Canada Ltd. v. Ontario (Minister of Finance)[2006] SCR 715. A purposive approach, as suggested by the Appellant, cannot be used to supplant clear statutory language where there is no ambiguity.

Other Issues

The rule in subparagraph (ii) is commonly referred to as the “Contribution Test”. Pursuant to draft legislation released on July 16, 2010, the Contribution Test will be replaced by a rule whereby a foundation cannot be controlled by a person (or a group of arm’s length persons) who contributed more than 50% of the capital to the foundation (the “Control Test”). This legislation, once enacted, will have retroactive application to years after 1999.

According to the Crown’s Memorandum of Fact and Law, the CRA also refused to register the Appellant as a public foundation because, in the Crown’s view, both the Contribution Test and Control Test are not met. Interestingly, the Crown did not advance any argument on this final point in its written submissions, except to say that given the uncertainty that the proposed legislation will become law, the Appellant cannot seek registration on the grounds that it satisfies the Control Test. It is also interesting to note that the position taken by the Crown is contrary to the public position announced by the CRA by way of news release dated July 11, 2007 that it would administer the Act as though the Control Test applied.

The appeal was heard by a three-member panel of the FCA comprised of Madame Justice Eleanor Dawson, Madame Justice Johanne Trudel, and Mr. Justice David Stratas. Judgment was reserved.

The Tax Court has once again considered the meaning of the phrase “beneficial owner” for purposes of the tax treaty between Canada and the Netherlands (the “Treaty”).  It has also once again ruled in favour of the taxpayer in determining that a Dutch holding company was the “beneficial owner” of amounts received from a related Canadian company.

On February 24, 2012, the Tax Court of Canada released its eagerly-anticipated decision in Velcro Canada Inc. v. Her Majesty the Queen, which addresses the applicable Canadian withholding tax rate in respect of cross-border royalty payments within a multinational corporate group.  The decision comes almost four years after the Tax Court of Canada released its landmark decision in Prévost Car Inc. v. The Queen, which dealt with the identical treaty interpretational issue in the context of cross-border dividend payments.  The decision of the Tax Court was affirmed by the Federal Court of Appeal.

Both the Prévost Car Inc. and Velcro decisions are relevant to any multinational enterprise using a foreign holding company as an investment/financing vehicle and provide considerable comfort concerning the tax effectiveness of such structures.

The issue in Velcro was whether a Dutch holding company was the “beneficial owner” of royalties paid by a related Canadian company, and therefore entitled to a reduced rate of Canadian withholding tax under the Treaty in respect of the royalties.  Pursuant to the “beneficial owner test” described in Prévost Car Inc., this required that the Tax Court consider the following issues:

• Did the Dutch holding company enjoy possession, use, risk and control of the amounts it received from the Canadian corporation?
• Did the Dutch holding company act as a “conduit”, an agent or a nominee in respect of the amounts it received from the Canadian corporation?

The CRA’s position was that Dutchco was not the beneficial owner of the royalties generally because Dutchco was contractually required to remit a specific percentage of all amounts received from the Canadian corporation to its parent company located in the Netherlands-Antilles (which does not have a comprehensive tax treaty with Canada).  If the Canadian company had paid royalties directly to the Netherlands-Antilles company the royalty payments would have been subject to a 25% Canadian withholding tax.  In the CRA’s view, Dutchco was merely a collection agent for the Netherlands-Antilles company.

The Court rejected the CRA’s arguments and concluded that Dutcho was indeed the beneficial owner of the royalties.  The basis for the Court’s conclusion was that, even though Dutchco may have been contractually required to pay money onward to the Netherlands-Antilles company, it retained some discretion as to the use of the royalties while in its possession. Dutchco therefore possessed sufficient indicia of beneficial ownership while it held the royalties and could not be considered a conduit based on the “beneficial ownership test” outlined in Prévost Car Inc., which requires a lack of all discretion.

It is unclear at this time whether the CRA will appeal the Tax Court’s decision in Velcro to the Federal Court of Appeal. The tax community will continue to watch the progress of this case (if any) with great interest.

Please open the attached PDF for further information about the Velcro case.

Please visit the FMC website for prior coverage of Prévost Car Inc.

The most recent Canadian transfer pricing trial concluded on February 3, 2012 after four days of argument in the Tax Court of Canada in Toronto. This marked the conclusion of a trial that commenced on October 17, 2011. At issue before Justice Patrick Boyle is whether the agreed-upon discount rate for factoring accounts receivable differed from the discount rate to which the parties would have agreed had they been dealing with one another at arm’s length.

The agreed-upon discount rate was 2.2% while the Minister of National Revenue assumed 1.0127% as the arm’s length rate for factoring the accounts receivable at issue.

Counsel for McKesson Canada Corporation began his submissions by arguing that the reassessment should be vacated as McKesson Canada had met its burden of demonstrating to the Court, on a balance of probabilities, that the agreed-upon discount rate was consistent with the discount rate to which the parties would have agreed had they been dealing with one another at arm’s length. Counsel argued that the absolute lowest discount rate the Court could possibly find, based on all the expert evidence, is not be less than 1.7863% as reflected in the opinion of one of the Crown’s experts. Counsel emphasized that the evidence of the Crown’s experts should be given little or no weight as, among other things, they overlooked cost of capital, prompt payment discount and servicing fees. Furthermore, counsel submitted that the Part XIII assessment should be vacated as it was issued after the 5-year limitation period in Article 9(3) of the Canada-Luxembourg Income Tax Convention (1999) (the “Treaty”).

Counsel for McKesson Canada referred to the OECD guidelines which suggest that restructuring business transactions would be an unusually arbitrary exercise. He emphasized that paragraph 247(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act cannot be used to re-write the transaction or to change what has already happened.

Justice Patrick Boyle sought guidance from counsel on whether paragraph 247(2)(a) could be used to revise the terms or conditions of the transaction.

Crown counsel criticized the methodology used by an experts called by McKesson Canada on the basis that he had never used that methodology to price any other receivables and there was no indication that that methodology was actually followed in the market. Counsel also questioned certain assumptions made by experts called by McKesson Canada (e.g. the Crown argued that capitalization should be assessed based on the capitalization of the entire corporate group, not just the immediate parent, which would result in a significantly lower arm’s length discount rate).

Crown counsel also argued that the “terms and conditions” referred to in paragraph 247(2)(a) extend beyond price and, based on the OECD guidelines, that structural adjustments are permissible as part of the “realistically available option” standard. Counsel submitted that the “realistically available option” standard allows for several significant adjustments to the discount rate.

Justice Boyle sought guidance from Crown counsel on the extent to which structural changes could be made within the scope of paragraph 247(2)(a).

With respect to the Part XIII assessment, Crown counsel contended that the limitation period in Article 9(3) of the Treaty only applies to corresponding adjustments by the other contracting state and, therefore, the Part XIII assessment was timely issued.

In reply, counsel for McKesson Canada urged the Court to look to the words of paragraph 247(2)(a) and emphasized that the discount rates offered by the experts called by McKesson Canada took into account considerations such as the cost of capital and the servicing fee where the discount rates offered by the Crown’s experts did not.

Judgment was reserved.

On Thursday, January 26, 2012, in the ballroom of the historic Fairmont Royal York Hotel in downtown Toronto, the Canadian Tax Foundation hosted a lively panel discussion on the recent Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) decision in Copthorne Holdings Ltd. v. The Queen. The event was also webcast, with an audience from coast to coast in Canada, and internationally as far away as France and New Zealand.

The decision in Copthorne centred on whether a “doubling-up” of paid-up capital (“PUC”) amounted to abusive tax avoidance that should be subject to the application of the general anti-avoidance rule (“GAAR”). For more on the Copthorne decision, see our previous post here.

The esteemed panel included a diverse group of tax experts. Madame Justice Karen Sharlow of the Federal Court of Appeal and Mr. Justice Wyman W. Webb of the Tax Court of Canada provided judicial insights into the potential ramifications of the SCC’s decision in Copthorne. Noted tax litigators Al Meghji of the private bar and Elizabeth Chasson of the Department of Justice considered the impact that the decision may have on the tax dispute resolution process, particularly in instances where the Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”) is seeking to impose the GAAR. Tim Wach, a tax planner in private practice who was previously seconded to the Department of Finance, and Wayne Adams, former Director General, Income Tax Rulings at CRA rounded out the panel.

The discussion, moderated by Justin Kutyan, Pooja Samtani and Timothy Fitzsimmons of the CTF’s Young Practitioner’s group in Toronto, began with several panel members expressing their opinions on whether the decision in Copthorne changed their understanding of the application of the GAAR. Mr. Adams indicated that the SCC seems to have affirmed the CRA’s application of the GAAR where taxpayers have “created” tax attributes or have otherwise engaged in “sleight of hand”. Madame Justice Sharlow noted that the impact of Copthorne cannot be fairly assessed separate and apart from particular fact situations which will be presented to the courts in due course. Mr. Meghji said that, in his opinion, the approach taken by the Supreme Court is notably distinct from the approach taken in other international GAAR cases, particularly those coming from Australia and New Zealand.

The panel was also asked for their views on the impact of the Copthorne decision on the meaning of “series of transactions” as it is used in Canadian tax law generally. Mr. Wach expressed the view that he did not think that the decision required the Department of Finance to revise the extended meaning of “series of transactions” in subsection 248(10) of the Income Tax Act (Canada). Mr. Adams noted that, in his view, the Court validated the CRA’s approach to the concept of a “series of transactions” as it has been applied for the last 15 years (in contrast, he noted, to earlier cases in the which the SCC emphatically rejected CRA’s approach in other areas). The panel session also included a rather animated debate among the panel members on the role of the GAAR Committee in light of Copthorne and whether the positions taken by individual members of the GAAR Committee would be relevant to a Court in deciding a GAAR case.

The panel engaged in a lively discussion touching on many aspects of the Copthorne decision, the meaning of “series of transactions” and the GAAR more generally. While there was agreement among certain panel members on some issues, there was also respectful disagreement on many others with each member of the panel expressing his or her views with considerable passion and conviction.

On January 10, 2012, the Federal Court of Appeal (the “FCA”) released its decision in CIBC World Markets Inc. v. The Queen (2012 FCA 3) on a motion by the taxpayer seeking an order for enhanced costs.  In a unanimous judgment, Justices Sharlow, Layden-Stevenson, and Stratas dismissed the taxpayer’s motion, holding that there was no legal basis upon which the Minister of National Revenue could have accepted the offer of the taxpayer to settle the claim.

The underlying litigation dealt with a claim for input tax credits (“ITC”s) under the Excise Tax Act.  Specifically, the issue was whether the taxpayer was entitled to file a second claim for input tax credits in respect of the same year (further details are available in our earlier posts on the litigation).  Litigation commenced, with the result that the taxpayer was unsuccessful at the Tax Court of Canada (2010 TCC 460) but was successful at the Federal Court of Appeal (2011 FCA 270).

At issue on the motion before the FCA was an offer of settlement made by the taxpayer before the commencement of proceedings at the Tax Court of Canada.  The offer put forward by the taxpayer would have had the Minister issue a reassessment granting 90% of the ITCs at issue.  It had no expiry date and was left open for acceptance throughout the remainder of the action.  In its motion, the taxpayer argued that because it was entirely successful at the FCA, it should be entitled to 80% of solicitor and client costs, beginning from the date of offer and ending on the judgment by the FCA (80% being the “substantial indemnity” set out in Practice Note No. 18 of the Tax Court of Canada).

The FCA first dispensed with the taxpayer’s claim for enhanced costs in respect of the FCA action, noting that an offer of settlement made before trial must be reasserted after the trial decision if the offeror intends it to be effective in respect of the FCA proceeding as well.  As the taxpayer did not do so in this case, the only matter at issue were costs between the time of offer and the judgment of the Tax Court of Canada.

In dealing with that portion of the motion, the FCA noted that the rules governing offers of settlement include an implicit and important pre-condition that the offer made must actually have been capable of acceptance to trigger cost consequences.  In this case, the Minister asserted that the offer to settle (by permitting 90% of the ITCs initially claimed) was an arbitrary compromise on quantum, and was not legally supportable under the legislation – neither the Tax Court of Canada nor the FCA could have ordered such a result.  This kind of issue was described by the Minister as a “yes-no” issue of statutory interpretation where the taxpayer’s position was either entirely correct, or would be wholly rejected. 

The FCA agreed with the Minister, relying on Galway v. Minister of National Revenue, [1974] 1 FC 600 and subsequent decisions under the Income Tax Act.  Those decisions reflect the requirement that all settlements must be made on a “principled basis”: the Minister can only accept a settlement that is consistent with the legislation and the result that the legislation would allow.  Compromise decisions and risk mitigation are impermissible if not otherwise supported by the legislation.  The FCA confirmed that this rule applies equally to the Excise Tax Act, and that “there is no legislative provision that repeals Galway”. 

The taxpayer argued that compromise settlements would help to relieve the backlog of appeals at the Tax Court of Canada and should therefore be permitted as good policy.  The Court was not persuaded by this argument, suggesting that there are many policy considerations, in favour and against compromise settlements, and that it was a matter for Parliament, not the judiciary, to decide. 

This decision affirms that Galway remains the governing law with respect to settlements, and that a “principled basis” remains a requirement for all settlements, unless Parliament takes action to change the present state of the law.  Suggestion have been offered by commentators as to what such legislative reform might look like.  For one analysis, based on a multi-jurisdictional perspective, see Carman R. McNary, Paul Lynch, and Anne-Marie Lévesque, “Tax Dispute Resolution: Is there a Better Way?,” Report of Proceedings of Sixty-Second Tax Conference, 2010 Tax Conference (Toronto:  Canadian Tax Foundation, 2011), 14:1-15.

In 9056-2059 Quebec Inc. v. The Queen (“9056-2059”), the Federal Court of Appeal (Nadon, Trudel and Mainville, JJ.A.) allowed the taxpayer’s appeal from a decision of the Tax Court of Canada. In the process, the FCA provided valuable guidance on the interpretation of section 138 of the Excise Tax Act (the “Act”), which deals with the provision of multiple supplies for a single price.

The registrant in 9056-2059 operated an agri-tourism business interested in beekeeping.  To promote sales of its cottage-industry products (such as honey), the registrant developed a network of nature trails on its land.  To gain access to the trails, users were obliged to purchase a farm product.  The transaction was carried out through the purchase of tickets.  The first ticket was sold at $12 for an adult and $10 for a child.  In practice, an adult who paid $12 obtained a first farm product, priced at one ticket, and needed do nothing more to be able to use the trails that day for as many hours as desired.  According to the pricing sheet, one ticket could have been used to obtain one of the following products: 50 g of honey or maple syrup, a bag of 8 candies, a maple lollipop or a 454-g bag of buckwheat flour.  By comparison, a 500-g jar of churned liquid honey is priced at 4 tickets, whereas the 1-kg jar is priced at 6 tickets.  Exceptions aside, additional tickets cost $1.50 each.

If supplied separately, the supply of farm products would have been zero-rated (i.e., taxed at a rate of 0%) whereas the supply of access to the trails would have been fully taxable.

The Minister of National Revenue assessed the registrant on the basis that section 138 of the Act applied to the combined supplies of admission and farm products.  Specifically, the Minister asserted (and the Tax Court of Canada agreed) that the principal supply was taxable access to the trails and the otherwise zero-rated supply of farm products was only incidental to the main supply, such that section 138 of the Act deemed the supply of farm products to form part of the taxable main supply.  This had the effect of rendering all sales taxable, and the Minister assessed accordingly.

At issue in 9056-2059 was whether section 138 of the Act applied.  The Federal Court of Appeal (per Trudel J.A.) noted that for section 138 to apply, each of the following conditions must be satisfied: (1) two or more supplies must be supplied for a single consideration; and (2) the provision of one of the supplies must reasonably be regarded as incidental to the provision of the other.  While the Federal Court of Appeal found that the first condition was met, the Court was not satisfied that the supply of food products was incidental to the supply of access to the trails.

Using the Canada Revenue Agency’s (“CRA’s”) Policy Statement P-159R-1: Meaning of the Phrase Reasonably Regarded as Incidental (revised on March 8, 1999) (“P-159”) against the CRA, the Federal Court of Appeal noted that while the disproportionate gap between the price of the first ticket and the quantity of honey to which the purchaser was entitled suggested that the provision of farm products was secondary to the provision of access to trails, that did not mean that it was incidental.  The production costs for honey and the honey-based products (approximately 89% of selling price) were found to be too significant for them to be considered small in comparison to the price of the first ticket.

Further, the Court noted that P-159 emphasizes that section 138 “is intended to apply in situations where the dollar value of the purported incidental supply is small. It generally will not apply to transactions where its application would have significant tax revenue implications”.  That is precisely what would happen here, if it applied.  Thus, the Court found that section 138 did not apply in the circumstances and allowed the registrant’s appeal.  As a result, for the period at issue, the registrant had to remit only the net tax resulting from its sales in connection with access to the trails.

Taxpayers that have implemented cross-border tower financing structures and that have claimed a Canadian tax deduction for any U.S. taxes paid should revisit their structures carefully in light of the Tax Court of Canada’s recent decision in FLSMIDTH Ltd. v. The Queen (2012 TCC 3), which is the Court’s first decision concerning tower structures.

For a more detailed review of this case, please click here.

The primary tax benefit of the typical tower structure is an interest deduction in both Canada and U.S. in respect of the same borrowing.  However, in certain tower structures, a spread is earned by a U.S. entity based on the amount of interest that is received by that entity from lower-tier entities in the structure and the amount of interest that is paid by the entity on external bank financing.  This spread is typically subject to U.S. federal income tax.

In FLSMIDTH Ltd. v. The Queen, the viability of the double interest deductions was not at issue; rather, the issue was whether an additional deduction under subsection 20(12) of the Income Tax Act (Canada) (the “Act”) was available under the Act with respect to the U.S. income tax that was paid on the spread.

Generally, the taxpayer would be entitled to the deduction under subsection 20(12) of the Act for the U.S. tax paid if two conditions were met:

1. the tax must have been paid in respect of a source of income under the Act; and

2. the U.S. tax must not reasonably be regarded as having been paid in respect of income from the share of a capital stock of a foreign affiliate of the taxpayer.

The Tax Court agreed that the U.S. tax was paid in respect of a source of income for purposes of the Act, even though that specific source of income (i.e., income that was characterized as interest for U.S. tax purposes) was not itself subject to tax under the Act; however, the Tax Court denied the deduction on the basis that the tax was in respect of income from the share of a foreign affiliate of the taxpayer.  Central to the Court’s decision was the broad interpretation that is to be given to the term “in respect of” for purposes of the Act.

Taxpayers that have implemented tower structures and that have claimed a subsection 20(12) deduction on any U.S. tax paid should reconsider their structures and contact a tax advisor to discuss the potential implications of this case in their particular circumstances.

At this time it is unclear whether the taxpayer will appeal this decision to the Federal Court of Appeal.

On Friday morning January 13, 2012, the Supreme Court of Canada heard arguments in GlaxoSmithKline Inc. v. The Queen. See our earlier posts on the case here and here.

By way of background, Glaxo Canada purchased ranitidine, the active pharmaceutical ingredient in Zantac, a branded ulcer medication, from a non-arm’s-length non-resident. In 1990-1993, Glaxo Canada paid approximately $1,500 per kg of ranitidine, while generic purchasers of ranitidine were paying approximately $300 per kg. The Minister of National Revenue reassessed Glaxo Canada under former section 69 of the Income Tax Act on the basis that the taxpayer had overpaid for the ranitidine in light of the fact that generic manufacturers were paying considerably less for the same ingredient.

The issue before the Tax Court was whether the amount paid by the taxpayer to the non-arm’s-length party was “reasonable in the circumstances.” The Tax Court held that (a) the “comparable uncontrolled price” (or CUP) method was the most accurate way to determine the arm’s-length price for ranitidine and (b) the appropriate comparable transactions were the purchases of ranitidine by the generic manufacturers. Subject to a relatively minor adjustment, the Tax Court dismissed the taxpayer’s appeal.

The Federal Court of Appeal allowed the taxpayer’s appeal. The Court of Appeal held that the lower court had erred in its application of the “reasonable in the circumstances” test, and that it should have inquired into the circumstances that an arm’s-length purchaser in the taxpayer’s position would have considered relevant in deciding what reasonable price to pay for ranitidine. The Court of Appeal set aside the lower court judgment and sent the matter back to the Tax Court to be reconsidered.

The Crown appealed and Glaxo Canada cross-appealed the portion of the order sending the matter back to the Tax Court. The appeal was heard by a seven-member panel of the Court (Chief Justice McLachlin, Justice Dechamps, Justice Abella, Justice Rothstein, Justice Cromwell, Justice Moldaver and Justice Karakatsanis).

The Crown argued that the analysis under subsection 69(2) required a “stripping away” of the surrounding circumstances of the transaction in question and, in particular, the license agreement pursuant to which Glaxo Canada was entitled to market and sell the drug ranitidine under the brand name Zantac.  Having done that, the only relevant comparator was the price of ranitidine on the “open market”, namely, the price paid for ranitidine by generic drug manufacturers.

The Court asked a number of questions about whether subsection 69(2) (with its reference to “in the circumstances”) makes the ultimate use of the ranitidine relevant to the analysis. Several judges asked whether it made a difference that the ranitidine purchased by Glaxo Canada was to be marketed and sold as Zantac, a branded product that would yield a higher retail price than the equivalent generic product.  Justices Abella and Rothstein were particular active during this discussion.

In stark contrast to the Crown’s position, Glaxo Canada contended that the only question to be answered under subsection 69(2) was whether two arm’s-length parties, sitting across a boardroom table, would arrive at the same deal that was concluded by Glaxo Canada and its non-resident parent company. Justice Abella wondered if, even in those circumstances, an arm’s-length party would pay $1,500 for a kilogram of ranitidine.

Chief Justice McLachlin asked about bundling and its relationship to transfer pricing – if the $1,500/kg price included an amount paid for something other than ranitidine why was it not identified by Glaxo Canada as such and why was withholding tax not remitted thereon under section 212 of the Act? Counsel for Glaxo Canada responded by making two points: First, if a portion of the price paid by Glaxo Canada for ranitidine were more properly characterized as royalties, for example, such amounts would be expenses to Glaxo Canada and thus there was no mischief from a transfer pricing perspective in bundling them into the cost of the goods. Second, it is not the policy or practice of the CRA to require taxpayers to unbundle intellectual property or other intangibles from tangible property as, presumably, the practical burden imposed by such a requirement would be difficult to overstate. It was unclear whether the tension between the issues of bundling and arm’s-length pricing was resolved at the hearing. 

In a nutshell, the choice before the Court is this: Is the fact that the ranitidine purchased by Glaxo Canada was destined to become Zantac relevant to the analysis under subsection 69(2)? Glaxo contends that it is, while the Crown contends that it is not.

On the cross-appeal, Glaxo Canada argued that it had met the case against it on the pleadings and the matter should, therefore, have concluded at the Federal Court of Appeal and should not have been sent back to the Tax Court. There were a number of questions from the bench on that point.    

The panel reserved judgment on both the appeal and cross-appeal.

On Friday January 6, 2012, the University of Toronto and the University of British Columbia National Centre for Business Law presented a panel discussion on the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Copthorne Holdings Ltd. v. The Queen.

The discussion, held at Flavelle House at the University of Toronto’s Faculty of Law, was hosted by U of T’s Professor Ben Alarie. The panelists included Professor David Duff (UBC Faculty of Law), Deen Olsen (Department of Justice), Mark Brender (Osler Hoskin and Harcourt LLP), Robert Couzin (Couzin Taylor LLP), Phil Jolie (Canada Revenue Agency), and Professor Tim Edgar (Osgoode Hall Law School).

The general view of the panelists was that the decision was well-written and comprehensive, but does not add much that is new or insightful to the existing GAAR jurisprudence.

Deen Olsen noted that there are six points the Department of Justice believes are important in interpreting the Supreme Court’s reasoning about “series of transactions”:

1. “Series of transactions” in subsection 248(10) is to be interpreted expansively.
2. The taxpayer bears the onus of rebutting the Minister’s assumption that particular transactions form part of a series.
3. Which transactions are included in a series will depend of the facts of each case.
4. A “strong nexus” is not required for a transaction to be included in a series.
5. Transactions will not be included in a series where subsequent transactions are only a mere possibility or connected with an extreme degree of remoteness.
6. The analysis of whether certain transactions form part of a series may be undertaken prospectively or retrospectively.

Phil Jolie stated that it will be “business as usual” for the CRA with respect to its approach to the application of the GAAR. Mr. Jolie noted a few specific points regarding the CRA’s interpretation of the decision:

1. The decision does not say that a comparison of the difference in tax result between dividend treatment and capital gains treatment is irrelevant to the GAAR analysis.
2. Though the decision does not say that there is a general anti-surplus stripping policy in the Income Tax Act, the CRA may still be able to argue in “bits and pieces” based on the jurisprudence that such a policy does exist.
3. Despite the Court’s comment that the GAAR does not include a “smell test”, such a test does likely exist and the CRA’s analysis of a transaction will look at any anomalous result (i.e., the bad smell) but the CRA will ask why the result is anomalous and whether an argument exists that the outcome was the result of an abuse of the Act (in other words, the smell test is part of the process but not the end of the process).
4. The Court’s statement that it must be “clear” that the taxpayer abused the Act must mean that the Minister must prove the abuse on a “balance of probabilities”.
5. Paid up capital, as a tax attribute, is likely becoming less valuable because of the reduction of the withholding rate on dividends to 5% in the tax treaties between Canada and its major trading partners.
6. There is likely no anti-PUC trading scheme in the Act because the Act is not concerned with PUC trading in the same way that it is concerned with, and precludes, loss trading (i.e., the prohibition on loss trading is intended “to keep factories open” whereas an anti-PUC trading regime would not accomplish that goal).

The afternoon concluded with remarks by the former Chief Justice of the Tax Court of Canada, Donald G.H. Bowman, who noted that the unanimous 9-0 decision was a credit to Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin as the Court produced a well-written and sensible decision, which many in the tax community had wished for in Lipson v. The Queen.

The Copthorne decision will continue to provoke analysis and discussion.  The conversation will continue with a second conference in Toronto sponsored by the Canadian Tax Foundation on January 26.

On December 19, 2011, the Tax Court partially granted an application by Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (“CIBC”) (2011 TCC 568). The motion concerned whether the Crown’s Reply should be struck out, either wholly or in part (there were actually four separate Replies, but all are substantially similar). Associate Chief Justice Rossiter did not strike out the entire Crown pleading, but ordered 98 paragraphs struck out and 92 paragraphs amended from the main Reply (with the same amendments to be made to the other three Replies). The main Reply was 94 pages long with 70 pages of assumptions.

The Tax Court appeals involve the deductibility of amounts paid by CIBC to settle litigation arising from the failure of Enron in 2001. CIBC was named (along with a number of other parties) as a defendant in a pair of law suits filed after Enron went bankrupt. CIBC settled the claims against it in consideration for a payment of $2.65 billion in 2005 and deducted those amounts, along with related interest and legal expenses in computing income for its 2005 and 2006 taxation years.

The Minister of National Revenue denied the deduction of the settlement amounts. CIBC appealed to the Tax Court of Canada. The Crown filed a Reply, and CIBC filed a motion to have the Reply struck out in its entirety. The contentious point is whether the “egregious or repulsive” principle can be used to determine whether expenses are deductible. The concept was referred to at paragraph 69 of the reasons for judgment in 65302 British Columbia Ltd. v. Canada where a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada (per Iacobucci J.) made the following observation:

It is conceivable that a breach could be so egregious or repulsive that the fine subsequently imposed could not be justified as being incurred for the purpose of producing income. However, such a situation would likely be rare and requires no further consideration in the context of this case, especially given that Parliament itself may choose to delineate such fines and penalties, as it has with fines imposed by the Income Tax Act.

On this motion, the Crown argued that it should be open to it to establish that the “egregious or repulsive” principle could also apply in respect of amounts paid in order to settle litigation. CIBC contended that this concept has never been held to apply to settlement amounts and that, as a result, the Reply was fatally deficient.

Associate Chief Justice Rossiter first concluded that part of a pleading should only be struck where it is “certain to fail because it contains a radical defect.” Here, the Crown was trying to use the “egregious or repulsive” principle to justify denying the deduction of amounts paid to settle a law suit rather than amounts laid out to pay fines. The Court acknowledged that the “egregious or repulsive” principle had been developed by the courts in the context of fines, but noted that it could apply to settlement payments, and so the Respondent’s pleadings did have a chance of success. He refused to strike the Crown’s entire pleading as a result.

However, Associate Chief Justice Rossiter found that in the Reply the Crown pleaded evidence, conclusions of law or mixed fact and law, immaterial facts or advanced prejudicial or scandalous claims or claims that were an abuse of process of the Court. In the result, the Court held that portions of the Reply were improper and had to be removed. The Crown was given 60 days to file a less argumentative Amended Reply with the offending portions deleted.

On December 16, 2011, the Supreme Court of Canada released its much-anticipated decision in Copthorne Holdings Ltd. v. Canada (go here for our blog post on the decision).  Next Friday afternoon, January 6, 2012, the Faculty of Law at the University of Toronto will be hosting an extraordinary event exploring the implications of the decision for the future of the GAAR.  An outstanding array of speakers has been lined up (including FMC’s own Don Bowman).  Spending that Friday afternoon at the Faculty of Law is sure to be one of the best ways to efficiently get up to speed on all the implications of the decision. 

For details, please see the attached flyer, or go directly to http://www.copthorne.ca for registration information.

On December 19, 2011, the Tax Court dismissed a motion by General Electric Canada Company and GE Capital Canada Funding Company (the “Appellants”) in their current appeals (2010-3493(IT)G and 2010-3494(IT)G). The Appellants sought to strike several paragraphs from the Replies filed by the Crown on the basis that the Crown was relitigating a previously-decided matter. Justice Diane Campbell dismissed the motion but gave leave to the Crown to make a small amendment to one of the Replies.

General Electric Canada Company (“GECC”) is the successor by amalgamation to General Electric Capital Canada Inc. (“GECCI”), and GECC had inherited commercial debts owed by GECCI. GECC was reassessed and denied the deduction of fees paid to its parent corporation (“GECUS”) for guaranteeing the inherited debts. However, GECCI had previously litigated the deductibility of those fees and won (see General Electric Capital Canada Inc. v. The Queen, 2009 TCC 563, aff’d 2010 FCA 344). The current appeal involves similar issues, but with different taxpayers (GECC instead of GECCI) and tax years. In their application, the Appellants argued that the Crown was trying to relitigate issues that had been decided in the previous appeal.

The Court first dealt with the Appellant’s contention that res judicata precluded the Crown from having the issues reheard in another trial. Res judicata may take one of two forms: “cause of action” estoppel or “issue” estoppel. For either to apply, the parties in the current matter must have been privy to the previous concluded litigation. The Appellants said GECC had been privy to the decision since both it and GECCI were controlled by a common mind. The Court dismissed that argument since the appeals involve different tax years from those in the previous concluded litigation and, therefore, reflect different causes of action.

The Appellants also argued that it was an abuse of the Court’s process to relitigate the purpose and deductibility of the fees since the debt and the fee agreements were substantially the same as those in the previous concluded litigation. They asked the Court to strike out references to those agreements from the Replies. The Crown’s counter-argument was that the nature of the agreements was a live issue since it was not established that the fee agreements between GECUS and GECC were the same as those with GECCI. The Court agreed and refused to strike the sections of the Replies referring to the agreements.

The Appellants also sought to strike parts of the Replies where the Crown denied facts which the Appellants said had been proven in the previous concluded litigation. Again, the Court noted that the issues in the present appeals were different than those at issue in the previous concluded litigation, and that the Appellants did not show that the facts at issue (which were part of a joint statement of facts in the prior case) had actually been considered by the Court in the prior decision. Since the facts had not been proven they were best left to be determined later at trial.

Further, the Appellants contested two theories reflected in the Replies that they characterized as a fishing expedition. The Appellants stated these theories were not used as a basis for the original reassessment and, therefore, violated the restrictions on alternative arguments under subsection 152(9) of the Act. The Court dismissed this argument, saying that the theories were simply alternative approaches to showing that the guarantee fees paid by GECC were not deductible. The Court held they were alternative pleadings and refused to strike them out. Further, the Appellants also argued that two separate basis for the reassessments (one based on paragraphs 247(2)(a) and (c); the other, on paragraphs 247(2)(b) and (d)) should be pleaded as alternative grounds, since the two parts of that section were inconsistent with one another. This was dismissed on the basis that the two parts were complementary and were drafted in a way so that if both were satisfied, one would take precedence over the other.

Finally, the Appellants argued that they had been deprived of procedural fairness as the CRA had not consulted its own Transfer Pricing and Review Committee with respect to the reassessments, and the Appellants had been unable to make submissions to that committee. The Court held that there was no requirement that the committee consider the matter first and, even if there was, the Tax Court does not rule on administrative matters.

In the end, the Appellants succeeded on one minor point: the Crown will amend one paragraph in one Reply to clarify the distinction between legally binding guarantees and implied guarantees or support. The Crown was awarded costs.

On December 16, 2011, the Supreme Court of Canada released its latest General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR) decision in Copthorne Holdings Ltd. v. Canada.  The appeal was heard on January 21, 2011 by all nine of the Justices (Chief Justice McLachlin, Justice Binnie, Justice LeBel, Justice Deschamps, Justice Fish, Justice Abella, Justice Charron, Justice Rothstein and Justice Cromwell).  Since the date of the hearing, Justices Binnie and Charron have retired.  This was the fourth GAAR appeal heard by the Supreme Court (the earlier cases were Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. Canada, Mathew v. Canada and Lipson v. Canada).

With Justice Rothstein writing for a unanimous Court, the taxpayer’s appeal was dismissed.  In so doing, the Court arrived at the same result as the Tax Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal while, at the same time, providing important guidance for corporate Canada on the interpretation and application of the GAAR particularly in the context of reorganizations and distributions.  The clarity and precision of Justice Rothstein’s reasons should be welcomed by the business community, though the result in this particular case was unfavourable to the taxpayer.

If $96 million was contributed as capital, how can a taxpayer withdraw more than that amount as a tax-free return of capital?  Does the GAAR preclude such a result?  That the Court’s answer to the latter question was “yes” should not be regarded as a general defeat for tax planners.  The encouraging news for tax planners appears most clearly in two paragraphs of the reasons (note the deliberate use of the word “and” in paragraph 121):

[121] Copthorne also argues that the Act does not contain a policy that parent and subsidiary corporations must always remain as parent and subsidiary.  I agree. There is no general principle against corporate reorganization.  Where corporate reorganization takes place, the GAAR does not apply unless there is an avoidance transaction that is found to constitute an abuse.  Even where corporate reorganization takes place for a tax reason, the GAAR may still not apply.  It is only when a reorganization is primarily for a tax purpose and is done in a manner found to circumvent a provision of the Income Tax Act that it may be found to abuse that provision.  And it is only where there is a finding of abuse that the corporate reorganization may be caught by the GAAR.

* * *

[123] While Parliament’s intent is to seek consistency, predictability and fairness in tax law, in enacting the GAAR, it must be acknowledged that it has created an unavoidable degree of uncertainty for taxpayers.  This uncertainty underlines the obligation of the Minister who wishes to overcome the countervailing obligations of consistency and predictability to demonstrate clearly the abuse he alleges.

Background

In a nutshell, a non-resident invested $96 million in a Canadian holding company.  Those funds were then used to purchase Canadian portfolio investments and Canadian real property.  There were a number of subsidiaries and other affiliated corporations through which those investments were made.  About $67 million of that $96 million was, in turn, contributed to a subsidiary.  Following a 1993/1994 series of transactions, that $67 million of PUC was preserved which resulted in aggregate paid-up capital (“PUC”) as between the two companies of $163 million ($96 million plus $67 million).  That amount of PUC was later utilized, in another transaction, to permit the non-resident to withdraw $142 million from Canada free of withholding tax.

It was a set of 1994 proposals by the Department of Finance relating to the foreign accrual property income (“FAPI”) rules which caused the non-resident to monetize certain of his holdings.   This was done by redeeming $142 million of shares without payment of Canadian withholding tax.  What troubled the Minister of National Revenue was that the original investment was $96 million - any amount withdrawn in excess of the original capital contribution ought to have been considered a deemed dividend subject to Canadian withholding tax.

Having made the decision to divest those holdings, the taxpayer’s choice was whether to organize such a divestiture by way of a horizontal amalgamation or a vertical amalgamation.  If divestiture was to be accomplished by way of a horizontal amalgamation, the taxpayer believed that the total amount that could be removed free of Canadian withholding tax was $163 million ($96 million plus $67 million) as subsection 87(3) of the Income Tax Act does not provide for horizontally amalgamated corporations to lose their PUC as would have been the case on a vertical amalgamation (in the latter case, the PUC of the subsidiary would disappear on the amalgamation as the shares in the subsidiaries would necessarily have been cancelled).

There were two sets of transactions which the Crown had to connect in order to succeed under the extended definition of “series” in subsection 248(10) of the Income Tax Act.  There was a series of transactions in 1993/1994 (the sale of VHHC Holdings to Big City, and the subsequent amalgamation of VHHC Holdings with Copthorne I to form Copthorne II) which achieved the result of preserving $67 million of PUC in the subsidiary.  Then there was a transaction in 1995 (Copthorne III redeemed its shares without its shareholder incurring an immediate tax liability) which actually utilized the $67 million of PUC which had been preserved under the 1993/1994 series of transactions.

Was There a Tax Benefit?

In paragraph 37, Justice Rothstein explains why there was clearly a tax benefit:

[37] . . . . The only question was whether the amalgamation would be horizontal or vertical.  As the Tax Court judge pointed out, the vertical amalgamation would have been the simpler course of action.  It was only the cancellation of PUC that would arise upon a vertical amalgamation that led to the sale by Copthorne I of its shares in VHHC Holdings to Big City.  To use the words of Professor Duff, “but for” the difference in how PUC was treated, a vertical amalgamation was reasonable.

Was the Transaction Giving Rise to the Tax Benefit an Avoidance Transaction?

As there was no question about the tax benefit, the first issue was whether there was an “avoidance transaction”.  According to the Crown, the avoidance transaction was the 1993/1994 series of transactions which preserved the $67 million of PUC in the subsidiary as that series of transactions resulted in a tax benefit as part of a larger series (including the 1995 redemption transaction) in which the $67 million of PUC was actually utilized.

One of the Supreme Court’s concerns during oral argument was whether the 1993 series of transactions preserving $67 million of PUC was undertaken primarily for bona fide (i.e non-tax) purposes.  The taxpayer argued that it would have been imprudent, from a business perspective, to have squandered (or failed to preserve) all of the available PUC.  There is no relevant nexus, the taxpayer argued, between the 1993/1994 series of transactions and the 1995 redemption transaction.

During oral argument, considerable time was spent on the question of whether the extended meaning of “series of transactions” in subsection 248(10) of the Income Tax Act could be used to connect transactions where the first series was not undertaken specifically in order to facilitate the second transaction.  The taxpayer argued that the 1995 series could not have been undertaken “in contemplation of” the 1993/1994 series as the 1995 series was prompted by an intervening event (i.e., the proposed change to the FAPI rules).

Justice Rothstein held as follows:

[48] The Tax Court judge was aware both of the intervening introduction of the FAPI rule changes, as well as the time interval between the sale and amalgamation in 1993 and 1994 and the redemption in 1995 (para. 38).  Copthorne argued that these intervening events broke the purported series.  The Tax Court judge agreed that the test should not catch “transactions that are only remotely connected to the common law series” (para. 39).  Nonetheless, she found that there was a “strong nexus” between the series and the subsequent redemption, because “the Redemption   . . . was exactly the type of transaction necessary to make a tax benefit a reality based on the preservation of the PUC” (para. 40).  The Federal Court of Appeal upheld this conclusion, finding that there was no palpable and overriding error of fact. I would also uphold the Tax Court judge’s conclusion for the same reason.

At paragraph 56, Justice Rothstein concluded that, as stated by the Court in Canada Trustco, ”the language of s. 248(10) allows either prospective or retrospective connection of a related transaction to a common law series and that such an interpretation accords with the Parliamentary purpose.”  He therefore agreed with the Tax Court and Federal Court of Appeal that ”the redemption transaction was part of the same series as the prior sale and amalgamation, and that the series, including the redemption transaction, resulted in the tax benefit.” [paragraph 58]

Justice Rothstein’s observations here should be of considerable comfort to tax planners who will look to paragraph 47 in particular:

[47] Although the “because of” or “in relation to” test does not require a “strong nexus”, it does require more than a “mere possibility” or a connection with “an extreme degree of remoteness” (see MIL (Investments) S.A. v. R., 2006 TCC 460, [2006] 5 C.T.C. 2552, at para. 62, aff’d 2007 FCA 236, 2007 D.T.C. 5437).  Each case will be decided on its own facts.  For example, the length of time between the series and the related transaction may be a relevant consideration in some cases; as would intervening events taking place between the series and the completion of the related transaction.  In the end, it will be the “because of” or “in relation to” test that will determine, on a balance of probabilities, whether a related transaction was completed in contemplation of a series of transactions.

Tax planners now know that a transaction will not fall within a series of transactions unless it was undertaken “because of” or “in relation to” the series.  Such a test is far superior to the ”mere possibility” standard.

On the ”avoidance transaction” issue as a whole, Justice Rothstein concluded that:

[60] The Tax Court judge found that the 1993 sale of VHHC Holdings shares from Copthorne I to Big City was an avoidance transaction.  The Federal Court of Appeal agreed.

[61] The sale preserved the PUC of the VHHC Holdings shares when VHHC Holdings and Copthorne I were amalgamated to form Copthorne II, which allowed for the subsequent redemption of Copthorne III shares without liability for tax.  This is a tax purpose.

[62] Copthorne argues that the transactions were undertaken for the purposes of simplifying the Li Group companies and using the losses within the four amalgamated companies to shelter gains also within the four amalgamated companies.  While simplification and sheltering gains may apply to the other transactions, they do not explain the sale of VHHC Holdings shares to Big City.  As the Tax Court judge found, the share sale introduced an additional step into a process of simplification and consolidation.  A vertical amalgamation would have resulted in the same simplification and consolidation.  Moreover, Copthorne has not shown why sheltering gains using losses within the four companies would not have been possible if the companies were amalgamated vertically.

[63] I see no error in the finding of the Tax Court judge that the sale of the VHHC Holdings shares from Copthorne I to Big City was not primarily undertaken for a bona fide non-tax purpose.  The burden was upon Copthorne to prove the existence of a bona fide non-tax purpose (Trustco at para. 66), which it failed to do.  Thus, I would affirm her finding that the sale of the VHHC Holdings shares to Big City was an avoidance transaction.

[64] Because there was a series of transactions which resulted in a tax benefit, the finding that one transaction in the series was an avoidance transaction satisfies the requirements of s. 245(3).

Was the Avoidance Transaction Giving Rise to the Tax Benefit Abusive?

The Crown argued that the role of PUC in the Income Tax Act is to ”benchmark” the total amount that may be repaid to shareholders tax free.  It argued that the taxpayer abused, among other provisions, subsection 87(3) of the Income Tax Act by undertaking a horizontal amalgamation as it did.  The purpose of that provision, the Crown argued, is to prescribe how a taxpayer is to compute PUC on all amalgamations - it instructs taxpayers that they may not amalgamate a parent and a subsidiary without eliminating the PUC of the subsidiary.  The Crown contended that this was, at the end of the day, an amalgamation of a parent and subsidiary to which subsection 87(3) was intended to apply.  The Crown argued that the “result” was a vertical amalgamation and that the GAAR is a “results-based” test.  The result was a vertical amalgamation “by another name” and that is how subsection 87(3) was abused.  The taxpayer “inserted” an avoidance transaction (the 1993 series) which resulted in a vertical amalgamation being done horizontally.  In the final analysis, a subsidiary (with $67 million of PUC) had been amalgamated with the parent (with $96 million of PUC).  As subsection 87(3) is intended to prevent the duplication of PUC, a transaction that avoids the effect of subsection 87(3), but which nevertheless achieves PUC duplication, is abusive and, therefore, properly subject to the GAAR.

Justice Rothstein reviewed the purpose of subsection 87(3) and held as follows:

[88] In any GAAR case the text of the provisions at issue will not literally preclude a tax benefit the taxpayer seeks by entering into the transaction or series.  This is not surprising.  If the tax benefit of the transaction or series was prohibited by the text, on reassessing the taxpayer, the Minister would only have to rely on the text and not resort to the GAAR.  However, this does not mean that the text is irrelevant. In a GAAR assessment the text is considered to see if it sheds light on what the provision was intended to do.

[89] The text of s. 87(3) ensures that in a horizontal amalgamation the PUC of the shares of the amalgamated corporation does not exceed the total of the PUC of the shares of the amalgamating corporations.  The question is why s. 87(3) is concerned with limiting PUC in this way.  Since PUC may be withdrawn from a corporation without inclusion in the income of the shareholder, it seems evident that the intent is that PUC be limited such that it is not inappropriately increased merely through the device of an amalgamation.

[90] Section 87(3) also provides, in its parenthetical clause, that the PUC of the shares of an amalgamating corporation held by another amalgamating corporation is cancelled.  In other words, in a vertical amalgamation, the PUC of inter-corporate shareholdings, such as exists in the case of a parent-subsidiary relationship, is not to be aggregated.  Again, having regard to the fact that PUC may be withdrawn from a corporation not as a dividend subject to tax but as a non-taxable return of capital, the indication is that the parenthetical clause is intended to limit PUC of the shares of the amalgamated corporation to the PUC of the shares of the amalgamating parent corporation.  While the creation of PUC in the shares of downstream corporations is valid, its preservation on amalgamation may be seen as a means of enabling the withdrawal of funds in excess of the capital invested as a return of capital rather than as a deemed dividend to the shareholder subject to tax.

In arguing why such a result was not abusive, the taxpayer had asked the Court to bear in mind the entire scheme of the Income Tax Act, including capital gains tax.  The taxpayer noted that a capital gain of some $150 million was realized under the Income Tax Act on the disposition of the taxpayer’s Canadian investment portfolio.  It was argued that the fact that there was no Canadian tax on that gain by virtue of the Canada-Netherlands Tax Convention was irrelevant – it was Canada’s decision not to tax such gains in the context of the Treaty.

Justice Rothstein responded to this argument as follows:

[100] Copthorne argues that the provisions of the Act relating to capital gains and PUC are part of a single integrated scheme that “provides a complete solution to this situation” and ensures that tax eventually is applied to shareholder returns, either as a deemed dividend or as a capital gain (A.F., at para. 69).

[101] On the basis of the arguments made, I have not been convinced to accept Copthorne’s position.  Capital gains or losses are calculated in relation to the adjusted cost base (“ACB”) of a share, not its PUC.  While PUC relates to shares, ACB relates to a specific taxpayer. PUC depends on the amount initially invested as capital, whereas the ACB reflects the amount the current shareholder paid for the shares.  In some cases the ACB and PUC may be the same, but in others they may not be.  In the case of shares acquired from a prior shareholder it will be unlikely that the ACB will be equal to the PUC.

[102] I would hesitate to conclude that the Act contains a “complete solution” whereby any withdrawal that would not be caught under the PUC-deemed dividend scheme would be caught instead by the capital gains scheme.  An amount returned to a shareholder on a share redemption may be considered a return of capital  rather than a deemed dividend under s. 84(3).  However, the return of capital may reflect either a capital gain or a capital loss, which would be determined in relation to the ACB of the shareholder.

[103] Further, the tax rates applicable to dividends and capital gains are not identical.  With respect to non-resident shareholders, tax treaties may exempt capital gains from tax but not dividends.  This suggests that the capital gains scheme is not an automatic proxy for the PUC-deemed dividend scheme, whereby a taxpayer will always be liable for the same tax under one tax scheme or the other on a redemption.  Copthorne did not cite any sources directly on point.  The capital gains issue was not addressed by either the Tax Court judge or the Federal Court of Appeal.  In the circumstances, Copthorne has not substantiated this argument sufficiently that it can be accepted in this case.

The taxpayer contended that no one would squander a valuable ”corporate attribute” such as PUC by undertaking a vertical amalgamation in which the $67 million of PUC would have vanished.  There was no abuse here as Parliament specifically described in subsection 87(3) a set of circumstances in which PUC would be reduced (i.e., on a vertical amalgamation) but provided no reduction of PUC on a horizontal amalgamation.

On the overall “abuse” analysis, Justice Rothstein concluded as follows:

[124] Copthorne agrees that s. 87(3) would have led to a cancellation of the PUC of the VHHC Holdings shares if it had been vertically amalgamated with Copthorne I.  Instead of amalgamating the two companies, Copthorne I sold its VHHC Holdings shares to Big City, in order to avoid the vertical amalgamation and cancellation of the PUC of the shares of VHHC Holdings.  The transaction obviously circumvented application of the parenthetical words of s. 87(3) upon the later amalgamation of Copthorne I and VHHC Holdings.

[125] The question is whether this was done in a way that “frustrates or defeats the object, spirit or purpose” of the parenthetical words of s. 87(3) (Trustco, at para. 45).  In oral argument, Copthorne argued that by leaving VHHC Holdings and Copthorne in a vertical structure would be “throwing away” the PUC upon amalgamation.  It argued that the purpose of s. 87(3) cannot require shareholders to throw away valuable assets.  However, it must be remembered that there has been a finding of tax benefit (protecting the PUC of the shares of VHHC Holdings of $67,401,279 from withholding tax upon Copthorne III redeeming a large portion of its shares) and an avoidance transaction (the sale of VHHC Holdings from Copthorne I to Big City).  The GAAR analysis looks to determine whether the avoidance of a vertical amalgamation and preservation of the VHHC Holdings’ PUC of $67,401,279 circumvented s. 87(3), achieves an outcome s. 87(3) was intended to prevent or defeats the underlying rationale of s. 87(3).  If such a finding is made, the taxpayer is not “throwing away” a valuable asset.  It is the application of the GAAR that applies to deny the benefit of that “asset” to the taxpayer.

[126] It is true that the text of s. 87(3) recognizes two options, the horizontal and vertical forms of amalgamations.  It is also true that the text does not expressly preclude a taxpayer from selecting one or the other option.  However, I have concluded that the object, spirit and purpose of s. 87(3) is to preclude the preservation of PUC, upon amalgamation, where such preservation would allow a shareholder, on a redemption of shares by the amalgamated corporation, to be paid amounts without liability for tax in excess of the investment of tax-paid funds.

[127] I am of the opinion that the sale by Copthorne I of its VHHC Holdings shares to Big City, which was undertaken to protect $67,401,279 of PUC from cancellation, while not contrary to the text of s. 87(3), does frustrate and defeat its purpose.  The tax-paid investment here was in total $96,736,845.  To allow the aggregation of an additional $67,401,279 to this amount would enable payment, without liability for tax by the shareholders, of amounts well in excess of the investment of tax-paid funds, contrary to the object, spirit and purpose or the underlying rationale of s. 87(3).  While a series of transactions that results in the “double counting” of PUC is not in itself evidence of abuse, this outcome may not be foreclosed in some circumstances.  I agree with the Tax Court’s finding that the taxpayer’s “double counting” of PUC was abusive in this case, where the taxpayer structured the transactions so as to “artificially” preserve the PUC in a way that frustrated the purpose of s. 87(3) governing the treatment of PUC upon vertical amalgamation.  The sale of VHHC Holdings shares to Big City circumvented the parenthetical words of s. 87(3) and in the context of the series of which it was a part, achieved a result the section was intended to prevent and thus defeated its underlying rationale.  The transaction was therefore abusive and the assessment based on application of the GAAR was appropriate.

Although the decision is a defeat for a taxpayer on the facts of the case, the approach used by the Court (particularly the cautionary notes struck in paragraphs 121 and 123) along with the clarity and precision of the reasons written by Justice Rothstein (as adopted by the entire Court) should be generally reassuring to the business community.  Corporate Canada will still be able to engage in tax planning to advance business objectives if the transactions contemplated are adequately supported by non-tax purposes and if the results of those transactions do not circumvent any provisions of the Income Tax Act that are clearly aimed at precluding those results.

The Federal Court of Appeal heard the appeal in Transalta Corporation v. The Queen (Court File No. A-350-10) on December 13, 2011 in Calgary. The panel consisted of Justices Evans, Layden-Stevenson and Mainville.

The case concerns the allocation to goodwill of $190 million of a $818 million purchase price paid by AltaLink LP (“AltaLink”) to Transalta to purchase an electricity transmission business.  The Tax Court (2010 TCC 375) partially upheld the application of section 68 of the Income Tax Act  (the “Act”) to re-allocate a portion of the amount allocated to goodwill to tangible assets, despite the fact that the goodwill amount was approximately the amount in excess of the amount that all parties accepted as the net book value of the business assets and working capital.

On appeal, the Crown maintained its argument that not everything that increases the price of a business above its net book value must be regarded as goodwill, since goodwill is a distinct asset of the business with a value.  The Crown argued that the owners of a business would not receive any additional benefit from items such as a skilled employee force.

Transalta argued that the Tax Court had erred by adopting a new test for goodwill as something other than the established residual definition, i.e., the value of a business in excess of its realizable assets.  The test adopted by the Tax Court would require undue and costly subjective analysis and would be commercially unworkable.  Furthermore, one side of a transaction would usually be unaware of the reasons that another party would pay an amount in excess of the realizable value of the business assets.

Transalta argued that where sophisticated arm’s-length parties have agreed to an allocation, for the purposes of section 68 of the Act, there should effectively be a shift of the onus to the Minister of National Revenue to demonstrate that the allocation was not reasonable.  Translta argued that the test for section 68 should be whether a reasonable business person would have agreed to the allocation, having only business considerations in mind.  This would extend the test in Gabco Ltd. v. The Queen (68 DTC 5210), which is well-established as the test for the purpose of section 67 of the Act.

At the conclusion of the parties’ submissions, the panel reserved judgment.

The taxpayer’s Memoranda of Fact and Law are here and here.

The Crown’s Memorandum of Fact and Law is here.

On December 5, 2011, the Federal Court of Appeal released its decision in John Fluevog v. The Queen (2011 FCA 338).  In a unanimous judgment, Justices Nadon, Sharlow, and Mainville allowed the Crown’s appeal, reversing an interlocutory decision of Justice Margeson of the Tax Court of Canada (2010 TCC 617).  In that decision, the Tax Court had permitted the taxpayer, Mr. Fluevog, to amend his Notice of Appeal to add a claim of discrimination under section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Mr. Fluevog made payments to Swim Canada, an organization that is a “registered Canadian amateur athletic association”, as that term is defined in section 248(1) of the Income Tax Act (the “ITA”).  He claimed a tax credit in respect of these payments under section 118.1 of the ITA as an eligible gift.  The credit was denied by the Minister of National Revenue (the “Minister”), on the basis that Mr. Fluevog had received consideration in the form of swimming lessons for his children.  As such, the payment was not a gift at law.

The proposed Charter claim arose from an administrative position of the Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”) that permits a tax credit for payments to religious schools that solely provide religious instruction.  This position is described in Information Circular IC 75-23, which states that “it has been the Agency’s practice not to view religious instruction provided at parochial schools as consideration”.  Mr. Fluevog sought to argue that this administrative position was discriminatory on religious grounds and prohibited under section 15 of the Charter.  He took the position that the administrative policy should therefore be extended to the receipt of non-religious consideration such as swimming lessons.

The arguments at the Tax Court of Canada on the motion to amend the pleadings focused primarily on the question of whether the policy discriminated against Mr. Fluevog, such that the proposed amendments may disclose a cause of action.  As noted above, Justice Margeson ruled in favour of the taxpayer, holding that the amendment presented “at least an arguable case”.

Writing for the panel, Justice Nadon stated that the decision to grant or deny an amendment to pleadings is discretionary and is entitled to deference, barring an error in law or an improper use of discretion.  In this case, however, the decision at the Tax Court of Canada was based on an error of law.  In a brief paragraph, the Federal Court of Appeal concluded:

It is not open to the Minister to determine that a payment that is not a gift as a matter of law will nevertheless be treated as a gift for income tax purposes. If that is what the Minister has done by adopting the impugned assessing policy (and I express no opinion on that point), then the policy is wrong in law and cannot stand. But that is of no assistance to Mr. Fluevog. The remedy for adopting a policy that is wrong in law is to reject the policy, not extend it to everyone who pays for swimming lessons for their children.

As a result, Mr. Fluevog’s motion to amend his pleadings was dismissed.  There has been no word on whether Mr. Fluevog will seek leave to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court of Canada announced today that its long-awaited General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR) decision in Copthorne Holdings Limited v. The Queen will be released on Friday, December 16, 2011 at 9:45 a.m.

In preparation for Friday, it will be useful to re-read the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal dismissing Copthorne’s appeal as well as the decision of the Tax Court of Canada dismissing Copthorne’s appeal.

In addition, the written submissions of each party are available at the Supreme Court of Canada’s website and the archived webcast of the hearing may be viewed from the Court’s website as well.  The appeal was heard on January 21, 2011.

On December 7, 2011, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed the hearing dates for the following three income tax appeals (same as the tentative dates provided by the Court earlier):

The Queen v. GlaxoSmithKline Inc. – Hearing Date: January 13, 2012

Garron Family Trust v. The Queen - Hearing Date: March 13, 2012

The Queen v. John H. Craig - Hearing Date: March 23, 2012

Justice Leslie M. Little, recently retired from the Tax Court of Canada, was interviewed by Tony Sheppard for the Fall 2011 edition of the Tax Newsletter of the University of British Columbia Faculty of Law.  Justice Little enjoyed a remarkable career with government, in private practice and then with the Tax Court.  An interview well worth reading.

On December 1, 2011, the panel of Justice John Maxwell Evans, Justice Carolyn Layden-Stevenson and Justice David Stratas of the Federal Court of Appeal heard the “Branksome Hall” parking cases (Geraldine Anthony, Heather Friesen, Leslie Morgan, Jarrod Baker v. The Queen (2011 FCA 336)). The appeals were dismissed with a unanimous judgment delivered from the bench by Justice Layden-Stevenson shortly after Appellants’ counsel concluded his oral argument.

As discussed in an earlier post, the appeals of four employees of Branksome Hall (a private school in Toronto) (the “Appellants”) were heard collectively as test cases and on common evidence. The Appellants and approximately 100 other employees of Branksome Hall were reassessed for their 2003 and 2004 taxation years to include $92 per month (inclusive of GST and PST) in their income, representing the value of free parking provided by their employer. The issues were whether parking provided to the Appellants by their employer was a taxable benefit under paragraph 6(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act (the “Act”) and, if so, how the value of that benefit should be assessed.

Counsel for the Appellants argued in his opening statement that this is a case of the Canada Revenue Agency casting its tax net as wide as possible and attempting to tax items that it had not taxed in the past. In response to this statement, Justice Evans noted that the Federal Court of Appeal is required to apply the law as prescribed under paragraph 6(1)(a) of the Act and not make any findings on the practices of the Canada Revenue Agency.

The Appellants’ submissions focused on Justice Brent Paris’ conclusion in the Tax Court of Canada that the value of the taxable benefit was its fair market value. They argued that fair market value should only be applied to cases where there is an open market to test competitive prices. Since the demand for parking at Branksome Hall only came from staff members and Branksome Hall was restricted from charging members of the public for parking as a result of zoning restrictions, there was no open market and, therefore, fair market value should not be applied. The Appellants submitted that the value of the taxable benefit should be determined by considering only the cost incurred by the employer to provide the benefit.

In delivering reasons for judgment on behalf of the panel, Justice Layden-Stevenson stated that the Court: a) agrees with the Tax Court’s finding that even if it is accepted that the parking benefit to the Appellants should be valued at Branksome Hall’s cost of providing the parking, the evidence adduced by the Appellants was not sufficient to prove what those costs were; b) rejects the argument that the fair market value is an appropriate method of valuation only when there is an open market for the benefit in issue; and c) finds that the Appellants’ argument has been overtaken by the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Spence v. The Queen (2011 FCA 200).

In Spence v. The Queen (2010 TCC 455), the Tax Court had valued an employment benefit of reduced tuition costs by using the cost approach instead of the fair market value approach. The Federal Court of Appeal reversed the Tax Court’s decision and applied the fair market value approach to the taxable benefit on June 13, 2011 – after the Appellants in the “Branksome Hall” cases had submitted their Memorandum of Fact and Law.

The Tax Court recently released a decision dealing with the issue of whether gains realized by an unwitting participant in a Ponzi scheme are taxable.  In Johnson v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 540, the taxpayer had invested $10,000 with Andrew Lech (“Lech”).  They agreed he would invest the funds in options and pay her profits minus commissions.  The scheme paid the appellant $614,000 in 2002 and $702,000 in 2003.  However, the reality was that Lech was simply shuffling the money around between various accounts and other investors.  Further, Lech told the appellant that his family trust paid all the income tax on the investment and, therefore, the Appellant need not be concerned about paying tax.  Lech’s scheme fell apart in 2003 and he was later sentenced to jail.

The Minister assessed the Appellant for the gains she received from the scheme in 2002 and 2003.  She appealed, saying the payments were not taxable because they were not from a source of income as required by paragraph 3(a) of the Income Tax Act.  The Respondent stated that the gains were income that arose from capital she had invested with Lech, and were not windfalls exempt from tax.

The Court held that the profits from the scheme were not taxable, finding there was precious little connection between the capital invested and the gains received because the gains were taken from other investors and did not arise from any actual investment.  Further, the profits did not arise from the investment agreement with Lech because he had never intended to comply with that agreement.  Finally, the Court applied the criteria from Cranswick and held that the payments were akin to windfalls because they were funds passed on to the appellant through the fraudulent actions of Lech and did not represent a return on invested capital.

The Court also held the Minister was statute-barred from reassessing the Appellant’s 2002 taxation year in any event (although the Court found that the Appellant was careless in respect of her 2003 return, and thus if the Court found that the gains were taxable, her 2003 taxation year would have been open to reassessment).

As of the time of posting, the Crown has not filed an appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal.

It will be interesting to see how US Courts will deal with investors who profited from the Bernie Madoff scandal in 2009.  There has already been some consideration of the issue of the taxation of profits from a Ponzi scheme in earlier US jurisprudence.  In Premji (T.C. Memo. 1996-304) the US Tax Court ruled that an interest payment received from a Ponzi scheme should have been included in the taxpayer’s gross income because the payment was not a return of capital.  See also IRS CCA 200451030.

Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose. The United Kingdom is now seriously considering the introduction of a form of GAAR after having relied for years on judicial doctrines of anti-avoidance as expounded in such cases as WT Ramsay Ltd v. IRC, [1981] STC 174 (HL); CIR v. Burmah Oil Co. Ltd., [1982] STC 30 (HL); Furniss v. Dawson, [1984] STC 153 (HL); Craven v. White, [1988] STC 476 (HL); Ensign Tankers (Leasing) v. Stokes (HMIT), [1992] STC 226 (HL).  The most recent report is dated November 11, 2011 and is entitled “GAAR Study: A study to consider whether a general anti-avoidance rule should be introduced into the UK tax system“.

The uncertain and indeed sometimes contradictory principles developed in the U.K. cases have impelled an Advisory Committee consisting of a distinguished group of practitioners, academics and judges led by Graham Aaronson, Q.C. to advocate a “moderate” rule that targeted “abusive” arrangements, but to reject a “broad spectrum” general anti-avoidance rule. It is difficult for Canadians who have lived for over 20 years with the GAAR in section 245 of the Income Tax Act and observed the Canadian courts in scores of cases grapple with concepts such as “abuse”, “misuse” or “avoidance transactions” not to view with a measure of smug satisfaction – indeed Schadenfreude – the spectacle of a high level panel wrestling with such philosophical conundrums as the distinctions between “contrived and artificial schemes”, “abnormal arrangements” and “responsible tax planning”. The problem in the United Kingdom of codifying an anti-avoidance rule is similar to that in the United States where the judicial anti-avoidance doctrines applied in different circuits have necessitated the enactment of an amendment to § 7701(o) of the Internal Revenue Code to include a complex codification of the economic substance doctrine, one of the principal pillars of United States anti-avoidance jurisprudence. The Advisory Panel has performed a creditable task by analyzing the very problems that Canadian courts have been struggling with since the inception of the Canadian version of GAAR. The philosophical predilection of the United Kingdom courts embodied in Ramsay and its progeny may well influence the interpretation of the English GAAR just as the Duke of Westminster‘s case has implicitly survived GAAR in Canadian jurisprudence and has influenced its interpretation and evolution.

We can expect to see substantial refinement in the development of the “moderate” (or “targeted”) anti-avoidance rule (“TAAR” as opposed to “GAAR”) to ensure that it conforms to the stated objectives of the rule in that it

(a) deters or counteracts contrived, artificial and abusive schemes;

(b) does not undermine or discourage competitiveness that arises from “responsible” tax planning;

(c) eliminates uncertainty in predicting the tax consequences of arrangements that results from, inter alia

(i) “notoriously long and complex” tax legislation;

(ii) differing interpretations of arrangements by courts and tribunals; and

(iii) a battery of specific anti-avoidance rules.

Graham Aaronson and the Advisory Committee are to be commended for producing a competent and commonsensical report that responds realistically to a serious issue. The legislative implementation of the proposals is not certain. The possibility of GAAR was explored in the United Kingdom in 1998 and came to nothing. It may be assumed that if the proposals are enacted, it will take many years for the United Kingdom courts to develop principles that will clarify the application of the rule, in the same way in which the Supreme Court of Canada has reduced the Canadian version of GAAR to manageable proportions in Canada Trustco.

On November 21, 2011, the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) issued a news release entitled “Taxpayer relief deadline is December 31, 2011“, which confirms that it formally accepts the interpretation of the 10-year limitation period for interest relief established by the Federal Court of Appeal in Bozzer v. Canada.

Before the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Bozzer, the CRA took the position that the Minister may exercise his discretion to cancel or waive interest otherwise payable under the Income Tax Act only if a taxpayer applies within 10 calendar years of the end of the taxation year in which the underlying tax debt arose. The Federal Court of Appeal in Bozzer held, however, that the Minister’s discretion allows for the cancellation or waiver of interest that accrues during the 10 calendar years preceding the calendar year in which the request for relief is made, regardless of the year in which the tax debt arose.

Although the Bozzer decision dealt with the interpretation of the 10-year limitation period for interest relief requests in the context of the Income Tax Act, the CRA confirmed in its November 21, 2011 news release that the 10-year limitation period will be interpreted in the same manner with respect to interest relief applications made under the Excise Tax Act, the Air Travellers Security Charge Act, the Softwood Lumber Products Export Charge Act, 2006, and the Excise Act, 2001.

Although the Crown did not seek leave to appeal the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, it was unclear whether the CRA would actually follow and apply the FCA decision across the board.  For this reason, the news release is most welcome.

[Note: The author, along with David Spiro of Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP, acted as counsel for Mr. Bozzer in the Federal Court of Appeal - Ed.]

For those who missed the live webcast of the hearing in City of Calgary v. The Queen before the Supreme Court of Canada on November 15, 2011, the archived webcast of the argument is now available.  McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Deschamps, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver and Karakatsanis JJ. heard the appeal.

Ken S. Skingle, Q.C. argued for the City of Calgary and Gordon Bourgard argued for the Crown. 

For our report on the argument, see our earlier post.  Judgment was reserved.

Earlier today, the Supreme Court of Canada heard arguments in the City of Calgary v. The Queen, the second GST dispute to be heard by Canada’s highest court.  The issue was whether the City was entitled to an input tax credit (“ITC”) in respect of approximately $6.3 million in GST paid in relation to the construction of a municipal transit system.  See our earlier post to read more about the appeal.

Counsel for the City of Calgary faced questioning from the panel (McLachlin C.J., and LeBel, Deschamps, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver and Karakatsanis JJ.) throughout his submissions.  Members of the panel were particularly concerned about whether the City made a “supply” to the Province of Alberta.  If the answer was “no”, the City’s appeal would be dismissed.  Counsel for the City argued that there was a taxable supply in this case, and that there need not be a prior contractual obligation to provide a supply in order for a “supply” (within the meaning of the Excise Tax Act) to exist.  In addition, members of the panel were concerned about the City’s characterization of its agreements with the Province of Alberta, insofar as (in their view) it reflected an artificial view of the relationship between the City and the Province.  In addition, questions were asked regarding whether the agreements were more in the nature of “accountability agreements” (i.e., to ensure public grants were applied for their intended purpose, as the Crown contends) rather than “supply of service agreements” (as the City contends).  Counsel for the City referred the panel to U.K. authorities (including Edinburgh Leisure et al v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise [2005] LLR 41 (VATD Tribunal)) and the Federal Court of Appeal decision of Commission Scolaire des Chênes v. The Queen in support of the City’s position that it made a separate taxable supply of services to the Province, for which it would be entitled to claim ITCs on its taxable inputs.

Counsel for the Crown faced relatively few questions.  In particular, the panel was interested in hearing the Crown’s position on whether the Commission Scolaire des Chênes decision was correct and whether it was distinguishable.  Counsel for the Crown pointed out certain differences between that case and the present case, yet he stated that the Federal Court of Appeal’s analytical approach in the Commission Scolaire des Chênes decision reflected the correct approach.

Counsel for the City made a very brief reply, and the panel reserved its decision.

This morning at 9:30 a.m. catch the live webcast of the arguments in the Supreme Court of Canada in City of Calgary v. The Queen, the second GST dispute to be heard by Canada’s highest court.

See our earlier post to read more about the appeal.

On November 10, 2011, the Federal Court of Appeal (the “FCA”) delivered a unanimous decision in Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited v. The Queen, 2011 FCA 308. As discussed in an earlier post, the panel of Justice Marc Nadon, Justice Karen Sharlow and Justice Eleanor Dawson were asked to determine whether a one-time, lump sum payment of approximately $118 million made to employees to extinguish an employee stock option plan was a deductible expense or a payment on account of capital which is precluded from deduction by paragraph 18(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act (the “Act”).

The FCA dismissed the appeal of Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited (“Imasco”) and upheld Justice Bowie’s decision in favour of the Crown in Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited v. The Queen, 2010 TCC 648 noting that the decision of the Tax Court of Canada (the “Tax Court”) was “consistent with the evidence and the applicable legal principles.”         

Justice Sharlow found, notwithstanding the decision by Chief Justice Bowman of the Tax Court that a similar payment made in the course of the same series of transactions was fully deductible (Shoppers Drug Mart Limited v. The Queen), three factors that pointed to the conclusion that the payment was made on account of capital:

(i) the payment coincided with a reorganization of the capital of Imasco (the going private transaction and amalgamation);

(ii) the arrangements put in place for making the payment facilitated and were intended to facilitate the capital reorganization; and

(iii) the payment was intended to and did end all future obligations of Imasco to deal with its own shares, which can be described as a once and for all payment that resulted in a benefit of an enduring nature.

Justice Sharlow did acknowledge that there were two factors in favour of Imasco, namely, that (a) the employee stock option plan was entered into to provide a form of employee compensation and did make periodic cash payments for the surrender of options, and (b) the payment for the optioned shares represented only a small portion of the outstanding shares of Imasco (just over 1%).

In the end, the FCA followed its 1990 decision in Kaiser Petroleum Ltd. v. The Queen. Justice Sharlow agreed with Justice Bowie that the distinctions between the circumstances of Imasco and the facts in Kaiser were “distinctions without a difference”. Furthermore, the FCA rejected Imasco’s argument that Kaiser is not in step with current economic realities on the basis that it was decided at a time when employee stock option plans were not commonly used as part of the ordinary compensation package for employees of all levels.

In light of the significant difference in approach to the issue on substantially the same facts between the Federal Court of Appeal and Chief Justice Bowman in Shoppers, it would not be surprising if a leave application is filed with the Supreme Court of Canada.  As Justice Ian Binnie, formerly of the Supreme Court of Canada, noted in a recent interview, the function of counsel applying for leave “is to kick the ball up in the air in an interesting way and the judges will grab it.”  That may very well be easier here than in many other tax disputes.

The federal government announced today that it is interested in receiving comments on proposals to improve the caseload management of the Tax Court of Canada. Specifically, the potential changes would:

• Allow a taxpayer to elect to proceed by way of the Informal Procedure where the aggregate of all amounts in issue in an income tax appeal is equal to or less than $25,000 (or where a loss does not exceed $50,000).
• Require a taxpayer to proceed by way of the General Procedure for GST/HST appeals involving an amount in dispute in excess of $50,000.
• Allow the Tax Court of Canada to dispose of one or more issues raised in an appeal separately, so that some issues can be resolved independently from others.
• Allow the Tax Court of Canada to hear a question affecting a group of two or more taxpayers that arises out of substantially similar transactions, and provide that the resulting judicial determination is binding across the group.

The Informal Procedure limits (i.e., $12,000 / loss not in excess of $24,000) have been unchanged since 1993. There is a general consensus that it is now time to increase that threshold so as to facilitate greater access to the Tax Court under the Informal Procedure.

In addition, the Tax Court has, in recent years, had to deal with an increasing number of “group appeals” but has not had the ability to bind other similarly situated taxpayers. The proposed rules would give the Tax Court greater power to deal with a growing list of group appeals in a more expeditious manner.

The Department of Finance announcement is here.

The Department of Finance backgrounder is here.

The decision of the Federal Court in Minister of National Revenue v. RBC Life Insurance Company et al., 2011 FC 1249 may have opened the door to new opportunities for judicial review in the context of ex parte orders in federal tax matters only days after the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Stemijon Investments Ltd. v. Attorney General of Canada (see our earlier post) appeared to have narrowed those opportunities in the context of so-called “fairness applications” dealing with late-filed forms under federal tax statutes.

By way of background, the case concerned insurance products known in the industry as 10-8 plans. These essentially were a tax-effective insurance structure where, in very general terms, the taxpayer paid a high rate of deductible interest on loans in connection with insurance products where relatively high rates of interest accrued free of tax. The Canada Revenue Agency was aware of these structures at the highest levels and the record disclosed that they had considerable concern that the structures were abusive, violated GAAR, etc. As a result, CRA made ex parte applications under subsection 231.2(3) of the Income Tax Act against a number of the issuers of such 10-8 plans requiring the production of detailed information about these plans and their customers.

What CRA did not disclose to the Court on these ex parte applications was that one of the principal purposes of these applications was to take measures to “chill” 10-8 plan business. This offended the Court:

[58] At the hearing, the Insurers conceded that the Minister had a valid audit purpose in issuing the requirements, but argued that this valid purpose was extraneous to her primary goal, which was to chill their 10-8 plan business. I agree.

[59] I do not believe that the Minister’s central purpose in issuing the requirements is sufficiently tied to her valid audit purpose. Contrary to the Minister’s pretension, I did find evidence that the targeted audit of specific 10-8 plan holders was not only done to test the reasonableness of the 10% payable interest rate or the possible application of the GAAR but to send a message to the industry. I am not satisfied that the Minister’s attempt to “send a message” is a valid enforcement purpose such that subsection 231.2(3)(b) of the Act is satisfied or that this goal is sufficiently connected to the Minister’s valid audit purpose.

Accordingly, Justice Tremblay-Lamer cancelled the earlier ex parte orders with costs.

The Federal Court’s decision is a refreshing affirmation of the Crown’s duty of fairness and candour, particularly in ex parte proceedings. The decision should encourage those in receipt of “unnamed persons” requirements to challenge such requirements with a view to ascertaining whether the facts put forward by the CRA on the ex parte application to obtain the order constituted a “full and frank” disclosure of all the relevant facts.

On October 21, 2011, the Federal Court (Justice Sandra Simpson) released her decision on an application for judicial review in Dolores Sherry v. The Minister of National Revenue. The applicant requested judicial review pursuant to section 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act of a decision of the Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”) in which the CRA refused to cancel or waive interest and penalties related to the applicant’s taxes for 1989 to 2000. The decision is important because the Federal Court held that the reasons provided to the applicant by the CRA were inadequate.

The applicant had sought judicial review of the refusal by the CRA and on October 25, 2005, the Minister commenced a review of the applicant’s file in accordance with the terms of an order by Justice Heneghan on April 25, 2005. Justice Heneghan made an order on consent referring the matter to the Minister for redetermination. Upon completing its redetermination, the CRA told the applicant that it declined to reduce the interest charged to the applicant from 1989 to 2000 for the following reasons:

In reviewing your financial circumstances, we conducted a cash flow analysis to determine your ability to meet your tax obligations from 1989 to 2000. In conducting this analysis we have applied the direction in the Court Order and excluded the $100,000 you reported as taxable capital gain in our cash flow analysis and included your rental loses for years 1989 to 1994 as cash outflow. Our cash flow analysis shows that your net cash flow (funds received less expenses paid during the applicable years) was sufficient to meet your tax obligations from 1989 to 2000, except for the negative cash flow years 1991, 1992, and 1993. However, we considered the fact that you had significant equity in properties that you owned during the years 1991 to 2000 and could use this equity to meet your tax obligations and to cover the negative cash flows. Therefore, your request for interest relief under financial hardship is denied.

Justice Simpson held that those reasons were inadequate as CRA “extrapolated” from her income and expenses in 2001 a cash flow summary for the years 1989 to 2000 and CRA relied, in part, on its own appraised value of the applicant’s properties when it considered whether she had equity in her real estate holdings.

Justice Simpson concluded that although the CRA’s decision, as originally communicated to the applicant, did not offer adequate reasons, a more detailed “Fairness Report” prepared by the CRA did provide an adequate explanation. Although, by the time of the hearing, the applicant had a copy of the “Fairness Report”, she was not given a copy when the CRA first told her about its decision. Therefore, the application for judicial review was allowed.

As the applicant was required to initiate a judicial review application before she received the “Fairness Report”, the Court granted her costs for the preparation of the application. Once the “Fairness Report” was secured by the applicant, the only issue on which the applicant was successful was resolved and therefore, no relief beyond the cost award was granted.

On October 26, 2011, the Federal Court of Appeal released its decision in Stemijon Investments Ltd. v. Attorney General of Canada and five related appeals (see our earlier post).  Justice David Stratas wrote for the panel (Justice Marc Noël and Justice Johanne Trudel were the other members) and dismissed taxpayers’ appeals of the Federal Court judgments which rejected their claim that the Minister of National Revenue (the “Minister”) acted unreasonably in deciding not to cancel penalties and interest on late-filed T1135 forms.

By way of background, subsection 233.3(3) of the Income Tax Act requires each taxpayer who owns specified foreign property to file a Form T1135 where the total cost amount of the property is over $100,000.  The taxpayers filed the forms for 1998 and 1999 but did not do so for 2000-2003 until the CRA reminded them to file, which resulted in late filings for those years.

The taxpayers did not initially file the T1135 forms for 2000-2003 as their representative felt that the Canada Revenue Agency was receiving all the information it needed from other filings made by the appellants’ Canadian investment managers.  The foreign investments of almost all the taxpayers were managed by a Canadian investment manager who was already subject to Canadian reporting requirements.  Failing to file the forms in a timely manner for 2000-2003 was, therefore, a conscious decision because the representative believed that the Canada Revenue Agency was receiving information about the taxpayers’ foreign holdings from other filings.

The taxpayers asked for the late-filing penalties and interest to be cancelled.  Their request was denied.  They applied for a second level review where their request was denied.  They applied for judicial review in the Federal Court which found that the Minister’s decision was not unreasonable.  The taxpayers then appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal.

In the Federal Court of Appeal, the taxpayers won the battle, but lost the war.  The Court found that the Minister’s decision was unreasonable as it was based exclusively on whether the facts fit within three specific scenarios set out paragraph 23 of Information Circular IC07-1 (“Taxpayer Relief Provisions”), namely, (a) extraordinary circumstances beyond the taxpayer’s control, (b) actions of the Canada Revenue Agency and (c) inability to pay.  The Minister’s representative did not base his decision on the wider scope of discretion granted to him by law, namely, by subsection 220(3.1) of the Income Tax Act.  The Court concluded that “the scope of the Minister’s discretion [under subsection 220(3.1)] is broader than the three specific scenarios set out in the Information Circular.”  The Court concluded that it was unreasonable for the Minister to proceed as though the source of his decision-making power was the Information Circular and not the law.  As Justice Stratas noted (at paragraph 60):

An administrative policy is not law. It cannot cut down the discretion that the law gives to a decision-maker. It cannot amend the legislator’s law. A policy can aid or guide the exercise of discretion under a law, but it cannot dictate in a binding way how that discretion is to be exercised.

The taxpayers lost the war because, in the words of Justice Stratas (at paragraph 46):

In this case, there would be no practical end served in setting aside the Minister’s decision and returning the matter to him for redetermination. The excuses and justifications offered by the appellants for the delay in filing and the grounds offered in support of relief have no merit. The Minister could not reasonably accept them and grant relief under subsection 230(3.1) of the Act. Returning the matter back to the Minister would be an exercise in futility.

The Court explained that referring the matter back to the Minister would be an exercise in futility because the relief requested could not reasonably be granted on the facts.  The representative filed the T1135 forms on time for 1998 and 1999 but, after that, he “consciously chose not to comply with the Act” as he believed that the CRA was receiving the same information from other sources such as the appellants’ Canadian money managers.  Even if that were the case, Justice Stratas observed, that would be no excuse.  There are a number of other provisions in the Income Tax Act requiring the provision of information from various sources in order to verify compliance (e.g. information provided to the CRA by an employer and its employees).  The Court concluded that the taxpayers could not succeed on the explanations and justifications offered even if the Court returned the matter to the Minister for redetermination.

In addition, the Court observed that it would be an unreasonable exercise of discretion to grant relief on the basis that the imposition of six separate penalties in respect of a single decision by a single representative was unfair.  The Court described the taxpayers’ argument for a ”volume discount” as having “no merit”.

In light of the Court’s conclusion that the Minister’s decision was unreasonable, most observers would have expected the matter to be sent back to the Minister for redetermination as a matter of course.  The decision is significant as it may signal a more activist approach by the Federal Court of Appeal on judicial review matters.  Time will tell whether the courts will be more inclined to make decisions that the Minister ought to have made rather than routinely sending matters back to the Minister for redetermination.  If so, this decision may prove to be a harbinger of a much more complex era for judicial review of ministerial decisions.

On October 28, 2011 the Tax Court of Canada released Judgment and Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Judith Woods in Global Equity Fund Ltd. v. Her Majesty The Queen, 2011 TCC 507.  Global Equity Fund Ltd. (“Global”) had appealed the application of the General Anti-Avoidance Rule (the “GAAR”) by the Minister of National Revenue (the “Minister”) to disallow the deduction of a $5,600,250 business loss incurred on the sale of shares in a private corporation. 

The Court found that the loss was produced after Global subscribed for shares of a new subsidiary corporation, which then issued preferred shares to Global which were redeemable and retractable for $5,600,250 but had a paid up capital of $56 and which resulted in an income inclusion of $56.  The stock dividend had the effect of reducing the fair market value of the shares of the new subsidiary to a nominal amount but did not affect Global’s adjusted cost base in those shares.  Global then disposed of the common shares to a newly settled family trust at a loss in the amount of $5,600,250. 

The Court did not accept Global’s argument that the transactions leading up to the loss were implemented for creditor protection purposes.  Accordingly the Court held that a number of transactions in issue were avoidance transactions within the meaning of subsection 245(3) of the Income Tax Act (the “Act”).

The Court also noted that this case was similar to two recent decisions of the Tax Court of Canada where similar strategies were used by other taxpayers to create capital losses. In both cases (Triad Gestco Ltd. v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 259 and 1207192 Ontario Ltd. v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 383) the Tax Court upheld the application of the GAAR to deny the losses.  The Court noted that both of these decisions are under appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal. 

However, in Global’s case the Court was not prepared to accept the Crown’s argument that the object and spirit of the provisions of the Act identified by the Crown evidenced a policy to disallow losses realized within an economic unit to real losses.  The Court held that Parliament did not intend that the object and spirit of provisions identified by the Crown which targeted capital losses were intended to inform as to the object and spirit of the provisions relied upon by Global in the facts of this case.

Relying on the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. The Queen (2005 SCC 54), Justice Woods held that the provisions in the Act relied upon by Global to produce the losses had not been misused and she was also unable to discern a general policy from these provisions that restricted business losses in the manner suggested by the Crown.  The Tax Court rejected the Crown’s argument that there was a general restriction against the deduction of artificially-created business losses.  For all of these reasons the Tax Court held that the Minister had not met the onus of establishing abusive tax avoidance under subsection 245(4) of the Act and allowed the appeal.

[Note: The author, along with Jehad Haymour of Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP, acted as counsel for Global - Ed.]

As discussed in an earlier post, the Federal Court of Appeal (the “FCA”) heard submissions in Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited v. The Queen on October 26th, 2011. Justice Marc Nadon, Justice Karen Sharlow and Justice Eleanor Dawson heard the taxpayer’s appeal in Toronto.

The panel will determine whether a one-time, lump sum payment of approximately $118 million made to employees to extinguish an employee stock option plan was a deductible expense (as the taxpayer contends) or an outlay on account of capital which is precluded from deduction by paragraph 18(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act (as the Crown contends).

Imperial Canada Tobacco Limited (the “Appellant”) argued that the most important question that needed to be considered by the panel (and one that was not considered by the Tax Court of Canada) was whether there was an enduring benefit to the taxpayer. During argument, the panel was quite interested in why the Appellant agreed to facilitate the immediate vesting and exercise or surrender of all of the options to bring the stock option plan to an end. The Appellant maintained that “settling up” the stock option plan was a housekeeping matter that allowed it to satisfy its obligations before the completion of a going private transaction.

In addition to the 2007 decision of Chief Justice Donald Bowman in Shoppers Drug Mart Limited v. The Queen (“Shoppers”), the Appellant relied on three other cases (Boulangerie St-Augustin v. The Queen, International Colin Energy v. The Queen and BJ Services Company Canada v. The Queen) which permitted the deduction of expenditures incurred in the context of other corporate transactions.

The Crown argued that the cash payment to eliminate the stock option plan was a condition of the transaction and was not made in the ordinary course of the Appellant’s business. It was an extraordinary expense meant to facilitate the take-over transaction. The Crown also emphasized that the enduring benefit test should not be determinative. In this regard, the Crown relied on M.N.R. v. Algoma Central Railways, Johns-Manville Canada Inc. v. The Queen and Gifford v. The Queen.

The judgment will be eagerly anticipated as it remains to be seen whether the panel will follow the 1990 decision of the FCA in Kaiser Petroleum Ltd. v. The Queen, where it determined that a payment made to extinguish an employee stock option plan in the course of implementing a take-over transaction was a capital expenditure, or whether it will find persuasive the more recent decision of Chief Justice Donald Bowman of the Tax Court of Canada in Shoppers. In Shoppers, Chief Justice Bowman began with the proposition that “in the ordinary course a payment made by an employer to an employee for the surrender of his or her option under a stock option plan to acquire shares of the company is a deductible expense” and found that that did not change even in the context of a going private transaction.

On October 21, 2011, the Tax Court of Canada (Justice Valerie Miller) released her decision on a motion brought by the Crown for commission evidence to be taken in California from an art dealer (see our earlier post). The Court held that the art dealer’s testimony is material to the appeal, which deals with the valuation of artwork in the context of a charitable donation program, and ordered that a Commission and a Letter of Request be issued to allow the examination of Mr. Sloan in California under section 112 of the Tax Court of Canada Rules (General Procedure).

The Court took into account the following factors in exercising its discretion to make the order:

(a) the convenience of the person whom the party seeks to examine,

(b) the possibility that the person will be unavailable to testify at the hearing by reason of death, infirmity or sickness,

(c) the possibility that the person will be beyond the jurisdiction of the Court at the time of the hearing,

(d) the expense of bringing the person to the hearing,

(e) whether the witness ought to give evidence in person at the hearing, and

(f) any other relevant consideration.

The Court was satisfied that the Crown had fulfilled the traditional tests for commission evidence, namely:

1. the application is made bona fide;

2. the issue is one which the court ought to try;

3. the witnesses to be examined can give evidence material to the issue;

4. there is some good reason why he or she cannot be examined here.

The only real issue was materiality of the dealer’s evidence.  The Crown submitted that its:

. . . theory of the case is that there was no identifiable market for the prints before Coleman, Silver and Artistic [the promoters] created a market through the donation program. Mr. Sloan is able to give evidence concerning the origins of the donation program and the absence of any discernible market for the artwork before it was packaged as part of the Artistic program. His testimony is also necessary to authenticate documents necessary to challenge the appellant’s anticipated expert evidence.

The Court also noted that the Crown is entitled “to put its best foot forward in this litigation” and should be allowed to obtain the evidence necessary to accomplish that objective.

A transfer pricing trial commenced on October 17, 2011, in the Tax Court of Canada in Toronto.  Mr. Justice Patrick Boyle will decide whether paragraph 247(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act (the “Act”) applies to the transaction at issue (the factoring of accounts receivable) to reduce the deduction of an amount paid by a Canadian corporation to a non-resident affiliate which assumed the risks of collecting the Canadian corporation’s accounts receivable.  The agreed-upon discount rate was 2.2% but the Minister of National Revenue (the “Minister”) says it would have been just over 1% had the parties been dealing at arm’s length.  The trial is expected to take approximately 6-7 weeks.  The hearing began on Monday, October 17, 2011 with an opening statement by counsel for the Appellant, McKesson Canada Corporation (“McKesson Canada”).

McKesson Canada contracted to sell its accounts receivable to a related, non-resident company, McKesson International Holdings III S.à R.L. (“McKesson International”). McKesson Canada and McKesson International agreed to a variable discount rate that would be applied to the accounts receivable.  The rate was calculated using a formula that resulted in a discount rate of 2.2% for the 2003 taxation year.  According to the terms of the agreement, all bad debt risk relating to the accounts receivable that were sold was assumed by McKesson International. The discount rate was intended to compensate McKesson International for assuming the risk that some of the accounts receivable may not be collected and would have to be written off.

The Minister disallowed a portion of the amounts deducted by McKesson Canada in respect of the discount on the sale of accounts receivable. The Minister determined that, based on the terms and conditions in the agreement, the discount rate that would have been agreed upon had the parties dealt with one another at arm’s length would not have exceeded 1.0127%. Accordingly, the Minister added some $26 million to the Appellant’s income for its 2003 taxation year, reflecting a discount rate of 1.0127% rather than the rate of 2.2% as agreed by the parties.

In his opening statement, counsel for McKesson Canada contended that the issue should be whether the discount rate agreed upon by the parties was appropriate for an arm’s length transaction given the amount of risk that was being transferred from the vendor to the purchaser of the accounts receivable and that the issue should not be what the discount rate should be if the principal terms of the contract were changed to reflect some other hypothetical agreement used by the Minister for purposes of his assessment.

In addition to the Part I appeal, there is a Part XIII appeal as well. The issue there is whether McKesson Canada conferred a benefit on its controlling shareholder, McKesson International, under subsection 15(1) of the Act by selling certain of it accounts receivable and, therefore, whether McKesson Canada should be deemed to have paid a dividend to McKesson International under paragraph 214(3)(a) of the Act. Including interest, the Part XIII assessment is approximately $1.9 million.

In conclusion, counsel for McKesson Canada argued that the Part XIII assessment is barred by virtue of the Canada-Luxembourg Income Tax Convention (1999) (the “Treaty”), which is applicable since McKesson International is a company existing under the laws of Luxembourg. As Article 9(3) of the Treaty includes a five year time limit for changes by Canada to the income of a taxpayer, the time for the adjustment expired on March 29, 2008 (before the Part XIII assessment was mailed).

The hearing continues.

For the link to the Part I Notice of Appeal, click here.

For the link to the Part I Amended Reply, click here.

For the link to the Part XIII Amended Notice of Appeal, click here.

For the link to the Part XIII Reply, click here.

On October 14, 2011, the Tax Court of Canada heard a Crown motion requesting an order for commission evidence in the case of Sackman v. The Queen (Court file 2002-4824(IT)G). The issue in the appeal is whether the amount Mr. Sackman is entitled to claim as a charitable deduction for artwork obtained from Artistic Ideas Inc. and donated to various charities is (a) the appraised value of the artwork or (b) the purchase price of the artwork.

The motion was brought by the Crown so that the Tax Court may receive the evidence of Mr. Paul Sloan (who lives in California) prior to the hearing pursuant to Section 119 of the Tax Court of Canada Rules (General Procedure). Mr. Sloan had provided works of art to Artistic Ideas Inc., which he obtained through past ownership of various art galleries in the United States.

The Crown argued that Mr. Sloan’s evidence is material. In light of the fact that Mr. Sackman obtained the artwork from Mr. Sloan, Mr. Sloan could provide evidence as to the true value of the artwork. The Crown described the test in GlaxoSmithKline Inc. v. The Queen, which sets out the factors the Tax Court will consider in determining whether to grant a request for commission evidence. The Crown submitted that the request satisfied those criteria.

Counsel for Mr. Sackman submitted that the crux of the GlaxoSmithKline test is to determine whether the evidence is relevant to the case. Counsel argued that the Crown had not provided any evidence or support, either in its written or oral submissions, to demonstrate why Mr. Sloan’s evidence will be material. Counsel also submitted that should the Court grant the request for commission evidence, Mr. Sackman would be prejudiced through yet another delay (the Notice of Appeal was filed on December 16, 2002). Finally, counsel argued that the value of the artwork was supported by reputable appraisers and the manner in which the artwork was acquired or the individual from whom it was acquired should have no bearing on the decision of the Court.

Justice Valerie Miller reserved judgment on the motion.

A panel of the Federal Court of Appeal (Noël, Trudel and Stratas, JJ.A.) heard arguments this morning in Ottawa on appeals from judgments of the Federal Court which held that the Canada Revenue Agency acted reasonably in deciding not to cancel or reduce penalties and arrears interest on late-filed T1135 forms. See our earlier blog post for more information on the background to this case.

The Appellants’ main argument to the panel was that the Minister of National Revenue had improperly fettered his discretion in deciding that certain penalties and arrears interest should not be cancelled or reduced. In particular, the Appellants emphasized the fact that the CRA official, in his written reasons, held that the Appellants did not fit within the categories set out in the Taxpayer Relief Guidelines and thus that the Minister could not grant the request for relief. This, the Appellants argued, showed that the Minister did not appreciate or understand that he had unfettered discretion to provide relief. The Appellants argued, on the facts and with unfettered discretion, the reasonable conclusion would have been to grant relief.

Justice Stratas noted that on the reasonableness standard of review, a reviewing court may look to what might have been the reasons of the decision-maker.  In response, counsel for the Appellants responded that in Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, the Supreme Court of Canada held that that what could have been the reasons of the decision-maker should not dilute the importance of giving reasons.

After putting the issue of “missing justification” to Crown counsel (who argued that cross-examination transcripts showed the CRA official had in fact considered all of the facts before him at the time), Justice Stratas wondered whether the CRA’s later justification was really just an exercise in bootstrapping. Members of the panel appeared concerned that taxpayers are obliged to file applications for judicial review simply in order to obtain an answer to their request for relief. Counsel for the Appellants argued that taxpayers “deserve the attention of the Minister” for their specific circumstances, given the nature of the discretion granted to the Minister under the Income Tax Act.

Justice Noël was interested in the fact that the Appellants failed to file the forms due to a common administrative error. Counsel for the Appellants described the policy objective underlying the penalty provision and argued that a multiplicity of penalties for what was actually just one common error would be disproportionate to the oversight by the taxpayers and would not advance the underlying purpose of the penalty. He argued that the existence of the common error should have had some significance to the exercise of the Minister’s discretion to cancel or reduce the penalties.

The panel reserved judgment.

All parties in the “Branksome Hall” parking cases (Geraldine Anthony, Heather Friesen, Leslie Morgan, Jarrod Baker v. The Queen) have filed their Memoranda of Fact and Law in the Federal Court of Appeal. The hearing has been scheduled for December 1, 2011 in Toronto.

The issues are whether parking provided to the Appellants by their employer (a private school in Toronto) was a benefit taxable under paragraph 6(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act (the “Act”) and, if so, how the value of that benefit should be assessed.

The Appellants, along with approximately 100 other employees of Branksome Hall, were reassessed for their 2003 and 2004 taxation years to include $92 per month (inclusive of GST and PST) in their income representing the value of free parking provided by their employer. These four appeals were chosen as test cases and were heard on common evidence.

In the decision of the Tax Court, Mr. Justice Brent Paris found that (a) the Appellants received a taxable benefit within the meaning of paragraph 6(1)(a) of the Act because they had a right to a parking spot by virtue of their employment, the benefit to them was not incidental to any benefit to their employer and they saved money by being given a parking spot, (b) relying on Schroter v. The Queen (2010 FCA 98), the value of that taxable benefit was its fair market value and (c) the fair market value of the taxable benefit was $75 per month in 2003 and $77 per month in 2004.

The Appellants take issue with the finding of a taxable benefit in the circumstances and the legal test used by the Tax Court to determine its quantum. The Appellants argue that there was no economic benefit to them and the provision of parking was incidental to the infrastructure of their place of employment. They also contend that their case is nothing like Schroter v. The Queen, in which a corporate executive was rewarded with a free parking pass at his downtown office tower on his promotion. If the free parking at Branksome Hall is determined to be a taxable benefit, the Appellants argue that the value should be computed on the basis of the employer’s cost of providing that privilege, which is “in accordance with the text, context and purpose of [the Act], provides certainty, predictability and fairness, and is most appropriate in this case.” Finally, the Appellants argue that the Tax Court’s decision would have far reaching implications if left undisturbed. For example, a domestic caregiver who enjoys free parking on the driveway of an employer’s home would potentially be subject to tax on that “benefit”.

For the written submissions of the appellants, see the Memorandum of Fact and Law of Geraldine Anthony, Jarrod Baker, Leslie Morgan and Heather Friesen.

For the written submissions of the respondent, see the Memorandum of Fact and Law of the Crown.

On September 30, 2011, the Federal Court of Appeal (Sharlow, Layden-Stevenson, and Stratas, JJ.A.) released Reasons for Judgment in the appeal of CIBC World Markets Inc. (“CIBC”) from a judgment of the Tax Court of Canada (see our earlier post).  CIBC’s appeal was allowed.

By way of background, the Excise Tax Act (the “Act”) permits a taxpayer to claim an input tax credit (“ITC”) to recover goods and services tax (“GST”) paid in respect of property and services acquired by that taxpayer for consumption, use or supply in the course of a “commercial activity”.  Where there is a mixed use of inputs in both commercial and GST-exempt activities, then for purposes of claiming ITCs, subsection 141.01(5) of the Act requires the taxpayer to allocate its GST among the taxable and exempt activities using a “fair and reasonable” method that is “used consistently throughout the year”.

In 1998 and 1999, CIBC used a particular ITC allocation methodology to determine its ITC claims for those years.  In 2000, CIBC used a new ITC allocation methodology to determine its ITC claim for the year, which enhanced its recovery of ITCs.  The Minister of National Revenue considered both ITC allocation methods to be “fair and reasonable” within the meaning of subsection 141.01(5) of the Act.

Using the new method, however, CIBC then made a second claim for ITCs in respect of the 1998 and 1999 years for amounts over and above those originally claimed for the 1998 and 1999 years.

The issue was whether CIBC was entitled to make a further claim for ITCs using the new ITC allocation methodology.  The Tax Court of Canada held that CIBC was not entitled to make such claims.  CIBC appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal (the “FCA”).

Justice David W. Stratas, writing for the panel, held that a person can make more than one claim for ITCs in respect of a year, provided the person does not try to claim the same ITCs more than once.  In so holding, he noted that there is nothing in the Act precluding a person from making more than one claim per year.  Although a person cannot use one ITC allocation methodology for one part of the year and another ITC allocation methodology for another part of the year, CIBC did not do so in this case; instead, CIBC merely used an alternative ITC allocation methodology which it applied throughout the year.

The Crown has until Tuesday, November 29, 2011, to file an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

One week today (October 11, 2011), the Federal Court of Appeal will hear arguments in Ottawa on whether the Federal Court erred in law in deciding that the Canada Revenue Agency acted reasonably in deciding not to waive penalties and interest on the late filing of Form T1135 (Foreign Income Verification Statement).

The panel scheduled to hear the appeal is Mr. Justice Marc Noël, Madam Justice Johanne Trudel and Mr. Justice David W. Stratas. 

See our earlier blog post to read the decision of the Federal Court, a case comment by Jamie Golombek and the written submissions of each party in the Federal Court of Appeal.

On September 30, 2011, The Honourable Rob Nicholson, P.C., Q.C., M.P. for Niagara Falls, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, announced the following appointment to the Tax Court of Canada:

The Honourable Randall S. Bocock, a lawyer with Evans, Philp LLP in Hamilton, is appointed Judge of the Tax Court of Canada in Ottawa, to replace Mr. Justice P. Archambault, who elected to become a supernumerary judge as of April 23, 2011.

Mr. Justice Bocock received a Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) in 1982 from McMaster University and a Bachelor of Laws (LL.B.) in 1985 from the University of Ottawa. He was admitted to the Ontario Bar in 1987.

Mr. Justice Bocock has been with the firm Evans, Philp LLP since September 1987. He has been the head of the firm’s business law department since 2000 and a member of the management committee since 2005. His main areas of practice were corporate commercial law, administrative law and estates and trust law.

Mr. Justice Bocock was an active member of the Hamilton Law Association from 1989 to 1999. He has been involved with the County and District Law Presidents’ Association since 2001 and has been Chair since 2008. He has been a member of the Canadian Association of University Solicitors since 1987. He was also executive member, vice-president and president of the McMaster University Alumni Association from 1991 to 2002. More recently, he was nominated as the director of the Lawyers Professional Indemnity Company and joined the Executive Council of the National Conference of Bar Presidents. He was the founding director and secretary of Haven of the Homeless Child, a charitable organization in Hamilton from 1999 to 2005, as well as member of the Hamilton Shelter Health Network since 2008.

This appointment is effective immediately.

On September 21, 2011, the Federal Court of Appeal (Sharlow, Layden-Stevenson, and Stratas, JJ.A.) heard an appeal by CIBC World Markets Inc. (“CIBC”) from a judgment of the Tax Court of Canada dismissing the taxpayer’s appeal of an assessment by the Minister of National Revenue under the Excise Tax Act.  For further details, see our earlier post.

The Appellant’s oral argument dealt with many of the points raised in the reasons for judgment of the Tax Court judge (Rip, CJ), specifically the interpretation of subsection 141.01(5) and section 225 of the Excise Tax Act.  Counsel for the Appellant was asked only a few questions from the bench during his submissions.

Counsel for the Respondent faced a number of questions from the panel.  Counsel for the Respondent argued that the Appellant had not adduced evidence to show that its revised input tax credit (“ITC”) allocation methodology was “fair and reasonable” within the meaning of subsection 141.01(5) of the Excise Tax Act.  The panel observed that the revised ITC allocation methodology had already been accepted by the Minister as a “fair and reasonable” method for subsequent years.  The panel was interested in hearing the Respondent’s submissions on what statutory basis exists in the Excise Tax Act precluding a taxpayer from using an alternative “fair and reasonable” allocation methodology in respect of prior years.

After a brief reply by Appellant’s counsel, the hearing concluded and the panel reserved judgment.

The Alberta Court of Appeal released its decision in this appeal on July 21, 2011.  Brick Protection Corp. (Brick Protection; now Trans Global Warranty Corp.) was a sister corporation of the Brick Warehouse Corp. (The Brick).  Brick Protection sold extended warranties to consumers on appliances and furniture purchased through The Brick.  The issue: Was Brick Protection Corp. doing business as an insurance company in Alberta?  If so, they would be subject to insurance corporation tax under Part IX of the Alberta Tax Act (the Act; now in the Alberta Corporate Tax Act).

For more on the decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal in Brick Protection Corp. v. Alberta (Treasury), read the commentary in FMC’s Focus on Tax.

GlaxoSmithKline’s factum has now been filed with the Supreme Court of Canada addressing the arguments set out earlier in the Crown’s factum.  There are no particular surprises.

As noted in our earlier blog post, the Crown was granted leave to appeal the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision and GSK was granted leave to cross-appeal. The Crown contends in its factum that the FCA gave short shrift to the arm’s length principle which it was required to apply under subsection 69(2) of the Income Tax Act as developed in the OECD Guidelines. The Crown argues that the FCA has replaced the arm’s length standard with a “reasonable business person” test.

In its factum, GSK argues that the approach taken by the FCA in determining “reasonable in the circumstances” is consistent with the OECD Guidelines which call for the application of the arm’s length principle in light of the actual business circumstances faced by the taxpayer. Neither subsection 69(2) of the Income Tax Act nor the arm’s length principle require courts to ignore the circumstances of the marketplace. GSK also says that the Crown’s approach effectively reads out the phrase “in the circumstances” as used in subsection 69(2) of the Income Tax Act.

Finally, by way of cross-appeal, GSK takes issue with the FCA’s order that the matter be re-heard by the Tax Court of Canada, contending that that the FCA ought simply to have set the assessments aside.

On September 7, 2011, the Tax Court of Canada released its reasons for judgment in 1207192 Ontario Limited v. The Queen, the latest general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) case to be considered by the Tax Court.

In short, the Minister applied the GAAR to deny a capital loss of $2,999,900 realized by the taxpayer in its taxation year ending February 28, 2003 on the disposition of common shares it held in a corporation (Newco).  The Tax Court (per Paris J.) found that the GAAR applied and dismissed the taxpayer’s appeal.

The facts can be briefly summarized as follows: The loss on the common shares was generated by the declaration of a stock dividend by Newco on the common shares prior to the disposition by the taxpayer.  The payment of the stock dividend had the effect of decreasing the value of the taxpayer’s common shares in Newco by an amount equal to the value of the stock dividend.  The stock dividend consisted of preferred shares with a low paid-up capital and a high redemption amount.

After the payment of the stock dividend, the taxpayer’s loss on the common shares was crystallized by a disposition of those shares to a family trust of which the beneficiaries were family members of the sole shareholder of the taxpayer corporation.  The capital loss was used by the taxpayer to offset a capital gain of $2,974,386 it realized during its 2003 taxation year.

The Tax Court concluded that (a) there was an avoidance transaction, as one of the transactions in the series was undertaken primarily to obtain a tax benefit, and (b) there was an abuse or misuse, as the transactions undertaken by the taxpayer frustrated the spirit and purpose of the capital loss provisions of the Income Tax Act (namely paragraphs 38(b), 39(1)(b) and 40(1)(b)).

On September 6, 2011, the Federal Court of Appeal (Nadon, Trudel and Mainville, JJ.A.) heard an appeal by Saipem UK Limited (“Saipem UK”) against a decision of the Tax Court of Canada interpreting Article 22 of the Canada-UK Tax Treaty. The appeal was dismissed from the bench with costs.

The Tax Court had dismissed Saipem’s appeal and held that subsection 88(1.1) of the Income Tax Act does not discriminate on the basis of nationality since the determination of whether a corporation is a “Canadian corporation” is not dependent on a corporation’s nationality (i.e., a corporation incorporated outside Canada may be a Canadian resident based on the “management and control” test).

Mr. Justice Nadon delivered the following reasons for judgment:

[1] Notwithstanding Mr. Lefebvre’s forceful arguments, we have not been persuaded that the judge made any error which would allow us to intervene.

[2] More particularly, with regard to article 22(1) of the Canada – United Kingdom Tax Convention (the Tax Treaty), we are all of the view, substantially for the reasons given by the judge, that the provisions of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) as amended, at issue discriminate on the basis of residency and not nationality and, as a result, do not constitute discrimination against the Appellant under the Tax Treaty. With regard to article 22(2) of the Tax Treaty, we are all of the view, also for the reasons given by the judge, that the provisions at issue do not constitute less favourable treatment of the Appellant.

[3] In the end, Mr. Lefebvre’s argument, in effect, is that Canada should not be allowed, in the particular circumstances of this case, to discriminate against the Appellant on the basis of residency. Unfortunately, there is nothing in the Tax Treaty to support that view.

[4] Consequently, the appeal will be dismissed with costs in favour of the Respondent.

See our earlier post on the Saipem case.

On January 13, 2012, the Supreme Court of Canada is scheduled to hear an appeal by the Crown and a cross-appeal by GlaxoSmithKline Inc. (“GSK”) in the first transfer pricing case to be heard by the Court.

The Minister of National Revenue reassessed GSK by increasing its income in its 1990 through 1993 taxation years on the basis that it had overpaid its non-arm’s length supplier – a non-resident company – for the purchase of ranitidine, a pharmaceutical ingredient in a drug marketed by GSK in Canada (Zantac).  During that period, GSK paid between $1,512 and $1,651 per kilogram of ranitidine.  According to the Minister, a reasonable amount for GSK to have paid for ranitidine was the price paid by other pharmaceutical companies that were selling generic forms of the drug (i.e., between $194 and $304 per kilogram).

The Tax Court of Canada agreed with the Minister’s position but made a $25 upward adjustment to the price paid by GSK.  The Federal Court of Appeal set aside the decision of the Tax Court of Canada and ordered that the matter be re-heard by the Tax Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal to the Crown and granted leave to cross-appeal to GSK.  The issues raised in this appeal include the following:

(a) Whether identification of the transaction which is the subject of a transfer price analysis is limited by bona fide legal arrangements of the taxpayer.

(b) Whether transfer prices in independent transactions between a Canadian taxpayer and different entities of a multinational group should be assessed separately or bundled together.

(c) Whether, when conducting transfer pricing analysis in Canada, the arm’s length standard has been displaced by the “reasonable business person” test.

(d) Whether the Federal Court of Appeal erred in returning matter to the Tax Court of Canada for rehearing.

For the written submissions of the appellant, see the factum of the Crown.

For the written submissions of the respondent, see the factum of GlaxoSmithKline Inc.

On March 13, 2012, the Supreme Court of Canada is tentatively scheduled to hear an appeal by the trustee of two trusts (St. Michael Trust Corp., as trustee of the Fundy Settlement – a.k.a. the Garron Trust – and the Summersby Settlement – a.k.a. the Dunin Trust).

Each Trust was settled by an individual resident in St. Vincent and had Canadian beneficiaries.  The trustee of each Trust was a Barbados corporation.  In 2000, each Trust disposed of shares it owned in a Canadian corporation to an arm’s length purchaser and thus realized a capital gain.

The capital gains for Canadian income tax purposes were approximately $217 million for the Garron Trust and approximately $240 million for the Dunin Trust.  The capital gain inclusion rate at the relevant time was 2/3, so that the taxable amounts were approximately $145 million for the Garron Trust and approximately $160 million for the Dunin Trust.  The capital gains were not subject to tax in Barbados.  

The purchaser withheld and remitted amounts to the Canadian government in accordance with section 116 of the Income Tax Act.  The trustee sought a return of the withheld amount, claiming an exemption from tax pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article XIV of the Canada-Barbados Income Tax Agreement (1980).  Under the exemption, tax would only be payable in the country in which the seller was resident, and the trustee contended that each Trust was a resident of Barbados.

The Minister of National Revenue assessed on the basis that the exemption in the treaty did not apply because each Trust was a resident of Canada.  The trustee appealed on behalf of the Trusts.  The Tax Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals.

For the written submissions of the appellant, see the factum of St. Michael Trust Corp.

For the written submissions of the respondent, see the factum of the Crown.

For the appellant’s response to the Crown’s factum, see the responding factum of St. Michael Trust Corp.

On March 23, 2012, the Supreme Court of Canada is tentatively scheduled to hear the Crown’s appeal in The Queen v. John H. Craig.  The Court will have an opportunity to reconsider its 1978 decision (Moldowan v. The Queen, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 480) which has been relied on in almost every farm loss case since then.

While earning most of his income in his 2000 and 2001 taxation years as a partner of a law firm, Mr. Craig also had income from a business comprising the buying, selling, breeding, and racing of horses.  The Minister disallowed the losses deducted by Mr. Craig in those years in respect of the horse business.

Relying on subsection 31(1) of the Income Tax Act, which restricts farm losses in instances where a taxpayer’s “chief source of income” for a taxation year is neither farming nor a combination of farming and some other source of income, the Minister restricted Mr. Craig’s allowable deductions from the horse business to $8,750 for each year on the basis that his other income was not subordinate to his farming income.

Mr. Craig appealed the Minister’s reassessments.  The Tax Court of Canada allowed Mr. Craig’s appeals, and the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the Minister’s appeal.

The questions to be addressed in this appeal include the following:

(a) Whether the test to determine whether farming is a “chief source of income” under subsection 31(1) of the Income Tax Act continues to be the test described in the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Moldowan.

(b) Whether an appellate court is bound by a previous decision of that appellate court when it is inconsistent with a prior decision of the Supreme Court of Canada.

For the appellant’s written submissions, see the factum of the Crown.

For the respondent’s written submissions, see the factum of Mr. Craig.

On November 15, 2011, the Supreme Court of Canada is scheduled to hear its second GST appeal in The City of Calgary v. The Queen. The first GST appeal was heard in 2009 in United Parcel Service Canada Ltd. v. Canada where it was unanimously decided that a customs broker was entitled to a rebate for overpaying GST.

In this case, the City of Calgary constructed a transit system for the use of Calgary residents pursuant to obligations imposed on it by the City Transportation Act, R.S.A 2000, c. C-14 (the CTA).  In the course of constructing that system, the City entered into funding agreements with the Province of Alberta as contemplated in the CTA.  The City paid GST with respect to purchases made for the construction of the transit system.

Since the provision of a municipal transit service is an exempt supply for purposes of the Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15 (the ETA), the City would not be entitled to claim input tax credits (ITCs) with respect to purchases made for the purpose of providing that exempt supply.

The City took the position that the construction of the transit system (as opposed to its operation) was a separate supply to the Province of Alberta, pursuant to its contracts with the Province, for which the Province paid consideration, pursuant to those contracts.  The City took the position that this separate supply was not an exempt supply and claimed ITCs with respect to that supply.  The Minister rejected the City’s position.

The Tax Court of Canada decided in favour of the City, however, this decision was overturned by the Federal Court of Appeal.

The main issue for the Supreme Court of Canada is whether the City was entitled to an ITC in respect of approximately $6.3 million in GST paid in relation to the construction of a municipal transit system.  In answering this question, the Supreme Court of Canada may provide guidance on the meaning of “supply” for purposes of the ETA.

For the written submissions of the appellant, see the factum of the City of Calgary.

For the written submissions of the respondent, see the factum of the Crown.

On September 06, 2011, the Federal Court of Appeal is scheduled to hear an appeal by Saipem UK Limited (“Saipem UK”) against a decision of the Tax Court of Canada interpreting Article 22 of the Canada-UK Tax Treaty.

Saipem UK was a UK-incorporated company and non-resident of Canada that carried on business in Canada through a PE. Saipem UK acquired Saipem Energy International Limited (SEI), another UK-incorporated company and non-resident of Canada that carried on business in Canada through a PE. SEI was wound-up into Saipem UK under section 88 of the Canada Income Tax Act, and Saipem UK  deducted certain non-capital losses of SEI pursuant to subsection 88(1.1). The Minister of National Revenue disallowed the deduction by Saipem UK on the basis that the corporations were not “Canadian Corporations” (i.e., incorporated or resident in Canada) as required by subsection 88(1.1).

Before the Tax Court, Saipem UK argued that subsection 88(1.1) violated Article 22 of the Canada-UK Tax Treaty, which prohibits a Contracting State from discriminating against a non-resident taxpayer on the basis of nationality.

The Tax Court dismissed Saipem UK’s appeal and held that subsection 88(1.1) does not discriminate on the basis of nationality since the determination of whether a corporation is a “Canadian Corporation” is not dependent on a corporation’s nationality (i.e., a corporation incorporated outside Canada may be a Canadian resident based on the “management and control” test).

For the appellant’s notice of appeal, see the Notice of Appeal of Saipem UK Limited.

For the written submissions of the appellant, see the Memorandum of Fact and Law of Saipem UK Limited.

For the written submissions of the respondent, see the Memorandum of Fact and Law of the Crown.

Stemijon Investments Ltd. v. A.G. Canada - Hearing Date: October 11, 2011 (Ottawa)

Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited v. The Queen - Hearing Date: October 26, 2011 (Toronto)

On October 26, 2011, the Federal Court of Appeal is scheduled to hear an appeal by Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. against a decision of the Tax Court of Canada denying the deduction of $118,575,528 as employee compensation paid to satisfy its obligations under an employee stock option plan. 

In assessing, the Minister of National Revenue took the position that the amounts are not deductible.  He argued, and the Tax Court of Canada agreed, that they were not amounts paid as employee compensation at all, but were amounts laid out by Imperial Tobacco in the course of the corporate reorganization to rid itself of an employee stock option plan, the deduction of which is precluded by paragraph 18(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act.

In a 2007 decision, Shoppers Drug Mart Limited v. The Queen, the Tax Court of Canada reached a different conclusion in the context of the same transaction.

For the appellant’s notice of appeal, see the Notice of Appeal of Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited.

For the written submissions of the appellant, see the Memorandum of Fact and Law of Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.

For the written submissions of the responsdent, see the Memorandum of Fact and Law of the Crown.

On September 21, 2011, the Federal Court of Appeal is scheduled to hear an appeal by CIBC World Markets Inc. against a decision by the Tax Court of Canada dismissing an appeal challenging an assessment by the Minister of National Revenue under the Excise Tax Act.  

The Minister had disallowed revised claims for Input Tax Credits (“ITCs”) which used an ITC allocation methodology different than that which was used on the returns originally filed.

The issue is whether, for purposes of claiming ITCs, the revised method of allocating inputs between those used in a “commercial activity” and those used in an “exempt activity” was “fair and reasonable” and used consistently throughout each of 1998 and 1999 as required by section 141.01 of the Excise Tax Act and did not offend section 225 of the Excise Tax Act.

For the appellant’s notice of appeal, see the Notice of Appeal of CIBC World Markets Inc.

For the written submissions of the appellant, see the Memorandum of Fact and Law of CIBC World Markets Inc.

For the written submissions of the respondent, see the Memorandum of Fact and Law of the Crown.

On October 11, 2011, the Federal Court of Appeal is scheduled to hear an appeal by Stemijon Investments Ltd. (and four other taxpayers) against a decision by the Federal Court dismissing a judicial review application challenging a decision by the Canada Revenue Agency denying a request for taxpayer relief from penalties and arrears interest reassessed because of late filing of T1135 forms concerning foreign investment property.

For commentary on the Federal Court decision, see ”A Late T1135 Can be Costly” by Jamie Golombek (November 17, 2010).

For the appellant’s notice of appeal, see the Notice of Appeal of Stemijon Investments Ltd.

For the written submissions of the appellant, see the Memorandum of Fact and Law of Stemijon Investments Ltd.

For the written submissions of the respondent, see the Memorandum of Fact and Law of the Attorney General of Canada.