Tax Litigation 

An expert does not draft his/her report in a vacuum. Communication with counsel is required. Ultimately, an expert must provide independent and objective evidence at a hearing. So the question arises as to what amount of communication is appropriate between counsel and the expert during the drafting stage. This was an issue considered by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in Moore v. Getahun (2014 ONSC 237).

In Moore, the plaintiff suffered a wrist injury in a motorcycle accident, and claimed medical negligence against the treating doctor. The defendants called an expert to testify on the medical treatment of the plaintiff following the accident. During the preparation of the expert’s report, the expert and defence counsel had a 90-minute conference call during which the draft report was discussed.

In 2010, sections 4.1 and 53.03 of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure were amended to (among other things) codify the expert’s duty to the court and to require the execution and filing of an expert’s certificate acknowledging this duty.

These amendments are similar to the recent amendments to the Tax Court of Canada Rules (General Procedure): Section 145 (“Expert Witnesses”), Form 145(2) (“Certificate Concerning Code of Conduct for Expert Witnesses”) and Schedule III (“Code of Conduct for Expert Witnesses”).

In Moore, the court considered the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure amendments and concluded:

Whether it is appropriate for counsel to review experts’ draft reports

[519]      Defence counsel reviewed Dr. Taylor’s draft report during a one-and-a-half-hour telephone conference call.

[520]      The purpose of Rule 53.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is to ensure the independence and integrity of the expert witness. The expert’s primary duty is to the court. In light of this change in the role of the expert witness under the new rule, I conclude that counsel’s practice of reviewing draft reports should stop. There should be full disclosure in writing of any changes to an expert’s final report as a result of counsel’s corrections, suggestions, or clarifications, to ensure transparency in the process and to ensure that the expert witness is neutral.

(See also the court’s discussion of this issue at paragraphs 47-52 of the Moore decision.)

Not surprisingly, the Ontario court’s narrow interpretation of Rule 53.03 attracted the attention of litigators across the country.

In response, the Advocates’ Society has drafted a position paper (and a set of nine principles) regarding communications with expert witnesses. The Advocates’ Society has taken the position that the view expressed by the court in Moore (i.e., that the amendments constitute a change in the role of expert witnesses) is mistaken. The case law prior to Moore on the subject of experts’ testimony had established that experts must testify independently and objectively. Further, the amendments were likely responding to the specific problem of “hired guns” or “opinions for sale”, and thus codified the expert’s duty and imposed the certificate requirement so that testifying experts clearly understand their duty to the court.

The report also notes the problems and unintended consequences of the court’s ruling in Moore – namely, that the ruling fails to recognize the “important and entirely appropriate role” of advocates in ensuring that expert evidence is presented in a cogent, succinct and well-organized fashion that will assist the trier of fact; further, a “one-size-fits-all” approach to communications with experts is discordant with the realities of modern litigation.

Given the similar language in the Tax Court’s rules regarding expert evidence, Moore could have an impact on the manner in which expert reports are to be prepared for a Tax Court proceeding.

Moore has been appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal.

We have previously written about court decisions on the tax results arising from taxpayers’ (failed) investments in Ponzi schemes (see our posts on Roszko v. The Queen (2014 TCC 59), Johnson v. The Queen (2011 TCC 54) and (2012 FCA 253), Hammill v. The Queen (2005 FCA 252) and Orman v. Marnat (2012 ONSC 549)).

These decisions raise questions as to how the CRA may assess all aspects of the income earned and losses suffered by the duped investors. For example, while the cases focused on whether the taxpayer was required to report some of the returned funds as income, the tax treatment of losses after the collapse of the fraudulent scheme has not been considered.

The CRA has now provided some guidance on how it will administer the Income Tax Act (Canada) in respect of the income and losses arising from Ponzi schemes. In CRA Document No. 2014-0531171M6 “Fraudulent Investment Schemes” (July 3, 2014), the CRA stated:

• Income inclusion – Amounts paid to a taxpayer that are returns on their investment should be included in the taxpayer’s income. The fact that the funds were not invested on behalf of the taxpayer does not change the nature of the transaction for the taxpayer.
• Bad debt – If the investment was a fraudulent scheme, the taxpayer may be able to claim a bad debt under paragraph 20(1)(p) of the Act in respect of the lost investment funds. The amount of the bad debt claim will be subject to certain adjustments. The bad debt should be claimed in the year the fraud is discovered (i.e., the year in which fraud charges are laid by the Crown against the perpetrator, or at such earlier time as the debt is established to have become bad).
• Losses – The taxpayer may be able to claim a capital loss or business investment loss:
  • Capital loss – The taxpayer may be able to claim a capital loss under paragraph 39(1)(b) of the Act, which may be carried back three years or forward indefinitely. A net capital loss may only be applied against a taxable capital gain.
  • Business investment loss – Under paragraph 39(1)(c), a business investment loss is a capital loss from a disposition of a share of a small business corporation or a debt owing to the taxpayer by a Canadian-controlled private corporation that was a small business corporation. Under paragraph 38(c) of the Act, one-half of a business investment loss is an allowable business investment loss, which may be deducted against all sources of income.
• Other deductions – The taxpayer may be able to claim interest expenses or other carrying charges not previously claimed by filing a T1 Adjustment Request form.
• Recovered amounts – Where the taxpayer recovers funds from a scheme (i.e., through a legal settlement or otherwise), these recovered amounts may be taxable as recovery of a previously deducted bad debt, recovery of a previously deducted business loss, or recovery of a previously deducted capital loss.
• Taxpayer relief – The CRA will consider requests for taxpayer relief on a case-by-case basis.

This guidance is helpful, but there are many technical requirements for the operation of these provisions, and further it is not clear how the CRA’s administrative views accord with the case law. For example, at least three cases (Roszko, Orman and Hammill) have held that amounts paid out a fraudulent scheme are not income to the duped investor. In future cases, we expect the courts will continue to clarify the tax treatment of income and losses arising from failed Ponzi schemes.

What is the result of the Crown’s failure to properly plead its assumptions in the Reply? This issue was considered by the Tax Court in Health Quest Inc. v. The Queen (2014 TCC 211) in which the Crown’s Reply included “assumptions” that were statements of mixed fact and law rather than facts alone.

The taxpayer was a distributor of modified and “off-the-shelf” therapeutic footwear for relief of various disabling conditions of the feet. During the reporting periods at issue, section 24.1 in Part II of Schedule VI of the Excise Tax Act stated that zero-rated supplies included footwear designed for use by an individual who has a crippled or deformed foot or other similar disability when the footwear is supplied on the written order of a medical practitioner. (The provision was amended in 2012 to broaden the definition to include written orders by a “specified professional”.) The taxpayer considered that most or all of the footwear it sold was zero-rated under s. 24.1.

The CRA audited the taxpayer for the period of January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2009. Based on a sampling of the taxpayer’s sales (in the months of August and December 2009), the CRA assessed additional GST owing of $42,274.72 for the period.

In the Tax Court, the taxpayer argued that all of the shoes it sold were for a prescribed diagnosis and thus zero-rated. The Respondent argued that the “off-the-shelf” shoes sold by the taxpayer (i.e., sold “as-is” without modification) were not zero-rated and thus subject to GST.

Under section 6 of the Tax Court of Canada Rules of Procedure Respecting the Excise Tax Act (Informal Procedure), every Reply to a Notice of Appeal must contain (among other things) a statement of the findings or assumptions of fact made by the CRA when making the assessment and the reasons the Crown intends to rely on in support of the assessment. (The Tax Court’s other procedural rules contain substantially identical provisions – see, for example, section 49 of the Tax Court of Canada Rules (General Procedure)).

In Health Quest, the Crown’s Reply stated, “In so assessing the Appellant, the Minister relied on the following …

(a)        the facts stated and admitted above;

(b)        the Appellant was a GST/HST registrant;

(c)        the Appellant was required by the Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15, as amended (the “Act”) to file its GST/HST returns on a quarterly basis;

(d)       the Appellant was a corporation involved in the supply of footwear which were specially modified by the Appellant or were specially designed by the manufacturer for persons with physical disabilities;

(e)        the products described in subparagraph 7(d) above are zero-rated for HST pursuant to Schedule VI of the Act;

(f)        the Appellant also supplied other products which were not zero-rated pursuant to Schedule VI of the Act; and

(g)        during the periods under appeal, the Appellant failed to collect tax of not less than $42,274.72 on its supply of products which were not zero-rated pursuant to Schedule VI of the Act.”

The Tax Court noted that paragraphs (f) and (g) were problematic in that they both contained statements of mixed fact and law, which the Federal Court of Appeal has stated have no place in the Minister’s assumptions (see Anchor Pointe Energy Ltd. v. the Queen (2003 FCA 294) and Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. The Queen (2013 FCA 122)). In Anchor Pointe, the Court of Appeal stated,

[23] The pleading of assumptions gives the Crown the powerful tool of shifting the onus to the taxpayer to demolish the Minister’s assumptions. The facts pleaded as assumptions must be precise and accurate so that the taxpayer knows exactly the case it has to meet.

In Health Quest, the Tax Court determined the Crown’s key “assumptions” were merely the Respondent’s view on the application of the law to the facts of the appeal.

The Court noted that where the Crown has not set out any proper assumptions of fact in the pleadings, the evidentiary onus reverts to the Crown to establish the correctness of the assessment (see Pollock v. Minister of National Revenue (94 DTC 6050 (Fed. C.A.) and Brewster v. the Queen (2012 TCC 187)). In other words, the normal requirement that a taxpayer must adduce evidence to “demolish” the Crown’s assumptions is reversed and the Crown must prove its case.

In Health Quest, the Respondent’s only evidence was the testimony of the appeals officer. The Tax Court held the testimony did not establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the footwear in question was not zero-rated. The Court noted that it would have been beneficial to have product literature, scientific studies, or the testimony of medical professionals, and this type of evidence would have been essential to engage in a meaningful textual, contextual and purposive analysis of the applicable legislation (there are no previous cases that have considered the interpretation of section 24.1).

The Tax Court allowed the appeal.

The Court’s decision in Health Quest is a helpful reminder of the importance of including only facts and not legal arguments in the assumptions in a Reply. Taxpayers and their counsel should closely scrutinize the assumptions and reasons described in a Reply to ensure the pleading conforms with the Tax Court’s rules.

In Bolton Steel Tube Co. Ltd. v. The Queen (2014 TCC 94), the Tax Court of Canada allowed the taxpayer’s motion requesting an Order that would require the CRA to reassess the taxpayer in accordance with the terms of a settlement agreement. In doing so, the Tax Court discussed certain principles regarding settlement agreements and the resulting reassessments.

In Bolton Steel Tube, the CRA reassessed the taxpayer for its 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997 taxation years on the basis that the taxpayer failed to report income in each of those taxation years (the “2007 Reassessment”).

In 1996, the taxpayer reported $1.2 million of income. The CRA added approximately $600,000 of unreported income for total income of $1.8 million. During examinations for discovery, the CRA’s representative admitted that approximately $200,000 of the $600,000 increase should not have been made. Accordingly, for the 1996 taxation year, the maximum amount of income the CRA could have added as unreported income was $400,000. The CRA further confirmed this admission in its Reply.

On June 15, 2012, the taxpayer delivered to the Crown an offer to settle which proposed to settle the appeals on the basis that (i) the CRA would vacate the reassessments for 1994, 1995 and 1997, and (ii) the CRA would reassess the 1996 taxation year to add $403,219 to the taxpayer’s income and impose a penalty under subsection 163(2) of the Income Tax Act (the “Act”). The Crown accepted this offer without further negotiation, and the parties entered Minutes of Settlement on these terms.

Following the settlement, the CRA issued a reassessment that calculated the taxpayer’s income for its 1996 taxation year to be $2,266,291, essentially adding $403,219 to the $1.8 million that had been previously assessed (the “2012 Reassessment”). The result was illogical: The agreed amount of unreported income – $403,219 – was added twice, and the $200,000, which the CRA had admitted was not to be added to the taxpayer’s income, was included as well.

In requesting the Order, the taxpayer argued that:

The 2012 Reassessment was not supported on the facts and the law;

The 2012 Reassessment violated the principle that the CRA cannot appeal its own assessment; and

The 2012 Reassessment was made without the taxpayer’s consent, which would be required pursuant to subsection 169(3) of the Act.

The Crown argued that if the 2012 Reassessment was varied or vacated then there had been no meeting of the minds, the settlement was not valid, and the 2007 Reassessment should remain under appeal.

The Tax Court agreed with the taxpayer on all three arguments.

With respect to the first argument, the Tax Court found the CRA’s interpretation of the Minutes of Settlement to be “divorced from the facts and law”. The Crown’s position was unsupportable since settlements must conform with the long-standing principal from Galway v M.N.R. (74 DTC 6355 (Fed. C.A.)) that settlements must be justified under, and in conformity with, the Act. In Bolton Steel Tube, the Tax Court went as far to say “even if both parties consented to settling in this manner, it could not be permitted” and “there is nothing to support the [Crown's] interpretation and nothing to support the [Crown's] further contention that the [taxpayer] offered this amount in exchange for other years to be vacated”.

With respect to the arguments surrounding subsection 169(3) of the Act, the Tax Court found that the taxpayer had not consented to having its income increased by the amount in the 2012 Reassessment.

The Crown argued that subsection 169(3) of the Act, which allows the CRA to reassess an otherwise statute-barred year upon settlement of an appeal, also allows the CRA to increase the amount of tax which the CRA could reassess despite subsection 152(5) of the Act. Subsection 152(5) of the Act is the operative provision that prevents the CRA from increasing an assessment of tax. Here, the Tax Court maintained the longstanding principle that a reassessment cannot be issued that results in an increase of tax beyond the amount in the assessment at issue. This is tantamount to the CRA appealing its own reassessment, which is not permitted, and thus renders the 2012 Reassessment void. We note that the Tax Court also considered the 2012 Reassessment to be void on the basis that it was an arbitrary assessment.

The Tax Court rejected the Crown’s argument that the settlement was ambiguous and therefore there was no meeting of minds as would be required for a valid contract. The Crown argued that the settlement was not valid and therefore the years under appeal should remain in dispute. The Tax Court turned to fundamental principles of contractual interpretation and found that the contract validly existed since it could reasonably be expected that the Crown would have known that the addition of $403,219 was to be added to the appellant’s income as originally reported (i.e., $1.2 million) and not to the income amount in the 2007 Reassessment (i.e., $1.8 million).

Accordingly, the Tax Court rejected the Crown’s argument, found that the settlement was valid and that the Minister should reassess on the basis that $403,219 should be added to the taxpayer’s income as originally reported. Since the 2012 reassessment was not valid, and therefore did not nullify the 2007 reassessment, and a notice of discontinuance had not yet been filed, the Tax Court continued to have jurisdiction over the appeal.

The result of this motion was a clear victory for the taxpayer and for common sense. It serves as a reminder that precision is essential when entering into settlement agreements.

On January 10, 2014, McKesson Canada Corporation appealed the decision of the Tax Court of Canada in McKesson Canada Corporation v. The Queen (2013 TCC 404) (see Federal Court of Appeal File Nos. A-48-14 and A-49-14).

In McKesson, the Tax Court upheld the CRA’s transfer price adjustments (made pursuant to section 247 of the Income Tax Act (Canada)) that had reduced the discount rate paid under a receivables sales agreement between McKesson Canada and its parent company, MIH, from 2.206% to 1.013%. The Tax Court also upheld the assessment of withholding tax on a deemed dividend that arose in a secondary adjustment resulting from the lower discount rate.

The Appellant’s Memorandum of fact and law was filed on June 11, 2014.

In its Memorandum, the Appellant states that the Trial Judge made a “fundamental error of law” and requests that the appeal be allowed with costs and the matter be remitted to the Tax Court for a new trial before a different judge. The Appellant describes the issues on the appeal as follows:

Did the Trial Judge err in law by stepping outside the pleadings and the case put forward and as developed by the parties over the course of the trial to find against McKesson Canada, thereby depriving McKesson Canada of its right to know the case it had to meet and its right to a fair opportunity to meet that case?

Did the Trial Judge err in law when he misconstrued the arm’s-length principle by holding that, in determining what terms and conditions arm’s length parties would have made or imposed, he was to assume that one party (purchaser) controls the other (seller)?

As a result of stepping outside of the pleadings and the case put forward and as developed by the parties over the course of the trial and committing an error of law, did the Trial Judge calculate the discount rate in a manner that ignored the assumption of risk by MIH, contrary to the terms of the Agreement and resulted in a discount rate that is commercially absurd?

Did the Trial Judge err in permitting the Minister to assess non-resident withholding tax after the expiry of the applicable limitation period and in contravention of Canada’s obligations under a bilateral tax treaty?

See our previous commentary on the Tax Court’s McKesson decision here.

Subsection 163(1) of the Income Tax Act (the “Act”) imposes a penalty of 10% on an amount that a taxpayer fails to report in his/her return where there has been a previous failure to report income in any of the three preceding taxation years.

The penalty under subsection 163(1) has been described as “harsh” due to the 10% federal penalty, a potential 10% provincial penalty, and the fact that the penalty may apply even where minimal or no additional tax is owing by the taxpayer (i.e., the tax relating to the unreported amount was withheld at source and remitted to the CRA).

In several cases, the courts have held that a taxpayer that is the subject of a penalty under subsection 163(1) has a due diligence defence. A taxpayer can satisfy the due diligence test in one of two ways: (i) By establishing that he/she made a reasonable mistake of fact (i.e., the taxpayer was mistaken as to a factual situation and the mistake was reasonable), or (ii) by establishing that he/she took reasonable precautions to avoid the event leading to the imposition of the penalty (see Les Résidences Majeau Inc v The Queen (2010 FCA 28)).

Some court decisions on the due diligence defence under subsection 163(1) appear to have reached inconsistent conclusions on the issue of whether the taxpayer’s due diligence must exist in respect of (i) either of the two years in which the failure occurred (see, for example, Franck v. The Queen (2011 TCC 179), Symonds v. The Queen (2011 TCC 274), Chan v. The Queen (2012 TCC 168) , and Norlock v. The Queen (2012 TCC 121)) or (ii) only the year upon which the penalty is imposed (i.e., the second failure) (see, for example, Chendrean v. The Queen (2012 TCC 205), and Chiasson v. The Queen (2014 TCC 158)).

This was the question considered by the Tax Court in Galachiuk v. The Queen (2014 TCC 188). In Galachiuk, the taxpayer failed to report portions of income in two consecutive taxation years: $683 in his 2008 tax return and $436,890 in his 2009 tax return. Given Mr. Galachiuk’s failure to report income on two separate occasions, the Minister imposed a penalty under subsection 163(1).

The taxpayer argued that he had been duly diligent in 2008 because he had taken steps to inform his investment broker and advisors of a change of residence, and had also arranged with Canada Post to have his mail forwarded to his new address. Despite these efforts, one T3 slip had not been forward to or received by the taxpayer. The Crown argued that the fact that some T-slips had the incorrect information should have alerted the taxpayer to the need to take additional steps to ensure he had all of his T-slips for the year.

For 2009, the taxpayer argued that he had received a T4 slip and a T4A slip from his former employer, and had concluded that no additional slips were forthcoming from the former employer and that the two slips he received had included all of the income he had received from the former employer in 2009. The Crown argued that a reasonable person would not have made this mistake in the circumstances.

In respect of the legal test, the Tax Court stated that subsection 163(1) is a harsh provision and the absence of language that would limit the due diligence defence made it clear that Parliament had intended that the defence was available to explain the omission in either year. The Court noted that there was no requirement in the provision that the penalty could only be imposed if the taxpayer had first been reassessed in respect of his/her first failure to report (see such a precondition exists in the language of subsections 162(1) and (2) regarding repeated failures to file returns). Accordingly, the defence can be made out where the taxpayer was duly diligent in respect of either of the failures to report income.

In the present case, the Court stated that the taxpayer had been duly diligent in 2008 because he had taken steps to ensure he received his T-slips, he carefully prepared his 2008 tax return, and the unreported amount was a “tiny portion” of his income for the year. Accordingly, the taxpayer was duly diligent in reporting his income in 2008, and the Court allowed the taxpayer’s appeal and ordered that the CRA reassess to delete the penalty imposed in 2009.

Additionally, the Court went on to consider whether the taxpayer had been duly diligent in 2009. On this issue, the Court concluded that it was not reasonable for the taxpayer to believe that his former employer would issue only one T4A in respect of the various amounts paid to him in the year. Further, there was a material difference between the amounts the taxpayer knew his former employer had paid to him in 2009 and the amount that had appeared on the single T4A slip he received. Accordingly, the taxpayer was not duly diligent in preparing and filing his 2009 return.

Interestingly, the Tax Court noted in a brief comment that it expected that there was a reasonable chance the Crown may appeal the decision to the Federal Court of Appeal in order to obtain clarity on the interpretation of subsection 163(1). As of the publication of this article, no appeal had yet been filed with the Court of Appeal.

The Society of Trust and Estate Practitioners (STEP Canada) held its 16th annual national conference on June 16-17 in Toronto. As it has in previous years, the conference featured a Canada Revenue Agency Roundtable wherein two representatives from the CRA answered 19 questions about topical issues facing tax and estate practitioners and their clients.

The CRA was represented by Steve Fron (Manager, Trusts Section, Income Tax Rulings Directorate) and Phil Kohnen (Manager, Trusts Section, Income Tax Rulings Directorate).

The following is a summary of several of the questions and answers relating to audits and assessments. (The complete list of Roundtable questions is available here.)

Question 6 – Trust Audit Issues

The CRA was asked to provide an update on the most common audit issues that it finds / reviews regarding trusts.

The CRA stated it has reviewed a broad range of trust compliance issues in recent years, including:

1. Attribution under subsection 75(2) of the Income Tax Act (Canada) (the “Act”);
2. Benefits pursuant to subsection 105(1) of the Act;
3. Gifts by Will – The CRA noted that it had recently determined that no gift could be made for tax purposes where the power to make such a gift did not exist in the Will;
4. Stop loss rule in subsection 112(3.2) – The CRA stated that they deal with a variety of issues in regards to this subsection of the Act, but specifically mentioned the issue of the deductibility of professional expenses in the context of the administration of an estate;
5.  Late or amended subsection 104(21) designations.

Question 9 – Interest and Penalties on Deficient Instalments of Inter Vivos Trusts

In response to Question 20 at the 2010 STEP Canada national conference, the CRA noted that under the current administrative policy, the CRA would not assess installment interest and penalties where an inter vivos trust does not make instalment payments required under section 156. The CRA was asked to confirm that this remains its current policy.

The CRA stated that, with respect to inter vivos trusts, the CRA will not assess penalties or interest where the trust fails to pay installments. However, in preparation for the changes to the trust rules in 2016, all trust rules are being reconsidered and that the policy will be reviewed during such this process.

Question 13 – Voluntary Disclosures

The CRA has held voluntary disclosures that cover more than 10 taxation years in “limbo” as a result of the decision in Bozzer v. The Queen (2011 FCA 186). Apparently, voluntary disclosures officers are awaiting direction from head office in Ottawa to determine how to deal with voluntary disclosures that exceed 10 years. The CRA was asked for an update on this situation.

In Bozzer, the Federal Court of Appeal held that the 10-year limit under subsection 220(3.1) of the Act refers to years during which the interest accrued, not the year for which the tax was originally paid. Before Bozzer, the CRA had taken a contrary administrative position on the application of subsection 220(3.1).

The CRA stated that the voluntary disclosures that exceed 10 years are now being processed in accordance with the findings in Bozzer.

Question 14 – Registration of Tax Preparers

Recently, the United States government lost its appeal of the decision in Sabina Loving et al v IRS et al, which stated that the IRS has no legal authority to regulate the tax preparation industry. The CRA was asked comment on this case and to provide an update on its consultations regarding the registration of tax preparers in Canada.

The CRA noted that it had previously announced its consultation process on the proposed Registration of Tax Preparers Program (RTPP), a component of the CRA’s efforts to ensure and improve compliance in the small- and medium-sized business community.

The CRA stated that it does not intend to introduce tax competency standards or professional development standards through the RTPP. The CRA stated that the registration of tax preparers (who will be issued an identification number) will allow the CRA to efficiently identify and work with tax preparers to prevent common errors.

Question 19 – Multiple Assessments

The CRA was asked to consider a lengthy hypothetical regarding multiple assessments of a series of transactions. In such situations, the multiple assessments (only one of which could be correct) could create a cumulative tax liability in excess of the transaction itself. The CRA was asked whether, in these types of situations, it would grant interest-relief under the fairness provisions.

The CRA stated only that subsection 220(3.1) of the Act gives the Minister discretion to waive or cancel arrears of interest in whole or in part.  Subsection 220(3.1) also gives the Minister the ability to cancel penalties in a 10-year period.  The CRA referred to Information Circular IC 07-1 “Taxpayer Relief Provision” (May 31, 2007),which states that interest and penalty relief may be available where the taxpayer cannot pay as a result of financial hardship.

The decision of the Tax Court of Canada in Marzen Artistic Aluminum Ltd. v. The Queen (2014 TCC 194) is the latest addition to a growing body of Canadian judgments on the application of the transfer pricing rules in section 247 of the Income Tax Act (Canada) (the “Act”).

In a lengthy set of reasons, the Tax Court upheld all but a fraction of the CRA’s reassessment of the taxpayer, such reassessments having disallowed the deduction of approximately $7.1M of fees paid by the Canadian taxpayer to its Barbados subsidiary. The Court also upheld the imposition of a penalty under subsection 247(3) of the Act.

The taxpayer was in the business of designing, manufacturing and selling aluminum and vinyl windows. Beginning in 1999, the taxpayer implemented what the Court referred to as the “Barbados Structure”. Under this structure, the taxpayer entered into a “Marketing and Sales Services Agreement” (“MSSA”) pursuant to which the taxpayer’s Barbados subsidiary (“SII”) would provide certain marketing and other sales-related services to the taxpayer in respect of certain jurisdictions, notably the U.S. The fee was calculated as the greater of $100,000 or 25% of sales originated by SII. In total, amounts paid by the taxpayer to SII under the MSSA and related agreements was $4.1M for 2000 and $7.8M for 2001. These amounts were deducted by the taxpayer in computing its Canadian income. SII paid nominal income tax in Barbados on this income. SII then declared dividends to the taxpayer, which were generally received tax-free as dividends out of exempt surplus, pursuant to the deduction in section 113 of the Act.

The Canada Revenue Agency reassessed under section 247 of the Act to disallow a portion of the deduction and imposed a penalty.

In considering the transfer pricing rules in section 247, the Court stated the issues were as follows: (i) whether the terms and conditions imposed in respect of the MSSA differed from what would have been agreed to by persons dealing at arm’s-length, (ii) if so, what adjustments should be made to the quantum of the fees paid under the MSSA so that it was equivalent to the price that would have been paid had the parties been at arm’s-length, and (iii) whether the taxpayer was liable to penalty under subsection 247(3) for the 2001 tax year.

The Court determined that the terms and conditions of the arrangement were not consistent with what arm’s-length parties would have agreed to. In the Court’s view, SII provided few or no marketing and sales services (such services having been subcontracted to another of the taxpayer’s foreign subsidiaries). Further, the Barbados Structure was purely tax-motivated, allowing deductible fees to be repatriated as tax-free exempt surplus dividends. These “attractive advantages” in the Court’s view, would not be available to arm’s-length parties. In the Court’s opinion, applying the “comparable uncontrolled price” method of determining the transfer price, as argued by the Crown, provided the most accurate arm’s-length price.

In this case, the taxpayer was entitled to deduct certain of the fees paid to SII plus $32,500 in each year for corporate and directorship services provided to SII by its director. In the result, the vast majority of the fees paid by the taxpayer to SII were denied and added back into the taxpayer’s income. The Court also found that the transfer pricing penalty was applicable, as the taxpayer failed to make reasonable efforts to determine and use arm’s-length transfer prices in 2001 (the 2000 adjustment did not meet the $5 million threshold for imposing a penalty under subsection 247(3) of the Act).

Under subsection 118.5(1) of the Income Tax Act, an individual taxpayer may claim a tax credit in respect of certain qualifying tuition fees. Pursuant to paragraph 118.5(1)(a), the following requirements apply: (i) the student must be enrolled at an educational institution in Canada; (ii) that educational institution must be a university, college or “other educational institution”; and, (iii) the educational institution must provide courses at a post-secondary school level. Tuition credits may be transferred to a parent or grandparent under section 118.9 of the ITA. (See also Income Tax Folio S1-F2-C2 “Tuition Tax Credit” (March 2013)).

In Van Helden v. The Queen (2014 TCC 196), the taxpayer had claimed the tuition credit in respect of fees paid for weekly private piano lessons for his two daughters.

In an earlier case (Tarkowski v. The Queen (2007 TCC 632)), the Tax Court had determined that the Mississauga School of Music was an “educational institution” for the purposes of subsection 118.5(1), and the relevant music courses were “at a post-secondary school level” because a Grade 12 high school credit was a prerequisite to taking these courses.

In Van Helden, the taxpayer argued that, just as the Mississauga School of Music was found to be an “educational institution” in Tarkowski, the private instructors in this case should be found to be educational institutions.

However, the Tax Court disagreed and dismissed the taxpayer’s appeal (see also Kam v. The Queen (2013 TCC 266)). The Tax Court cited the Parliamentary debates (from 1961) regarding the intent and scope of the term “educational institution” and stated:

[20] In conclusion, the original intent of the tuition credit was to make post secondary education more accessible to students by lessening their financial burden. Although subsection 118.5(1) should be interpreted broadly, it is clear that Parliament did not intend that the provision should apply to fees which students paid for private piano lessons at an instructor’s home.

In recent years the Tax Court of Canada has strictly applied the requirements for adjournments and timetable amendments as described in the Court’s Practice Note No. 14. We understand this may have been prompted by a practice that had developed over time whereby the parties to an appeal would consent to extensions of time or adjournments and then informally seek the Court’s approval.

The Federal Court of Appeal appears to have been wrestling with similar scheduling and adjournment issues. In UHA Research Society v. Canada (2014 FCA 134), the Appellant sought an adjournment of a hearing date due to the unavailability of counsel.

In a lengthy discussion of the Court’s scheduling process, the Court’s expectations of counsel and the test for an adjournment request (i.e., there must be significant new developments, marked changes in circumstances, or compelling reasons of fairness), Justice Stratas provided a reminder about the Court’s procedure and practice regarding adjournments.

In UHA, Justice Stratas granted the adjournment request, but cautioned:

[18] Having written these reasons – reasons written in response to a spate of recent incidents of lack of regard for scheduling orders of this Court – I may well be less accommodating in a future case.