Reuters recently reported a study showing that corporations face very long odds in tax appeals heard by the United States Supreme Court. There were 919 income tax cases in the Supreme Court of the United States from 1909 to 2011. 364 of those cases involved corporations. In “abuse” cases, the government won 61% of the time. In other cases, the government won 68% of the time. The real story is likely much grimmer since the statistics show that the US Supreme Court only grants review in about 2% of leave applications.

The Canadian Supreme Court heard 356 income tax cases between 1920 and 2003. Of these, the statistics show that the government won 223, or roughly 2/3. The record of Supreme Court tax cases between 2004 and 2012 is essentially similar. While an exact breakdown of corporate cases is not available, anecdotal evidence suggests that the success rate of corporations is roughly 1/3 (a more detailed analysis will be available in the future).

While the Canadian experience appears superficially to mirror the American statistics, a very different story is disclosed by Canadian leave to appeal statistics.

As the chart demonstrates, roughly 12% of leave applications are granted in Canada. Thus, corporations and other taxpayers may have as high as 6 times more likelihood of success in a tax appeal before the Supreme Court of Canada than in cases before the Supreme Court of the United States.

The Federal Court of Appeal has once again affirmed the importance of Generally Accepted Account Principles (GAAP) in computing liability for the large corporation tax (LCT) applicable prior to 2006 while rejecting the Crown’s economic substance argument: The Queen v. Bombardier Inc.

The case turned on how Bombardier accounted for advances received in connection with long-term construction contracts:

[9] It can be seen from this agreement that the respondent has two divisions: the Aerospace Division (aircraft sale contracts) and the Transportation Division (public transportation equipment) and aircraft parts and components. It can also be seen that, in the Aerospace Division, as shown at paragraph 6 of the agreement, “[t]he income from contracts for aircraft sales is recognized as work progresses, on the basis of the delivery date, whereas in the Transportation Division, as shown in paragraph 10, “[i]ncome from long‑term contracts is recognized as work progresses, on the basis of costs incurred”.

[10] In summary, in the Aerospace Division, financing for long‑term work is obtained through advances of funds paid on dates predetermined in the contract of sale. The amounts of these advances do not depend on the work in progress or the work completed. They correspond to a portion of the selling price.

[11] Conversely, in the Transport Division, financing for work of the same nature is acquired through payments in amounts determined by progressive billing proportionate to the work completed.

In the case of aircraft sale contracts Bombardier used the “percentage-of-completion” method. The Crown did not dispute that this method was authorized by GAAP:

[27] The fact that the respondent’s balance sheet was GAAP‑compliant in all respects is recognized and acknowledged by the appellant and its expert. Indeed, the appellant’s expert, Mr. Thornton, confirmed this on cross‑examination. He also admitted that the respondent had correctly exercised its judgment regarding the advances, seemed to have applied standard SOP 81‑1 and had used paragraph 6.19 as a basis for its judgment; and that standard SOP 81‑1 was an acceptable source: see Mr. Thornton’s cross‑examination, Appeal Book, Vol. 10, at pages 109 to 114. He also acknowledged that the advances had been allocated to the project for which they had been paid, not used to finance other projects: ibidem, at page 117.

The Crown’s position was that in this case GAAP did not reflect economic reality:

[32] The appellant’s position, with which the Court of Québec agreed [a decision which is currently being appealed to the Québec Court of Appeal], gives precedence to the legal reality over the commercial and accounting reality by not allowing the amount of the advances to be reduced by the cost of the work for the purposes of calculating the taxable capital under paragraph 181(3)(b). According to the respondent’s expert, by designating the full amount of the advances as liabilities, the appellant is refusing to recognize that, on a commercial and economic level, the respondent used its inventory to perform the contract and sold that inventory, although from a legal standpoint ownership had not yet been transferred: see Mr. Chlala’s cross‑examination, Appeal Book, Vol. 9, at pages 40 to 43. In other words, the appellant’s position does not reflect the [translation] “economics of the situation” prevailing between the parties, which [translation] “suggest that a continuous sale occurs as the work progresses, and revenue should be recognized accordingly”: see the excerpt from the work by Messrs. Chlala, Ménard et al., quoted above in connection with the percentage‑of‑completion method.

The Court of Appeal rejected the Crown’s argument citing its earlier decision in Attorney General of Canada v. Ford Credit Canada Ltd.

In that decision Ryer JA wrote:

[27] In my view, this decision is far from helpful to the Minister in this appeal. In essence, Rothstein J.A. determined that the balance sheet of the taxpayer must be accepted for LCT purposes if it was accepted by the Superintendent of Financial Institutions. In my view, the same logic should apply where the corporation in question is subject to subparagraph 181(3)(b)(i) rather than subparagraph 181(3)(b)(ii). On that basis, provided that the balance sheet in question has been prepared in accordance with GAAP and otherwise complies with the specific provisions of Part I.3, that balance sheet must be accepted for the purposes of the determination of the LCT liability of the corporation.

While LCT decisions are of limited application to most taxpayers, this decision and the Ford Credit Canada Ltd. decision (where David Spiro was the successful lead counsel) form a useful bulwark against attacks mounted by the CRA based on “economic substance”.

On April 23, Morguard Corporation filed an appeal with the Federal Court of Appeal of the decision of Boyle J in the Tax Court of Canada, 2012 TCC 55, (Date: February 24, 2012) holding that a $7.7 million break fee was taxable. See my colleague Sebastian Elawny’s earlier blog post about the trial decision.

The taxpayer’s principal argument at trial (and, one assumes, on appeal): that the break fee was a non-taxable windfall. Windfalls are a very rare species in Canadian tax law. The last FCA decision to examine the issue of windfall in any detail dealt with penalty interest on an expropriation: Bellingham v. The Queen (1996) 50 DTC 6075 (per Robertson JA):

Against this background, we are left to pursue the judicial understanding of what items fall outside the grasp of paragraph 3(a). I begin with the recognized exclusionary categories: gambling gains, gifts and inheritances, and the residual category of windfall gains. I shall deal briefly with the first two categories as they provide the underlying framework for the third.

Gambling gains are non-taxable provided the taxpayer is not in the business of gambling: see Graham v. Green, [1925] 2 K.B. 37; Minister of National Revenue v. Walker William, S., [1952] Ex. C.R. 1; Morden, Harry Edgar v. Minister of National Revenue, [1962] Ex. C.R. 29. The classical reason for excluding such receipts from income is that a “bet” is based on an “irrational agreement”. A more compelling argument is that a gambling gain does not flow from a productive source. That is, a source that is capable of producing income: see F. E. LaBrie, The Principles of Canadian Income Taxation, (Don Mills, Ont.: CCH Canadian Ltd., 1965), at page 25.

There is no need to cite authorities for the proposition that gifts and inheritances are immune from taxation. It is well accepted that these items represent non-recurring amounts and the transfer of old wealth. Underlying the source doctrine is the understanding that income involves the creation of new wealth. Gifts do not flow from a productive source of income. Where a gift emanates from what otherwise is regarded as a productive source, e.g. the taxpayer’s employment, then the issue is one of concealed wages and employee benefits (see section 6 of the Act). To qualify as a gift, there must be voluntary and gratuitous transfer of property. There must be an absence of valuable consideration. Hence, a payment that takes the form of a quid pro quo will not be characterized as a gift.

The precise scope of the residual category “windfall gains” has proven problematic. At best, it can be said that a payment which is unexpected or unplanned and not of a recurring nature, is more likely than not to be characterized as a windfall gain. But like all generalizations, this observation must be scrutinized meticulously

The only somewhat recent Supreme Court of Canada decision to indirectly examine the question of windfall was Canada v. Fries, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1322 (per Sopinka J):

We are not satisfied that the payments by way of strike pay in this case come within the definition of “income . . . from a source” within the meaning of s. 3 of the Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970‑71‑72, c. 63. In these circumstances the benefit of the doubt must go to the taxpayers. The appeal is therefore allowed and the decision of the Tax Review Board is restored. The appellant is to have his costs throughout.

If Morguard succeeds in its windfall argument in the Federal Court of Appeal, it will be a rare event – not unlike sighting a yeti. The odds are high that the Court will not disturb the careful reasons of Boyle J.

In Garron Family Trust v. The Queen (2009 TCC 450), Justice Judith Woods of the Tax Court of Canada came down with a very broad new rule for determining the residence of trusts.

[162]  I conclude, then, that the judge-made test of residence that has been established for corporations should also apply to trusts, with such modifications as are appropriate. That test is “where the central management and control actually abides.”

This was viewed widely as a repudiation of the historic test based on the residence of the trustee. Many tax professionals thought that the test for residence of a trust required a determination of the residence of the majority of the trustees and where their functions were performed, and that it was not necessary to go beyond this test.

The Federal Court of Appeal in St. Michael Trust Corp. v. Canada (2010 FCA 309) appeared to endorse Justice Woods’ new legal test but in a somewhat guarded fashion:

[63]    St. Michael Trust Corp. argues that a test of central management and control cannot be applied to a trust because a trust is a “legal relationship” without a separate legal personality. I do not accept this argument. It is true that as a matter of law a trust is not a person, but it is also true that for income tax purposes, a trust is treated as though it were a person. In my view, it is consistent with that implicit statutory fiction to recognize that the residence of a trust may not always be determined by the residence of its trustee.

[64]    St. Michael Trust Corp. also argues that the residence of the trust must be determined as the residence of the trustee because section 104 of the Income Tax Act embodies the trust, as taxpayer, in the person of the trustee. In my view, that gives section 104 a meaning beyond its words and purpose. Section 104 was enacted to solve the practical problems of tax administration that would necessarily arise when it was determined that trusts were to be taxed despite the absence of legal personality. I do not read section 104 as a signal that Parliament intended that in all cases, the residence of the trust must be the residence of the trustee.

When the Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal, some tax professionals were puzzled.  These tax professionals believed that it was unlikely the decision would be reversed since the Crown had a very strong factual case that the trusts in question were managed in Canada by the trust beneficiaries.  The decision released on April 12 by the Supreme Court (Fundy Settlement v. Canada, 2012 SCC 14) in fact dismissed the appeal in somewhat cursory fashion.

[15]    As with corporations, residence of a trust should be determined by the principle that a trust resides for the purposes of the Act where “its real business is carried on” (De Beers, at p. 458), which is where the central management and control of the trust actually takes place.  As indicated, the Tax Court judge found as a fact that the main beneficiaries exercised the central management and control of the trusts in Canada.  She found that St. Michael had only a limited role ― to provide administrative services ― and little or no responsibility beyond that (paras. 189-90).  Therefore, on this test, the trusts must be found to be resident in Canada.  This is not to say that the residence of a trust can never be the residence of the trustee.  The residence of the trustee will also be the residence of the trust where the trustee carries out the central management and control of the trust, and these duties are performed where the trustee is resident.  These, however, were not the facts in this case.

[16]    We agree with Woods J. that adopting a similar test for trusts and corporations promotes “the important principles of consistency, predictability and fairness in the application of tax law” (para. 160).  As she noted, if there were to be a totally different test for trusts than for corporations, there should be good reasons for it.  No such reasons were offered here.  [Emphasis added]

On a close reading it is arguable that the Supreme Court has gently tempered the new rule set out by Justice Woods and, to some extent, by the Federal Court of Appeal.  Where the trustee does what it is supposed to do, including managing the trust and its properties, the operative test remains the residence of the trustee.  It would seem that only where the trustee carries on those “management and control” activities in a place other than where the trustee is resident, or where the trustee abdicates many of its powers to a third party, that Justice Woods’ new test becomes relevant.

Less than a month after hearing oral argument on March 13, 2012, the Supreme Court of Canada today released judgment and reasons for judgment in the Fundy Settlement v. Canada also known as the Garron Family Trust appeals (St. Michael Trust Corp., as Trustee of the Fundy Settlement v. The Queen and St. Michael Trust Corp., as Trustee of the Summersby Settlement v. The Queen).  The Court’s alacrity is remarkable, particularly in light of the fact that it had taken nearly eleven months to release its last tax decision (Copthorne Holdings Ltd. v. The Queen).

See here for a summary of the oral argument before the Supreme Court of Canada and here for the facts, the reasons for judgment of the Tax Court and Federal Court of Appeal and the factum filed by each party in the Supreme Court of Canada.

In Fundy Settlement, a unanimous panel of seven (Justices LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Rothstein, Moldaver and Karakatsanis) dismissed the Trustee’s appeals and held that the test for the determination of the residence of a trust is the same test as the corporate test, namely, the place where “central management and control” is exercised.  The reasons were written by the “Court” which further serves to highlight the unanimity of opinion among the judges who heard the appeals.

In a ringing endorsement of the reasoning of Justice Judith Woods of the Tax Court of Canada and Justice Karen Sharlow of the Federal Court of Appeal (both of whom had used a “functional analysis” to decide the issue) the Court explained, in a relatively brief 19 paragraph decision, why it agreed with the lower courts on this issue:

[14]  . . . there are many similarities between a trust and corporation that would, in our view, justify application of the central management and control test in determining the residence of a trust, just as it is used in determining the residence of a corporation.  Some of these similarities include:

1)   Both hold assets that are required to be managed;

2)   Both involve the acquisition and disposition of assets;

3)   Both may require the management of a business;

4)   Both require banking and financial arrangements;

5)   Both may require the instruction or advice of lawyers, accountants and other advisors; and

6)   Both may distribute income, corporations by way of dividends and trusts by distributions.

As Woods J. noted:  “The function of each is, at a basic level, the management of property” (para. 159).

[15]  As with corporations, residence of a trust should be determined by the principle that a trust resides for the purposes of the Act where “its real business is carried on” (De Beers, at p. 458), which is where the central management and control of the trust actually takes place.  As indicated, the Tax Court judge found as a fact that the main beneficiaries exercised the central management and control of the trusts in Canada.  She found that St. Michael had only a limited role ― to provide administrative services ― and little or no responsibility beyond that (paras. 189-90).  Therefore, on this test, the trusts must be found to be resident in Canada.  This is not to say that the residence of a trust can never be the residence of the trustee.  The residence of the trustee will also be the residence of the trust where the trustee carries out the central management and control of the trust, and these duties are performed where the trustee is resident.  These, however, were not the facts in this case.

[16]  We agree with Woods J. that adopting a similar test for trusts and corporations promotes “the important principles of consistency, predictability and fairness in the application of tax law” (para. 160).  As she noted, if there were to be a totally different test for trusts than for corporations, there should be good reasons for it.  No such reasons were offered here.

[17]  For these reasons, we would dismiss the appeals with costs.

In light of its conclusion on the main issue, the Court did not find it necessary to deal with the Crown’s alternative arguments, namely the application of section 94 of the Income Tax Act or the General Anti-Avoidance Rule.

By FMC’s Tax team in cooperation with CCH

On March 29, Canada’s Finance Minister Jim Flaherty tabled the 2012 federal budget, which was met with, as expected, detractors and supporters of the announced spending and tax measures. The Department of Finance’s focus was, obviously, on reducing spending for the foreseeable future, and the only surprise was that the spending reductions were not as extensive as many had anticipated.

Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP (FMC) worked in collaboration with CCH to produce editorial commentary on the content and potential effects of the 2012 federal budget for clients and those in the business and legal community. Some of the significant topics relating to corporate and business tax changes include:

• Expanding eligibility of clean energy equipment for capital cost allowance
• Reducing or eliminating some existing tax credits (such as the tax credit for mineral exploration and overseas employment)
• Changing the rates and qualifying expenditures for the SR&ED program
• Denying paragraph 88(1)(d) “bumps” for partnership interests
• Amending thin capitalization, transfer pricing and foreign affiliate rules
• Allowing split- and late-designations for eligible dividends
• Enhancing transparency and accountability for charities, and including gifts to foreign charitable organizations
• Changing the provisions regarding group sickness/accident insurance plans, retirement compensation arrangements and employee profit sharing plans

For further information or to read FMC and CCH’s commentary, download the complete analysis from FMC’s website.

On March 21, 2012 the Tax Court of Canada issued judgment in the decision of McClarty Family Trust et al v. The Queen. The Minister of National Revenue (the “Minister”) had applied the general anti-avoidance rule (the “GAAR”) in section 245 of the Income Tax Act (the “Act”) to re-characterize capital gains reported by the McClarty Family Trust (“MFT”) as taxable dividends. However, the Court agreed with the appellants’ submissions that the transactions in issue were undertaken primarily for the purpose of placing Darrell McClarty, the father of the minor beneficiaries of the MFT, beyond the reach of creditors and allowed the appeal.

The Minster’s argument was that pursuant to a series of transactions, Darrell McClarty was able to split business income with his minor children in a manner that avoided the tax on split income in section 120.4 of the Act (as it existed in 2003 and 2004).

Darrell McClarty was the owner of all of the issued and outstanding Class A voting shares of McClarty Professional Services Inc. (MPSI). The MFT owned all of the issued and outstanding Class B, non-voting common shares. MPSI, in turn, owned 31% of Projectline Solutions Inc., which earned business income from the provisions of geotechnical engineering services.

In 2003 and 2004, the MFT received stock dividends consisting of Class E common shares of MPSI. The Class E shares had low paid-up capital and a high redemption value. After the Class E shares were received by the MFT, the MFT sold them to Darrell McClarty for fair market value, realizing capital gains. The capital gains were then distributed to the minor beneficiaries of the MFT, and thereby not subject to tax under section 120.4 of the Act.

Through a series of loans between Darrell McClarty, MPSI and the MFT, Mr. McClarty ended up owing $104,400.37 in outstanding promissory notes to the MFT and the MFT had outstanding promissory notes in the amount of $96,000 owned to its minor beneficiaries. The Minister argued that the creditor protection objectives were essentially ineffective and that the circular flow of loans disguised the true intention of the plan, which was to distribute funds to minor beneficiaries in a manner that would not subject them to the tax on split income in section 120.4.

However, the Court accepted Mr. McClarty’s evidence that he was motivated to protect assets from his former employer, who was a potential judgment creditor in relation to allegations of improper use of software belonging to the former employer. The Court also agreed that because of the liabilities of Mr. McClarty and the MFT noted above, the creditor protection objectives were achieved.

It was also argued that the protection from creditors would have been achieved simply by paying dividends to the beneficiaries of the MFT and therefore the declarations of stock dividends amounted to avoidance transactions. However, the Court accepted the Appellants’ argument that the transfer of wealth from MPSI was undertaken to provide protection from creditors without attracting significant tax costs. The transactions were not avoidance transactions because it was acceptable to undertake creditor proofing transactions in a manner that attracted the least possible tax. Furthermore, the transaction would never have occurred in the absence of the need to protect MPSI’s assets.

The Court therefore concluded that because there were no avoidance transactions under subsection 245(3) of the Act, there was no need to continue the analysis to determine if there was abusive tax avoidance. However it did note that to the extent that there was a gap in the legislation, which allowed for the distribution of capital gains to minor beneficiaries of a trust in a manner that was not taxable under section 120.4 of the Act, it was inappropriate for the Minister to use the GAAR to fill in the gaps.

Typically, a simple informal request by a taxpayer to the CRA for copies of the T20 Audit Report, T401 Appeals Report or other documents will result in disclosure of those documents. However, sometimes these informal requests are met with resistance.

Assuming that there is no issue regarding the disclosure of taxpayer information under section 241 of the Income Tax Act, there are few reasons, if any, for the CRA not to provide these documents to a taxpayer upon an informal request.

In fact, the CRA has published CRA Document P148 “Resolving Your Dispute: Objection and Appeal Rights under the Income Tax Act” (2009), which lists the records available to taxpayers, including audit reports and working papers; scientific, appraisal and valuation reports; records of discussions between auditors and appeals officers; and others.

Additionally, the CRA recently published the answer it provided at the 2011 STEP Conference in response to a question about obtaining information and documents in the possession of the CRA (see CRA Document 2011-0403751C6 “2011 STEP Conference – Q8 – Access to Information” (June 2-3, 2011)).

In short, the CRA stated that its Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) Directorate promotes and encourages informal disclosure of documents by the CRA. The formal request procedures under the Access to Information Act (ATIA) and the Privacy Act (PA) are intended to complement and not replace existing procedures for access to government and personal information. The CRA stated that documents or reports created by an auditor or appeals officer should be given to the taxpayer without requiring the taxpayer to make a formal request under the ATIA and PA.

This is a helpful published position that should be referred to by the taxpayer if he/she is encounters resistance on an informal request for information/documents in the CRA’s possession.

Were your ears ringing this morning? They might have been if you are a racehorse owner or breeder in Canada, or if you are any other type of farmer who earns income from farming and some other source of income and are thus subject to section 31 of the Income Tax Act (the “Act”).

Section 31 of the Act is the restricted farm loss rule that operates to restrict the deductibility of your full farming losses against other sources of income if farming or a combination of farming and some other source of income is not your “chief source of income.”

For the past 35 years, section 31 has been applied to taxpayers on the basis of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Moldowan v. R., 1977 DTC 5213 (S.C.C.), which has resulted in section 31 being one of the most litigated provisions of the Act and replete with confusion, ambiguity and inconsistent results. Finally, the Supreme Court of Canada granted leave in The Queen v. John R. Craig, which was heard this morning by a seven judge panel (Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Fish were absent). For our earlier blog post on the case (including the factum filed by each party), click here.

The argument took two hours to complete. In the first hour the Court heard argument from counsel representing the Canada Revenue Agency (“Crown Counsel”), which was divided equally into two distinct sets of submissions organized by issue, and argued in succession by two Department of Justice lawyers.

The first issue addressed by Crown Counsel was its assertion that the legal doctrine of stare decisis was misapplied by the Federal Court of Appeal when it decided Craig, which, in the Crown’s submission, suggested that if Moldowan was applied in the manner desired by the Crown, then the case should have ended there with a Crown victory. Madam Justice Abella and Mr. Justice Rothstein took charge of this issue and put Crown Counsel to task with several related questions.

Justice Abella was very active in her questioning and emphasized that the evolution of the principles of statutory interpretation over the course of time makes it appropriate for outdated concepts to be reviewed. Further, the Supreme Court of Canada is THE venue for addressing any inconsistencies and is charged with the task of adjusting the principles for future application if the updated approach yields a different outcome.

It was also emphasized by both Justice Abella and Justice Rothstein that it is appropriate for lower courts to indicate that there is a problem with a prior precedent or an approach to interpretation, since that is the only way the record can be built and the matter brought before the Supreme Court of Canada for final resolution. That’s why they are there.

It was also noteworthy that Crown Counsel stated that the main issue to be decided was stare decisis, whereas Justice Rothstein was clear in his comments that the Supreme Court of Canada is free to overrule itself, and emphasized to Crown Counsel that the real question is whether Moldowan is right or wrong in the face of so much judicial and academic criticism. Those are the submissions he wanted to hear.

The second half of Crown Counsel’s submissions focused on the assertion that the Moldowan analysis of section 31 is correct and should not be disturbed.

Other tidbits from the panel during Crown Counsel’s submissions was Mr. Justice Moldaver’s comment that the ‘government is quite happy with Moldowan’ and Justice Abella’s comment that ‘farming is inherently unreliable as a source of income’ emphasizing the complexity of dealing with farming in the context of tax law. Justices LeBel, Karakatsanis and Cromwell also engaged Crown Counsel with questions during argument.

Mr. Craig’s counsel (“Taxpayer Counsel”) spent his hour focusing on Moldowan and why it needs to be overruled, given current principles of statutory interpretation, its unfairness to taxpayers and emphasizing the better approach taken by the Federal Court of Appeal in Gunn v. R., 2006 DTC 6544 (F.C.A.), which was followed by the Federal Court of Appeal in Craig. Further, it was submitted by Taxpayer Counsel that Mr. Craig would be successful with respect to the section 31 issue even upon strict application of the Moldowan principles.

The Justices were quite engaged in this discussion, which elicited questions or comments from Justices Abella, Moldaver, Cromwell, Karakatsanis, Deschamps and LeBel, all primarily directed at the wording of section 31 and how sense can be made of its wording to create fairness and certainty.

Taxpayer Counsel spent very little time on the stare decisis issue on the basis that, in its submission, the real issue is the correct interpretation of section 31.

After exactly two hours of argument, the far reaching financial implications on racehorse owners, breeders and other part-time farmers is now in the hands of the highest Court in the land to determine the future application of section 31, once and for all. The judgment is expected to be rendered within the next six to twelve months. Stay tuned.

For further background on this issue and a more comprehensive analysis of the history of section 31 prior to the appeal of Craig to the Supreme Court of Canada, click here.

Tax law geeks call it “form over substance” – how Canadians are taxed on their actual relationships and transactions rather than what they intended those to be.

However, mistakes can be made – and sometimes the tax assessed is not reflective of the true nature of the situation at hand.

In the March 16, 2012 issue of The Lawyers Weekly, I discuss the ways in which mistakes may be fixed so as to avoid unintended and adverse tax consequences.